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"As history shows, however experienced the party may be, nature at 
a particular time and place can deceive even the most cautious." 
From Coroner Bradley's written decision on the inquest into the deaths of three 
mountain guides and one client that occurred on Mt Tasman in Dec 2003 
(In Cropp, 2004). 
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ABSTRACT 
Outdoor education involves the interaction of people with the natural 
environment, often in challenging situations. Because of this there are often real 
risks involved that must be suitably managed. Despite efforts at managing these 
risks, incidents are still occurring during outdoor education experiences that 
sometimes culminate in serious injury and even death. While in the past these 
injuries and fatalities would have been considered unfortunate acts of 
misadventure, new attitudes in society seek to ascribe blame in the wake of an 
accident and those involved, or their families, seek penalties for those blamed. 
Recent legislation such as the Health and Safety in Employment Act make these 
penalties easier to apply, while the recent actions of both the police and officers of 
the Department of Labour show the willingness of public officials to investigate 
and prosecute outdoor education providers if accidents occur. 
The outdoor education sector has been poorly equipped to reply to the public in 
the wake of serious incidents. There are few if any statistics on incident rates in 
the outdoor education sector, and there is very little known about the underlying 
causes of those incidents. To ensure that outdoor education provision can continue 
into the future such information needs to be available and training programmes 
developed based on those findings. 
This research builds a profile of almost 2000 incidents that occurred in the years 
1996 - 2000 at 12 of the 25 larger outdoor education centres in New Zealand that 
were invited to participate. That profile includes calculating accident rates for the 
group of organisations sampled and compares these to the rates of accidents 
occurring in outdoor centres in other parts of the world as well as those occurring 
in other aspects of life in New Zealand. 
Eighteen of the incidents were chosen that had potential for serious injury, and 
these were studied for the root causes of the incidents using a Delphi technique 
involving three panels of outdoor experts. From this investigation, and an in-depth 
review of literature from the fields of safety management and psychology, I 
developed a taxonomy of root causes of outdoor education incidents and suggest a 
new model of how these root causes can interact to result in an incident. Not all of 
the identified types of error in the taxonomy of root causes could easily be 
IV 
accommodated within the existing frameworks of outdoor decision-making. In 
order to provide a model that incorporated these error types, theories of cognitive 
psychology were combined into a new model of outdoor education decision-
making in hazardous situations. This shows how personality factors, attitudes and 
other social factors can act to bias decisions and lead to incidents occurring. 
As a result of this research, an ongoing collection of incident data in the outdoor 
education sector is advocated, as is the adoption of the taxonomy of root causes 
and model of an outdoor education incident into training programmes for outdoor 
instructors. Through these processes it is hoped that risk management practices 
will be improved, incidents reduced in frequency and severity, and therefore 
participation of young people in outdoor education programmes for personal 
development outcomes can continue to be promoted and justified. 
Suggestions for further research to build the knowledge of the processes leading 
to incidents in outdoor education activities are made at the end of this thesis. 
V 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis is the culmination of a lengthy and challenging journey - a journey 
that would not have been completed without the support and encouragement of a 
large number of people. 
Firstly I would like to acknowledge the contribution of Dr Ken Gilbertson of the 
University of Minnesota, Duluth. Ken took me into the UMD outdoor programme 
and encouraged my independent style of learning, allowing me to achieve the 
university's Masters Degree requirements while achieving my personal 
educational goals. I left the programme with a desire to undertake further study. 
Dr Norm McIntyre became a colleague and respected friend through working 
together on the board of Outdoors New Zealand and bringing groups of students 
to OPC. He encouraged me to work on my proposal for this Doctoral study and 
guided me through the academic labyrinth that posed special challenges to 
someone with a more practical background such as myself. Even in moving to 
Canada to work at Lakehead University, Norm continued with his commitment to 
my study by staying on my committee and providing astute and considered 
feedback, despite being appalled by my writing style which he would regularly 
describe as 'rambling prose'. 
A special thanks to Dr David Coy and Dr Howard Davey of the School of 
Management Studies at Waikato University who agreed to supervise my study 
once Norm left Waikato University. Although my study was not in their normal 
field of work, both men had a longstanding interest in the outdoors and followed 
my progress keenly, transferring their skills to help guide me to the result 
presented here. David, as my supervisor, was always available to discuss issues, 
help find a way past obstacles and suggest fruitful directions to progress the 
research. Without his guidance I would not have finished this work. 
I am also indebted to Dr John Buchanan of the Waikato Management School who 
provided advice on statistical analysis. 
Vl 
The Trustees and staff at my workplace, OPC, are encouraging of ongoing 
training and development. They supported my wish to undertake this study by 
helping financially and by providing time to enable me to write up the results of 
my research. Without this assistance I would not have been able to finish this 
study. 
This study would not have been possible without the cooperation of the 12 large 
NZ outdoor education organisations that were willing to let me access their 
incident data. Following this, 18 instructors allowed me to question them about 
incidents that had potentially serious consequences. Both the organisations and 
instructors showed a high level of trust in allowing this to happen, driven by their 
belief in the outcomes of this research being useful for the sector in helping to 
understand and reduce incidents. I hope I haven't disappointed them. 
Eighteen outdoor experts agreed to help analyse the various incidents. They gave 
their time freely while having many commitments of their own. They must have 
become scared while checking their emails at times as I pestered them to get their 
results back to me. The quality of the results of this study is a direct consequence 
of the input of these people. 
Most importantly, I must acknowledge the unflagging support ofmy wife and best 
friend Sarah. She has been exceptionally understanding of the evenings and 
holiday periods when I would head away to read or work on my computer to keep 
this study moving. During the almost five years it has taken to reach this point, we 
managed to produce three children. While this does show that we managed to 
spend some time together, there is no doubt that Sarah carried the greater burden 
of raising the children while I often escaped into my thesis work. Thank you for 
your understanding, patience and love during this period. 
And finally, to friends, colleagues and academic peers who offered words of 
encouragement, forwarded articles from a wide range of sources to aid in the 
research, and those who simply stifled laughter at the task I was setting myself 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
lll 
IV 
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . VI 
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vm 
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvI 
List of Figures.................................................................. xvnI 
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION 1 
1.1. Introduction 1 
1.2. Aims and significance 1 
1.3. Risk management in New Zealand outdoor education 3 
1.4. Problem statement 5 
1.5. The research objective and issues 6 
1.6. Methodology and method 7 
1. 7. Outline of thesis 8 
1.8. Scope, limitations and assumptions 10 
1.8.1. Scope 10 
1.8.2. Limitations and assumptions 10 
1.8.2.1. Sample data 10 
1.8.2.2. Retrospective personal accounts of accidents 10 
1.8.2.3. Analysis of accounts 11 
CHAPTER TWO - OUTDOOR EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF SAFETY 
2.1. Introduction 
2.2. Defining outdoor education 
2.3. History of outdoor education in New Zealand 
2.4. Safety issues and attitudes pose a threat to outdoor education 
2.5. The importance of measuring accident rates in outdoor education 
2.6. Sector response to the threat 
2.7. The knowledge gap 










2. 7.2. A model of outdoor education incidents and their root causes 27 
2.8. Summary 28 
CHAPTER THREE - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND 
METHOD 29 
3 .1. Introduction 29 
3.2. The researcher in the research 29 
3 .3. Methodology 31 
3.3.1. Background to the methodological framework 31 
3.3.2. Methodological framework and overview of the method 
used for this study 35 
3.3.3. Summary 43 
3.4. Method 43 
3.4.1. Overview 43 
3.4.2. Phase One - Quantitative data collection and analysis 43 
3 .4.2.1. Sample selection - Sampling organisations 45 
Vlll 
3.4.2.2. Data collection towards establishing a profile of 
outdoor education incidents 46 
3.4.2.3. Data analysis 50 
3.4.3. Phase Two - Qualitative data collection and analysis 50 
3.4.3.1. Sample selection- Choosing case studies of 
serious incidents 50 
3.4.3.2. Data collection- Narratives of serious incidents 56 
3.4.3.2.a. Interview rationale 57 
3.4.3.2.b. Interview questions and format 60 
3.4.3.2.c. Conducting interviews 65 
3.4.3.3. Data analysis 66 
3.4.3.3.a. History and application of the Delphi 
technique 68 
3.4.3.3.b. What is the Delphi technique? 69 
3.4.3.3.c. The Delphi method for this study 72 
3.4.4. Phase Three - Qualitative Analysis Stage 2 77 
3.5. Reliability and validity- Research trustworthiness 77 
3.5.1. Reliability 78 
3.5.2. Validity 79 
3.6. Summary 82 
CHAPTER FOUR-REVIEW OF LITERATURE: THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF AN OUTDOOR EDUCATION INCIDENT 
MODEL, TAXONOMY OF ERROR AND A TOOL TO 
DIAGRAMMATICALLY REPRESENT AN INCIDENT 84 
4.1. Introduction 84 
4.2. Outdoor education literature review 85 
4.2.1. Profiling outdoor incidents 85 
4.2.1.1. New Zealand outdoor education incident data 85 
4.2.1.2. United Kingdom outdoor education incident data 86 
4.2.1.3. United States outdoor education incident data 89 
4.2.1.4. Australian outdoor education incident data 93 
4.2.1.5. Summary 93 
4.2.2. Root causes of outdoor education incidents 94 
4.2.2.1. Incident models 94 
4.2.2.2. Other outdoor education writing on the root causes 
of outdoor accidents 100 
4.2.3. Summary 104 
4.3. Incident models from the disciplines of industrial safety 
management and related fields 106 
4.3.1. The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) loss 
causation model 106 
4.3.2. Reason's model of human elements of accident causation 108 
4.3.3. Petersen's causation model 113 
4.3.4. Types and tokens of error 115 
4.3.5. Interim model of an outdoor education incident 118 
4.3.6. Summary 120 
4.4. Identifying the root causes of incidents from the literature of 
industrial safety management and psychology 121 
4.4.1. Theories of judgment and decision-making 121 
4.4.1.1. The traditionalist approach to decision-making 124 
4.4.1.2. The naturalistic decision-making approach 126 
IX 
4.4.1.3. A conceptual model ofjudgment 129 
4.4.1.4. Summary 130 
4.4.2. Sources of bias in the judgment process 131 
4.4.2.1. Sources of bias in the acquisition of information 
(situational awareness) 132 
4.4.2.1.a. Availability 134 
4.4.2.1.b. Selective perception 134 
4.4.2.1.c. Frequency 135 
4.4.2.1.d. Concrete information (ignoring base-rate 
or prior information) 136 
4.4.2.1.e. Illusory Correlation 136 
4.4.2.1.f. Datapresentation 137 
4.4.2.1.g. Summary of biases in the acquisition of 
information 13 8 
4.4.2.2. Sources of bias in the processing of information 
(situational assessment) 138 
4.4.2.2.a. Inconsistency 139 
4.4.2.2.b. Conservatism 139 
4.4.2.2.c. Non-linear extrapolation 139 
4.4.2.2.d. Heuristics used to reduce mental effort 139 
4.4.2.2.e. Consistency of information sources 142 
4.4.2.2.f. The decision environment 142 
4.4.2.2.g. Summary of biases in the processing of 
information 149 
4.4.2.3. Sources of bias in the output process 150 
4.4.2.3.a. Question format and scale effects 150 
4.4.2.3.b. Wishful thinking 150 
4.4.2.3.c. Illusion of control 151 
4.4.2.3.d. Summary of sources of bias in the output 
process 151 
4.4.2.4. Sources of bias in the feedback process 152 
4.4.2.4.a. Outcome irrelevant learning structures 152 
4.4.2.4.b. Misperception of chance fluctuations 153 
4.4.2.4.c. Success/failure attributions 153 
4.4.2.4.d. Logical fallacies in recall 153 
4.4.2.4.e. Hindsight bias 153 
4.4.2.4.f. Summary of biases in the feedback process 156 
4.4.3. The Elaboration Likelihood Model 157 
4.4.4. Categorising the type of root causes of poor judgment 160 
4.4.4.1. Slips and Mistakes 161 
4.4.4.1.a. Types of slips 162 
4.4.4.1.b. Mistakes as errors of thought 163 
4.4.4.2. Lapses and Violations 165 
4.4.4.3. A categorisation system for the root causes of 
poor judgment 167 
4.4.5. Identifying management system errors 169 
4.4.6. Summary 171 
4.5. Testing the root causes of incidents identified through outdoor 
education literature with the proposed taxonomy 172 
4.6. Proposed model of an outdoor education incident including an 
interim taxonomy of root causes 178 
4.7. A tool to analyse root causes in outdoor education incidents 181 
X 
4. 7 .1. Criteria for an effective incident analysis tool 181 
4. 7.2. Existing tools in the field of safety management 181 
4. 7 .2.1. Qualitative methodologies 183 
4. 7.2.2. Tree based techniques 183 
4.7.2.3. Techniques for dynamic systems 183 
4. 7 .2.4. Traditional approaches 183 
4.7.2.5. System safety approach 185 
4.7.2.6. Accident framework 185 
4.7.2.7. The most applicable tool for the investigation of the 
root causes of outdoor education incidents 185 
4.7.2.8. Summary 186 
4.7.3. Events and causal factor analysis (ECFA) 186 
4.7.3.l. Uses and advantages ofECFA 186 
4.7.3.2. Description of the ECFA technique 188 
4.7.3.3. Adapting the ECFA technique for the analysis of 
outdoor education incidents 190 
4.7.4. Summary 192 
4.8. Summary of the literature review 194 
CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: A PROFILE OF 
NEW ZEALAND OUTDOOR EDUCATION INCIDENTS 
1996 - 2000 196 
5.1. Introduction 196 
5 .2. A profile of outdoor education incidents 1996 - 2000 196 
5.2.1. Breakdown of data according to incident type 196 
5.2.2. Ratios of accident severity - The accident triangle 198 
5.2.3. Activities as a predictor of injury 205 
5.2.4. Gender of instructor as a predictor of injury 211 
5.2.5. Time of day as a predictor of injury 214 
5.2.6. Outdoor education accident rates 219 
5.2.7. Further discussion and recommendations 221 
5.3. Summary 222 
CHAPTER SIX-RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: IDENTIFYING 
THE ROOT CAUSES OF OUTDOOR EDUCATION INCIDENTS 
IN NEW ZEALAND 1996 - 2000 225 
6.1. Introduction 225 
6.2. The Delphi analysis of CAI data - A case study of Incident 14 71 226 
6.2.1. Introduction 226 
6.2.2. The CAI data - Incident 1471 227 
6.2.2.1. Setting the scene 227 
6.2.2.2. Narrative of the incident 229 
6.2.2.3. Incident timeline 230 
6.2.2.4. Decision point identification 231 
6.2.2.5. Other comments 233 
6.2.3. Delphi panel analysis of the CAI data- Incident 1471 234 
6.2.3 .1. First Delphi Iteration 234 
6.2.3.1.a. Instructions to Delphi panel 234 
6.2.3. l .b. Response from Delphi panel 234 
6.2.3.1.c. Researcher sorting of Delphi results 241 
6.2.3.1.d. Compilation of an Events and Causal 
Factors Analysis (ECF A) for the incident 248 
XI 
6.2.3.2. Second Delphi Iteration 250 
6.2.3.3. Third Delphi Iteration 251 
6.3. Results of and comments on the Delphi analysis of 18 serious 
outdoor education incidents 253 
6.4. Establishing a taxonomy of error for the 18 serious outdoor 
education incidents 274 
6.4.1. Root causes due to instructor error 274 
6.4.1.1. Poor condition of instructor to supervise and make 
judgrnents 274 
6.4.1.2. Lack of skills and experience 275 
6.4.1.3. Mental slips and lapses 275 
6.4.1.4. Poor application of existing skills / experience 276 
6.4.1.5. Poor situational awareness 277 
6.4.1.6. Poor risk assessment 278 
6.4.1. 7. Failed to make own judgrnent or deferred the 
responsibility to others 279 
6.4.1.8. Accepting a higher than required level of risk 279 
6.4.1. 9. Breached organisational policies 281 
6.4.1.10. Sabotage 281 
6.4.2. Root causes due to management system errors 281 
6.4.2.1. Poor organisational safety philosophy 282 
6.4.2.2. Poor documentation of safety responsibilities 
and accountabilities 282 
6.4.2.3. Less than adequate risk management systems 283 
6.4.2.4. Less than adequate policies and guidelines 283 
6.4.2.5. Less than adequate systems to provide up-to-date 
knowledge of conditions 284 
6.4.2.6. Less than adequate training systems 284 
6.4.2. 7. Less than adequate systems to match the instructor 
to the task 284 
6.4.2.8. Less than adequate monitoring of instructional staff 285 
6.4.2.9. Less than adequate incident recording and analysis 
systems 285 
6.4.2.10. Less than adequate maintenance systems 285 
6.4.2.11. Equipment traps - Less than adequate equipment 
selection systems 286 
6.4.2.12. Environment traps - Less than adequate site 
selection systems 286 
6.4.2.13. Poor application of management skills 286 
6.4.3. The error-free incident 286 
6.4.4. An interim taxonomy of error for outdoor education 289 
6.4.5. Discussion 291 
6.4.5.1. Multiple causation 291 
6.4.5.2. Most frequently occurring root cause(s) of 
instructor error 291 
6.4.5.3. Major inadequacies in the management system 293 
6.4.5.4. Management staff errors 294 
6.4.5.5. Comparison of findings with those from the 
quantitative results in Chapter 5 294 
6.4.5.5.a. Extrapolation of Petersen's model of 
predictors of serious injury 295 
XU 
6.5. Summary 
6.4.5.5.b. Groups being supervised by male 
instructors are likely to have more serious 
injuries than those supervised by females 296 
6.4.5.5.c. Injuries happen more often in the afternoon 296 
297 
CHAPTER SEVEN - RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: A PROPOSED 
TAXONOMY OF ROOT CAUSES OF OUTDOOR EDUCATION 
INCIDENTS AND A MODEL OF INCIDENT CAUSATION IN 
OUTDOOR EDUCATION 301 
7 .1. Introduction 301 
7 .2. A taxonomy of error for outdoor education 302 
7 .2.1. The nature of taxonomies of error 302 
7 .2.2. The types and tokens of root causes of outdoor education 
incidents 305 
7.2.2.1. Root causes attributable to the category of 'Overload' 
of an individual in their role 307 
7.2.2.1.a. Lack of personal capacity 307 
7 .2.2.1.b. Poor physical or mental condition 308 
7 .2.2.1.c. Mismatch of skills / experience with task 308 
7.2.2.1.d. Task too large 309 
7.2.2.1.e. Traps present in the work environment 309 
7.2.2.2. Root causes attributable to the category of 'Poor 
concentration' 310 
7 .2.2.2.a. Actions without thinking 310 
7.2.2.2.b. Forgetting 310 
7.2.2.3. Root causes attributable to the category of 
'Misapplication of Skills' 310 
7.2.2.3.a. Misapplication of skills 311 
7.2.2.4. Root causes attributable to the category of 'Poor 
judgment' 311 
7.2.2.4.a. Poor situational awareness 311 
7.2.2.4.b. Inaccurate assessment of the risk 314 
7.2.2.4.c. Snap decision made without considering 
alternatives 316 
7 .2.2.4.d. Poor processing of past experiences 317 
7.2.2.5. Root causes attributable to the category of 'Failing 
to meet the judgment responsibilities of the role' 318 
7.2.2.5.a. Choosing to take a higher level of risk 
than needed 3 19 
7.2.2.5.b. Deferringjudgment to others 324 
7.2.2.5.c. No judgement I decision 324 
7.2.2.6. Root causes attributable to the category of 
'Misdirected motivation I attitude' 325 
7.2.2.6.a. Breaks organisational policies 325 
7.2.2.6.b. Sabotage 325 
7.2.2.7. Root causes attributable to the category of 'Senior 
management system errors' 326 
7.2.2.7.a. Less than adequate organisational safety 
philosophy, goals and learning objectives 326 
7.2.2.7.b. LTA accountability for the safety system 326 
7.2.2.7.c. LTA review of safety systems 326 
Xlll 
7.2.2.8. Root causes attributable to the category 'Staff 
recruitment and training system errors' 326 
7.2.2.8.a. LTA staff recruitment systems 327 
7.2.2.8.b. LTA staff induction systems 327 
7.2.2.8.c. LTA staff training systems 327 
7.2.2.8.d. LTS staff monitoring and appraisal 327 
7.2.2.9. Root causes attributable to the category 'Middle 
management system errors' 327 
7.2.2.9.a. LTA documentation of safety 
responsibilities and accountabilities 327 
7.2.2.9.b. LTA risk management systems 328 
7.2.2.9.c. LTA policies and guidelines 328 
7.2.2.9.d. LTA hazard reporting systems 328 
7.2.2.9.e. LTA communication systems 328 
7.2.2.9.f. LTA emergency systems 328 
7.2.2.9.g. LTA incident reporting systems 328 
7.2.2.9.h. LTA equipment/ resource systems 329 
7.2.2.9.i. LTA compliance to statutory requirements 329 
7 .2.2.10. Root causes attributable to the category 'Operational 
system errors' 329 
7 .2.2.1 O.a. LT A client screening mechanisms 329 
7.2.2.1 O.b. LTA systems to match an instructor 
with a task 329 
7 .2.2.10.c. LT A safety meetings 329 
7.2.3. A taxonomy of error for the outdoor education sector 330 
7.2.4. The application of case-based reasoning and information 
retrieval tools to extend the taxonomy 332 
7.3. A model of outdoor education incident causation 333 
7.4. Delphi panel response to the taxonomy of error and model 
of incident causation 338 
7.5. Further discussion - Significance of the research 343 
7 .5 .1. The current state of knowledge 343 
7.5.2. A language and categorisation system for outdoor 
education error 346 
7.5.3. Implications for Hale's model of an outdoor accident 348 
7.5.4. Implications for the Meyer and Williamson matrix 349 
7.5.5. Implications for Boyes' outdoor adventure decision-making 
model 350 
7.5.5.1. Weaknesses in the outdoor adventure 
decision-making model 350 
7.5.5.2. The theory ofreasoned action 351 
7.5.5.3. The Attititude-to-Behaviour process model 353 
7.5.5.4. A proposed decision-making model for outdoor 
education: the Likelihood-To-Think (LTT) model 356 
7.5.5.5. Cognitive dissonance and implications for the LTT 
model 362 
7.5.6. Implications for Priest's Multiphase Problem Solving model 366 
7.6. Summary 369 
CHAPTER EIGHT- SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
CONCLUSION 373 
8.1. Introduction 373 
XIV 
8.2. Background to the study and research objective 373 
8.3. Research methodology and method 375 
8.4. Research findings and contributions to knowledge 376 
8.5. Limitations 381 
8.6. Recommendation and suggestions for further research 383 
8.6.1. Need for a national incident database 383 
8.6.2. Implications of the taxonomy of error for outdoor education 
safety and training efforts 3 84 
8.6.3. Considerations of a heirarchy of importance of the root 
causes of error 387 
8.6.4. Is judgment a transferable skill 390 
8.6.5. A suggested approach to incident analysis 392 
8.6.6. Suggestions for further research . 393 
8.7. Conclusion 394 
REFERENCES 396 
APPENDICES 422 
1. A detailed comparison of a range of outdoor education providers in 
New Zealand 423 
2. The Computer Assisted Interview Tool 426 
3. Instructions to Delphi Panel Members 429 
4. Instructions for Delphi Panel Members to Assist in Interpreting the 
ECF A Diagrams 431 
xv 
LIST OF TABLES 
CHAPTER ONE Page 
CHAPTER TWO 
1 Examples of outdoor education provision in New Zealand, 15 
2004 
CHAPTER THREE 
2 Contrasting axioms between the positivist paradigm and the 
constructivist paradigm. 32 
3 Comparisons of four important paradigms used in social and 
behavioural sciences 35 
4 Accident severity scale 48 
5 Summary of serious incidents where the instructor concerned 
agreed to an in-depth study 57 
6 Structure of the enhanced cognitive interview 62 
CHAPTER FOUR 
7 New Zealand Mountain Safety Council (1998) report on 
fatalities in outdoor recreation where people were involved 
with instruction, guidance or other professional care 87 
8 Compilation of the average number of fatalities per year in 
the UK from various causes 88 
9 Compilation of the average number of accidental or sudden 
deaths amongst young people (up to the age of 19) per year in 







Comparison of injury rates between US outdoor education 
centres and other activities. 
United States Wilderness Risk Management Committee data 
of injuries and injury rates by activity 
Potential causes of accidents in outdoor pursuits 
Management system errors derived from the OutdoorsMark 
quality assurance components 
Root causes of outdoor incidents from management system 
errors 
Comparison of the possible root causes of incidents identified 
through outdoor education literature with the proposed 
taxonomy of root causes 
CHAPTER FIVE 







type for the 12 participating organisations (1996 - 2000) 197 
17 Number of injuries, sorted by severity, for incidents 
occurring while under instruction, for the 12 participating 
organisations (1996 - 2000) 201 
18 Near misses grouped according to the potential severity 
of their outcomes, for incidents while under instruction, for 
the 12 participating organisations (1996 - 2000) 201 
19 Activities ranked by number of serious injuries, or those with 
potential for serious injury for the 12 participating 







Effect of instructor gender on the severity of injury or the 
potential severity of injury for the 12 participating 
organisations ( 1996 - 2000) 
Effect of time of day on incident frequency for the 12 
participating organisations (1996 - 2000) 
Comparison between number of incidents occurring in 
morning and afternoon activity sessions for the 12 
participating organisations ( 1996 - 2000) 
Comparison of the seriousness of incidents by time of 
instructional session for the 12 participating organisations 
( 1996 - 2000) 
Injury rates for the 12 participating organisations ( 1996 -
2000) 
CHAPTER SIX 









26 Possible corrective training methods for instructors once the 






LIST OF FIGURES 
Page 
1 A research cycle 33 
2 Outline of methodological design employed in this research 36 
3 The inductive logic in the qualitative phase of this study 42 
4 Research method used in this study 44 
CHAPTER FOUR 
5 Dynamics of accidents theory 94 
6 Model of an accident in the outdoors 95 
7 Five inhibiting factors at work in the danger analysis procedure 97 
8 The pathways to change model 99 
9 The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) loss causation 
model 106 
10 The various human contributions to the breakdown of complex 
systems 109 
11 The basic elements of production 110 
12 Comparison of organisational heirarchy and quality control 
heirarchy 111 
13 Proposed outdoor education organisation hierarchy 112 
14 The risk versus safety meter for adventure programmes 113 
15 The causation model 114 
16 Example of a causal sequence to show the difference between 
tokens and types 117 
17 Interim model of an outdoor education incident 118 
18 Factors required to produce an outdoor education incident 119 
19 A generic problem solving model 122 
20 Phases of the decision making process 123 
21 Simplified flow-chart of the decision analysis approach 125 
22 Decision process model 127 
23 Framework model of outdoor adventure decision making 129 
24 Conceptual model of judgment task environment 131 
25 Brunswik's lens model 133 
26 The two routes to persuasion according to the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) 158 
27 The seven stages of human action 162 
28 A summary of the psychological varieties of unsafe acts 166 
29 The root causes of poor instructor judgment or performance 168 
30 Proposed model of an outdoor education incident (Simple 
version) 179 
31 Proposed model of an outdoor education incident (Full version) 180 
32 Example of ECF A Chart 189 









Industrial accident ratio study 
Four windows matrix 
The number of incidents of differing severity as reported by the 
12 participating organisations ( 1996 - 2000) 
Predictors of serious injury 
Graph of incidence of actual and potential severity of injury 
versus time of occurrence 
CHAPTER SIX 
39 ECFA diagram representing the second iteration of Delphi 
analysis for incident 1471 
40 Revised ECF A diagram representing the third iteration of 
Delphi analysis for incident 1471 
41 ECF A diagram for incident 42 
42 ECF A diagram for incident 43 
43 ECF A diagram for incident 59 
44 ECF A diagram for incident 126 
45 ECF A diagram for incident 261 
46 ECF A diagram for incident 281 
4 7 ECF A diagram for incident 292 
48 ECF A diagram for incident 318 
49 ECF A diagram for incident 321 
50 ECF A diagram for incident 576 
51 ECF A diagram for incident 611 
52 ECF A diagram for incident 636 
53 ECF A diagram for incident 728 
54 ECF A diagram for incident 845 
55 ECF A diagram for incident 857 
56 ECF A diagram for incident 1515 
57 ECF A diagram for incident 1649 
58 Interim taxonomy of error for outdoor education incidents 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
59 The causal network for error analysis 
60 Taxonomy of error for the outdoor education sector 
61 Model of outdoor education incident causation 
62 A simplified model of incident causation for outdoor education 
63 A schematic diagram of Ajzen and Fishbein's theory of 
reasoned action 






Proposed model of outdoor education decision-making in a 
hazardous situation - The Likelihood- To-Think Model (LTT) 
Proposed model of the spontaneous path to decision-making 
Proposed model of the thoughtful path to decision-making 






































69 Proposed hierarchy of root causes leading to increased accident 389 
potential 
XX 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.l 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
1.1 Introduction 
This introductory chapter gives a brief background to the current state of outdoor 
education in New Zealand and the risk management practices used in this sector. 
This is followed by a statement of the research problem and the objective of the 
study. The research methodology and method are introduced and a synopsis of the 
thesis presentation is given. The chapter concludes by outlining the scope and 
limitations of the study. 
1.2 Aims and Significance 
Outdoor education in various forms has been a component of New Zealand 
education since the 1850s (Lynch, 1998a). What began as school trips and 
recreational outings run by teachers, parents and volunteers in schools and club 
settings, has changed in form and delivery over the years. There is now extensive 
literature outlining theories and practice of outdoor education and delivery is 
conducted by highly skilled and trained personnel. A massive growth in outdoor 
education provision has also occurred, beginning in the 1950s (Lynch, 1998a). 
Knol (2001) estimated that there were over 800 providers of outdoor education 
experiences in this country including sole operators, schools, tertiary institutions 
and large outdoor education centres. 
It is not surprising that there has also been a huge increase in those offering 
training, assessment and qualifications for outdoor education leadership. Outdoors 
New Zealand identified 48 separate organisations in New Zealand offering such 
training (Grant & Boyes, 2003). 
Outdoor education is important for a number of reasons. At a fundamental level it 
has been argued by some that New Zealanders have a connection with the 
outdoors that is unique and sets us apart from people of other countries (Palmer, 
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2004). The rugged competitiveness, drive, individualism and achievements of 
people such as Sir Edmund Hillary, Sir Peter Blake, Rob Hall, Barbara Kendall 
and Lydia Bradey (the first woman to ascend Everest solo and without oxygen) 
have made them icons for this country. We certainly have a number of successes, 
and expectation as a country of success, on the international stage that is 
disproportionate to our small population. My belief is that these successes are due 
in part to childhoods which include exposure to the New Zealand outdoors that 
builds 'can do' personalities from attempting new experiences, accepting 
challenges and working through adversity, often in small groups, to attain goals. 
There are now significant numbers of people employed in the provision of 
outdoor education experiences for New Zealanders. There are even more 
employed in offering outdoor education to international students and in adventure 
tourism, where overseas visitors come to New Zealand to sample unique outdoor 
expenences. 
It is my belief that outdoor education is important to this country for many 
reasons: it offers personal development opportunities for young New Zealanders 
so that they are able to learn skills in communication, trust, teamwork and goal 
setting; the same young people gain knowledge and attitudes about caring for their 
environment into the future; through the attitudes developed in young people, 
New Zealand society retains its unique culture; significant employment results 
from outdoor education work; and, even more employment results from the spin-
offs of international outdoor education students and adventure tourism. 
Set against these suggested benefits of outdoor education are negative outcomes 
that have the potential to inflict significant damage on the sector including injuries 
and even fatalities among participants whilst under formal guidance and 
instruction. Society appears to be becoming more risk averse and the adoption of 
punitive legislation such as the Health and Safety in Employment Act [HSE] 
( 1992) has made the legal environment in which outdoor education providers 
operate more challenging and even precarious. 
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Preventing incidents happening to those in their care - especially incidents that 
result in serious harm - is a critical issue for those involved in outdoor education 
provision. Beyond the legal and moral reasons for preventing such incidents, the 
very existence of this form of education could be in jeopardy. Based on over 20 
years involvement in outdoor education, much of it in the training and 
management of outdoor leaders, I believe that the causes of incidents in outdoor 
education are inadequately understood. For example, I have regularly seen the 
outcome of incident investigations being that causes of those incidents are 
attributed to what I would term superficial factors such as: instructor error, faulty 
equipment, bad weather or a dangerous act from a student. I believe the root 
causes often remain undisclosed. For example, there are many possible underlying 
reasons for the instructor making an error: they may be over-worked, under-
trained, distracted, stressed, placed with an unsuitable group with unrealistic 
objectives, etc.; many possible reasons for faulty equipment getting into the field: 
faulty maintenance systems, poor purchasing policy, no responsibility for 
checking before use, etc.; reasons that a group may have headed out into 
unacceptable weather: poor weather information available, inability to vary 
programme content, etc.; and, reasons that a student wasn't stopped from carrying 
out a dangerous act: levels of supervision inadequate, lack of knowledge of 
previous history of such events, etc. 
It follows from this that, if the true causes of incidents are not well understood, 
then training programmes and management systems aimed at reducing incidents 
are not as effective as they might be. This research addresses this problem. 
1.3 Risk Management in New Zealand Outdoor Education 
This research is set within a period which I believe will be reflected upon and 
viewed by historians as an era of safety management reforms in the outdoor 
education sector. 
Prior to the 1980s there was very little in the way of a systematic approach to 
managing risk in the outdoors. In 1977 an attempt was made by a collective of the 
major outdoor recreational and educational government and quasi-government 
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organisations to establish a New Zealand Outdoor Training Advisory Board 
(OTAB) (Priest & Gass, 1997). The aim ofOTAB was to encourage competent 
leadership to improve standards, reduce accidents and promote environmental 
care (OTAB, 1980). It provided a framework for outdoor leader training and 
encouraged those involved in outdoor education to log their experience. The 
suggested curriculum of training made no mention of the terms risk management, 
safety management or accident / incident investigation. The OT AB scheme met 
with little enthusiasm from the sector and was abandoned. The only reported 
study at this time that touched on safety management was a Winston Churchill 
Memorial Fellowship Study in UK and USA outdoor centres to investigate safety 
frameworks for New Zealand outdoor education (Allan, 1983). This study appears 
to have received little attention. 
Following the death of a school student in a mountaineering accident while on an 
outdoor education trip in 1986, an appeal was made by the parents of the deceased 
to the Ministry of Education for the establishment of standards for those involved 
in outdoor education instruction with school-aged students (Moodie, 1998). The 
Ministry responded by establishing a voluntary risk management training course 
with an accompanying log of experience. Assessment of competence was avoided. 
In 1987 outdoor instructors established a professional association, the New 
Zealand Outdoor Instructors Association (NZOIA), to run training and assessment 
schemes across a range of outdoor activities (Davidson, 1988). These schemes 
closely followed the British models that existed at the time for mountain 
leadership and canoeing awards. 
The early 1990s saw a number of fatal accidents in the outdoor education sector 
that received high media profile (Barker, 1990; Bower, 1991; Brett, 1994; Locke, 
1990). This attention reflected, perhaps, an increase in the general risk averse 
nature of society. The HSE Act in 1992 further indicated society's risk aversion 
reflected in legislation that included the outdoor education sector and posed 
serious threats to those running outdoor education programmes in the form of 
potential large fines and jail sentences. 
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Those in the outdoor education sector responded to this legislation by focusing on 
risk management techniques in an attempt to reduce the frequency and severity of 
accidents. The principal risk management tool that was adopted by the outdoor 
education sector was the Risk Analysis and Management System (RAMS) and 
subsequent variations (Davidson, 1992). This relied on the identification of 
hazards prior to an activity and the development of strategies to mitigate those 
hazards where possible. The Mountain Safety Council published the first ever risk 
management text in New Zealand (Haddock, 1993) which has recently been 
updated and reprinted (Haddock, 2003). This text relied heavily on literature 
published in the United States through the Journal of Experiential Education, and 
papers presented at annual conferences run by the Association for Experiential 
Education and the Wilderness Risk Managers Committee. There is very little 
published on the subject by or for New Zealanders. 
Conferences were held in both Australia in 1996 and New Zealand in 2002 with 
risk management as the principal theme. At the time of writing (2004) risk 
management is still a critical issue in the outdoor education sector. Serious 
incidents are still occurring, no system exists for collection of incident data in the 
sector or for the analysis and dissemination of lessons from those incidents, and 
there is only rudimentary knowledge of the causal factors leading to those 
incidents. While some outdoor education proponents have tried to focus attention 
on the positive aspects of risk (Bailie, 2003a ; Zinc, 2000; Zinc & Leberman, 
2001) the public are understandably more focused on the negative aspects when 
incidents happen. 
It is my belief that the proposed 'safety management era' will be ongoing until the 
shortfalls in our understanding about the 'true' or 'root' causes of incidents in 
outdoor education are addressed. 
1.4 Problem Statement 
I believe there are serious deficits in the state of knowledge regarding the root 
cause or causes of outdoor education incidents. If these knowledge deficits can be 
filled, then training programmes for instructional staff, and the efforts of managers 
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to implement effective safety systems, can be improved. This should lead to 
reduced frequency and severity of incidents in the sector. 
For the purposes of this study the following definitions are used: 
Incident: "Either an accident or near accident. In the broader loss control 
definition, it refers to an event which could or does result in a loss." (Bird & 
Germain, 1989, p.36) 
p. 6 
Accident: "An undesired event that results in harm to people, damage to property 
or loss to process. It is usually the result of contact with a substance or source of 
energy above the threshold limit of the body or structure." (Bird & Germain, 
1989, p.36) 
Near Accident: "An event which, under slightly different circumstances, could 
have resulted in harm to people, damage to property or loss to process."(Bird & 
Germain, 1989, p.36) 
Root Causes: "Those causes of accidents which would effect permanent results 
when corrected. They are those weaknesses which not only affect the single 
accident being investigated, but also might affect many other future accidents and 
operational problems." (Petersen, 1988, p.11) 
1.5 The Research Objective and Issues 
The research objective was to construct a model of an outdoor education incident 
that increased the understanding of the root causes leading to incidents occurring. 
As part of the process of achieving this objective, the research addressed a number 
of secondary issues: 
• An understanding of the current state of knowledge about outdoor education 
incidents was compiled. This included both theoretical knowledge and 
empirical evidence. 
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• A sample of outdoor education incidents was gathered from which an 
outdoor education incident profile was developed. This profile included the 
distribution of recorded incidents by variables such as severity of outcome, 
time of day, gender of instructor, etc. An accident rate was also calculated 
from this sample and compared to international accident rates and those 
prevalent in other contexts. 
• The sample of incidents was analysed to identify variables that were 
predictors of those incidents, especially ones likely to result in serious 
mJury. 
• A Delphi analysis (an iterative process by which a group of anonymous 
experts reach consensus) of 18 case studies of serious incidents was used to 
produce a list of root causes of those incidents. 
• The. list of root causes from the 18 incidents was supplemented by additional 
root causes of incidents identified from a literature review from the fields of 
safety management and psychology to produce a taxonomy of error for 
outdoor education. 
• Possible implications of the findings of this research to the training needs of 
the sector were also explored. 
1.6 Methodology and Method 
This research adopted a pragmatist paradigm using a mixed methods approach. A 
sample of outdoor education incidents was collected for the years 1996 - 2000 
inclusive. Quantitative methods were used to analyse this data to build a profile of 
the incidents and to identify predictors of serious injury. Qualitative techniques 
were employed to investigate the root causes of a subset of the sample collected. 
This subset of 18 incidents was chosen to include incidents which had the 
potential for serious injury but were representative of a broad spectrum of outdoor 
contexts. The qualitative techniques included instructor interviews about incidents 
they had been involved in, with the use of Delphi panels of outdoor experts to 
analyse this interview data. 
The research method included a literature review from the fields of industrial 
safety management and psychology. Information discovered through this review 
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process was incorporated with the empirical data to develop a possible model of 
an outdoor education incident including a taxonomy of root causes of those 
incidents. 
Biases that could result from these techniques were discussed and the methods 
taken to minimise them explained. 
1. 7 Outline of Thesis 
The thesis is presented in eight chapters as follows: 




Outdoor Education in New Zealand and the Critical Issue 
of Safety: This chapter provides a setting for the research 
topic. Outdoor education is defined and a brief history of the 
development of outdoor education in this country is 
explained. The size and coverage of the sector is explored, the 
current perception of outdoor education accidents explained 
and the need for a focus on safety within the sector is 
justified. 
Research Methodology and Methods: This chapter states 
the methodological assumptions that guide the research and 
outlines and justifies the research methods employed. 
Review of Literature - The Development of an Outdoor 
Education Incident Model, Taxonomy of Error and a Tool 
to Diagrammatically Represent an Incident: This chapter 
provides a comprehensive review of knowledge about 
incident causation and root causes leading to incidents, from 
the fields of outdoor education, industrial safety management 
and psychology. From this information I have developed: 
• an interim model of an outdoor incident; 





• a taxonomy of root causes from the literature; and, 
• a tool to diagrammatically represent an outdoor 
education incident that aids in identifying root causes. 
Results and Discussion - A Profile of New Zealand 
Outdoor Education Incidents 1996- 2000: This chapter 
summarises the quantitative phase of the research. Incident 
rates are presented and compared against other activities. 
Variables that are predictors of incidents leading to serious 
injury are identified. 
Results and Discussion - Identifying the Root Causes of 
Outdoor Education Incidents in New Zealand 1996 -
2000: This chapter provides a summary and analysis of the 
qualitative phase of the research. Interviews were conducted 
with the instructors involved in 18 case studies of serious 
outdoor education incidents. These interviews were analysed 
using a Delphi technique for the root causes of the incidents. 
These root causes were grouped and categorised to provide a 
list of errors. This list is used to help explain some of the 
results obtained in Chapter 5. 
Results and Discussion - A Proposed Taxonomy of Root 
Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents and a Model of 
Incident Causation in Outdoor Education: In this chapter 
the results of Chapter 6 are compared and contrasted with the 
model developed in Chapter 4. The result is a proposed model 
of incident causation for outdoor education, accompanied by 
a taxonomy of root causes of error. 
Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 
Chapter One - Introduction and Overview p. JO 
1.8 Scope, Limitations and Assumptions 
1.8.1 Scope 
As will be explained in Chapter Two, the outdoor education sector is diverse, 
encompassing programmes within schools, individuals contracting their services 
as sole traders, small companies and large outdoor education centres. The scope of 
this research was limited to the larger outdoor education centres although it is 
anticipated that the results will have application to a wider audience. 
1.8.2 Limitations and Assumptions 
A study such as this has inherent challenges and limitations. These limitations are 
due principally to the availability of sample data, the bias that can be introduced 
into retrospective personal accounts of past stressful events and the subjective 
analysis of those accounts by outdoor experts. 
1.8.2.1 Sample data 
Sample data were limited in two senses. Firstly the sample was restricted in order 
to make the study manageable. As explained in the discussion of the scope of this 
study only larger outdoor education centres were canvassed. In addition, the 
sample was further restricted to include only those incidents occurring between 
the years 1996 - 2000 inclusive. The sample was selected from within this group 
by the willingness of: firstly the organisation in making its incidents' records 
available; and secondly by individual instructors being willing to discuss incidents 
in which they had been involved. It was recognised that this could bias results in 
that organisations with poorer safety records may not have contributed to the 
statistics and those instructors who were less open to sharing their incidents may 
have limited the number and type of root causes identified. 
1.8.2.2 Retrospective personal accounts of accidents 
It was assumed that those instructors who agreed to be interviewed about their 
incidents would report honestly about their experiences. It was recognised that 
bias could be introduced into their accounts of the incident by wrongly 
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interpreting key information at the time of the incident, forgetting key information 
in their retelling of the incident, or omitting or even altering key information in 
their retelling in order to look better in the eyes of those reading the account. The 
fact that the researcher is a major employer in the outdoor education sector and 
involved in the governance structure of several outdoor organisations increases 
the likelihood of these biases occurring. 
1.8.2.3 Analysis of accounts 
All of the interview data were analysed by experts in outdoor education for root 
causes. I collated the individual analyses to send back to the experts for comment. 
These stages rely on the subjective evaluation of data by individuals and are 
therefore prone to bias and error. 
The limitations in the sample choice and subsequent data were acknowledged and 
methods (see Section 3.5) were employed to increase the validity of the findings 
and hence the ability of the results to be generalised to the larger population of 
outdoor education providers. 
Readers will need to make their own judgments about how well these limitations 
have been overcome, the generalisability of the findings and appropriateness of 
the recommendations. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
OUTDOOR EDUCATION IN NEW ZEALAND 
AND THE CRITICAL ISSUE OF SAFETY 
2.1 Introduction 
p.12 
This chapter gives a detailed overview of outdoor education in New Zealand and 
explains why finding appropriate ways of dealing with safety issues are key to the 
continued growth of the sector. 
The chapter starts by defining outdoor education and how this is different from the 
adventure and ecotourism sectors. The history of outdoor education in New 
Zealand is then reviewed. The threat to outdoor education from safety issues is 
explained and the different ways that outdoor educationalists in New Zealand, 
Britain and the United States have responded to this threat is examined. Finally 
the knowledge gap is described and what is needed to fill that gap in order for the 
outdoor education sector to be able to deal effectively with the threat - a better 
understanding of what incidents are occurring in the sector, the rate at which they 
are occurring, and a model of an outdoor education incident identifying the root 
causes that produce it. 
2.2 Defining Outdoor Education 
Outdoor education is defined as an experiential philosophy of "learning by doing 
with reflection" that takes place primarily, but not exclusively, through 
involvement with the natural environment (Priest & Gass, 1997). Historically 
outdoor education has been considered in two component branches: adventure 
education and environmental education. Adventure education involves the use of 
adventurous activities that provide a group or individual with compelling tasks to 
accomplish from which participants learn about themselves and how they relate to 
others; environmental education is concerned primarily with learning about 
ecosystemic relationships (the interdependence of living organisms in an 
ecological system) and ekistic relationships (the key interactions between human 
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society and the natural resources of the environment) (Priest & Gass, 1997, pp.17-
18). Rather than differentiating between component parts, it is now considered 
more appropriate and effective to incorporate learning about all relationships 
(interpersonal, intrapersonal, ecosystemic, ekistic) into any programme in a 
holistic manner. This is consistent with a second definition given for outdoor 
education," ... a broad term describing education in the outdoors,for the outdoors, 
and about the outdoors" (Ministry of Education, 2004). This latter definition is 
based on the pioneering work of early outdoor education theorists such as 
Hammerman, Hammerman & Hammerman (1985) and Smith, Carlson, 
Donaldson & Masters ( 1972). For the reasons outlined here the global term of 
"outdoor education" is the most appropriate to use in this study. 
Outdoor education should not be confused with tourism. While there is potential 
overlap between outdoor education and aspects of tourism (especially adventure 
tourism and ecotourism), the goals of the two are often different. A research 
study by Sung, Morrison & O'Leary (1997) resulted in a definition for adventure 
travel from a provider's perspective (adventure travel being used by Sung et al. as 
a synonym for adventure tourism). 
"A trip or travel with the specific purpose of activity participation to 
explore a new experience, often involving perceived risk or controlled 
danger associated with personal challenges, in a natural environment or 
exotic setting" (Sung et al., 1997). 
This definition helps to establish the difference between outdoor education and 
adventure tourism: the goal of adventure tourism is participation whereas the goal 
of outdoor education is the structured learning that can be derived from that 
participation. 
2.3 History of Outdoor Education in New Zealand 
New Zealand has a long history of outdoor education, especially for youth, 
although the nature and means of provision of this form of education has changed 
and evolved over the years. Lynch (1998a) has researched the development of 
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outdoor education in the school system in New Zealand. The first recorded 
references to outdoor educational activities date to school field trips in the 1850s. 
These school 'treats' and recreational trips, educational visits and curriculum 
related field trips continued until the term 'outdoor education' came into common 
usage in the 1940s. This form of education continues today where many schools 
offer outdoor education activities including tramping, kayaking, orienteering and 
caving, organised by enthusiastic teachers and supported by parents. There are 
many schools throughout the country that own and manage their own lodges in 
remote settings. Although there are few reliable records, it appears that there was 
a rapid growth in school-based outdoor education from the mid 1950s to the 
1990s, with outdoor education programming for forms 3-7 in secondary schools 
reaching a zenith in 1989 (Gainsford, 1973; Lynch, 1998b ). 
Organised youth groups such as Boy Scouts, Girl Guides and Sea Cadets have 
been in existence in New Zealand since 1908. They have had strong followings 
and used the outdoors extensively, although anecdotal evidence suggests they 
have declined in support in recent years. 
When the Outward Bound programme was introduced to New Zealand from 
Britain in the 1960s, it was readily embraced by New Zealanders and seen by 
many as an excellent way for young people to learn about accepting challenges, 
overcoming adversity and developing character for adulthood. The introduction of 
the Outward Bound model to New Zealand was influential in that never before 
had a specifically designed educational programme been offered which was 
staffed by full-time, trained, experienced and paid instructors operating to a set of 
standards based on an international model. 
Other professional outdoor education providers soon followed the Outward Bound 
School. The other two important early examples were the Spirit of Adventure 
Trust which used Tall Ships for their programmes commencing in 1973, and the 
Sir Edmund Hillary Outdoor Pursuits Centre of NZ which established 
programmes in 1973 for secondary school students based around activities in the 
mountain environment. 
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Table 1 
Examples of Outdoor Education Provision in New Zealand, 2004 




Voluntary-Award Developing young people. 
focused: 
The Young NZers' 
Challenge. Began in 
1963. (Naresh, 2004) 
Uniformed Youth The mission of World Scouting 
Group: is to contribute to the education 
Scouting NZ. Began in of young people, through a 
1908. value system based on the 
(Knighton, 2004) Scout Promise and Law, to help 
bui Id a better world where 
people are self-fulfilled as 
individuals and play a 
constructive role in society. 
Outdoor Education Developing people's potential 
Centre - Private through: 
Training • Challenging outdoor 
Establishment: adventures 
The Sir Edmund Hillary • Environmental education 
Outdoor Pursuits Centre • Fun and support 
of New Zealand. Began -
in 1973. (Smith, 2004) 
Youth Sail Training: To offer equal opportunity to 
The Spirit of Adventure young New Zealanders to 
Trust. Began in 1973. develop qualities ofleadership 
(Lister, 2004) ,independence and community 
spirit through the medium of 
the sea. 
Adult Personal Vision: 
Development Centre: Helping to develop better 
Outward Bound NZ. people, better communities and 
Began in 1963. a better world. 
(Taylor, 2004) 
Polytech Vocational To provide leadership and 
Training: scholarship in outdoor 
Christchurch Polytech education and adventure 
Institute of Technology. recreation in order to enrich 
Began in 1994. individuals and society; and to 
(Bailey, 2004) contribute to the sustainability 
of the natural environment. 
School Residential OE In this unique and challenging 
Programme: environment, through the 
Tihoi Venture School. medium of community living, a 
Began in 1979. quality academic programme 
(Firminger, 2004) and wide ranging outdoor 
pursuits we aim to provide the 
best possible opportunities to 
promote the personal and social 
development of our students. 
School OE To teach students the skills of 
Programme: Nelson goal setting, communication, 
College. team work and environmental 
Began in 1964. awareness while taking part in 
(Cant, 2004) outdoor pursuits in New 
Zealand's outdoors. 
Community Personal development, 
Programme: New recreation skills, training and 
Plymouth YMCA. qualifications - We build strong 
Began in 2000. kids, strong families, strong 
(McKee, 2004) communities. 
Activities 
and sites 
Any activity at 
any site in NZ 
Any activity 





rivers, lakes and 
forests of the 
Central North 
Island 




around the coast 
and coastal islands 
of New Zealand 
Mostly sailing, 
kayaking and 







in the Canterbury 
region 
Kayak, rock, sail, 
tramping, caving, 
solo, alpine skills, 
survival. 
Activities are run 




are run in the 
mountain ranges, 
rivers, bush and 









None - must be Approx. 15,000 
organised by the participating with 
participant 1500 finishing each 
year. 
All Scout Approx. 18,000 
leaders come young people 
from volunteers enrolled in Scouting 
within local each year doing 
communities. outdoor activities. 
Approx. 34 full Approx. 6,600 
time equivalent participants per 
staff of which year. 
18 are 
instructional. 
I O full time sea Approx. 5500 
staff, 8 shore participants 





Approx. 49 Approx. I 065 
staff, 22 of students do 21 day 
whom are courses annually and 
instructional 355 do 8 day 
courses. 
12.5 Full time 150 students on 
equivalent staff. Certificate, Diploma 
and Degree courses. 
12 fulltime 128 students take 
staff, 10 of place each year. 
these are This is a compulsory 
instructional. component of school 
life for year l 0 
students at St Paul's 
Collegiate Hamilton. 
Two specialist Approx 453 students 
OE teachers take part each year.. 
who also teach 
other subjects 
plus contractors 
Four full time Approx. 2100 
staff plus participants per 
contractors year. 
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In New Zealand in 2004 there is significant employment in small businesses, 
schools and larger organisations using the outdoors as a teaching medium. 
Henceforth, I will refer to this as the outdoor education sector, which is itself a 
sub-sector of the sport, fitness and outdoor recreation industry. From a small and 
unstructured beginning where experiences were offered by a number of schools 
and a few other groups, there has been an enormous growth in the number of 
providers (Boyes, 2002; Jesson, 2000). It has been estimated by Outdoors New 
Zealand that including school camps, private training establishments (PTEs), 
Conservation Corps Programmes, Polytechnical Colleges, Universities, freelance 
instructors, charitable trusts and private businesses there are in excess of 800 
providers involved in the delivery of outdoor education in New Zealand (Knol, 
2001). Although there are no data available, it is assumed that the increase in 
provider numbers also reflects an increase in the number of student days of 
outdoor education delivered. There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the sector 
may have peaked in about 2000 in terms of provider numbers and student days 
delivered. Some providers have ceased offering instructor training programmes 
since 2000 because of declining student numbers. Further research is needed to 
investigate this perceived trend. Some examples of this diversity of outdoor 
education providers are shown in Table 1. 
2.4 Safety Issues and Attitudes Pose a Threat to Outdoor Education 
At the same time as this massive growth in the provision of outdoor education 
experiences, there is evidence to indicate that attitudes in society are becoming 
more risk averse (Cumming, 2002; Heeringa, 2004; Jones, 2004; New Zealand 
Herald, 2004; Stirling, 2004). This trend can also be seen in legislation where, for 
example, the Health and Safety in Employment Act ( 1992) and its 2003 
amendment, place high standards of care on employers for their employees at 
work and visitors to the workplace. 
It may seem that there is a paradox between the massive growth in the demand for 
outdoor education experiences and a society that is becoming more risk averse. At 
least one writer argues that the increased participation in extreme sports is 
evidence that individuals are actually seeking greater risks in line with a more 
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liberal society where responsibility is shifting from corporate bodies to individuals 
for the control of risk (Simon, 2002). Assuming that we live in a society that can 
be described as "advanced liberal" or "neoliberal" (O'Malley & Palmer, 1996; 
Rose, 1996) another interpretation of this risk transfer exists. Giddens ( 1991) 
subscribes to the idea that we live in a "risk society" but believes these risks are 
mostly those that we personally have little or no control over: stock exchange, 
global warming, etc. We mitigate these risks, or create a semblance of control, by 
an increased reliance on "expert systems" be they financial advisors, scientists, 
doctors, or, as in this research, outdoor experts. Giddens would see the outdoors 
as being especially applicable as it feeds into the modem project of "identity" 
formation. Using experts, all of the organisation, skill development, risk 
assessment and judgment are handed over to those experts and in this way the risk 
is controlled. This idea of controllable risk is a very desirable product to parents 
wanting to develop their children on outdoor education programmes, or 
individuals wanting the outcomes of adventure tourism. As is the case for other 
expert systems however, if the system fails and loss results, the experts (lawyers, 
surgeons, financial analysts and outdoor experts) are held accountable to the point 
of civil and criminal prosecution. This argument goes some way to explain the 
apparent paradox between increased participation rates in outdoor education and a 
perceived increase in risk aversion by society: individuals increasingly want to 
explore and develop their identity through adventure activities and they control 
the risk in those activities by using experts - hence the increase in participation. 
The use of experts removes individual responsibility from the risk equation and 
therefore when accidents happen, those individuals seek redress from the experts 
who were meant to protect them. The increased safety consciousness, and transfer 
of responsibility of risk control from individual to expert, is interpreted by many 
as risk aversion. This transfer of control to experts in order to manage the risk, 
such that to the participant the risk simply no longer exists, is evidenced by the 
research of Sung et al. ( 1997) who found that in a survey about the definitions of 
"Adventure Travel", the least acceptable definitions involved associations with 
physical danger. 
This lack of personal responsibility for risk is also revealed in negative public 
reaction to incidents that occur during outdoor education experiences. New 
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Zealand is not unique in this regard, as there is a trend of increased official and 
media scrutiny of outdoor education in the wake of high profile incidents, 
especially those involving young people. 
In the United Kingdom in May 1993, a multiple fatality of young teenage children 
at Lyme Bay provoked nationwide media attention. Criminal charges were 
brought against the staff and management of the outdoor education centre 
concerned resulting in convictions, fines and jail terms (Geary, 1995; Laurie, 
1996). Justice Ognall made a call for an immediate and thorough appraisal of the 
running of activity centres as, in his mind, the potential for injury or death was too 
obvious for safety procedures to be left, "to the inadequate vagaries of self 
regulation" (as cited in Bradford, 2000). The UK government introduced a 
specific Act of Parliament [Activities Centres (Young Persons' Safety) Act 1995] 
to manage the perceived risk. This is the only Act of its type in the world. The Act 
imposesd an inspection system on all outdoor centres (excluding schools) dealing 
with children, with rigorous standards of operation required. Discussions with 
Marcus Bailie, head of inspection services for the Adventure Activities Licensing 
Authority (AALA) indicate that there have been no studies done on the effect of 
the introduction of licensing. He believes that in the UK there may have been 
some loss of provision as organisations chose to opt out of working with young 
people and also that provision within schools seems to be under heavy pressure. 
Bailie described the reaction to the Lyme Bay incident to me as "a true moral 
panic", and believes the introduction oflicensing was almost certainly an over-
reaction in as much as it helped fuel the fire of parental and societal paranoia 
(Bailie, 2003b ). 
Another teacher was jailed in 2003 in the United Kingdom for manslaughter 
following the drowning of a student in a swollen stream as part of an outdoor 
education trip. The reaction from teaching unions to this further criminal 
conviction was the threat that all school trips could be cancelled as the personal 
risk to teachers of running such trips was too high (Wainwright, 2003 ). 
Similar serious incidents have also occurred in outdoor education programmes in 
New Zealand. Substantial media attention was given to some recent incidents such 
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as three fatalities of diving students while under instruction at French Pass in 
March, 2000 (New Zealand Herald, 2000a), the drowning of two school students 
while taking part in an outdoor education camp on the Coromandel Peninsula 
(New Zealand Herald, 2000b), the drowning of two school children during a 
canoeing trip operated by a professional contractor on the Clarence River in 
October, 2001 (Perrott & Black, 2001), and the more recent student kayak death 
on the Buller River as part of a tertiary education programme in February, 2002 
(New Zealand Press Association, 2002). All of these incidents took place under 
the supervision of instructors purporting to be skilled and experienced. In addition 
to the loss of life and distress caused to the families of those killed, the negative 
publicity has potential to be very damaging to the outdoor education sector. 
Public attitudes towards such losses have changed radically. Fifty years ago in 
New Zealand, incidents like these were more readily accepted as part of the 
vagaries of life. Nowadays, scrutiny from public officials, often goaded by a 
voracious media, can be intense. When incidents occur the public expect 
accountability and someone to blame. If incidents continue they expect 
government agencies such as the police, Occupational Safety and Health (OSH), 
Maritime Safety Authority (MSA), or the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) to 
move in, fine or imprison those responsible and impose further controls to solve 
the problem. Beedie ( 1996, p.13) notes that, " ... the spectre of potential disaster 
and the implications an accident may have for the image of outdoor education are 
constantly present". 
While no criminal prosecutions have occurred in outdoor education in New 
Zealand to date, the atmosphere is ripe for such an event. The prosecution and 
conviction of Astrid Andersen who had a cycling participant die during a race she 
organised, is seen as ominous by some outdoor commentators (Lynch, 2002). 
Certainly incidents occurring on outdoor trips that result in injury or are even 
near-misses, would not have rated much media attention in the past. Now the 
media seems keen to follow up and give them major profile (Dye, 2004; New 
Zealand Press Association, 2004). The reaction of some principals to the threat of 
liability for themselves and their staff has been to cancel school trips in a very 
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similar move to their British counterparts (New Zealand Herald, 2001; New 
Zealand Herald, 2003; Quirke, 2003). 
p.20 
As explained earlier, the increasing number of outdoor education providers 
indicates that people are seeking out adventurous activities for themselves or their 
children in order to experience challenges and other positive benefits of risk, and 
yet are less willing to accept the negative aspects of those risks - injury or death. 
2.5 The_ Importance of Measuring Accident Rates in Outdoor Education 
In order to judge whether the safety concerns of the public are warranted, it is 
necessary to know what the accident rate is for outdoor education and how this 
compares with accident rates for other everyday activities. The increasing number 
of providers of outdoor education experiences mentioned earlier would indicate 
that there is growing participation in outdoor education. Without having a 
measure of accident rates, it is only conjecture whether the increased media 
reporting of serious outdoor education accidents is due to an increase in accidents, 
an increase in provision with a similar rate of accidents, a temporary aberration, or 
a focus by the media on such accidents leading to a perception of higher rates. 
To measure accident rates requires data on the number of participant days in 
outdoor education programmes and the number of accidents occurring in those 
programmes - preferably sorted by severity. Unfortunately data such as these do 
not exist in New Zealand. A review ofliterature for both Australia and the United 
States reveals that there is a similar lack of data in those countries. What data that 
do exist is explored in Chapter Four. 
This lack of information on accident rates makes it difficult to respond to media 
attention and limit any imposition of increased legal and bureaucratic constraints 
on outdoor education practice. However the reality may be that any death or 
serious injury occurring in outdoor education is unacceptable to the public. 
Brown ( 1998) states that public outrage in the wake of an outdoor accident is 
greatest when: 
• Activities are unfamiliar to the community; 
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• Leaders are professional; 
• Children are involved; 
• Professional standards are compromised; 
• Participants are uninformed; and 
• Community is risk averse. 
Thus, the majority of outdoor education accidents will result in high public 
outrage. 
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Justifying the continued exposure of young people to the risks of outdoor 
education activities becomes problematic. The list above indicates some strategies 
that need to be adopted: the community needs continual education about what 
outdoor education is, the activities involved, and the perceived benefits from 
taking part (It is noted that while I and others have plenty of subjective, anecdotal 
evidence of the benefits of outdoor education, there is a shortage of robust 
empirical evidence that has been subjected to peer review. A number of authors 
have published lists of research findings on the outcomes of outdoor education, or 
meta-analyses of this research [see, for example, Barret & Greenaway (1995); 
Crompton & Sellar ( 1981 ); Rickinson, Dillon, Teamey, Morris, Choi, Sanders & 
Benefield (2004)], however the weaknesses of the individual research studies are 
often masked by these meta-analyses. While these meta-analyses generally 
support the hypothesis that there are beneficial outcomes from outdoor 
educational experiences, the authors of a recent meta-analysis conclude that, "the 
wide variance in findings raises questions about the validity of quantitative 
research for this field, the reliability of instruments used for assessment of pre-
and post-program changes, and the host of unknown variables that may be 
influencing both positive and negative effects of adventure programming" (Cason 
and Gillis, 1994, p.46). Further carefully designed research into the benefits of 
outdoor education would therefore be valuable to our sector); leaders need to be 
operating at the highest professional standards; and, participants and their 
guardians need to be fully informed of the risks. Beyond this the outdoor 
education sector must be able to present clear accident statistics to show that the 
risks are being managed well. Furthermore, safety management systems must be 
developed so that the accident rates decrease even further and serious accidents 
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become rare, otherwise a serious threat is posed to the continuing viability of the 
sector. 
2.6 Sector Response to the Threat 
The outdoor education sector has responded to the call for higher standards of 
operation in different ways in various parts of the world. Priest and Gass (1997, 
p.6) contend that there is currently no consensus in the profession as to how best 
to do this but summarise three main approaches: ( 1) Individual certification - a 
process guaranteeing that certain minimum standards of competency have been 
met or exceeded by a candidate; (2) Programme accreditation - a process 
recognising that a programme or institution has met certain predetermined 
standards of operation; and (3) Outdoor leader preparation - a process in which an 
organisation provides one or more training experiences to 'upskill' an outdoor 
leader and other processes to ensure 'upskilling' continues in the workplace. 
While the third approach is used in all countries, those same countries vary in 
their emphasis on the first two approaches. 
In the UK the main emphasis until recently has been on the certification of 
individuals. There have been extensive instructor award / certification systems 
through National Bodies such as the British Canoe Union and the Mountain 
Leader Training Board since the early 1960s. The systems for the mountain 
awards underwent revision and addition in 1972 following a multiple fatality of 
school children in Scotland in 1971 known as the "Cairngorms Disaster". A 
review of vocational qualifications within the education system in the UK began 
in 1986. Under this framework of National Vocational Qualifications (NVQ), 
standards for the outdoor profession were completed in 1992. This allowed 
individuals to work through national qualifications in the school system and also 
through government and privately registered tertiary agencies. Although the 
NVQs now exist, the Head of Outdoor and Environmental Education at the 
University of Edinburgh has indicated that they are rarely used as a standard and 
that the preference is still for the National Body awards along with degree courses 
from various universities (Higgins, 2005). 
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As discussed earlier, following the Lyme Bay incident, the UK government 
imposed a nationwide licensing system for those providing outdoor experiences 
for young people less than 18 years of age with the introduction of the Activity 
Centres (Young Persons Safety) Act in 1995 (Bradford, 2000). This licensing 
system is similar to the accreditation system for organisations involved in 
experiential education in the United States. 
In the United States there is much less emphasis on instructor awards/ 
certification. Their approach has been to opt for a voluntary system of accrediting 
organisations rather than individuals. The accreditation system, managed by the 
Association for Experiential Education (AEE), involves an audit by a team of peer 
reviewers who check the quality of the management systems of the organisations 
seeking accreditation and the implementation of those systems in the field. A key 
advantage of accreditation promoted by the AEE to organisations is reduced 
insurance costs (www.aee.org). 
As much of the USA risk management focus is on avoiding civil legal action if an 
accident occurs, there is significant discussion of client waivers and how they can 
be effective. Some of the latest writings from the United States on legal defense 
for outdoor education accidents argue that many types of accidents are due to the 
inherent risk of going into the outdoors ( Gregg, 1999a, 1999b ). Inherent risks are 
those so closely associated with an activity that they cannot be eliminated without 
altering the nature of the activity. A provider of services can avoid liability for 
losses caused by such inherent risks by state statutes, case law, or written 
agreements whereby such risks are assumed. The argument therefore is that an 
instructor making a wrong judgment is an inherent risk of outdoor activities that 
can not be eliminated without altering the nature of the activity and therefore must 
be assumed by the participants. 
New Zealand has closely followed the British approach. Prior to the 1980s all that 
existed were a small number of individual award schemes administered by clubs 
and agencies ( e.g., New Zealand Canoeing Association and NZ Mountain Safety 
Council) for their members. A training scheme initiated by a group of outdoor 
groups in 1977, and named the Outdoor Training Advisory Group, failed to 
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capture the interest of outdoor leaders and went into recess in the early 1980s 
when funding stopped. Following the death of a school student at an outdoor 
education centre in New Zealand in 1986 there was a call from the parents of the 
student for a government imposed award scheme for instructors (Moodie, 1998). 
The outdoor sector in New Zealand took proactive steps to set and assess its own 
standards of instructor competence by establishing the New Zealand Outdoor 
Instructor Association in 1987 with a range of instructor awards for various 
outdoor pursuits. Other award systems are offered by organisations such as the 
New Zealand Mountain Guides Association, New Zealand Mountain Safety 
Council, and the Sea Kayak Operators Association of NZ. 
Under the Industry Training Act 1992, the Sport Fitness and Recreation Industry 
Training Organisation (Sfrito) was created. Similar to the British NVQ system, 
Sfrito was tasked by government with breaking down the competencies required 
for employment in each of its sectors into assessable Unit Standards and then 
grouping these into suitable qualifications. This included the outdoor recreation 
sector. Sfrito is now the fifth largest Industry Training Organisation in the 
country based on funding for trainees. 
None of the qualifications mentioned is mandatory to operate as an outdoor 
instructor in New Zealand, although commercial concessionaires require 
minimum standards to operate on Department of Conservation estate. 
Just as legislation forced increased standards in Britain following outdoor deaths, 
the Maritime Safety Authority (MSA) imposed stringent operating conditions and 
standards on the rafting industry in the 1990s following a number of fatal 
incidents. Reports into rafting fatalities show a decreased number for the five 
years following the imposition of the new standards compared to the five years 
preceding the standards. Whether this is due to the new standards or to other 
factors is not known. Whatever, fatalities are still occurring (AdventurePro, 2002; 
Brown, 2003) and I believe that every effort needs to be made to reduce them. 
In 2004 Outdoors New Zealand introduced a voluntary licensing system for 
outdoor education providers called OutdoorsMark based on the AALA scheme. 
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This was launched by the Associate Minister for Education in Parliament and 
received a strong endorsement from the Minister in his speech at the launch. It is 
very early days for the effects of this scheme to be assessed as only five 
organisations hold the license to date (2004) with seven further organisations 
moving through the process. 
Recent risk management practices in the outdoor sector in New Zealand have 
been driven by the Health and Safety in Employment (HSE) Act 1992 and its 
2003 amendment. This has led to a proliferation of paper-based systems whereby 
risks are identified and various management techniques recorded for the benefit of 
the instructional staff working with groups. The recent safety guidelines prepared 
for schools involved in education outside the classroom (EOTC) activities 
promote the use of the Risk Analysis and Management System (RAMS) and 
Safety Activity Plans (SAPS) (Ministry of Education, 2003). These are both good 
examples of paper based systems. My belief is that while systems such as these 
are well-intentioned and can be useful, for many organisations they are completed 
at the behest of management, with the main purpose of protecting the organisation 
from criticism following incidents. In my experience, active instructors rarely 
ref er to them. 
Comment has already been made on the litigious environment that exists in the 
United States. A no-fault accident compensation scheme was introduced by the 
Government in New Zealand in the early 1960s that practically eliminated the 
ability of individuals to sue others for damages in the event of an accident. 
Revisions of this accident compensation scheme that reduced the cover it offered, 
the introduction of legislation such as the HSE Act that includes punitive 
measures, and increased safety consciousness and expectations in society leading 
to police investigations / prosecutions following outdoor accidents are rapidly 
increasing the risks to those who take on the roles of experts supervising others. 
Despite all the approaches and systems used to manage risk in outdoor education, 
accidents are still occurring. The public reaction when accidents occur, and the 
increasing risk of criminal and civil liability, are threatening the viability of 
offering outdoor education experiences to New Zealanders. 
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2. 7 The Knowledge Gap 
I believe there is a lack of knowledge about the relative frequency of outdoor 
education incidents and their underlying root causes. 
p.26 
This lack of information is due in part to a culture within the sector of not sharing 
information about mistakes. Experience suggests that when incidents occur, there 
is a tendency to close ranks, keep heads down, investigate the incident internally, 
and do what can be done within the organisation to prevent similar incidents 
occurring in the future. Organisations try to contain knowledge of any incident to 
avoid adverse publicity, investigation by outside authorities and possible legal 
action. 
Not only are there the legislative and punitive issues to avoid in keeping a low 
profile when an incident occurs, there are the more subtle negative marketing 
issues. There is a competitive environment for students within which no 
organisation wants to concede an edge to other organisations by disclosing 
information that may be interpreted by the public as suggesting their use of unsafe 
practices. 
This research was an attempt to break through the culture of silence about 
incidents occurring in outdoor education. The organisations sampled were asked 
to adopt a shared responsibility approach to the contribution of information for 
this research project. They were encouraged to contribute information on incidents 
with the assurance that it would be analysed in such a way that the anonymity of 
the source would be preserved, while valuable lessons from the cumulative data 
could be derived for distribution throughout the sector. 
2. 7.1 Profile of Outdoor Education Incidents 
Whilst risk can never be reduced to zero when going into the outdoors, neither is 
the risk zero in the course of everyday activities. Currently we do not know, and 
cannot communicate to the public what the accident rates are in outdoor education 
and how they compare to other everyday activities. We do not know as a sector 
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which activities are producing the most incidents or accidents, or which produce 
the most serious injuries. Accurate information may reduce some of the public's 
insecurity surrounding outdoor education safety and create a realistic risk 
assessment in the community. The lack of this information is a key deficit and its 
collection and analysis are essential pre-requisites to effective communication 
among practitioners and with legislators, the public and the media. 
Of course being able to quote statistics about injury and fatality rates is pointless 
if society is not tolerant of any serious incident in outdoor education, and that 
certainly is the case at present. As eloquently put by one experienced outdoor 
commentator, 
"Regardless of the facts we choose to paint a picture of risk in our 
activities, society does not expect people to experience serious injury or 
death in educational or recreational endeavors. These expectations often 
have far more power than our data" (Schimelpfenig quoted in Haddock, 
2003, p.4). 
These same sentiments have been expressed over the years by a number of 
outdoor experts (Ewert, 1984; Hunt, 1998; Mobley, 1981; Ongena, 1981; 
Schultze, 1980). This is all the more reason to work on effective ways to reduce 
incidents, especially ones resulting in serious injuries and fatalities. 
1. 7.1 A Model of Outdoor Education Incidents and Their Root Causes 
As stated above, the risk in the outdoors can never be eliminated but that should 
not be used as an excuse to prevent those of us in the sector doing all we can to 
reduce the occurrence of injuries or death in the outdoors. I believe there is 
potential to learn a lot about preventing future incidents by studying recent 
incidents for their root causes. By developing a model of how outdoor education 
incidents occur including the interaction of the root causes, long term solutions to 
incident producing situations will become apparent. 
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2.8 Summary 
Outdoor education has evolved in New Zealand from activities offered as treats or 
recreation in schools or clubs run by volunteers, to highly structured learning 
experiences run by skilled instructors in dedicated outdoor educational 
organisations. Outdoor education has had a rapid expansion in the last 50 years 
and is now a large employer, with workplaces ranging from small private 
businesses to large outdoor centres. As society has become more risk conscious 
and individuals less willing to accept personal responsibility for risks they face in 
an educational setting, there is increasing public perception that outdoor education 
is dangerous and that someone should be found to blame for any accidents that 
occur. This is a threat to the continued provision of outdoor education. Recent 
legislation that offers the potential for large fines and jail terms increases this 
threat. 
The outdoor education sector has responded to that threat through the 
establishment of instructor award schemes and quality assurance schemes but 
serious incidents are still occurring. My contention is that there is important 
knowledge missing in the sector. Knowing outdoor education accident rates and 
comparing these with the rates of accidents in more common daily activities may 
help dispel the perception that outdoor education is overly dangerous. Having a 
model of how outdoor education incidents occur and an understanding of the root 
causes leading to those incidents will provide a more effective means of avoiding 
such incidents in the future. Also, I believe that using this information, and 
training instructors based on it, will make instructors aware of root rather than 
superficial causes, and this will help reduce the frequency and severity of such 
incidents. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHOD 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the approach taken to achieve the research objective; 
namely how this study constructs a model of an outdoor education incident that 
increases the understanding of the root causes leading to those incidents 
occurnng. 
The chapter falls into two main parts. The first part describes the research 
methodology. The research methodology outlines the principles by which 
adherents to any discipline learn to accept or reject knowledge. The methodology 
is thus the guiding strategy that underlies the research (Aitken, 1980). The second 
part describes the research method - the process by which data were collected, 
analysed and evaluated to result in the model. 
3.2 The Researcher in the Research 
Before discussing both the methodology and the research method, it is important 
to acknowledge my background as this can provide the reader with an insight into 
the motivation to address the research questions, clues about bias that may be 
introduced into the research and possible shortcomings in the findings. 
I am a white, second generation New Zealand male with an academic background 
in the physical sciences. Cause and effect relationships are ingrained in my 
paradigm of how the world operates through a traditional scientific background, 
although work in subatomic physics, including knowledge of the breakdown of 
Newtonian laws and understandings, have evolved attitudes to the post-positivistic 
frame that not everything can be known at once and that there are various ways to 
approach the world. A paradigm of cause and effect relationships is apparent in 
the research title. However, I am aware that any model developed must allow for 
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the wealth of contexts that outdoor education incidents involve and the model will 
remain open-ended because of this. 
I have been involved in the outdoor education sector for over twenty years, and 
have been the Director of the Sir Edmund Hillary Outdoor Pursuits Centre of New 
Zealand for 14 years. I hold national instructor qualifications across a range of 
outdoor activities, was a national assessor of those qualifications for a number of 
years, was instrumental in forming the New Zealand Outdoor Instructors 
Association, am currently a board member on the Sport, Fitness and Recreation 
Industry Training Organisation and New Zealand Outdoors. I recently helped 
develop a quality assurance scheme for outdoor providers (OutdoorsMark) and am 
currently the Chair o(the Register of Outdoor Safety Auditors. 
The motivation for this research comes from being in the role of a Director of an 
outdoor centre employing 18 instructional staff at any one time and being 
accountable for the educational and safety outcomes of over 4000 students 
annually. One fear of any person in my position is having to explain to a parent or 
other loved-one that his / her son or daughter has been killed or badly injured in 
an accident while on one of our programmes. Observations made over years of 
instruction and managing other instructors, and the follow-up of incidents that 
occurred over those years, gave me indications that common factors often lay 
behind incidents and that these needed to be formally identified. This research is 
an attempt to do just that; but this history, while being a motivator, also points to 
underlying biases and preconceptions that must be guarded against. These 
preconceptions may cause me to subconsciously ignore, or attach less importance 
to, certain evidence that does not support my beliefs. 
The research is concerned with developing a model of outdoor education incidents 
and the root causes of those incidents that is derived from empirical data and 
existing theory. In acknowledging the potential causes of bias explained above, I 
am more aware of them and can guard against their impact. As will be explained 
in the research methods section, I have made extensive use of expert peer review 
of both empirical findings and model development to help limit the impacts of the 
potential sources of bias on the validity of the outcomes of the research. 
Toward~ Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.31 
3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Background to the Methodological Framework. 
Traditionally it has been thought that the choice of a suitable methodology, 
" ... depends on ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of 
reality and the best ways of gaining access to that reality ... " (House, 1994, p.15). 
Two principle paradigms evolved that had strong advocates for their view; 
paradigms being defined as the world views or belief systems that guide 
researchers (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). These two paradigms are the 
positivist/empiricist approach using what are termed quantitative methods and the 
constructivist/phenomenological approach using qualitative methods 
( Cherryholmes, 1992; Guba & Lincoln, 1994 ). 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) ascribed five axioms to both positivist and naturalist 
(their version of constructivist) paradigms. These axioms are shown in Table 2 
along with a sixth axiom, deductive logic, that has been added by Tashakkori and 
Teddlie ( 1998) based on the writing of many authors ( eg., Goetz & LeCompte, 
1984; Patton, 1990). 
These contrasts were so black and white that researchers separated into two 
camps, each rigorously defending their methodological stance. This led to a period 
of paradigm debates, some referring to this period by the stronger term of 
"paradigm wars" (Gage, 1989; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
As the debates continued, social researchers started writing of a continuum of core 
assumptions, and thus a continuum of approaches, to the investigation of social 
sciences, rather than simply two discrete categories of positivist versus 
constructivist I phenomenologist (Hussey & Hussey, 1997; Morgan & Smircich, 
1980). Lather ( 1992) for example, writes of at least four different terrains and 
boundaries of methodology. The first is a positivist map where a researcher 
moves about using a realist ontology, detached from everyone and everything. 
Second is an interpretivist map with hermeneutics, phenomenology and 
constructivism as some of the landmarks. The researcher tries to find meaning in 
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context and tries to understand the world. Multiple realities and ways of knowing 
are acknowledged. The third and fourth maps are termed critical map and 
deconstructionism respectively, both of which are more closely aligned to 
working with participants to change them and their world. 
Table 2 
Contrasting Axioms Between the Positivist Paradigm and the Constructivist 
Paradigm (based on Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 7 & JO) 
AXIOM POSITIVIST PARADIGM CONSTRUCTIVIST 
PARADIGM 
Ontology (nature of There is a single reality There are multiple 
reality) constructed realities 
Epistemology ( the The knower and the The knower and the 
relationship of the known are independent known are inseparable 
knower to the known) 
Axiology (role of values Inquiry is value free Inquiry is value bound 
in inquiry) 
Generalisations Time and context-free Time and context-free 
generalisations are generalisations are not 
possible possible 
Causal linkages There are real causes that It is impossible to 
are temporally precedent distinguish causes from 
to or simultaneous with effects 
effects 
Deductive logic There is an emphasis on There is an emphasis on 
arguing from the general arguing from the 
to the particular, or an particular to the general, 
emphasis on a priori or an emphasis on 
hypothesis (or theory) grounded theory 
Out of these debates, a new group emerged calling themselves pragmatists. These 
people believe that the differences between the two paradigms have been 
overstated, that quantitative and qualitative methods are compatible and that 
researchers could make use of both methods in the same research (Brewer & 
Hunter, 1989; Datta, 1994; House, 1994). Pragmatists believe therefore that not 
only are quantitative and qualitative methods compatible, but the most appropriate 
methods should be chosen based on the research questions that are posed. These 
methods need not be a choice between qualitative and quantitative methods but 
can be a combination of the two methods as well, using the strengths of each in its 
appropriate place. They argue that research on any given question at any point in 
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time falls somewhere on the research cycle shown in Figure 1. Research on any 
substantive matter travels through this cycle at least once before it ends and it 
therefore it doesn't matter where on the cycle a researcher starts. Pragmatists 
accept that they have a choice of using either inductive or deductive logic in the 
course of their research, but they can also use both types simultaneously in a 
mixed model study (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 









From Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998, p. 25) 
!Deductive Reasoning 
Many now accept that the paradigm wars are at an end and a large range of 
methodologies are accepted as valid by the research world (Cresswell, 2003; 
Hammersley, 1996). Tashakkori and Teddlie ( 1998) divided these methods into 
~ 
three broad categories: 
• Monomethods where a researcher can adopt a purely quantitative or 
qualitative approach. 
• Mixed method studies where qualitative and quantitative approaches are 
combined into a single study. 
• Mixed model studies where quantitative and qualitative techniques are 
combined within the different phases of the process from design of the 
study through data collection to analysis. 
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Tashakkori and Teddlie ( 1998) went on to suggest taxonomies of both mixed 
methods designs and mixed model designs. Other writers (e.g., Cresswell, 2003) 
on the subject of mixed methods did not differentiate a third category as shown 
above. These researchers have also produced taxonomies of various mixed 
methods (Cresswell, 2003; Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989; Patton, 1990). 
Cresswell believed all mixed methods can be described by three general 
strategies, although there are several variations within each strategy: 
• Sequential procedures in which a researcher seeks to elaborate or expand 
on the findings of one method with another method. 
• Concurrent procedures in which the researcher converges quantitative 
and qualitative data in order to provide a comprehensive analysis of the 
research problem. This technique includes variations of triangulation 
techniques referred to by other writers ( e.g., Campbell & Fisk, 1959; 
Denzin & Lincoln, 2000; Jick, 1979) where data sources are combined 
across methods in an attempt to cancel the biases in each of those 
respective methods. 
• Transformative procedures in which the researcher uses a theoretical lens 
within a design that contains both quantitative and qualitative data. 
This well-documented body of knowledge about mixed method research 
approaches shows its widespread acceptance and validates the pragmatist 
paradigm. This provides four predominant paradigms that are used as the 
foundation for any research as shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 
Comparisons of Four Important Paradigms Used in Social and Behavioural 
Sciences (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 23) 
Paradigm POSITIVISM POSTPOSITIVISM PRAGMATISM CONSTRUCTIVISM 
Methods Quantitative Primarily Quantitative + Qualitative 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Logic Deductive Primarily Deductive Deductive+ Inductive 
Inductive 
Epistemology Objective Modified dualism. Both objective Subjective point of 
point of view. Findings probably and subjective view. Knower and 
Knower and objectively "true" points of view known are inseparable 
known are 
dualism 
Axiology Inquiry is Inquiry involves Values play a Inquiry is value-
value free values, but they may large role in bound 
be controlled interpreting 
results 
Ontology Nai"ve realism Critical or Accept external Relativism 





Causal Real causes There are some There maybe All entities 
linkages temporally lawful, reasonably causal simultaneously 
precedent to stable relationships relationships, shaping each other. 
or among social but we will It's impossible to 
simultaneous phenomena. These never be able to distinguish causes 
with effects may be known pin them down from effects 
imperfectly. Causes 
are identifiable in a 
probabilistic sense 
that changes over 
time 
3.3.2 Methodological Framework and Overview of the Method Used/or this 
Study 
In order to construct a model of an outdoor education incident, that increases an 
understanding of the root causes of those incidents, a pragmatist paradigm was 
adopted. Pragmatism was appropriate for this study as I believed the best way to 
achieve the research objective was to incorporate a mixture of quantitative and 
qualitative data and quantitative and qualitative analysis techniques in the research 
method. An outline of the methodological approach used is shown in Figure 2. 
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Phase One - Chapter 5 
i Sample I Selected .. 
r-----------------1,----------. 
: Profile of outdoor 
education incidents 
in New Zealand is 
produced 
Predictors of serious 




data analysis 1-----, 
Phase Two - Chapter 6 
Theoretical lens 
developed from a 
literature review Model ofan 
outdoor education 
incident and its root 
causes is produced 
'---------- _______ .,/ 
"V 
Phase Three - Chapter 7 
This methodological approach is an example of a transformative procedure as 
described by Cresswell (2003) in the last section. Data from phases one and two 
of the research were transformed into a model of an outdoor education incident by 
employing a "theoretical lens" of an incident developed through a literature 
review from the fields of safety management and psychology. 
Each of the phases of the research design is explained in concept below to give an 
understanding of the methodological approach. Each step in the method itself has 
a detailed explanation in Section 3.4. 
Phase One of the research was purely quantitative in nature. In this phase, existing 
incident data were collected from outdoor education providers throughout New 
Zealand for a sample period of 1996 - 2000 inclusive. The phase had three 
outcomes: 
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• The data were analysed using statistical methods and a profile of outdoor 
education incidents was produced that included incident rates, frequencies of 
incidents occurring of differing severity of outcomes, and the ratio of 
occurrences between those categories of severity. 
• Statistical methods were also used to identify a number of variables that can 
be used as predictors of serious injury if an incident occurs. 
• The compiled database of incidents was used to select more serious incidents 
for further study by other methods. 
Phase Two of the research employed mixed methods. A sample of incidents that 
had the potential for serious injury was selected for further study. The instructors 
who were leading the groups at the time were asked to provide retrospective 
accounts of their incidents and their impressions on what had led to those 
incidents. These narratives and other commentaries from the instructors were 
reviewed by Delphi panels of outdoor experts. Using their expert knowledge and 
lengthy experience in the outdoors, the Delphi members were tasked with 
identifying what they believed were the root causes of the incidents under study. 
Delphi members were asked to identify any root causes in two categories: those 
related to errors made by the instructor; and those that could be linked to errors in 
the organisation's safety management systems. These two categories had been 
predetermined by a theoretical conceptualisation of an outdoor incident developed 
through a literature review (Chapter 4) and used as a 'lens' to focus the study. I 
compiled the results from the Delphi members and sent the compilation back to 
the Delphi panel for verification of the results. The instructor concerned was also 
involved in this verification cycle. This continued until no further changes were 
proposed by the Delphi members. 
This analysis by Dephi panel members involved the interpretation of the 
instructor's perceptions of what occurred which would have been influenced by 
the instructor's feelings, values and perceptions; both at the time of the event and 
after. Such an approach demonstrated the following characteristics and benefits 
of a qualitative approach (my italics in list below for emphasis): 
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• Occurs in a natural setting involving human behaviour and events 
(Cresswell, 2003). In this case the data consisted of retrospective accounts 
but these were based on real examples that happened in natural settings as 
opposed to hypothetical incidents or constructed simulations. 
• The researcher is the primary instrument in data collection rather than 
some inanimate mechanism (Eisner, 1991; Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990; 
Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1998) Although the primary data 
collection tool was a written narrative of the incident under study, this was 
done in such a way as to try to preserve the context of the situation and the 
impressions and subjective views of the instructor concerned. This is very 
different from a data collection device such as a survey using Likert scales 
which would be more typical of a quantitative study. 
• The data are reported in words rather than numbers (Fraenkel & Wallen; 
1990; Locke, Spirduso & Silverman, 2000; Marshall & Rossman, 1999; 
Merriam, 1998). The data in this study were reported in words. 
• The focus is on participant's perceptions and experiences and the way 
they make sense of their lives (Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990; Locke et al., 
1987; Merriam, 1998). The focus within the data collection of each case 
study was on the participant's perceptions and experiences and the way 
they made sense of the incident in which they were involved. 
• Focuses on the process that is occurring as well as the product or 
outcome. Researchers are particularly interested in understanding how 
things occur (Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990; Merriam, 1998). The outcome 
that is the focus of this study is the process that led towards the incident 
occurring, not the mere fact that the incident occurred. 
• It is an emergent design in its negotiated outcomes. Meanings and 
interpretations are negotiated with human data sources because it is the 
subject's realities that the researcher attempts to reconstruct (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985; Merriam, 1998). Through an iterative Delphi panel process 
and by involving the instructor concerned in iterations of this cycle, 
themes emerged to produce a negotiated result. 
• It relies on the utilisation of tacit knowledge (intuitive and felt) because 
often the nuances of the multiple realities can be appreciated most in this 
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• 
• 
way (Guba & Lincoln, 1985). The tacit knowledge of the Delphi members 
was used to interpret the data. 
The researcher seeks believability based on coherence, insight and 
instrument utility (Eisner, 1991) and trustworthiness (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985) through a process of verification rather than through traditional 
validity and reliability (Cresswell, 2003). The Delphi process exemplifies 
this approach. 
It favours purposeful sampling over random sampling (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985). Purposeful sampling was used to select those incidents that had the 
potential for serious injury but between incidents offered a broad range of 
activity type, setting and instructor gender. 
Once the Delphi process had identified the specific root causes for each case 
study, I then used a grounded theory approach to categorise general types ofroot 
causes to build a taxonomy of root causes that lead to an outdoor education 
incident. 
The original methodologies of grounded theory were developed in collaborative 
studies by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in the 1960s and their results were 
first published in their pioneering book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory 
( 1967). Glaser and Strauss' work on grounded theory was revolutionary because it 
ran counter to thoughts at the time amongst researchers that theory and research 
are separate entities, that quantitative methods are superior to qualitative methods 
because of the lack of rigour in the latter, and that qualitative research could not 
result in theory development (Charmaz, 2000). Glaser and Strauss' goal was to, 
" ... empower researchers with an open, generative, emergent methodology ... by 
giving them an honest approach to the data that lets the natural social organisation 
of substantive life emerge" (Glaser, 1995, p.7). 
Glaser's writing about grounded theory has been described as being dense and full 
of abstract terms which made it inaccessible to many readers (Charmaz, 2000). 
The technique also came under attack for the obvious and subtle positivistic 
premises underlying the logic of the method itself. Later work by Strauss (1987) 
and Strauss and Corbin ( 1990) made the techniques more accessible to a wider 
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audience, while developments such as constructivist grounded theory have taken 
the methodology into the middle ground between postmodemism and positivism, 
offering accessible methods for a range of research paradigms (Charmaz, 2000; 
Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Glaser, in later years, became frustrated by what he 
believed was an overanalysis of the technique. He stated that it is a general 
method to use on any kind and mix of data and is particularly useful with 
qualitative data, that it is a simple method, often over-analysed and rewritten in 
studies to be unrecognisable to him the originator. His advice to researchers 
wanting to use grounded theory is to, " .... just refer to it, and then just do the 
study" (Glaser, 1995, p.7). 
The process of grounded theory involves, " ... the researcher alternating between 
inductive and deductive thought. First, the researcher inductively gains 
information which is apparent in the data collected. Next, a deductive approach is 
used which allows the researcher to tum away from the data and think rationally 
about the missing information and form conclusions based on logic. When 
conclusions have been drawn, the researcher reverts to an inductive approach and 
tests these tentative hypotheses with existing or new data. By returning to the data 
the deductions can be. supported, refuted or modified ... It is this inductive / 
deductive approach and the constant reference to the data that helps ground the 
theory" (Hussey & Hussey, 1997, p.70). 
Cresswell (2003, p.14) defines grounded theory as that, " ... in which the 
researcher attempts to derive a general, abstract theory of process, action or 
interaction grounded in the views of participants in a study. This process involves 
using multiple stages of data collection and the refinement and interrelationship of 
categories of information (Strauss & Corbin, 1990, 1998). Two primary 
characteristics of this design are the constant and emerging categories and 
theoretical sampling of different groups to maximise the similarities and the 
differences of information". 
The process of grounded theory is used here because as Hussey & Hussey (1997, 
p. 70) state, "The purpose of grounded theory is to build theory that is faithful to 
and which illuminates the area under investigation. The intention is to arrive at 
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prescriptions and policy recommendations with the theory which are 'likely to be 
intelligible to and usable by, those in the situation being studied, and is often open 
to comment and correction by them' (Turner, 1981, p.226)". 
In this study detailed information was gathered from instructors based on selected 
case studies of incidents. This information was examined by Delphi panel 
members for root causes of the incidents. I identified themes within the collection 
of root causes allowing me to group the root causes into general types of root 
causes that are naturally occurring. These findings were fed back to the instructor 
and Delphi members for their feedback on my interpretation of the information 
sent to me. In this way the themes or categories that were uncovered from each 
case study were grounded in information from the Delphi panel. 
Figure 3 shows how this phase of the research fits the inductive logic of a 
qualitative study. 
Following the identification of the general categories of root causes, quantitative 
techniques were used to compare the frequency of occurrence of specific 
categories over the range of case studies to try to establish the importance of the 
categories in incident causation. This quantification of qualitative data is 
commonly used in mixed method research (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). 
Finally, once these general categories of types ofroot causes had been identified, 
they were compared with the predictors of incidents that result in serious injury, 
that were identified in Phase One of the research, to see if there was compatibility 
between the results. 
In Phase Three, I compared possible root causes of outdoor education incidents, 
that had been identified through a comprehensive literature review, with those 
identified in Phase Two, to produce a taxonomy of error for the outdoor education 
sector. These results were passed through the theoretical "lens" or perspective of 
the proposed incident model developed from the review of literature. This use of a 
theoretical lens was applied throughout the research to guide the study, raise 
questions and decide what issues were important (Cresswell, 2003). 
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Figure 3. The inductive logic in the qualitative phase of this study 
Researcher forms generalisations or 
theories to past experiences and 
literature 
t 
Researcher looks for broad patterns, 
generalisations or theories from 
themes or categories 
r 
Researcher analyses data to form 
themes or categories 
i 
Researcher asks open-ended questions 
of participants or records field notes 
r 
Researcher gathers information 
( e.g., interviews, observations) 
Stages in inductive logic of a qualitative 
study (Cresswell, 2003, p.132). 
r----------------
R e searcher generalises to form a 
taxonomy of error of an outdoor 
education incident and from this 
constructs a model of an outdoor 
education incident 
Researcher looks for broad patterns, 
generalisations to categorise root 
causes 
r 
Delphi panel use iterative process to 
identify root causes 
i 
Researcher asks open-ended questions 
of instructors involved in incidents 
i 
Researcher gathers information 
about incidents and selects case 
studies 
Stages in this study 
It is recognised that the final taxonomy of error and the model of an outdoor 
education incident are only frameworks towards understanding the processes 
involved in such an incident. The study of a finite number of case studies of 
incidents will not reveal the total number of possible root causes that can result 
from the interaction of humans with other humans and the environment. However, 
it will result in the identification of a number of themes or categories of root 
causes that can be built on and added to by other researchers as more information 
becomes available. Outdoor educators will be able to take this framework and if it 
is found appropriate, apply it to specific situations, and suggest additions and 
alterations as those contexts dictate. 
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3.3.3 Summary 
In summary, this section has justified the use of a mixed method approach to 
accomplish the research objective. A quantitative approach was used to 
investigate overall incident rates and to identify factors that have led to past 
incidents. A qualitative approach, that employed grounded theory techniques, was 
used to identify the root causes of outdoor education incidents. Quantitative 
techniques were used with the identified root causes to attempt to gauge a measure 
of the importance of each root cause. Finally, a model of an outdoor education 
incident and the root causes of that incident are formulated. It is only through the 
adoption of the pragmatist paradigm that quantitative and qualitative techniques 
could be combined in such a manner. 
3.4 Method 
3.4.1 Overview. 
As shown in Figure 2, this research is a mixed methods design that was divided 
into three phases. The actual design utilised is shown in more detail in Figure 4. 
The method employed in each phase and the rationale for it will be explained in 
the following sections: 
3.4.2 Phase One - Quantitative data collection and analysis 
3.4.3 Phase Two - Qualitative data collection and analysis followed by 
quantitative analysis 
3.4.4 Phase Three - Transformation of results through theoretical lens. 
3.4.2 Phase One - Quantitative Data Collection and Analysis 
The purpose of this phase of the research was threefold: 
• To provide background information on incident occurrence in the New 
Zealand outdoor education sector by building a profile of such incidents; 
• To identify any variables that may be predictors that serious injury is likely 
to result from an incident where the variable is present; and, 
• To act as a database of incidents from which case studies could be selected 
for further study. 
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Figure 4. Research method used in this study 
1) Sample chosen: Research 
restricted to incidents recorded at the 
larger NZ outdoor education centres in 
the years 1996-2000 
2) Quantitative data collected: 
A database of incidents was collated for 
the years 1996-2000 
4) Case Studies Selected: From 
the profiled incidents, 18 incidents with 
potential for serious consequences were 
selected for further analysis 
3) Quantitative data analysed: The 
data were analysed to produce a profile of 
outdoor education incidents in NZ and the 
predictors of serious injury were identified. 
5) Qualitative data collected: The 
instructor in charge of the group involved in 
the case study incident undertook a 
structured computer-based interview 
6) Qualitative data analysed 
6a) Delphi Panel Analysis: Each case 
study interview was sent to six members 
of a Delphi Panel of outdoor experts 
who were asked to identify root causes 
of the incident. 
+ 
6b) Case Study Model: 1 collated the 
findings of the Delphi Panel and 
produced a diagram for each incident 
that illustrated the flow of the incident 
and the root causes identi lied 
6c) Delphi Panel Check: The diagram 
of the incident was sent to the delphi 
panel members and the instructor 




suggested to the 
diagram? 
6d) Taxonomy of error produced for the 18 incidents: I combined the results of all 18 
case studies to produce a taxonomy of error for the outdoor education incidents. 
6e) Establishing importance of the root causes: I used quantitative techniques to 
establish the relative importance of the identified root causes. 
6f) Triangulation of taxonomy with earlier data: I tested the taxonomy to check 
consistency with the predictors of serious injury discovered earlier 
p.44 
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7b) Theoretical lens: 
A taxonomy of error and 
model of an incident, 
generated by reviewing 
existing literature was used 
as a lens to focus the 
researcher's thoughts 
7a) OE Incident Model Produced. 
Combining the empirical results in stage 6d 
with the theoretical results of a literature 
review, a proposed taxonomy of error and 
model of an incident was produced for the 
outdoor education sector 
+ 
7c) Delphi 
Review: The model 
and taxonomy were 
tested for validity 
through a Delphi Panel 
process 
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3.4.2.1 Sample Selection - Sampling Organisations 
The purpose of a structured sampling technique in any quantitative study is to be 
able to generalise the results of the study to the larger population from which the 
sample is drawn (Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990; Hussey & Hussey, 1997). 
As explained in chapter two, there are probably in excess of 800 individuals and 
organisations offering outdoor education experiences in New Zealand. 
Approaching all of those organisations for incident data was beyond the resources 
of this study and it is highly unlikely that many of those organisations, especially 
smaller ones, collected incident reports. This study was purposely limited to larger 
outdoor education organisations ( defined for this study as those organisations 
having three or more full-time paid staff) as these were the organisations most 
likely to be keeping incident records and have staff available to respond to 
questions in a timely manner. 
Outdoors New Zealand (ONZ), an umbrella membership organisation for outdoor 
groups, provided a list of 25 outdoor organisations from their database that met 
these criteria. Each organisation was contacted by mail and asked if they were 
prepared to contribute their incident data. They were ensured anonymity for their 
contribution and the details of specific incidents. Of the 25 organisations, 12 
offered to contribute their data. The other 13 did not contribute for various 
reasons: one organisation simply did not want to take part, seven others failed to 
respond to the initial request and a follow-up request, one believed they did not 
meet the criteria for contributing organisations, two did not keep incident records, 
and two indicated that their records did not include any incidents of interest. 
The sample studied was therefore a convenience sample (Fraenkel & Wallen, 
1990). Because of the convenience nature of the sample, there is a possibility that 
bias has entered the data which may make generalising to the population of 25 
larger outdoor centres invalid. For example organisations with poor incident 
records may have chosen not to contribute for fear of exposing themselves to 
criticism, despite the guarantee of anonymity. There did not appear to be any 
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pattern in the organisations that did not take part and therefore no specific issues 
of non-response bias could be identified. 
Although only 12 of the 25 organisations chose to contribute, the 12 organisations 
contained all of the larger providers and I believe they collectively represent well 
in excess of 50 % of the outdoor education student days being carried out by this 
part of the sector. On this basis, I argue that the results are indicative of the 
population of larger outdoor education providers in New Zealand, but care would 
need to be taken to extrapolate the results further to the wider population of 800 
providers. 
3.4.2.2 Data Collection Towards Establishing a Profile of Outdoor Education 
Incidents 
Collection of quantitative data began in late 2001 and was completed by mid-
2002. Because of the need to interview participant instructors in selected incidents 
in Phase Two of the research, the fact that instructors are itinerate by nature and 
move frequently not just within New Zealand but internationally and therefore 
may be hard to trace a long time after an incident, and also to make the data 
collection phase manageable, incidents were restricted to the timeframe of 1996 -
2000 inclusive. 
A database was built using Microsoft Access to store the data from the various 
organisations. The intent was to capture as much richness in the data as possible 
by having a wide number of fields / variables which would allow greater scope for 
analysis. A list of potential fields was established from existing incident report 
forms - the Wilderness Risk Manager's Committee Incident Report Form and the 
Outdoor Safety Institute Incident Report Form. The data for any field/ variable 
would be useful only if the majority of the organisations who had agreed to 
contribute actually recorded that information in their incident reports. For this 
practical reason the fields included in the database were limited to: 
• Incident Number 
• Organisation (coded and code only known to researcher) 
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• Year of incident 
• Accident outcome 
• Pre-existing condition? 
• Time of day 
• Major injury/illness/other 
• Secondary injury/illness/other 
• Days lost on programme because of incident 
• Person injured (student/instructor/other) 
• Gender of instructor 
• Whether under instruction at the time of incident 
• Brief narrative of incident 
• Severity of incident 
• Potential severity of incident 
It was anticipated that the last two fields / variables would not necessarily be 
recorded by the organisations. However I considered it was important to attempt 
to estimate both the actual and potential severity of the incidents to aid later 
analysis. Safety management experts believe that serious incidents are preceded 
by different causal factors than less serious ones (Petersen, 1988) however serious 
incidents are fairly rare and therefore it is also important to investigate those 
incidents that had the potential for serious outcomes (Bird & Germain, 1989). 
To complete these two fields for any incident, I created an accident severity scale 
based on a partially developed scale by Priest (1996a). The resultant severity scale 
is shown in Table 4. I presented this scale at the Risk 2002 conference where over 
100 outdoor practitioners, managers and theorists were able to review it and 
present feedback. It was well received and has subsequently been included in the 
latest edition of Haddock's (2003) Mountain Safety Council Outdoor Safety 
Manual. I read the narrative for each incident and made a subjective judgment of 
the actual severity of the outcome of the incident against the severity scale shown, 
and also the potential severity of the incident scenario. The assumption in doing 
this is that incidents are the culmination of a number of factors coming together to 
produce an accident potential. Once the sequence has been initiated, the type and 
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degree of loss are somewhat a matter of chance, depending partly on fortuitous 
circumstance and partly on actions taken to minimise the loss (Bird & Germain, 
1989). 
Table 4 
Accident Severity Scale 
Losses not related to participants 
GROUP DESCRIPTION OF DESCRIPTION DESCRIPTION OF DESCRIPTION OF DESCRIPTION 
>- 0 t: z DESCRIPTOR INJURY OF ILLNESS PSYCHOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT AL OF 
c:: ;2 OR EMOTIONAL DAMAGE EQUIPMENT U,l > z 
~~ DAMAGE DAMAGE 
1 Minor or Splinters, insect Minor irritant Temporary Littering Minor cost 
short term bites, stings embarrassment 
2 impact on Sunburn, scrapes, Minor cold, Temporary Minor damage to >$50 
individual(s) bruises, minor cut infection embarrassment environment that 
that does not with peers will quickly 
have a large recover 
3 effect on Blisters, mild Minor asthma, Shown up in front Scorched >$100 
their hypo/hyperthennia, cold, upset of group campsite, plant 
participation minor sprain, stomach, etc damage 
in the minor dislocation 
pro1m1mme 
4 Medium Lacerations, Mild flu, Does not want to Burnt shrubs, cut >$500 
Impact on frostnip, minor migraine participate again in life branches to 
individual(s) bums, mild this session bum, washed 
that may concussion group dishes in 
prevent stream, etc 
5 participation Sprains& Flu, Wants to leave Walked through >$2,000 
in the hyperextensions, gastroenteritis, group. A lot of sensitive 
programme mod vomiting work to bring back ecological area 
fora day or hypo/hyperthennia, m. destroying some 
two minor fracture plant life 
6 Major Fractures, Serious Leaves group and Destroyed/killed >$8,000 impactori . dislocations, asthma attack, requires on site some example of 
individual(s} frostbite, major serious counseling flora/fauna 
'tbatwoiM · bum infection, 
mean they medical 
were unable treatment 
to continue required 
7 with large Arterial bleeding, Infection or Therapy/counseling Killed, destroyed >$20,000 parts of the severe illness causing required by or polluted small 





8 Life· Spinal damage, Major illness Long tenn therapy Killed example of >$50,000 
changing concussion requiring required after protected species 
effect on hospitalisation incident 
9 individual(s) Single death Single Death Suicide because of Fire or pollution > $250,000 
or death. incident etc resulting in 
area of wilderness 
being destroyed 
10 Multiple fatality Multiple Multiple fatality Major fire or > $1,000,000 
fatality pollution causing 
serious loss of 
environment or life 
Adapted and Expanded from the Accident Frequency Severity Chart (Priest, 1996) 
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In addition to this incident data, the contributing organisations were asked for a 
summary of their activity in terms of student days of instruction for the year. 
Collecting these data enabled incident I accident rates to be calculated. 
All 12 outdoor organisations that agreed to take part in this study had a formalised 
incident recording system. Gaining access to the contents of the incident records 
at each organisation caused some challenges, mostly with regard to the 
willingness of the organisations to release their data offsite. Of the 12 
organisations only one had a computer database of incidents. The remainder had 
hard-copy forms. One organisation collated the yearly forms into an annual 
summary of incidents. Across the 12 organisations, data were entered in the 
following way: 
• One organisation provided a CD of their incident data for the five year 
period in an Access database. These data were able to be migrated into the new 
database with minimal problems. 
• Eight organisations sent either original incident reports or photocopies of 
original reports. Each of these had to be read and the data typed into the Access 
database. 
• Three organisations would not release their incident reports. To enter data 
required a site visit to their offices, original reports read, and data added to the 
Access database. 
Of the 12 organisations, nine had complete records for the five year period, one 
had records for four of the five years and two had records for only three of the five 
years. 
Arranging to have incident reports couriered, site visits to several of the 
organisations at a mutually convenient time and the task itself ofreading and 
inputting data, meant the process of data collection took over six months and 
resulted in 1906 incidents being identified and included in the study. 
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3.4.2.3 Data Analysis 
The quantitative data were analysed using a number of simple descriptive 
statistics to make comparison with incident statistics from other sources. It was 
also possible to use non-parametric inferential statistics to look in more depth at 
the interaction of some of the variables. This will be explained in greater detail 
when discussing the results in chapter five. 
3.4.3 Phase Two - Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis 
The purpose of this phase of the research was to identify the root causes of a 
number of case studies of serious outdoor education incidents. Once these root 
causes had been identified for the individual case studies, then common groupings 
of those root causes were classified as general types. The resulting classification 
was then analysed to see if any of these types were more prevalent across the case 
studies than others. Finally, the predictors of serious injury identified in Phase 
One were compared to this list of root causes to assess consistency in the findings. 
Collecting data on outdoor education incidents to investigate the root causes of 
those incidents was not without problems. The data needed to be collected from a 
natural setting to help ensure validity of the findings rather than, for example, 
using simulation techniques. Following instructors in charge of groups hoping to 
observe an incident in progress would be inefficient in time and unethical for the 
researcher, because once the conditions for an incident were seen to develop, it 
would be necessary to intercede to prevent harm or injury. For these reasons it 
was considered that the best way to collect data was to use incidents that had 
already occurred and gather information from those who were involved in the 
incident. 
3.4.3.1 Sample Selection - Choosing Case Studies of Serious Incidents 
From the profile of incidents compiled in Phase One, a sample of serious incidents 
was taken for further study. Serious incidents were defined for this study as those 
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that had a potential for, or resulted in, loss at level 6 and above on the Severity 
Scale shown in Table 4. 
In considering how many cases to study in this phase of the research, it was 
important to consider why the data were being collected: I was trying to identify 
the root causes of outdoor education incidents to construct a model of an outdoor 
education incident including a taxonomy of the root causes of the incident. As 
discussed by Patton (1990), there is a big difference between quantitative and 
qualitative sampling. Quantitative sampling concerns choosing enough cases (n = 
large number) in a truly random and statistically representative fashion so that the 
results can be confidently generalised from the sample to the larger population. 
Qualitative sampling typically focuses on relatively small samples, even single 
cases (n=l) selected purposefully. The cases are selected on the basis of being 
information rich and having the potential for significant learning about issues 
central to the study of the research. 
In deciding sample size Patton (1990, p.184) stated that, "There are no rules for 
sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on what you want to 
know, the purpose of the inquiry, what's at stake, what will be useful, what will 
have credibility, and what can be done with the available time and resources." 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend sample selection to the point of redundancy, 
where the sampling is terminated when no new information is forthcoming. 
However Patton commented that, 
"sampling to the point of redundancy is an ideal, one that works best for 
basic research, unlimited time lines, and unconstrained resources ... I 
recommend that qualitative sampling designs specify minimum samples 
based on expected reasonable coverage of the phenomenon given the 
purpose of the study and the stakeholder interests. One may add to the 
sample if information emerges that indicates the value of change. The 
design should be understood to be flexible and emergent. Yet, at the 
beginning ... one specifies a minimum expected sample size and builds a 
rationale for that minimum, as well as criteria that would alert the 
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researcher to inadequacies in the original sampling and / or size." (Patton, 
1990, p.186). 
K vale ( 1996) also states a preference for quality rather than quantity when it 
comes to the number of subjects studied. 
This sample was chosen to create a model of an outdoor education incident and 
taxonomy of root causes for those incidents. This taxonomy includes the human 
factors leading to poor instructor judgment and performance, and management 
system errors. The number of root causes was unknown. I also concede that due to 
restrictions on time and resource inherent in this study, and the diversity of 
contexts in which outdoor education experiences occur, that it was unlikely that 
all root causes would be identified through this study. Any taxonomy produced 
will remain open for additions in the future as new knowledge and research comes 
to light. It is acknowledged that taxonomies of error are never static but change as 
new knowledge is gained (Johnson, 2000). Johnson proposed a technique to 
overcome this described as 'case based reasoning and information retrieval tools'. 
Case-based reasoning uses computer searches of accounts of incidents for key 
words, and their similes, in order to identify new types to be added to a taxonomy. 
In this way, as a new root cause is added to a taxonomy, large databases of 
previously analysed incidents can be searched quickly for these key words or 
'cases' and statistical analysis carried out. Computer Assisted Interviews (CAI) 
similar to those that were collected during this research could easily be used in 
this manner. 
The Multiple Causation Principle (Bird & Germain, 1989) of incidents indicates 
that each incident will be the result of a combination of a number of errors. 
Therefore, if the incidents were chosen for diversity, I believed that a sample size 
of twenty incidents would be sufficient to provide a good range of information. 
Time and resource constraints did not warrant choosing a sample larger than 
twenty, and subsequent research beyond this study will continue to develop the 
taxonomy and model that resulted. 
For these reasons I restricted collection to a maximum of 20 incidents. The 
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incidents were purposefully selected using what Patton (1990, p.172) described as 
"maximum variation sampling". This strategy is designed for purposeful sampling 
aimed at capturing and describing the central themes or principal outcomes that 
cut across a great deal of participant or programme variation. The apparent 
weakness of dealing with a small number of samples of great heterogeneity is 
turned into a strength because, "any common patterns that emerge from great 
variation are of particular interest and value in capturing the core experiences and 
central, shared aspects or impacts of the programme" (Patton, 1990, p.172). 
Patton continued by saying that the results of analysing small samples of great 
diversity are two key findings: (1) high quality, detailed descriptions of each case 
which are useful for documenting uniqueness; and, (2) important shared patterns 
that cut across cases and derive their significance from having emerged out of 
heterogeneity. This approach seemed ideal for this particular study where the aim 
was to discover a range of root causes of incidents and also point to specific root 
causes that are particularly prevalent in an attempt to prevent incidents in the 
future. 
This technique of maximum variation sampling also allowed me to choose cases 
that are described by Patton as "critical cases" (cases where maximum application 
to other cases is possible), "politically important cases" ( cases where the results 
will attract attention to the study), and "intensity cases" (information rich cases 
that manifest the phenomenon intensely). These advantages of purposive sampling 
had to be weighed against the possible issues of generalising the results, 
especially as the sample was also based on available subjects (Babbie, 1989). 
Methods used to ensure the reliability and validity of the results are discussed in 
Section 4.4. 
Patton ( 1990) stated that the technique for getting maximum variation in a small 
sample involves identifying diverse characteristics or criteria for constructing the 
sample. I decided to choose incidents for study that exhibited diversity in the 
following characteristics: 
• Type of activity involved 
• Where the activity took place 
• Organisation involved 
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• Gender of instructor 
There were no fatalities among the contributing organisations during the study 
period, but wherever possible incidents with the highest actual or potential 
severity were chosen while trying to maintain the diversity within the sample as 
mentioned above. I would have liked to include 'instructor experience' as a 
variable, but this information was not included in any of the incident reports and 
would have been almost impossible to determine for the instructors involved in 
retrospect. 
The results of Phase One of the research gave a potential pool of 59 accidents to 
choose from that occurred while under instruction and that resulted in an injury 
with a severity rating of six or more. This was not considered a big enough pool to 
ensure the diversity of sample required, especially with the anticipated problems 
of getting access to the instructor concerned in any accident and then agreement of 
that instructor to take part in the study. The sample pool was increased by adding 
accidents and near misses that occurred while under instruction and that had the 
potential for serious injury. This provided a pool of 299 incidents from which to 
choose a sample. 
The incidents were grouped by activity type and their potential severity. As 
discussed in the next section, the data analysis technique utilised three separate 
expert panels to review incidents. For this reason, it was decided to try to choose 
three incidents representing an activity type so that the sample of incidents within 
each expert panel would be diverse but between expert panels would be similar. In 
the first instance, a sample was chosen of four incidents in each of the following 






• Rock climbing 
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• Ropes Course 
• Sailing 
• Sea kayaking 
• Tramping 
• Tube rafting 
• Miscellaneous (including vehicles) 
The rationale for choosing four incidents in each activity type was the anticipation 
that it might be difficult tracking down the instructors concerned and then getting 
their agreement to take part in the study. Therefore four were selected in the hope 
of getting three participants for the study. In a similar way 11 activities were 
chosen in the hope of getting seven activities with three participants agreeing to 
participate in each. The expectation was that the sample chosen was large enough 
to provide 20 incidents for in-depth study. 
The resulting 44 incidents occurred across nine of the 12 organisations who 
contributed data. The nine organisations were contacted and permission was 
sought to identify the instructor involved and then contact the instructor to see if 
they would participate in the study. After some time had elapsed, permission was 
received from seven of the nine. The remaining two prepared legal confidentiality 
agreements which were later signed and permission was received some months 
after the others. Incident descriptions of the sample were sent to the relevant 
organisations and they researched the name and contact details of the instructors 
involved; ninety per cent of whom no longer worked in the organisation 
concerned. When and if the name and address of an instructor could be located, 
the instructor was contacted and asked if they would agree to participate. 
Anonymity was guaranteed. 
A combination of untrackable instructors, those not wanting to participate and 
those not replying to a request after two follow-ups, resulted in 12 instructors 
agreeing to take part from the sample of 44 incidents. A further 20 incidents were 
chosen from the original database to try to increase the number of participating 
instructors. These were chosen from activities in the list above where it was most 
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likely to get a total of three participants based on those organisations who had 
responded to requests for instructor details in the timeliest manner. This second 
batch of incidents resulted in a further eight instructors agreeing to participate, 
giving the total of 20 participants required. A summary of the incidents that were 
available for in-depth study is shown in Table 5. There seemed to be no pattern 
emerging in terms of the characteristics of those who chose not to participate and 
therefore it was not possible to identify any form of non-response bias introduced 
by this. 
3.4.3.2 Data Collection - Narratives of Serious Incidents 
Once the sample was chosen, an appropriate method of data collection was 
required. The method used for data collection was important in that it needed to 
maximise the reliability of the data while also employing a collection method that 
could be replicated beyond this study. 
The data that were required for each incident under study was a recollection of the 
events leading up to the incident that could be analysed for root causes. Interviews 
of the instructors in charge of the incident therefore became a central method of 
data collection as they were the most expert observer of the incident. Other 
potential data sources were the students involved in the incident or a manager 
within the employing organisation who had the responsibility for internal review 
of the incident. Students were dismissed as data sources because it was extremely 
unusual for an incident report to record student details. Even if an occasional 
name existed, finding contact details would have been a challenge. Incorporating a 
management person in charge of incident analysis was considered and built into a 
preliminary research method, however this had to be dismissed when it was 
discovered that the personnel in each of th~ organisations in this role had changed 
at least once between the incidents occurring and data collection. 
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Table 5 
Summary of Serious Incidents Where the Instructor Concerned Agreed to an In-
Depth Study 
# DATABASE ACTIVITY GENDER OF 0RGANISA TION 
REFERENCE INSTRUCTOR 
I 126 Tramping Female I 
2 576 Tramping Male 3 
3 261 Tramping Male 1 
4 1471 Kayaking Female 6 
5 42 Kayaking Male 1 
6 636 Kayaking Female 3 
7 281 Canoeing Male 1 
8 292 Sit-upons Female 1 
9 1515 Canoeing Male 6 
10 611 Rafting Male 3 
11 43 Tube rafting Female 1 
12 59 Tube rafting Male I 
13 857 High ropes Male 11 
14 321 High ropes Female 1 
15 1649 Bridge jump Male 6 
16 318 Mtn. Bike Female 1 
17 728 Driving Male 9 
18 845 Rock Male 11 
19 1909 Kayaking Male 11 
20 1911 Rock Male 11 
3.4.3.2.(a) Interview rationale 
Interviews take a wide variety of forms. The most common form involves 
individual face-to-face verbal interviews but they can also take the form of group 
interchanges, mailed or self-administered questionnaires and telephone surveys. 
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An interview can be structured, semi-structured or unstructured. The use of 
interviewing to acquire information is extensive today with increasing focus on 
how things happen rather than what happens (Atkinson & Silverman, 1997; 
Fontana & Frey, 2000). 
I initially considered a research method that would employ unstructured, face-to-
face interviews with outdoor leaders who had been involved in incidents while 
leading groups. However, keeping in mind that beyond this study incident 
databases may be kept by agencies with no direct contact with those involved in 
the incident, this method was seen to have problems for future applications. Also, 
it is well documented that interviewers can consciously or subconsciously enter 
bias into their questioning of causes of incidents. This is due to selective 
perception in that they will see what they want to see and can ignore what does 
not fit their preconceptions (Hogarth, 1980; Rasmussen, 1990; Slovic, 1966). 
Rasmussen ( 1990) discussed this point in describing how causal sequences are 
arrived at in analysing incidents. The analysis of incidents occurs by way of 
causal back-tracking until all conditions are explained to the satisfaction of the 
person conducting the analysis by "abnormal but familiar events or acts" (p.452). 
What causes an analysis to be considered finished is set by stop rules. Rasmussen 
argued that "stop-rules" are not usually formulated explicitly: 
"The search will typically be terminated pragmatically in one of the 
following ways: (a) an event will be accepted as a cause and the search 
terminated if the causal path can no longer be followed because 
information is missing; or (b) a familiar, abnormal event is found to be a 
reasonable explanation; or (c) a cure is available. The dependence of the 
stop rule upon familiarity and the availability of a cure makes the 
judgment very dependent upon the role in which a judge finds himself. An 
operator, a supervisor, a designer and a legal judge will reach different 
conclusions" (Rasmussen, 1990, p.452). 
Scheurich (1995) in his postmodemist critique ofresearch interviewing discussed 
the dynamics of the interview and how the result can be influenced by both the 
interviewer and the interviewee, and the interaction between them. 
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"Some of what occurs in an interview is verbal. Some is non-verbal. Some 
occurs only within the mind of each participant (interviewer or 
interviewee), but it may affect the entire interview. Sometimes the 
participants are jointly constructing meaning but, at other times, one of 
them may be resisting joint constructions. Sometimes the interviewee 
cannot find the right words to express herself or himself and, therefore, 
will compromise her or his meaning for the sake of expediency. There 
may be incidences of dominance and resistance over large or small 
issues .... A participant may be saying what she thinks she ought to say; m 
fact, much of the interaction may be infused with a shift between 
performed or censured statements and unperformed and uncensored 
statements" (Scheurich, 1995, p.244). 
Mishler ( 1986) talked about asymmetries of power between the interviewer and 
interviewee that can distort the outcome of an interview. Lekburg (1997) carried 
out work that illustrated the biases that different experts introduced when 
analysing particular incidents. 
To get over some of these problems, "We need methods that remain true to the 
performance of interest with minimal intrusion of the decision analysts 
preconceptions" (Carroll, 1980, p.70). 
Johnson (2000) suggested a system of computer based interviews to help resolve 
some of these issues. A candidate for interview is presented with a computer 
programme or email based questionnaire that guides the interviewee through a 
series of framed questions. This forms the basis of a structured interview. Issues 
of power plays between the two parties are minimised using this technique and the 
questions or frames can be addressed at the convenience of the candidate as there 
are no imposed timeframes or expectations. This form of an interview, termed by 
some as a 'virtual interview' is predicted to increase in popularity as a research 
method (Fontana & Frey, 2000). 
It was decided to utilise Johnson's technique in this research project as it met the 
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success criteria for this study expressed earlier, of collecting data and also 
allowing external agencies to collect similar data beyond this study. A computer 
assisted interview (CAI) tool was developed as outlined in section 3.4.3.2.(b) to 
carry out this process. The knowledge that computers and email communication 
are almost universally accepted among the outdoor fraternity, especially as 
instructors are often global travelers and rely on technology for communication, 
helped reassure that any resistance to this form of data collection would be 
minimal. 
This form of interview, although not traditional, allowed all the "seven stages of 
interview investigation" suggested by K vale ( 1996) to be met. The seven stages 
being: 
( 1) Thematising: formulating the purpose of the investigation and 
describing the concept of the topic to be investigated before the interviews 
start; 
(2) Designing: Designing the study to obtain the necessary knowledge; 
(3) Interviewing: Conduct the interviews based on an interview guide; 
(4) Transcribing: prepare the interview material for analysis usually by 
transcribing oral speech to written text (note: this stage becomes 
redundant); 
(5) Analysing: decide on which methods of analysis are appropriate; 
( 6) Verifying: ascertain the reliability and validity of the interview 
findings; and 
(7) Reporting: Communicate the findings of the study in a readable 
product. 
3.4.3.2(b) Interview questions and format 
The purpose of the interview was to retrieve information about the incident that 
was as accurate and complete as possible. It was acknowledged that retrospective 
reports on any event are prone to error. These errors can be due to problems with 
encoding of the information as the event occurs, the storage of information for 
later recall, or the retrieval process itself which can be affected by stress, emotion 
or beliefs (Milne & Bull, 2000). Some respondents may even selectively mask or 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.6/ 
distort attitudes and responses in order to be seen as what they perceive the 
researcher desires, or how they would like to be seen by those reviewing the 
interview (Edwards, 1957; Henderson, 1990; Orne, 1962). These potential sources 
of error in the information retrieved from the interviews had the propensity to be 
accentuated in this case where the incidents were often traumatic, involved stress 
for the instructor being interviewed and where the interpretation of the instructor's 
actions by third party experts put that instructor at risk of being seen to have poor 
skills and judgment. It was not the intent of this research to look deeply into the 
mechanisms of these biases entering the incident recall, but rather to adopt 
interview techniques and analysis techniques to minimise these effects from 
invalidating the results. 
The Enhanced Cognitive Interview (ECI), developed by cognitive psychologists 
Fischer and Geiselman ( 1992) has proven to be one of the most effective 
techniques in retrieving maximum information (Milne & Bull, 2000). This 
technique is deemed to be the most applicable with interviewees who are acting in 
good faith to recall memories and is very suitable for use in outdoor incident 
review because of the similarity with outdoor education facilitation techniques 
and ethics (Wright & Merrill, 2003). The structure of the ECI process is shown in 
Table 6. 
The CAI tool used in this study was developed to follow the ECI stages as closely 
as possible within the limitations of the virtual format. A copy of the CAI tool is 
included as Appendix 2. The relationship between the stages of the CAI and the 
phases of the ECI are outlined below: 
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Table 6 
Structure of the Enhanced Cognitive Interview (Milne & Bull, 2000, p.40) 
PHASE l Greet and personalise the interview - establish rapport 
PHASE 2 Explain the aims of the interview 
• Report everything 
• Transfer control 
• No fabrication or guessing 
PHASE 3 Initiate a free report 
• Context reinstatement 
• Open-ended questions 
• Allow for pauses 
• Don't interrupt 
• Non-verbal behaviour 
PHASE4 Questioning 
• Questions from free report 
• Concentrate 
• Report everything 
• No fabrication or guessing 
• OK to say "Don't know" 
• OK to say "Don't understand" 
• Activate and probe an image 
• Open and closed questions 
PHASE 5 Varied and extensive retrieval 
• Change the temporal order 
• Change perspectives 
• Focus on all senses 
PHASE 6 Summary 
PHASE 7 Closure 
Phase I: Greet and personalise the interview - establish rapport. 
As the CAI is a computer-based tool, establishing rapport between myself and the 
interviewee was less important. It was important to ensure that the interviewee 
was receptive to the process and freely giving information. It was also important 
that my position, as outlined in section 3.1 of this study, did not impact overly on 
the interviewee responses. For these reasons a personable yet professional 
approach was taken with any email and mail correspondence with the interviewee, 
background information on the importance and objectives of the study were 
included and the introduction in Section 1 of the CAI reinforced the voluntary 
nature of the contribution, the preservation of anonymity of the interviewee and 
the ability to ask further questions at any stage to enhance clarity. In Section 3 of 
the CAI, the interviewee was told that the process would take some time to 
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complete and was invited to set aside enough time to fully complete the interview 
at one sitting. In addition, they were reminded that they should be in a suitable 
frame of mind to revisit this incident which could evoke bad memories. No time 
limit was placed on completing the process. 
Phase 2: Explain the aims of the interview 
Section 3 of the CAI deals with this phase. The background information that 
accompanies the CAI explained the objectives of the research. Section 3 of the 
CAI explained that the interviewee was to write exactly what happened based on 
their memory of the events - and to be careful not to embellish the facts with what 
they would have liked to have done with the benefit of hindsight. An advantage of 
the computer format is that control of the process and pace of the interview had 
been completely transferred to the interviewee. 
Phase 3: Initiate a free report 
In this phase of an ECI, the investigator initiates a context reinstatement, helping 
the interviewee go back to the place or context where the incident occurred. This 
is believed to help the recall process (Milne & Bull, 2000). After the context 
reinstatement, the interviewee recollects the events at their own speed, without 
interruption or questioning by the investigator. The CAI echoed this approach in 
Sections 4, 5 & 6. The interviewee was reminded of the incident that was the 
subject of the interview, they were then guided to return to the time of the incident 
in their memory by trying to recall what was happening for them on that month, 
week and day. They were then given a series of cues to focus them even more 
closely on the events, feelings and conditions before the incident. Finally, they 
were asked to provide a narrative of the events leading up to the incident until a 
point at which the incident was resolved. The benefit of the CAI approach was 
that control was firmly in the hands of the interviewee in terms of speed and there 
were no distractions from the interviewer seeking clarification on any points 
raised. 
Phase 4: Questioning 
Phase four of an ECI consists of asking questions concerning missing or unclear 
information. The lack of immediate interviewer/ interviewee interaction made 
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this phase a weakness of the CAI approach compared to a traditional unstructured 
interview approach. This weakness was partially resolved by the feedback stage of 
this research design, where the interviewee was sent a summary of the incident 
based on the expert panel's analysis of the incident. At that time they were able to 
comment on any perceived inaccuracies in the interpretations. 
Phase 5: Extensive and varied retrieval 
The ECI technique encourages different strategies to obtain more information. 
The CAI tool used three techniques to try to elicit more information: In Section 7, 
the interviewee was asked to construct a timeline of events which may have 
prompted different memories to surface which would lead them to go back and 
add to the narrative they had written in Section 5; Section 8 used a temporal order 
technique (Milne & Bull, 2000), where the interviewee was asked to work 
backwards through the incident to identify key decision points during the incident. 
Once again this different perspective on the incident may have prompted different 
memories of the event; and Section 9 of the CAI allowed for any other comments 
to be added about the incident that may not have been directly prompted by the 
other sections. 
Phases 6 & 7: Summary and Closure 
The ECI technique promotes presenting the interviewee with a brief summary of 
the information that the interviewee has provided, encouraging questions or 
correcting anything that does not sound right. Following this, the interview should 
be closed on a positive note. The CAI technique provided the opportunity for a 
summary of the event to be forwarded by email (Section 10 of the CAI) so that the 
interviewee could comment on the accuracy of the interpretation. The interview 
either stays open if they agreed to this extra stage or is closed at this point 
In summary, the 'interview' consisted of two main parts; (1) Interviewees were 
asked to write a personal account of the incident including all relevant 
components including planning, preparation, contributing events, etc. They were 
cued by questions to recall and document their thoughts and decisions at the 
various stages of the event; and, (2) They were asked to progress backwards 
through the incident from the time that the incident was identified to identify key 
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moments at which they believed that a different decision would have resulted in 
no incident or a diminished severity of incident given the benefit of '20/20' 
hindsight. They were asked to reflect on what factors they believed led them to 
make the decisions they did. 
The two parts of the CAI process are distinct. The first part, a personal written 
account some time after the incident, may be one of the first times the person has 
had the opportunity to work through the incident in detail in a structured way. 
Langer and Applebee (1987) reported that writing shapes thinking and that the 
more we manipulate information and work with it, the better we understand it. 
Through writing we are able to transfer the meaning from our minds to a text so 
that we can review it, reflect on it, and change it. Goody (1977) said that, "writing 
puts a distance between a man and his verbal acts. He can now examine what he 
says in a more objective manner. He can stand aside, comment upon, even correct 
his own creation ... " (p.150). Mishler quoted several scholars who claim that 
storytelling is universal and is, "the primary way ... human beings make sense of 
their experience" (Gee, quoted in Mishler, 1986, p.68). Through writing a 
personal account of the incident the interviewee had the opportunity to relive the 
events, cognitively sort the events and look for contributory causes they may not 
have considered before in a nonantagonistic, nonadversarial environment. 
The second part of the CAI causes them to take a different view of the incident: to 
think backwards through the incident trying to identify key decision points. It was 
hoped that this would produce a greater richness of detail for later analysis. 
3.4.3.2.(c) Conducting interviews 
Before conducting any interviews the interview questions and format were 
submitted to the University of Waikato's School of Management Human Research 
Ethics Committee for approval. This study closely followed the University of 
Waikato's general principals for ethical research involving human participants. 
Upon agreeing to take part, each instructor was sent a consent form, further 
information on the study, a floppy disk with the CAI tool recorded on it that had 
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been personalised to his / her incident, and a self-addressed, stamped package in 
which to return the completed CAI floppy disk and consent form. As part of the 
CAI information the instructor was given my email address should they have any 
questions about the process. 
Although some interview participants returned their completed CAI's in a timely 
manner, the majority required prompting. The most tardy respondents needed 
multiple follow-up letters, emails and phone calls to elicit the completed CAL 
It should be noted that completed CAI' s for Incidents 19 and 20 were never 
received. The instructor involved in Incident 19 died in an outdoor related 
accident before he was able to return his interview data. The instructor involved in 
Incident 20 never completed his interview despite repeated promises from him 
that this would happen. 
This phase of data collection took almost 12 months to complete. The result was 
18 fully completed CAI interviews of incidents with serious or potentially serious 
consequences. 
3.4.3.3 Data Analysis 
The qualitative data gathered from the instructors involved in serious outdoor 
incidents needed to be analysed to establish the root causes of the incidents. The 
intent of this analysis was to compile a taxonomy of the root causes and from this 
to construct a model of outdoor education incidents. 
As explained earlier, the building up of a model or theory from empirical data is 
termed grounded theory. The data needed to be read and analysed for what were 
considered to be root causes of the outdoor education incidents under study. This 
analysis of personal accounts is a common form of qualitative research. Mishler 
(1986) describes analysis where lines of words are decontextualised and divided 
into monads of supposedly unambiguous meaning. The reductive monads of 
meaning are then assembled into discovered aggregates through categorising, that 
is, "the process of grouping concepts that seem to pertain to the same phenomena" 
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(Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p.65). These aggregates were compared across 
interviewees. 
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Lincoln and Guba ( 1985) describe this as inductive analysis and compare it to 
content analysis, a process aimed at uncovering embedded information and 
making it explicit. Two essential subprocesses are involved with inductive 
analysis, unitising and categorising (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Unitising involves a 
process in which the raw data are systematically coded into units which permit 
precise description of relevant content characteristics (Holsti, 1969). Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) describe categorising as sorting the units into provisional 
categories or broader themes that may arise from this initial coding. Strauss and 
Corbin ( 1990) describe the interaction of linking categories and subcategories as a 
mechanism to produce grounded theory. Grounded theory is therefore inductively 
derived from the study of the phenomen~n it represents. That is it is discovered, 
expanded, and verified through systematic data collection and analysis of data 
pertaining to that phenomenon. 
The data gathered from each instructor through the CAI interview process, as 
discussed earlier, were only that one person's perceptions of what occurred at the 
time. It has already been shown that, through no fault of the interviewee, these 
perceptions have probably been distorted by the processes of memory and the 
subjective nature of recall. Any analysis of the interview data needed to be 
subjectively extrapolated to include root causes that may not have been explicitly 
included in the interview, but which may have contributed to the event. This 
extrapolation was done on the basis of expert opinion from people with extensive 
experience in the outdoor education sector, who had been in similar situations 
themselves and therefore could envision conditions and events which may have 
been present but had not registered in the interview material. 
Being an expert in the outdoor education sector myself, one possibility for 
analysis was for me, as researcher to analyse the data. This idea was dismissed as 
one person's subjective interpretation of the data alone would not lend validity to 
the final taxonomy and incident model that is the desired outcome of this research. 
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For this reason a Delphi technique was employed for the analysis of the data. 
3.4.3.3.(a) History and application of the Delphi Technique 
The technique was developed by Olaf Helmer and Norman Dalkey of the Rand 
Corporation in the 1950s. The US Airforce was trying to find a way to establish a 
reliable consensus of opinion among a group of experts about how Soviet military 
planners might target the US industrial system in an attack and how many atomic 
bombs would be needed to have a specified level of impact on US Military 
capability. This was the original 'Project Delphi' (Underhill, 2004). The name 
was not applied by the founders of the technique, but was labeled 'Delphi' as a 
joke by colleagues at Rand Corporation; the technique being used to forecast 
future occurrences was compared to the Delphi temple in ancient Greece which 
was the seat of the most important oracle of Apollo (Turoff & Hiltz, 2004). 
The Delphi technique has evolved over the decades since into a family of 
techniques rather than a single procedure (Martino, 1983; Underhill, 2004). 
Linstone and Turoff proposed a view of the Delphi method that they felt best 
summarised both the technique and its objective: "Delphi may be characterised as 
a method for structuring a group communication process, so that the process is 
effective in allowing a group of individuals, as a whole, to deal with complex 
problems" (Linstone & Turoff, 1975, p.3). The individuals described being chosen 
for their expertise in the field under study. Turoff and Hiltz (2004) state that the 
Delphi method is an example of an 'Expert System' used to capture the 
knowledge of a group of experts and store it for utilisation by non-experts. 
The Delphi technique is now widely used and applicable in research studies across 
many fields of enquiry (Linstone & Turoff, 1975; Mullen, 2000; Rowe & Wright, 
1999; Underhill, 2004). It can be used for any purpose for which a committee 
might be used (Martino, 1983 ). Lins tone and Turoff ( 197 5) describe the 
techniques and applications of the Delphi method and list as one of the properties 
of an application that lends itself to Delphi, "The problem does not lend itself to 
precise analytical techniques but can benefit from subjective judgment on a 
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collective basis" (p.4 ). This confirms that the Delphi technique is appropriate for 
the analysis of the data in this study. 
3.4.3.3.(b) What is the Delphi technique? 
As discussed above, Delphi is a family of techniques rather than one technique. 





An expert panel 
A series of rounds in which information is collected from panelists, 
analysed and fed back to them as the basis for subsequent rounds 
An opportunity for individuals to revise their judgments on the basis of 
feedback 
Some degree of anonymity for their individual contributions (Underhill, 
2004). 
The Delphi Panel is a collection of experts in the area under investigation, but the 
group members never meet each other or discuss the issue as a collective. Instead 
they receive information at their individual location, are asked for their expert 
opinion, this is collated by someone outside the panel and the group results are 
sent out for further comment by the panel in an iterative loop. 
The Delphi panel then is acting as a form of dispersed focus group where the 
members of the group do not interact directly, for the purpose of maintaining 
independent thought. The use of focus groups in the formulation and testing of 
instruments and development of these tools is well documented (Merton & 
Kendall, 1946; Morgan, 1988; Templeton, 1987). Templeton (1987) defines such 
a focus group as: "A small, temporary community, formed for the purpose of the 
collaborative enterprise of discovery. The assembly is based on some mutual 
interest. .. 'Grouping' fosters the kind of interaction that penetrates the impression 
management and uncovers some basic motivations" (p.5). 
There are obvious advantages to using a Delphi process. These advantages include 
a reduction in time and cost in having group meetings, especially when the experts 
are geographically spread, and individuals being able to contribute their opinions 
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more freely when they are not hindered by the social issues that can prevail in 
some group situations (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). Turoff and Hiltz (2004) 
believe the most important and often least understood properties of the Delphi 
method are the ability for asynchronous interaction and the anonymity of 
respondents. 
• Asynchronous interaction refers to the two characteristics by which 
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respondents may: ( l) choose to participate in the group communication process 
whenever they want to - any time of the day or night; and (2) contribute to that 
aspect of the problem they feel best able to contribute. In face-to-face approaches 
the group is forced to take a sequential path through the group problem-solving 
process. This fails to take into account variety in the individual's approaches, 
skills and cognitive abilities leading to some of the group not contributing. The 
Delphi method aims to tackle any problem from a variety of different perspectives 
and the asynchronous form of interaction helps to ensure this happens. 
• Anonymity has the advantages that individuals: can put forward initial 
expressions of an idea that may not tum out to be suitable without losing face; can 
change their minds about concepts without having to defend this change; do not 
get biases about ideas because of who introduced the idea; do not get swayed by 
influential contributors in the group who are able to argue their point well or who 
hold status in the community already. 
Turoff and Hiltz (2004) comment that the introduction of computers through on-
line contribution to the group process has enhanced the Delphi method and 
allowed further refinement in some cases. 
The criteria for choosing experts to join the Delphi panel is left to each researcher, 
although Helmer & Rescher ( 1959) suggest that experts are usually selected for 
their extensive knowledge of the subject of interest and track record as a predictor, 
while Scheele (1975, p.70) suggests that panel members will normally come from 
one of four groups: 
• Stakeholders - people directly affected by the issue under consideration 
• Experts - people with an applicable specialty or known experience 
• Facilitators - people with skills in clarifying and analysing 
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• Individuals with alternative global views on culture and society. 
Although the Delphi method has been commonly used for panels of 30 - 100 
individuals who could not function well in a face-to-face situation (Turoff & 
Hiltz, 2004), there are no set rules in the literature for the number of experts 
comprising a Delphi panel. Studies have used as few as six or seven in a panel 
(Dalkey & Helmer, 1963; Turner, 1992). 
Neither is there a set number of rounds in the iterative loop. Custer, Scarcella & 
Stewart ( 1999) suggest it is normal to have three rounds, while other literature 
suggest anywhere between two rounds as a minimum and five as a maximum 
(Coy, 1995). In a review of the effectiveness of the Delphi technique, Rowe & 
Wright ( 1999) considered 27 different Delphi studies which used between two and 
seven iterations. While it could be argued that iterations should continue until the 
result is stable, in that no further change is suggested by the panel members, there 
is evidence to suggest that no significant improvement occurs after the second 
round (Dalkey, 1969; Rowe & Wright, 1999). 
The researcher has the role of moderating and facilitating the responses from the 
panel members, putting them into a summary form that can be easily interpreted 
by the panel in the subsequent round. Turoff & Hiltz (2004) state that this 
function of analysis is a principal contribution to the improvement of the quality 
of the results in any study. They suggest the analysis must have these specific 
objectives: 
• Improve the understanding of the participants through the analysis of 
subjective judgments to produce a clear presentation of the range of views and 
considerations, 
• Detect hidden disagreements and judgmental biases that should be 
exposed for further clarification, 
• Detect missing information or cases of ambiguity in interpretation by 
different participants, 
• Allow the examination of very complex situations that can only be 
summarised by analysis procedures, 
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• Detect patterns of information and sub-group positions, 
• Detect critical items that need to be focused on. 
This concurs with Linstone & Turoff ( 1975) who state a number of reasons for the 
Delphi failing. These include: imposing the researcher's views and preconceptions 
upon the analysis and not allowing for other perspectives related to the problem; 
poor summarising techniques and presentation of the group response; ignoring the 
contributions of some panel members so that dissenters drop out of the study; and, 
underestimating the demanding nature of the Delphi as it is not an integral part of 
the panel member's job function. 
The knowledge of these objectives to help ensure success of the analysis, and the 
pitfalls that can be encountered, were incorporated into the final Delphi method 
design used in this study. 
3.4.3.3 (c) The Delphi method for this study. 
The desired outcome of the Delphi process was an analysis of the 18 CAis to 
establish the root causes of the incidents. The workload involved in reading the 
interview material and making a subjective interpretation of the root causes was 
estimated to be several hours for the first iteration and less for successive 
iterations. For this reason, it seemed unreasonable to expect any one expert 
panelist to analyse all 18 incidents while remaining focused and committed to the 
task. With this in mind the 18 incidents were divided into three subgroups. It was 
thought that anyone volunteering their services as a Delphi Panel member would 
be intrinsically motivated to be involved because they would be interested in the 
process and the results of the study. Six incidents were considered to be 
manageable for each expert. Each group of incidents was analysed by a separate 
Delphi panel. The incidents were divided among the three panels to provide as 
wide a variety of activity type within each panel as possible and as similar a range 
of activities between panels as allowed by the data collected. The use of multiple 
Delphi panels to make analysis more manageable is well documented in the 
literature (Best, 1974; Custer, Scarcella & Stewart, 1999; Turner, 1992; Turoff & 
Hiltz, 2004). 
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Outdoor experts were selected for the Delphi panels based on their depth of 
experience across a range of outdoor activities and contexts. To make the 
selection I used the databases of the New Zealand Outdoor Instructors Association 
(NZOIA) and Outdoors New Zealand (ONZ). The NZOIA is an organisation that 
assesses outdoor instructors against a set of standards and at different levels of 
expertise. These NZOIA qualifications are recognised by all members of the 
outdoor community in New Zealand. Members ofNZOIA holding national 
qualifications in outdoor activities were contacted by email, given details of the 
research study and asked for registrations of interest in being a member of a 
Delphi panel. It was stated in this email that an ideal panel member would have at 
least ten years' experience instructing in the outdoor sector across a range of 
activities and an understanding of the principles of risk management would also 
assist in managing the task. 
As explained above, there is no set number of experts on a Delphi panel. Linstone 
and Turoff (1975) discuss the balance in establishing the right number of people 
for the panel: The more people on the panel, the greater the ability to create a true 
picture of reality from a combination of subjective views. The decision was made 
to set up panels of six outdoor experts for the first iteration, plus my input. The 
instructor who was involved in that particular incident was included in the panel 
for subsequent iterations in order to give his/ her input into the experts' combined 
analysis of the root causes of the incident. The instructor of the incident was 
included because he / she was an expert for that particular example. This inclusion 
of the instructor was to prevent possible misinterpretation of the incident account 
by the experts. Susan Noffke ( 1990) describes all research as violence, in that any 
attempt at interpreting events is bound to introduce change from the reality of 
those events. Including the instructor in the individual Delphi panel helps reduce 
the level of this "violence". The "violence" that was trying to be controlled in this 
case refers to the interpretation of the sequence of events by the experts, rather 
than trying to limit any extrapolation by the exp~rts from those events to establish 
root causes. Therefore, the inclusion of the instructor acted as a form of 
triangulation to reduce bias and increase validity of the results. This will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this thesis. It was considered that this number 
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of panelists would provide a good spectrum of expert subjective opinion while 
remaining manageable. 
I received 25 expressions of interest from potential expert panel members. Each 
potential member was then contacted, asked for a brief CV of outdoor experience, 
given details about the workload, and the need for prompt processing of the 
interview material. As the Delphi would be conducted by email, access to internet 
was essential. Based on the responses to this information and the C.V.s of outdoor 
experience provided, 18 experts were chosen and divided into three Delphi panels: 
coded green, red and yellow for my benefit. The experts were chosen for the three 
panels such that each panel had a similar gender mix and included experts with a 
range of outdoor activity expertise. 
CAI data were emailed to each of the experts for the first of the incidents in each 
group of six incidents. No pre-analysis of the interviews was carried out because I 
did not want to influence the possible root causes that were to be uncovered by the 
different experts. Also, as Linstone and Turoff ( 1975, p.59) point out, "A Delphi 
should not be undertaken to validate concepts which you have already developed 
and refined; panelists want to make significant contributions and these will 
seldom build meaningfully on highly elaborated initial concepts". The experts 
were asked to identify both conditions leading to the incident occurring and root 
causes of the specific incident. The instructions sent to the panel members are 
included in Appendix 3. 
Once all six experts had returned their findings for a particular incident, I 
combined the findings into an Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECF A) 
diagram for the incident (Buys, Clark, Kingston-Howlett & Nelson, 1995) (NB: 
Section 4.7 explains this technique in detail). This provided a diagrammatic 
representation of what the experts had collectively identified as the causal factors 
for the incidents and how they were linked chronologically. A diagrammatical 
representation of incident scenarios is recommended to simplify otherwise 
complex situations in order to make them more easily understandable to those 
wishing to learn from them (Pidgeon, 1989; Toft & Turner, 1987). The ECF A 
technique is used because it is particularly suited to the multifactorial nature of 
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incidents involving employee errors and it: 1) assists the verification of causal 
chains and event sequences; 2) provides a structure for integrating investigation 
findings; and 3) assists communication both during and on completion of the 
investigation (Buys et al., 1995). It was anticipated that the diagram could be 
easily interpreted by the experts who would identify their contribution to the 
analysis and how it related to the ideas that other experts contributed. 
The timing of each iteration was therefore dependant on the slowest response 
from any expert in any group. Despite agreeing to a timely response to interview 
data when joining the Delphi panel, the personal circumstances of the experts 
changed during the study causing some tardy responses. I received email 
responses from South America, Europe and North America as individual experts 
replied from internet cafes while on expeditions and taking part in employment 
with international outdoor education organisations. Others were involved in 
giving birth, while yet others had work pressures. The first iteration took over 
three months to complete. 
The ECF A diagram was sent out to the Delphi panel as well as the instructor 
involved in the incident for comment as the second iteration of the Delphi process. 
This round was completed with much greater speed and there were often very few 
changes requested. A third iteration led to stability in response in all cases. 
With the time taken to complete the first incident across the three panels being 
much greater than expected, and with the threat of the study taking years to 
complete, a different approach was adopted for subsequent incidents. As each 
expert returned their analysis of an incident, that expert was immediately sent the 
CAI for the next incident. In this way any expert was able to progress at a rate that 
was not dependant on other experts for the first, more time intensive, iteration. If 
any expert did not reply to a particular incident within an eight week period, the 
analysis continued without their input. 
For different reasons, an expert dropped out of both the green and yellow panels, 
reducing these to five experts plus myself. Achieving stable ECF A diagrams for 
all 18 incidents took in excess of 12 months. 
Chapter Three - Research Method and Methodology p.76 
My frustrations at the Delphi process in having to pass control of the research 
progress over to the individual motivations and life pressures of the 18 expert 
panel members, made it easy for me to identify with the warning by Turoff & 
Hiltz (2004, p.1 ), "The straightforward nature of utilising an iterative survey to 
gather information 'sounds' so easy to do that many people have done 'one' 
Delphi, but never a second". 
Once all 18 incidents had been through the Delphi process, I gathered together the 
final ECF A diagrams. These showed the root causes perceived by the experts for 
each of the incidents, the relationships between the root causes in any incident and 
the relationships between those root causes and other conditions leading to the 
incident. From these 18 incidents, I copied the 227 individual root causes that had 
been identified onto Post-it notes and separated them into two piles: those related 
to instructor error and those related to errors in the management system. This 
separation was based on the theoretical 'lens' for an outdoor education incident 
which was developed through the literature review and is explained in detail in 
Chapter 4. Within each of these two categories the root causes were grouped into 
subcategories which appeared to share similar features. These subcategories 
became the 'types' ofroot causes and these are explained in depth in Chapter 6. 
These identified types of root causes created a taxonomy of error for the 18 case 
studies reviewed by the Delphi panels. 
Some writers argue that an 'inter-rater' or 'inter-coder' should be used to confirm 
this categorisation ( e.g. Bryman, 2001; Silverman, 2000). Other proponents of 
grounded theory leave the categorisation purely to the researcher. By using the 
Delphi members to review the final taxonomy produced (as explained in Section 
3.4.4.) it was considered that the use of another 'inter-rater' phase was redundant. 
The predictors of incidents that would result in serious injuries identified in Phase 
One (quantitative analysis) of the research, were then compared to the taxonomy 
of error developed in Phase Two (qualitative analysis). This was to see if the 
taxonomy could explain those variables influence in increasing the likelihood of 
serious incidents occurring. 
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3.4.4 Phase Three- Qualitative Analysis Stage 2 
It is acknowledged that the analysis of 18 case studies was unlikely to identify all 
of the root causes of outdoor education incidents. This was one reason why a 
review of outdoor education literature and also the more extensive literature from 
the related disciplines of industrial safety and cognitive psychology was carried 
out. From this literature review, I compiled a list of all of the factors that were 
considered by experts in their various disciplines to contribute to incidents. I 
compared and contrasted this list with the taxonomy of error that had been 
developed for the 18 outdoor education case studies. The result was a proposed 
taxonomy of error for outdoor education. 
I had also derived a model of an outdoor education incident from the literature 
review. This acted as a 'lens' to focus the results of the analysis of the 18 
incidents; where root causes were grouped into either instructor related errors or 
errors in the management system (Cresswell, 2003). The ECFA diagrams that 
resulted from the Delphi analysis in Phase Two showed the chronology of each 
incident and the relationship between the root causes and the conditions 
(immediate causes) leading to each incident. A model of an outdoor education 
incident, based on both existing literature and empirical data, was built based on 
these results. 
This model of an outdoor education incident and the taxonomy of error upon 
which it was based, were sent to the members of the Delphi panels for their 
comments. 
3.5 Reliability and Validity - Research Trustworthiness 
The objective of this research was to help the understanding of the root causes of 
outdoor education incidents so that through training and knowledge, the frequency 
of incidents could be reduced. I was therefore concerned with the results of this 
research being able to be applied to the broader outdoor education sector. The 
trustworthiness or credibility of the methods and the generalisability of the 
findings were, by inference, of primary concern. 
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The study presented here is a mixed methods design involving both quantitative 
and qualitative methods within a pragmatist paradigm. Within a purely 
quantitative design, the generalisability of the results can be argued in terms of 
reliability and validity measures employed in the research design (Fraenkel & 
Wallen, 1990). In pure qualitative research, researchers are often not interested in 
the generalisability of their findings to other individuals, settings and times. For 
these researchers, the working hypotheses are only time and context bound 
(Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998). Other qualitative researchers prefer the term 
transferability to the application of their findings in like contexts (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1995). Tashakkori and Teddlie argue that whatever term is used, some 
degree of generalisability is desired by all researchers and techniques can be 
employed in the research design so that this is an outcome for the findings. 
The sections below explain the techniques used within the research method 
already outlined to help ensure the generalisability of the findings so that they 
have application beyond the sample of incidents chosen. 
3.5.1 Reliability 
Reliability is defined by various authors to mean the consistency of the results 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990) or the extent to which studies can be replicated (Cook 
& Campbell, 1979; Goetz & Le Compte, 1984 ). In discussing mixed methods 
design, Tashakkori & Teddlie (1998, p.82) use the term "accuracy" to define 
reliability. If a measurement is accurate it will be repeatable over time or 
obtainable with an identical method of measurement. Therefore some forms of 
triangulation can help confirm the reliability of results. 
The reliability of this study was addressed by documenting the detailed design of 
the research so that any subsequent researcher would be able to faithfully 
reproduce the study to achieve the same results. 
In the quantitative Phase One of this research, sample selection, data collection 
and analysis techniques were all itemised so that replication would be 
straightforward. As discussed earlier, the representativeness of the sample means 
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care must be taken in generalising beyond the population oflarger New Zealand 
outdoor education centres employing paid staff. 
In the qualitative Phases Two and Three of this research, the empirical data relied 
heavily on the recall of past events by instructors involved in those events. The 
potential for these recollections to vary from the events that occurred are 
acknowledged due to memory recording, storage and retrieval issues with the 
instructor involved in a stressful situation, and the self-filtering of those memories 
due to social and values pressures during this study. Attempts have been made to 
improve the reliability of the data through a voluntary data gathering procedure 
where efforts were made to reduce any perceived threat, through "interjudge" 
techniques (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p.85) and through feedback to the 
instructor being interviewed so that as accurate a picture as possible of the actual 
circumstances were being described. The interjudge techniques mentioned are the 
reviews of the details of a particular incident by a panel of experts, including the 
instructors themselves. In this way the details of the incident are questioned and 
agreed on through subsequent rounds of the Delphi process. 
By detailing the methods of data analysis, showing quotes from interviews and 
how these were interpreted by the experts and myself to indicate root causes, this 
provides the reader of this research with an 'audit trail' to determine the quality of 
the methods, the theoretical propositions which led to the conclusions, and 
whether the methods meet the goals (Goetz & Le Compte, 1984; Maykut & 
Morehouse, 1994; Sarantakos, 1993). 
3.5.2 Validity 
Validity has been defined as, " ... the appropriateness, meaningfulness and 
usefulness of the specific inferences researchers make of the data they collect" 
(Fraenkel & Wallen, 1990, p.127). Tashakkori & Teddlie ( 1998) differentiate 
between internal validity and external validity. Internal validity is the degree to 
which conclusions and inferences can be trusted while external validity is the 
extent to which those results are transferable to a wider population. 
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Phase One of the research involved the collection and analysis of quantitative 
data. The validity of the conclusions was tested by what could be termed "peer 
debriefing" (Cresswell, 2003, p.196; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 91 ). The 
conclusions from analysis of these data were presented for review and comment at 
the 'Risk 2002' Conference. This was attended by over 100 outdoor educators and 
managers of outdoor education programmes with an interest in risk management 
theory and practice. The attendees were from New Zealand and overseas. There 
was no major change suggested by this group with any of the conclusions and 
inferences made from the data. A copy of the conference paper was subsequently 
posted as part of the conference proceedings on the ONZ website. I have received 
many requests to quote from the paper by tertiary level students and lecturers from 
throughout the world. None of these correspondents has suggested flaws in the 
conclusions. A paper outlining this stage of the research has been published by the 
highly regarded UK Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor Leaming 
(Davidson, 2004). Papers for this Journal are subject to expert peer review before 
acceptance. The latest reprint of the Mountain Safety Council Safety Manual 
(Haddock, 2003) quotes extensively from this work. This manual has been widely 
distributed and there has been no criticism of the quoted findings. 
Phase Two of the research was the analysis of interview data concerning outdoor 
education incidents to identify root causes of those incidents. The research design 
for this phase involved the incorporation of triangulation techniques and member-
checking to help ensure the validity of the qualitative inferences made during data 
collection. Triangulation is the use of multiple approaches to build a coherent 
justification for themes ( Cresswell, 2003 ). Denzin ( 1978) identified four basic 
types of triangulation: 
• Data triangulation: the use of a variety of data sources in a study; 
• Investigator triangulation: the use of several different researchers or 
evaluators; 
• Theory triangulation: the use of multiple perspectives to interpret a single 
set of data; 
• Methodological triangulation: the use of multiple methods to study a 
single problem. 
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Data triangulation was used to increase the validity of any root causes identified. 
The 18 incidents were purposefully chosen to be diverse in activity type, setting, 
organisation and gender. These different sourc~s of data helped confirm and 
validate root causes. 
Investigator triangulation was used through the Delphi process where six expert 
investigators all agreed on the inferences made from the data to determine root 
causes of the incidents under investigation. 
Member-checking was also employed. Those instructors who had been 
interviewed regarding their incidents were included in the second and third 
iterations of the Delphi process. In this way the validity of the inferences could 
also be checked. Patton ( 1990) described this technique as a fifth type of 
triangulation which he referred to as analytic triangulation. 
Methodological triangulation was used to compare the results of the quantitative 
phase of the research with the qualitative phase. Compatibility of these two results 
helped support the validity of the findings. 
Phase Three of the research involved the interpretation of the collective results of 
Phase Two, to produce a taxonomy of root causes and a model of an outdoor 
education incident. This stage relied heavily on my subjective judgment of what 
was and wasn't important to include in the final results, and how categories would 
be grouped. 
To help validate the findings theory triangulation was used. A model of an 
outdoor education incident was developed from a review of literature in the fields 
of outdoor education, industrial safety and psychology. This was compared with 
the results from the empirical data. The final model and taxonomy were then 
subjected to peer debriefing where they were both sent to members of the Delphi 
panel. The Delphi members were asked to review the final model of an outdoor 
education incident and the taxonomy of error and suggest changes or problems 
with both results. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter has described and discussed the research methodology of the study 
and has justified the implementation of adopting a mixed method approach. 
The mixed method design was explained whereby: 
• Data were collected firstly through historical records from outdoor education 
centres and then through interviews with instructors who had been involved 
in incidents that had potential for serious outcomes. 
• The quantitative data were analysed through statistical methods to produce a 
profile of incidents occurring in outdoor education programmes in New 
Zealand. 
• The qualitative data were analysed through a Delphi process where three 
concurrent expert panels each interpreted a subset of the total interview data. 
This resulted in 18 incident diagrams that showed the mechanisms of each 
incident chronologically and also indicated the relationships between the 
factors identified as causing the incident. I collated all of the findings of the 
root causes from these incidents, grouped these into categories of types of 
root causes based on their similarities and produced a taxonomy of error that 
could lead to those incidents. 
• The empirical results were combined with the results from the literature 
review to produce a proposed model of causation for outdoor education 
incidents and a taxonomy of root causes for those incidents. 
My own subjective judgment was a crucial component of the final stages of this 
research in particular. The categorising and naming of root causes was at my 
discretion. While a different researcher may have finished a similar study with 
different categories and nomenclature, it is believed that the general model of an 
outdoor education incident, and the types of root causes in the taxonomy would be 
identifiable. 
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Various techniques were built into the mixed-method research design that have 
given me confidence that the results are credible and can be applied beyond the 
sample selected. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN OUTDOOR EDUCATION INCIDENT 
MODEL, TAXONOMY OF ERROR AND A TOOL TO 
DIAGRAMMATICALLY REPRESENT AN INCIDENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to review the current literature concerning incident 
causation and from this review to develop: 
a) A model of incident causation. 
b) A taxonomy of potential root causes leading to incidents. 
c) A diagrammatical representation of an incident that can be used in this 
study. 
The first two of these will be used as a 'lens' to focus the direction of the research 
in Chapters 6 and 7. The development of a diagrammatic representation of an 
incident will be used in Chapter 6 to summarise the analysis of incident case 
studies. 
As part of this review, information is uncovered that helps build a profile of 
outdoor education incidents and their comparison with incident rates in other 
aspects of life. 
This review of literature falls into seven sections. 
1) Section 4.2 investigates knowledge that exists in the outdoor education 
literature about either: (a) describing a profile of outdoor education 
incidents, or (b) describing the root causes of outdoor incidents ( especially 
serious ones). 
2) Section 4.3 investigates contemporary models of incident causation from 
which an interim model of an outdoor education incident is proposed. 
3) Section 4.4 draws from the more extensive worlds of industrial safety 
management and psychology literature to find clues to the root causes of 
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incidents. The end of this section divides taxonomies of root causes into 
two categories: 
a. Those leading to poor instructor performance or judgment 
b. Management system errors 
4) Section 4.5 compares the potential root causes of incidents identified in 
outdoor education literature in Section 4.2, to confirm and expand the 
taxonomies in Section 4.4. 
5) Section 4.6 combines all of the information gained from the earlier 
sections to present a proposed model of an outdoor education incident 
including the taxonomies of root causes. 
6) Section 4.7 reviews all of the existing risk and incident analysis tools in 
common usage, in order to identify a suitable tool for the second phase of 
the data collection. From this review, modifications to the Events and 
Causal Factors Analysis (ECF A) procedure are proposed that will help 
outdoor educators understand the development of any incident under 
investigation and focus on the underlying root causes of that incident. 
7) Finally, Section 4.8 provides a summary of the chapter. 
4.2 Outdoor Education Literature Review 
4.2.1 Profiling Outdoor Incidents 
4.2.1.1 New Zealand Outdoor Education Incident Data 
There is almost no research in New Zealand that profiles the type and frequency 
of outdoor education incidents. With the requirement under the Health and Safety 
in Employment (HSE) Act ( 1992) to keep a register of all accidents in the 
workplace, it might be expected that such information would exist, but this is not 
the case. While individual organisations in all likelihood keep records, no 
summary and I or analysis of these data has yet occurred. A private company, the 
Outdoor Safety Institute, attempted to compile a database of outdoor incidents in 
the early 1990s but had very few contributions; probably due to concerns about 
confidentiality. The Accident Compensation Commission database does not 
categorise accidents resulting in claims by the category of outdoor education or 
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anything vaguely similar. The only information that does exist is a compilation of 
all fatalities that occur in the outdoors. This information is compiled by the New 
Zealand Mountain Safety Council (MSC) based on Coroners' Reports and at the 
time of writing (2004) it had not been kept up to date due to the lack of resources 
in the MSC. A summary of the deaths recorded is shown in Table 7 with the years 
over which data were collected for this study highlighted. As there were no data 
attached to the compilation which shows, or even estimates, the number of people 
or participation hours in the outdoor activities that the fatalities represent, no 
fatality rate statistics can be calculated. 
4.2.1.2 United kingdom Outdoor Education Incident Data 
The United Kingdom also lacks an incident database for the outdoor education 
sector. The Head Inspector of the Adventure Activities Licensing Authority, 
Marcus Bailie (2003a), compiled comparative statistics from a range of sources in 
an attempt to compare outdoor education with other risks in life. Some of these 
comparisons are shown in Tables 8 and 9. The point of Bailie's comparison is not 
only to indicate that comparatively few fatalities occur in adventure activities, but 
also that there are a great number of positive benefits from participation in 
adventurous activities that may reduce fatalities due to other factors including 
obesity I fitness related deaths, suicide, substance abuse, and even road deaths. In 
this latter case, he contends that young people are observably more clumsy and 
less aware of danger today because of their lack of experimentation in an outdoor 
setting. However, as Bailie is unable to access information about participation 
rates, it is not possible to directly compare fatality rates in the different UK 
contexts. 
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Table 7 
New Zealand Mountain Safety Council (1998) Report on Fatalities in Outdoor 
Recreation where People Were Involved With Instruction, Guidance or Other 
Professional Care 
Year Outdoor Recreation Fatalities in activities where people were 
involved with instruction, guidance or other professional care 
(IGPC). 
Note: (])Numbers in square brackets exclude free skiing, 
adventure tourism and non-educational activities. 
(2) Shaded area indicates years in which data on 
accidents was collected for this research. 
1979 2 [2] 
1980 8 [6] 
1981 9 [4] 
1982 4 [2] 
1983 1 [ 1] 
1984 7 [5] 
1985 6 [2] 
1986 5 [2] 
1987 4 [ 1] 
1988 6 [5] 
1989 8 [5] 
1990 5 [2] 
1991 10 [7] (NB: Ruapehu Army Incident = 6) 
1992 8 [3] 
1993 14 [6] 
1994 9 [2] 
1995 3 [2] 
1996 18 [15] (NB: Cave Creek Incident - 14) 
1997 6 [2] 
1998 7 [5] 
1999 Not available at time of writing (2004) 
2000 Not available at time of writing (2004) 
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Table 8 
Compilation of the average number of fatalities per year in the UK from various 
causes (Bailie, 2003a) 
Cause Number Source 
Heart attacks 130,000 Dept of Health 
All cancers > 120,000 Dept of Health 
Smoking related illnesses 110,000 Home Office 
Obesity and unfitness 30,000 National Audit Office 
Alcohol related 25,000 Home Office 
Breast Cancer 15,000 Dept of Health 
Total accidental deaths 10,000 HSE 
Suicides 6,000 Samaritans 
Asthma 4,000 Dept of Health 
Accidents in the home 4,000 DTi HASS/LASS 
Road traffic accidents 3,500 Dept of Transport 
Asbestosis 3,000 HSE 
Sunbathing (skin cancer) 1,400 Dept of Health 
Class A drugs 1,200 Home Office 
Epilepsy 1,000 Not specified 
Drowning 450 RoSPA 
Accidents at work 350 HSE 
Allergic reaction to aspirin 200 Rescue Emergency Care 
Trespassing on railway lines 120 HSE Railways Inspectorate 
Do-it-yourself 70 DTi HASS/LASS 
Train crashes 8 HSE Railways Inspectorate 
Canoeing 5 Dti HASS/LASS 
Adventure activities 150 Not specified 
Note the (pllowing abbreviations: 
HSE = Health and Safety Executive 
DTi = Department of Trade and Industry 
HASS = Home Accident Surveillance Systems 
LASS = Leisure Activity Surveillance Systems 
RoSPA = Royal Society for the Prevention of Accidents 
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Table 9 
Compilation of the Average Number of Accidental or Sudden Deaths Amongst Young 
People (up to the age of 19) Per Year in the UK/ram Various Causes 
(Bailie, 2003a) 
Cause Number 
All accidents 1420 
Road traffic accidents 700 
Congenital anomalies 470 
Cancers 430 
Cot deaths and ill-defined conditions 375 
Diseases of the nervous system 315 
Infectious and parasitic diseases 264 
Under 14's from accidents in the home 215 
Skin cancer caused by sunbathing 200 
Suffocation 140 






On school trips - Mostly road traffic accidents 3 
All other medical conditions 750 
Adventure Activities on school visits 1 
4.2.1.3 United States Outdoor Education Incident Data 
In the United States, some outdoor organisations have been collecting incident 
data and participation rates for many years and these have been published from 
time to time in reports and in the annual proceedings from the Wilderness Risk 
Management Conference (Leemon, 1999; Paton, 1995). It has been reported that 
many outdoor programmes demonstrate accident rates below those experienced in 
normal living (Gentile & Schimelpfenig, 1995; Paton, 1995; Priest, 1996b). Table 
10, which was compiled from Cooley (2000) and data from a variety of other 
sources illustrates this comparison. 
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Table 10 
Comparison of Injury Rates Between USA Outdoor Education Centres and Other 
Activities 
INJURY RATES PER 1,000 PARTICIPANT DAYS AND FATALITY RATES PER 
1,000,000 PARTICIPANT DAYS 
ACTIVITY INJURY/1000 FATALITY/MILLION 
PARTICIPANT DAYS PARTICIPANT DAYS 
USA Outward Bound Schools 0.49 - 1.14 5.59 
( 1962 - 1989) (Paton , 1995) 
US Outward Bound Schools 1998 0.34 - 1. 7 (NB: Outward ? 
(Outward Bound, 1998) * Bound counts incidents 
differently than most. The 
standard criteria is a person 
unable to participate in the 
programme the following day.) 
National Outdoor Leadership 1.99 2 
School (NOLS) (1984 - 1994) 
(Leemon, 1999) 
NOLS (1995 - 1998) (Leemon, 1.29 2 
1999) 
USA High School Football 19.74 
Practice (Zemper, 1998)* 
USA High School Football 35 .63 (plus 0.63 
Games (Mueller and Cantu, permanently 
1998)* disabling injuries, 
mostly paralysis) 
USA White Adolescents 15 - 19, ? 1.5 
all accidental causes (National 
Centre for Injury Prevention and 
Control, 1999b )* 
USA Adolescent Drivers and ? 4.5 
Occupants 15 - 19 (National 
Centre for Injury Prevention and 
Control, 1999a)* 
* As reported in Cooley (2000) 
A national incident database, entitled the Wilderness Risk Manager's Committee 
Incident Data Project, was initiated in the USA in 1989. A report on the data 
collected over the 1998 - 2000 period was published in 2002 and a summary of 
the findings produced by Leemon (2003). Contribution to this database is 
voluntary, although participation is a condition of accreditation with the 
Association of Experiential Education. To date, data from only 20 organisations 
have been analysed. Leemon notes that this sample is small compared to the over 
600 organisations that have attended the WRMC Conference since 1994. Even 
recognising that this is a small sample of the total programmes operating in the 
USA, it is a good start to producing valuable data. 
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Table 11 shows a list of activities ranked according to the number of injuries in 
the 1998 - 2000 sample years. While giving the best information to date, there is 
no separation of those injuries that were serious compared to those that weren't 
serious. Therefore comparing activity injury rates could be as meaningless as 
comparing the number of blisters with the number of broken femurs! There are 
also some 'non-sensible' injury rates reported because of some activities that had 
very low participation rates ( e.g. 888.89 for the years 1991 - 1997 and then O for 
the years 1998 - 2000). Therefore any data that are taken from this table for the 
purposes of comparison need to be taken from activities that have useful 
participation rates from which to calculate an injury rate per 1 OOO participant 
days. It is interesting to note that the incident rates over the two cumulative 
periods ( 1991 - 1997 compared with 1998 - 2000) have dropped considerably 
from 2.09 injuries per 1,000 programme days to 0.31 injuries per 1,000 
programme days. This could indicate that safety efforts have been working. 
However, this needs to be interpreted with caution because Leemon notes that 
only a few organisations have consistently submitted data, so the figures may be 
showing for example the difference between contributing organisations, their 
approaches to reporting or even differences in participation rates. Of note is the 
fact that there were no reported fatalities in the sample years among these 20 
contributing organisations. 
The information in Tables 10 and 11 allows comparison with results of the first 
stage of the incident data in this research. This comparison will be fully discussed 
in Chapter 5. 
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Table 11 
United States Wilderness Risk Management Committee Data of Injuries and Injury 
Rates by Activity (Rates per 1000 program days) 
Activity 1991-1997 1991-1997 1998-2000 1998-2000 
# of Injuries Injury rates # of Injuries Injury rates 
Backpacking 29 4.36 39 1.52 
Biking (mountain) 2 64.00 10 21.87 
Biking (touring) 3 33.33 1 10.90 
Boating (power, row) 2 ? 0 0.00 
Camping (general) 32 0.57 33 0.12 
Canoe (flatwater and 16 3.08 28 3.41 
porta2e) 
Canoeing 1 2.14 0 0.00 
(whitewater) 
Cave 2 888.89 0 0.00 
Climbing (rock, ice & 7 3.71 7 0.17 
raooellin2) 
Hiking (day, 10 30.07 10 3.32 
orienteerin2 
Horseback riding 0 0.00 5 4.17 
Kayaking 4 5.19 8 3.52 
(whitewater and sea) 
Marathon 1 16.67 0 0.00 
Mountaineering 1 18.18 0 0.00 
Rafting 2 1.72 0 0.00 
Sailing 1 1.43 0 0.00 
Skiing 0 0.00 0 0.00 
( downhill/telemark) 
Skiing (touring) 3 22.21 7 2.47 
Snowshoeing 0 0.00 0 0.00 
Solo 0 0.00 1 0.33 
Water (swim, wade, 6 22.64 3 7.31 
snorkel) 
Winter camping 1 8.70 1 3.51 
Work projects 0 0.00 1 0.34 
Total Backcountry 123 1.56 154 0.41 
Climbing walls n/a n/a 1 1.03 
Initiative team 10 3.26 16 0.10 
challen2es 
Rope course high and 8 2.67 8 0.10 
low 
Sports & recreational 17 79.98 18 7.24 
11:ames 
Transportation (to 2 1.11 6 0.16 
activity) 
Miscellaneous 22 ? 0 0.00 
Total Non- 59 7.30 49 0.18 
backcountry 
Total 182 2.09 203 0.31 
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4.2.1.4 Australian Outdoor Education Incident Data 
In Australia, there is also little in the way of formal collection and analysis of 
incident data. Brown (1998) mentioned the existence of the National Injury 
Surveillance Unit based at Flinders University in Adelaide, but this unit collects 
only regional data and is limited in that it groups all outdoor related injuries in a 
broad category of 'other sport or leisure activity'. Brackenreg ( 1997) reviewed a 
number of studies reporting injury and illness in outdoor education programmes, 
but was hindered by the widely different definitions of medical incidents. The 
studies he used were mostly those discussed earlier from the USA, a Project 
Adventure study also from the USA (Furlong, Jillings, Larhette & Ryan, 1995), 
and the statistics from one Australian outdoor education programme (St Joseph's 
College near Sydney: Kampen, 1996). There is little to learn about Australian 
incident rates from this review. Brookes (2003a, 2003b, 2004) carried out a study 
of 114 outdoor education fatalities that occurred in 72 separate incidents in 
Australia from 1960-2002. The incidents were identified by doing electronic 
searches of newspaper archives ( 1990 or later) using keywords, and microfilm 
searches of earlier newspaper records. Brookes admits that there was potential for 
incidents to have been missed in such a limited search. Analysis of the incidents 
was done based on the documentation rather than any follow-up interviews. No 
participation rates were available and therefore no fatality rates were able to be 
calculated. Analysis was limited to the more immediate causes of the incidents 
such as environment and supervision and therefore root causes as defined in this 
study were not considered. 
4.2.1.5 Summary 
This literature review has shown a consistent lack of incident data from the 
outdoor education sector in New Zealand, the United Kingdom., the United States 
and Australia. The most comprehensive data has been published in proceedings 
from conferences of the Wilderness Risk Managers Committee of the United 
States summarised in Tables 10 and 11. The data shown in these tables will be 
used in Chapter 5 to compare with New Zealand incident statistics. 
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4.2.2 Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents 
This section of the review looks at what information already exists about root 
causes of outdoor education incidents within the outdoor education literature. 
There is very little information that speaks directly to the causes of incidents 
which leaves me to interpret the more extensive writing on outdoor education risk 
management. One New Zealand study (Haddock, 1999c) investigated ten near 
misses that had high potential for loss at one outdoor education centre. The causal 
factors identified from this study are contained in the Mountain Safety Council's 
Outdoor Safety Manual (Haddock, 2003) and will be considered later in this 
section. 
4.2.2.1 Incident Models 
Early models used to explore outdoor incidents are shown in Figures 5 and 6. 
These models are generally similar, in that they share the basic premise that an 
accident, or the potential for one, occurs when there is an interplay of human 
factors within an environment that contains hazards. The model therefore suggests 
the simplest way to prevent all outdoor incidents is simply to separate the fallible 
humans from going into hazardous terrain! This is certainly what many land 
managers attempt to do with fencing, signage and regulations. However the very 
premise of positive gains from outdoor education lie in the interplay of humans 
being in the outdoors which makes this solution impractical. We need to retain the 
challenge and risks of the wilderness rather than trying to change the wilderness 
into a safe, engineered, adventure park (Batt, 1996; Schimelpfenig, 1995b ). 
Figure 5. Dynamics of accidents theory (Hale, 1984, p.4) 
HUMAN 
FACTORS 
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Figure 6. Model of an accident in the outdoors (Meyer, 1979, p.10) 
Meyer's model suggests that root causes of outdoor incidents fall under the 
headings of unsafe conditions, unsafe client acts and instructor judgment errors. 
My contention is that of these three categories, only judgment errors by the 
instructor are true root causes of incidents because it is the instructor's role to 
manage hazards produced by both the environment and by the acts of clients. Both 
of these categories of hazards are pre-existing in the workplace and must be 
identified and managed. In Sections 4.3.5 and 4.5 contemporary safety 
management models of incident causation will be used to support this argument 
that unsafe conditions in the environment and unsafe acts by clients are immediate 
not root causes of incidents. 
In their book titled "Effective Leadership in Adventure Programming", Priest and 
Gass ( 1997) developed Hale' s model further and suggested six factors which 
inhibit an instructor's ability to analyse danger. These are: 
• New or unexpected situations - which could include new sites, activities, 
group dynamics, etc., which an inexperienced instructor would have less 
competence to deal with. For this reason Meyer (1979) is a proponent of 
pre-site visits. 
• Inappropriate attribution - the psychological tendency of people to take 
credit for successful outcomes but to transfer the blame for poor outcomes 
to others. This may prevent instructors from realising incidents can happen 
to them and therefore cause them to be less alert to dangers. 
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• Relaxed concentration - being less aware to dangers due to fatigue, 
distraction, familiarity, etc. 
p.96 
• Smelling the barn - the willingness to take greater risks when the end is in 
sight or in order to meet a schedule. 
• Risky shift - the tendency for people in groups to take higher risks than if 
each were alone. Some participants abandon personal responsibility and 
transfer the responsibility for taking risks to the group. 
• Poor or unsound judgment - often through misperception of what is 
occumng. 
They proposed a procedure for analysing dangers in adventure programmes and 
how these inhibiting factors could interfere with this procedure. This is shown in 
Figure 7. 
Fallowing discussion of these points, Priest and Gass ( 1997) pointed out a number 
of safety measures that should be in place in an organisation to minimise the 
likelihood or impact of an incident. These include: 
• Appropriate safety policies, philosophies, goals, learning objectives, etc., 
written in a staff manual 
• Risk management plans for field activities including crisis response plans. 
• Accident report forms and analysis systems to learn from mistakes. · 
• Safety reviews carried out on programmes by external peers. 
• Staff who have the appropriate skills to work in the field. 
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Figure 7. Five inhibiting factors at work in the danger analysis procedure 
(Priest & Gass, 1997, p.92). 
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Priest and Gass also introduced a model of experience-based judgment. They 
briefly covered the concept of heuristics, which are simple principles or rules of 
thumb that humans use to make decisions. This is based on the work of 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky ( 1982). While heuristics can assist in simplifying 
complex decisions, they can also lead to errors in judgment. Examples given of 
heuristics are: 
• Representativeness - the extent to which information from past situations 
is useful or relevant to the current situation. If your past experiences are 
limited, you will have a limited number of solutions to apply quickly to a 
new situation. 
• Availability - the ease which you can bring specific information to mind 
can influence judgment. For example, media articles about avalanche 
accidents can cause over-estimation of hazard whereas recent exposure to 
1 
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travel in hazardous conditions with no avalanches can lead to under-
estimation of hazard potential. 
p.98 
• Simulation - the ability to imagine scenarios from information retrieved. 
Possible risks can be completely ignored or underestimated if inexperience 
or lack of information prevents the instructor from imagining certain 
scenanos. 
• Anchoring with adjustment - describes how humans generally weight 
information's importance in relation to the time it was obtained. 
Impressions formed based on early information are often hard to change in 
the light of new information. This can lead to poor judgrnent if the original 
information was faulty or incomplete. 
The bullet points listed above are the first indication of the existence of root 
causes of outdoor incidents. Some of these occur at the instructor level leading to 
poor judgrnent while others occur at management level in an organisation which 
lead to instructors being placed in situations which contain serious hazards. These 
categories of root causes are not obvious from the models of incidents shown 
earlier in Figures 5 and 6. 
In the recently published MSC Outdoor Safety Manual (Haddock, 2003), an 
incident model is proposed based on the work of industrial safety writers Bird & 
Germain ( 1989) and Kates, Hohenemser & Kasperson ( 1985). This model (Figure 
8) suggests that the way to prevent incidents is to block the pathway between the 
causal factors; it being progressively more difficult to block the pathway as the 
causal sequence advances. 
This model is the first time that the management of an organisation is shown 
explicitly in a model of an outdoor incident. There is no further development of 
this model in the text to explore the make-up of the various causal factors in a 
generic way. The original model as proposed by Bird & Germain ( 1989) will be 
revisited in the review of literature from other disciplines when I suggest an 
alternative model for an outdoor incident. 
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Figure 8. The pathways to change model (Haddock, 2003, p.84.). 
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Earlier in her book Haddock lists and explores a number of "Principles of Risk 
Management." These include: 
• Risk assessment - correctly identifying factors that contribute to risk 
• Judgment and decision-making - making good decisions in a dynamic 
environment entails skills in situational awareness, situational assessment, 
option selection, resource management and reflection on outcomes. 
• Having appropriate rules, policies and guidelines 
• Using appropriate leadership styles 
• Knowing the group 
• Offering challenge by choice 
• Teaching by progression 
• Having competent leaders 
• Checking equipment 
• Social and psychological factors broadly similar to those discussed above 
(Priest & Gass, 1997) and "Wild cards" described by Haddock as 
unpredictable and irresponsible behaviours that threaten the safety by 
taking the leader by surprise. I believe the name "wild card" is misleading 
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and that these "wild card" factors can be explained by a number of root 
causes of incidents that have not yet been classified in outdoor education 
literature but will be identified at a later stage in this research. Risk 
homeostasis theory suggests that people adjust the level of risk they are 
prepared to take upwards if'a new safety device becomes available ( e.g., 
cell phones, emergency position indicating radio beacons (EPIRBS)) This 
theory predicts that improved safety devices will do nothing to reduce 
accident rates as people tend to take higher risks with the new technology. 
Once again, these categories suggest some root causes that will be discussed later 
in this literature review. 
4.2.2.2 Other Outdoor Education Writing on the Root Causes of Outdoor 
Accidents. 
Each year a conference is held in the United States investigating the latest 
thoughts and research into Wilderness Risk Management. The proceedings from 
these conferences and papers published in the Journal of Experiential Education 
give a good overview of contemporary thought in the sector. 
Dan Meyer and Jed Williamson have been considered experts in the field of risk 
management for many years. Annually they publish an updated list of what they 
believe are the potential causes of accidents in outdoor pursuits. The list is divided 
into three categories based on Meyer's model shown as Figure 5.. The latest 
version of this list is shown in Table 12. 
My contention is that this list is a mixture of immediate causes ( environmental 
hazards and human hazards) and root causes. I believe this leads to confusion in 
targeting causal factors both in terms of preventing future incidents and also in the 
appropriate assignation of accountabilities and responsibilities. Table 12 which 
outlines the potential causes of incidents will be re-visited later in this chapter as 
the model of an outdoor incident progressively evolves. 
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Table 12 
Potential causes of Accidents in Outdoor Pursuits (Meyer & Williamson, 2003) 
POTENTIAL CAUSES OF ACCIDENTS IN OUTDOOR PURSUITS 
(A matrix designed and revised by Meyer and Williamson 1979 - 2003) 
Potentially Unsafe Potentially Unsafe Acts due to: Potential Errors in Judgment 
Conditions due to: due to: 
• Falling objects (Rocks, • Inadequate protection • Desire to please others 
etc) 
• Inadequate area security • Inadequate instruction • Trying to adhere to a 
schedule 
• Weather • Inadequate supervision • Misperception 
• Equipment/clothing • Unsafe speed (Fast/slow) • New or unexpected 
situation 
• Swift/cold water • Inadequate • Fatigue 
food/drink/medications 
• Animals/plants • Poor position • Distraction 
• Physical/psychological • Unauthorised/ Improper • Miscommunication of 
profile procedure participants and/or staff 
• Disregarding instincts 
There is no doubt that from the various references discussed throughout this 
section, errors in judgment by instructional staff are seen by all writers as the key 
to causing outdoor incidents. In the causal sequence shown by Haddock in Figure 
8, it is not clear where instructor judgment fits, even though the decisions and 
actions of an instructor working unsupervised in the field with a group of 
participants can subvert all of management's attempts at setting policy and 
standards in order to control the risk. It is no surprise then that there are an 
increasing number of journal articles and conference presentations discussing 
instructor judgment, the effect that errors in judgment have on outdoor incidents, 
and how to train staff to make better judgments ( Clement, 1999, 2000; Erickson, 
2000; Fredston, Fesler & Tremper, 2000; Garrett, 2003; Gookin, 1998; Medred, 
1999; Schimelpfenig, 1997). Schimelpfenig ( 1995b) comments that while errors 
in instructor judgment are recognised as the cause of many outdoor incidents, 
judgment is often ignored in the analysis of those incidents. This is because it is 
easier to deal with more visible and understandable factors such as equipment 
problems or hazards in the environment than human factors involving the less 
accessible and more uncomfortable notions of human frailty and states of mind. 
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In one of the latest books published on incident prevention in the outdoors, Hunt 
(2000) discussed a number of factors causing instructors to make decisions that 
lead ultimately to incidents, while discussing the ethical foundations of risk 
management. These include: 
• An instructor may get bored operating with students on activities well 
below his/ her own personal level of skill and challenge. To counter this 
boredom he / she may choose to undertake an activity with a higher level 
of risk. This following of personal goals rather than the organisational 
goals, which are student oriented, can lead to incidents. 
• Hubris refers to overbearing pride, presumption or arrogance in a person's 
character. Hunt believes hubris can lead to incidents when instructors lose 
the respect they once had for the dangers and seriousness of wilderness 
areas, often because of their past successes in a particular area and the fact 
that they now have higher skill levels. However the hazards still exist and 
can't be ignored. In comparison, Hunt comments on his respect for pilots 
and their rigorous ritual of preflight safety checks which are always carried 
out and how the most experienced pilot would be considered foolhardy if 
they failed to carry out these checks. 
There has been a growing interest in the outdoor education literature to the 
knowledge that can be transferred from the fields of safety management, aircraft 
safety, psychology, etc. (Boyes, 2000; Clement, 1999; Erickson, 2000; Schultz, 
2003). This knowledge will be addressed in the following sections of this chapter. 
One recent paper on lessons for avalanche education rates special attention 
(Fredston, Fesler & Tremper, 2000). In this presentation made at a Wilderness 
Risk Management Conference, the authors discussed a number of human factors 
which they believe resulted in many people being caught in avalanches. They 
state: 
"While some accidents are the result of not recognising potential hazard, 
most accidents occur because the victims either underestimate the hazard 
or overestimate their ability to deal with it. Victims tend to make critical 
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decisions based on human desires and assumptions rather than upon the 
integration of key pieces of physical data." (Fredston et al., 2000, p.45) 
The authors then presented the following list of human factors they believe are 
key contributors to avalanche accidents: 
• Incorrect assumptions - assuming a slope is safe based on prior 
information. Rather than seeking new information in the field to revise the 
assumption, people heed only information that reinforces their already 
held assumption. 
• The herding instinct - People take greater risks in a group than on their 
own, yet in avalanche terrain the more people there are, the greater the 
hazard. 
• Attitude - Pride, ego, hubris can easily produce unyielding behaviour in 
the face of contrary evidence. People with high risk-taking attitudes can 
filter information about potential hazards and draw unrealistically 
optimistic conclusions. Attitude, ego and goal orientation can all lead to 
tunnel vision. 
• Testosterone - Males tend to make riskier decisions than females. In Utah 
since 1980, there have been 22 fatalities. Although approximately one 
third of all back country skiers are female only one fatality has been a 
woman and she was a novice accompanying five males. 
• Weather and perception - A disproportionate number of avalanche 
accidents occur on blue-sky days. The authors believe sunny days make us 
feel good and we can ignore objective information from the snow pack. In 
contrast if people are traveling in stormy conditions they can also cut 
comers in hazard evaluation to get home and expose themselves to higher 
risk as well. 
• City thinking versus mountain thinking - The avalanche doesn't care if we 
have a meeting to get back to, ifwe paid a lot of money to fly into the 
hills, if we are lost in conversation - the hazards have to be assessed 
continually and on the mountains terms. 
• Avalanche skills versus travel skills - Most people (skiers, snowboarders, 
snowmobilers) getting caught in avalanches are very skilled at the physical 
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skill of their sport but this skill level has outpaced their avalanche skills, 
and they often vastly overestimate the former resulting in incidents. 
• Communication - Poor communication is a common denominator in 
almost all mountaineering accidents. This can take one of several forms: 
o People fail to speak up for fear of being labeled cowardly or 
unadventurous. 
o Incomplete information leads to incorrect assumptions or limited 
sharing of data 
o Misunderstanding of the plan or the potential hazard 
o No communication at all. 
The importance of this paper is that the causes of the accidents have been gathered 
by experts in the field of avalanche safety from the close examination of a number 
of avalanche accidents. As will be explained later in this study, the results of their 
work are root causes of the accidents and the root causes are framed in such a way 
as to be understandable to the practitioner. In Chapters 6 and 7 of this study, an 
attempt will be made to describe identified root causes of outdoor education 
incidents in such a way that outdoor practitioners can understand them. 
4.2.3 Summary 
There is little information in outdoor education literature that profiles the type and 
frequency of incidents in New Zealand. There is a similar lack of information in 
the UK although attempts have been made to look at other activities in life to 
compare fatality rates in those with adventure activities. Some USA statistics exist 
in the literature, especially for the two larger outdoor education centres: Outward 
Bound and the National Outdoor Leadership School (NOLS). An initiative by the 
Wilderness Risk Management Committee to collect data across a range of outdoor 
education providers in the USA has been limited by small sample size and 
inconsistent data retrieval. Nevertheless this initiative has produced some 
preliminary data that can be compared with those collected in New Zealand. 
Models of outdoor education incidents and their causal sequences are poorly 
developed in the literature. Generally, there is confusion between immediate and 
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underlying root causes evident in both the models and accompanying explanations 
of the causal factors. This confusion leads to a lack of understanding of causes and 
difficulties for managers in targeting weaknesses in safety systems. 
Some outdoor education writers have incorporated models from safety 
management and psychology into their work. On this basis, these writers have 
suggested that a lack of management control is potentially a key initiator of the 
causal sequence for incidents. This conceptualisation suggests two major root 
causes namely, lack of management control and errors in judgment by instructors. 
The reasons for lack of management control identified in this section include: 
• Inappropriate safety policies, philosophies, goals, learning objectives, etc. 
• Inadequate risk management plans, including crisis response plans. 
• Inadequate accident report forms and analysis systems. 
• Inadequate safety reviews. 
• Inappropriately skilled staff employed and running programmes. 
The factors identified in this section leading to errors in instructor judgment 
include: 
• Being in new or unexpected situations 
• Inappropriate attribution. 
• Relaxed concentration. 
• Taking greater risks when the end is in sight. 
• Risky shift. 
• Risk homeostasis 
• Heuristics. 
• Boredom 
• Hubris, pride, arrogance, ego. 
• Incorrect assumptions. 
• Testosterone. 
This section both confirms the need for this research and identifies a number of 
potential root causes that need to be incorporated into any taxonomy of error that 
results from this research. The two major categories of root causes (lack of 
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management control and errors in instructor judgment) will be developed further 
in the next section. 
4.3 Incident Models from the Disciplines of Industrial Safety Management 
and Related Fields 
Modem safety texts review the evolution of safety management over the past 
century. This evolution followed a development from an "Unsafe Act and 
Condition Era" where safety was a matter of engineering machines to eliminate 
human mishap and where operators were blamed for unsafe acts, to a "Safety 
Management Era" where safety engineers found that setting policy, defining 
responsibilities and clarifying authorities was more effective. Many management 
tools from other areas were adapted for safety purposes. From the early 1980s to 
the present we have seen the evolution of the "Human Era" - using the principles 
of human behaviour in safety programmes and structuring safety programmes out 
of things that make psychological sense. This new era involves significantly more 
participation by all workers in the pursuit of safety (Bird & Germain, 1989; 
Petersen, 1988). 
4.3.1 The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) Loss Causation Model 
Bird and Germain (1989) describe the International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) 
loss causation model shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9. The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) loss causation model 
(Bird & Germain, 1989, p.22) 
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This is one example of a multiple causation model for incidents. It shows that 
loss is generally not due to one thing, but rather to a combination of factors 
coming together to cause the incident. Reason ( 1990) describes this multiple 
causation concept as major disasters arising from the unforeseen and usually 
unforeseeable concatenation of several diverse events, each one necessary but 
singly insufficient. The multiple causation theory is now widely accepted by 
safety management specialists. 
Bird and Germain (1989) suggested that in the wake of an incident, too many 
investigations focus on the immediate causes. The "Immediate Causes" described 
in Figure 9 are those easily observable acts and conditions that combine to result 
in the incident. However, root causes of an incident are "Lack of Control" and 
"Basic Causes"; those management practices and human factors which, if 
addressed, would prevent further incidents beyond one specific event that may 
have occurred. 
"Immediate causes of accidents are the circumstances that immediately 
precede the contact ... frequently they are called unsafe acts and unsafe 
conditions ... Modern managers tend to think a bit broader and more 
professionally, in terms of substandard practices and substandard 
conditions ... an increasing number of safety leaders confirm the results 
from research in quality control that 80% of the mistakes (substandard 
acts) that people make are the result of factors over which only 
management has control. This significant finding gives a completely new 
direction of control to the long-held concept that 85-96% of accidents 
result from the unsafe acts or faults of people. This new direction of 
thinking encourages the progressive manager to think in terms of how the 
management system influences human behaviour rather than just on the 
unsafe acts of the people"(Bird & Germain, 1989, p.26). 
While one of the groups of contributing factors to any incident is unsafe acts or 
human errors, Bignell & Fortune (1984) further argue that any safety system is 
itself designed and maintained by humans and therefore that school of thought 
seeks to ascribe the cause of all failures to human errors. 
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4.3.2 Reason's Model of Human Elements of Accident Causation 
In a similar sequence to the ICLI model, Reason ( 1990) presents a model of the 
human elements of accident causation shown in Figure 10. The level of decision 
maker at each stage of accident causation is shown in Figure 11. He differentiates 
between two types of human failure. Those human failures due to people at the 
production level of the organisation and which have an immediate impact on the 
system, resulting in an accident, he terms "active failures". Another type of 
human failure is developed by those at higher levels of management that he 
describes as being at the "blunt end" of the system (Reason, 1990). These people 
put in place the whole organisational safety system, set rules and policies, 
establish equipment purchasing systems, inspection systems etc. Errors made at 
this level can lie dormant for some time before their presence is felt and they 
combine with other factors to produce an accident. Reason ( 1990) classifies these 
type of errors as "latent failures". 
Both the ILCI model and Reason's model point to the importance of failures in 
the systems set up by top level management as root causes of incidents. However 
Reason ( 1990) believes that it would be nai've to consider that a failure at line 
management level is purely a function of higher-level decision-making. 
"The native incompetence of any set of line managers could further 
exacerbate the adverse effects of high-level decisions or even cause good 
decisions to have bad effects. Conversely, competence at the line 
management level could do something to mitigate the unsafe effects of 
fallible decisions, make neutral decisions have safer consequences and 
transform good decisions into even better ones" (Reason, 1990, p.205). 
It seems then that line managers are critical to the safety performance of any 
organisation. Who are line management in an outdoor education setting? 
Petersen shows diagrammatically how the hierarchy works in an "Organisational 
Hierarchy" and in a "Quality Control Hierarchy" (Figure 12). 
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Figure 10. The various human contributions to the breakdown of complex systems 
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Figure 12. Comparison of organisational heirarchy and quality control heirarchy 













It is my belief that in an outdoor education setting the hierarchy for a typical 
organisation would correspond to that shown in Figure 13. This proposed 
hierarchy shows that "Instructors" in outdoor education operations are the 
equivalent of "Line Managers" in a standard "Organisational Hierarchy", or 
"Leaders" in a "Quality Circle" context. This can be justified on the basis that 
they have the same level of supervisory responsibility and competency 
requirements in supervising students as a "Line Manager" has managing the safety 
efforts of a number of employees. Just as line managers in a conventional 
manufacturing setting supervise employees in hazardous environments, instructors 
supervise students in similarly hazardous situations involving equipment use and 
the vagaries of outdoor environments. 
Accepting that instructors have a management role, in a truly participative 
organisation they will be involved in establishing the safety system for the 
organisation As Reason ( 1990) has commented above, line managers are critical 
in implementing the safety efforts of an organisation, and their competence or 
incompetence can be the difference between safety and disaster. This critical role 
has been recognised by outdoor educationalists as shown in Figure 14. 
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In Reason's model of the basic elements of production (Figure 11) instructors 
have the dual role ofline management (supervising their students) and productive 
activities (supervision in a hazardous environment). Thus instructors are prone to 
both latent and active failures as a result of problems existing in the basic 
elements of production. In Figure 11 these problems can relate to the latent errors 
resulting in a lack of reliable equipment, lack of a skilled and motivated staff, 
inadequate operations systems, inadequate maintenance systems, inadequate 
training systems, etc. Figure 11 also shows that the problems can equally relate to 
the integration of human and mechanical elements (instructors in a hazardous 
environment) leading to active failures. This dual definition of an instructor's role 
in an outdoor education organisation indicates that to help prevent incidents in an 
outdoor education setting requires a two-fold approach: it is necessary to ensure 
that all of the necessary management controls are in place; and, it is equally 
necessary to identify and assess the psychological precursors leading to active 
failures of instructors. This leads to the identification of two forms of latent failure 
in the outdoor education context: the first being errors in the quality management 
systems; and the second being the underlying precursors of active failures of 
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instructors. These two forms can be termed latent failure (systems) and latent 
failure (instructor). 
Figure 14. The risk versus safety meter for adventure programmes 














Petersen ( 1988) described "The Causation Model" (Figure 15) which showed how 
factors are linked to cause an incident. This diagram helps to show the difference 
between Reason's active and latent failures. 
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Figure 15. The causation model (Petersen, 1988, p. 14) 
(Note: Bracketed items showing latent and active failures have been added by Davidson) 
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The Causation Model suggests that incidents are all due to human error. The 
human errors are a result of one or more of the following pre-conditions: 
'overload', 'decision to err' and 'traps'. These human errors are equivalent to 
Reason's active failures and the conditions leading to the error are equivalent to 
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latent failures (instructor). The model also suggests that for an incident to occur 
something would have had to go wrong with the organisation's safety system in 
order for it not to pick up the error before it resulted in the incident. Higher levels 
of management should have a comprehensive set of systems in place to not only 
ensure that the staff members are prevented from being overloaded, making bad 
decisions or being trapped, but also inspecting performance to help ensure good 
judgments are being made. Any failure of these systems which lead to an incident 
occurring would also be deemed a latent failure (system) by Reason. 
4.3.4 Types and Tokens of Error 
Reason and Petersen are not the only experts in safety management to look more 
deeply at the active failures of front line managers. Hollnagel (1991) has used the 
metaphor and language of genetic traits to describe human error. An example, 
using Holnagel' s metaphor would be to consider the colour of a flower. The 
colour is produced by a hidden genetic code. The outward appearance or colour is 
known by biologists as the phenotype of that trait and is easy to observe, whereas 
the hidden genetic code which has created the colour is the genotype. The 
genotype can have several different forms to produce the same phenotype or 
outward appearance. Discovering the exact form of the genotype is much more 
difficult. Hollnagel's contention is that many safety experts have been focussing 
on the phenotype, which reflects the superficial characteristics of incidents, 
whereas real change can only be brought about by looking at the underlying 
genotype of the human error. Hollnagel's phenotype can be thought of as a 
synonym for the immediate causes (substandard acts and conditions), with the 
genotypes being the root causes: basic causes (personal and job factors), and lack 
of management control (inadequate programme, standards and compliance to 
standards) (Refer Figure 9). 
As discussed earlier, it is certainly simpler to identify the immediate causes and 
attempt to prevent incidents at this point. Hollnagel ( 1991) for example chose 
only to concentrate on the phenotype of errors, creating an action classification 
system - a taxonomy of active errors. The trouble with this approach is that it is a 
behaviourist classification. This classification system, based on exhibited 
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behaviours, is superficial and provides no aid in understanding the underlying 
mechanisms of the error. Since it provides only superficial information, it cannot 
be used for correction and improvement (Busse, 1998). Rasmussen ( 1987) 
observes that if an analysis is based on the external manifestation of the human 
error (active failures) a classification system will quickly become large and 
unwieldy, hindered by what he terms a 'combinatorial explosion'. 
Busse ( 1998) concluded that what is required is a conceptual categorisation 
scheme that seeks to identify causal mechanisms underlying human error - in 
other words taxonomies of the root causes of error. From the discussion above it 
can be seen that Reason's ( 1990) latent errors, and Hollnagel' s (1991) genotypes, 
are synonyms for root causes (Refer Figure 17). 
However, even categorising root causes may be a trap. Rasmussen (1990) warns 
of the danger of overspecificity and signals that we should be considering 
categories of root causes and not extensive lists of individual cases. 
Rasmussen ( 1990) believes that in identifying objective definitions of incident 
· causes, that regularity in terms of causal relations is found between kinds of 
events which he terms "types" not between particular, individually defined events 
(which he calls "tokens"). This is because in complex socio-technical systems, 
each path is a particular token shaped by higher order relational structures. 
Therefore if changes are introduced to remove the conditions of a particular link 
in the chain, odds are that this particular situation will never occur again. The 
concept that the emphasis should be placed on eliminating types, not individual 
tokens is echoed by others (Reason, 1990; Reason & Wagenaar, 1990). 
Figure 16 shows an example of a causal sequence leading to an incident to show 
the difference between tokens and types. 
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Figure 16. Example of a causal sequence to show the difference between tokens and 
types 
Stayed up late 
partying 










Rasmussen ( 1990) argues that it is pointless identifying the individual tokens. 
Instead we should be identifying the classes of these tokens, the types, as the 
classes are applicable to any situation and so can fit into a global model. 
Furthermore, he argues that each type ( category of root cause) should be 
represented by a clear exemplar of that 'type' to aid understanding in a particular 
context. 
"The behaviour of the complex, real world is a continuous, dynamic flow, 
which can only be explained in causal terms after its decomposition into 
discrete events. The concept of a causal interaction of events and objects 
depends on a categorisation of human observations and experiences. 
Perception of occurrences as events in causal connection does not depend 
on categories that are defined by lists of objective attributes, but on 
categories that are identified by examples, prototypes (as defined by Rosch 
( 1975)" (Rasmussen, 1990, p.451 ). 
Rasmussen is calling for exemplars of each type so that they can be easily 
understood by people using taxonomies of error produced for different industries. 
Rosch's 'prototypes' are therefore practical examples of tokens. 
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4.3.5 Interim Model of an Outdoor Education Incident 
Based on the discussion above, the model shown in Figure 17 is proposed to 
depict a causal sequence in an outdoor education incident. 
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This model argues that an incident is the direct consequence of a human error(s) 
of an instructor. The instructor may be in a situation where they are managing an 
activity that has hazards in the environment, hazards due to equipment, and even 
unsafe behaviour by clients or other people in the vicinity; however it is the 
instructor's role to manage these various hazards. The various hazards (unsafe 
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acts and conditions) would be obvious to a trained observer and might appear to 
be the actual cause of any final incident and possible loss, however there are 
hidden reasons for these hazards being present and the human error( s) being 
made. These hidden reasons are the human factors that lead to poor judgments 
and substandard performances, and weaknesses in the management systems of the 
organisation. Putting this model into the language of outdoor education produces 
Figure 18. 
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Note that Management System Errors can impact in two ways at different stages 
in the causal chain: 1) They can allow the outdoor education group to be exposed 
to the hazards of unsafe acts and conditions in the first place; and 2) They can fail 
to pick up and correct a human error made by the instructor therefore resulting in 
an incident. These hidden reasons are the root causes of the incident. The types 
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and tokens of these root causes are not shown in this diagram but would fit as 
categories and subcategories within the boxes shown as 'human factors' and 
'management system errors'. 
This model of an outdoor incident is potentially positive and empowering to those 
in the outdoor education sector. In the aftermath of any incident, it is a natural 
tendency to look for blame in the instructor in charge of the outdoor education 
activity at the time. This model suggests the effort needs to be placed at 
identifying the root causes in the management systems and other error producing 
factors that can be changed to reduce chances of a future occurrence. 
It remains to validate this model and to identify the root causes. 
4.3.6 Summary 
There are many existing models of incident causality in the literature of safety 
management. These models all have the common elements of: 
• multiple causality: where an incident is rarely due to one thing but usually 
due to a number of factors coming together and combining to produce an 
incident potential; 
• levels of causality: where the causes of an incident can be traced back from 
more easily observable factors to the underlying root causes of error. It is 
argued that addressing these root causes will lead to more precise and 
effective management of incidents which will reduce incident potential. 
There is a potential trap to identifying the root causes of incidents in that it is easy 
to be overspecific resulting in a very large list which is confusing and of little 
practical use. It is therefore much more sensible to try to identify categories of 
root causes rather than individual manifestations. Thus, it is necessary to focus on 
'types' or general categories ofroot causes, rather than on their multitudinous 
manifestations or 'tokens'. 
It has been demonstrated (Figure 18) that existing models of incident analysis can 
be adapted to ·· rovide a model useful in understanding outdoor education 
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incidents. This analysis suggests that the root causes of any incident fall under the 
headings of either human error leading to poor judgment or performance by 
instructors, or errors in the management system within which the instructor is 
operating. The following sections attempt to identify root causes within these two 
categories. 
4.4 Identifying the Root Causes of Incidents from the Literature of Industrial 
Safety Management and Psychology 
This section seeks to find root causes in the two classes shown in Figure 18: ( 1) 
human error producing factors that increase the likelihood of people performing 
poorly or making judgment errors; and (2) potential deficiencies in the 
management system of the organisation. The search attempts to find general types 
of root causes that can be applied across the outdoor education sector. 
4.4.1 Theories of Judgment and Decision-Making 
My assumption is that instructors working with groups of students will be doing 
their very best to resolve any situation to minimise loss. In other words, they will 
want to make goodjudgments in order to preserve the safety of their groups. 
Based on this premise, it seems reasonable to conclude that even when an incident 
occurred, the instructor in charge made the best judgments possible given that 
person's skills, abilities, experience and knowledge at the time. When viewed 
with the considerable advantages of hindsight and objectivity, experts may 
consider that a judgment( s) made at the time that led to the incident, was less than 
optimal. This section looks at what knowledge can be gleaned from the literature 
that might have led to that less than optimal judgment being made. 
Initially it is important to establish the relationship between the terms judgment, 
problem-solving and decision-making. Although at one level decision-making and 
problem-solving can be distinguished in that the former places the emphasis on 
the output of the process (the decision), while the latter places the emphasis on the 
input ( defining the problem), such a distinction serves little use in the analysis of 
outdoor incidents where the interest lies in errors in judgment. For the purposes of 
Chapter Four - Review of Literature p.122 
this study, the two terms will be considered as synonymous and only 'decision-
making' will be used hereafter. For many people judgment and decision-making 
are also identical but an important distinction can be made between the two in that 
judgment is viewed as the 'choice' phase of the decision-making process (Carroll 
& Johnson, 1990) and this choice is seen by observers as the output of this 
process. 
The role of judgment within the greater decision-making process is seen in the 
generic model of decision-making (Figure 19). In this model, the role of judgment 
is clarified by the definition of decision-making by Carroll and Johnson ( 1990, 
p.19) as, " ... a process by which a person, group, or organisation identifies a 
choice or judgment to be made, gathers and evaluates information about 
alternatives, and selects from among alternatives." (my italics.) 
Figure 19. A generic decision-making model (Waters, 1996, p.5) 
l. Define problem 










+--- possible solutions 
It might be argued that other steps in the decision-making model of Figure 19 
involve judgment as well. For example step 1, 'defining the problem', and step 2, 
'gathering information', could both be argued to require choice and therefore 
judgment. My argument is that these are both decision-making issues in their own 
right. This position is supported by writers such as Vari and Vecsenyi ( 1989) who 
suggest two mini-decision-making stages within their larger decision-making 
model (Figure 20). 
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Thus decision-making is the entire process of the identification of the problem, 
gathering information about the problem and possible solutions to the problem. 
Judgment is the process of choosing among possible solutions. The output of the 
decision-making process is seen to be the judgment that is implemented. 
Figure 20. Phases of the decision-making process (Vari & Vecsenyi, 1989, p.220) 
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The literature on judgmeflt and decision-making presents two divergent 
approaches to decision-making. namely the traditional or classical, and the 
naturalistic approaches (Azar, 1999). The former was based on research and 
experiments in the 1970s that: 
" ... were rooted in elegant but restricted mathematical concepts and 
models, such as expected utility maximisation of gambling choices, 
random utility models of pairwise preferential choice, and Bayes' theorem 
for the revision of probabilities in the light of new information" (Rohrman, 
Beach, Vlek & Watson, 1989, p.3). 
These investigations based on rational, logical and orderly thought enabled the 
research community to draft the theories of human suboptimality, bounded 
Chapter Four - Review of Literature p.124 
rationality and heuristic strategies for judgment and decision-making in 
experimenter-defined situations. Later, the concept of maximised utility as a 
motive for decision-making was extended by introducing social forms of 
internalised positive utility such as egoistic incentives, self-esteem and altruism 
(Dawes, Van de Kragt & Orbell, 1989). 
From the late 1970s onwards, 
" ... a sense of unease over popular and productive paradigms began to 
manifest itself. This grew stronger as more and more researchers began 
paying attention to real problems such as principal decisions in everyday 
life, managerial decisions in large organisations, or strategic decisions 
concerning technological developments ... " (Rohrman et al., 1989, p.4). 
This unease spawned work by researchers such as Tversky and Kahneman ( 1981) 
with their "prospect theory", Montgomery ( 1983) with "dominance search 
theory", and the development of naturalistic decision-making theories by a great 
number of researchers. 
The following sections elaborate on these major theoretical approaches to 
decision-making in order to find common threads that merit investigation to 
establish the root causes of sub-optimal judgments made in outdoor education 
contexts. 
4.4.1.1 The Traditionalist Approach to Decision-Making. 
An example of a traditionalist approach to decision-making is the framework of 
"Decision Analysis" as originally espoused by Brown, Kahr & Petersen (1974) 
among others. A simplified flow-chart of the Decision Analysis approach is 
shown in Figure 21 (Hogarth, 1980). Decision Analysis is a tool which aims to 
provide explicit quantitative representation of a problem and the expected benefits 
of different courses of action. This theory prescribes choosing the alternative 
which has the greatest expected utility ( expressed numerically wherever possible). 
Hogarth ( 1980) defines two types of judgment: value judgments in which people 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p. 125 
express preferences of one thing over another; and predictive judgrnents in which 
people make predictions which reflect what they expect to happen. He then goes 
on to say that, " ... choice reflects both evaluative and predictive judgrnents. The 
quality of choice depends upon the extent to which ( 1) evaluative judgrnents 
really translate as true preferences, and (2) predictive judgrnents are accurate" 
(Hogarth, 1980, p.3). Evaluating alternatives, therefore, becomes a combined 
process of assessing consequences (i.e. evaluative judgrnents) and assessing 
uncertainties (predictive judgrnents ). It is crucial that one does not influence the 
other otherwise it is likely to result in the "pitfall of wishful thinking" (Hogarth, 
1980, p.135). 
Figure 21. Simplified flow-chart of the Decision Analysis approach (Hogarth, 1980, p.131 
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Note that step 5, sensitivity analysis (Figure 21 ), is a step to check what degree of 
variation in the inputs of assessed consequences and uncertainties would change 
the alternative(s) chosen in step 4. This is based on the maxim that whatever data 
are used to model a situation, they must be wrong, because many of the inputs are 
subjective. However, if it can be shown that the choice between alternatives is 
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relatively insensitive to a range of such inputs, this can show how wrong the 
estimations can be before a different decision would be required. 
p./26 
In summary, a traditionalist would see decision-making as a combination of 
evaluative and predictive judgments, the final judgment being made according to 
which option affords the greatest utility for the person making the judgment. It 
should be noted that Decision Analysis is a technique which attempts to quantify 
utility and therefore minimise intuitive judgment. However, in outdoor education 
settings this approach is not often appropriate as time is often a factor and in such 
contexts assessed consequences and uncertainties are less amenable to 
quantification. 
The traditionalist decision-making approach shows that in order to reach a 
judgment (choice), requires the initial stages of gathering information (to define 
the problem and generate possible solutions) and then assessing the identified 
solutions. Following the judgment, the solution chosen is implemented and the 
results evaluated for use in further situations. 
4.4.1.2 The Naturalistic Decision-Making Approach. 
Johnson-Laird and Shafir ( 1994) discussed the conflict between normative 
theories ofreasoning and decision-making and the real-life, descriptive 
experiences that were being reported about how humans actually operated. They 
summed it up by maintaining that: 
"People are not intuitive logicians, intuitive statisticians, or intuitive 
rational decision theorists. Instead, the precise character of their thoughts 
and decisions is the outcome of complex and unobservable mental 
processes, the nature of which researchers in both these areas of inquiry 
are trying to elucidate" (Johnson-Laird and Shafir, 1994, p.5-6). 
From this observation rose the study of naturalistic decision-making (NDM) 
which confronts the issue of how experienced people, working as individuals or 
groups in dynamic, uncertain, and often fast paced environments, identify and 
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assess their situation, make decisions and take actions whose consequences are 
meaningful to them and to the larger organisation in which they operate 
(Zsambok, 1997). This form of decision-making seems much more descriptive of 
outdoor instructors in action. 
Klein and Woods (1993) indicated that the most important finding ofNDM is 
that; "people are able to use their experience to adopt successful courses of action 
even without applying rigorous analytical strategies" (p.404). This idea was 
further developed by Orasnu, Fischer and Tarrel ( 1993) from research into pilots' 
decision-making in flight from which they derived a decision process model that 
showed the range of decision-making options available dependent on time and 
experience (Figure 22). 
Figure 22. Decision process model (Orasanu & Fischer, 1997, p.352). 
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A most interesting finding (Figure 22) is that if the risk is high and time is limited, 
pilots do not spend large amounts of time creating and considering various options 
based on quantitative measures of utility, but rather, they immediately adopt a 
rule-based solution whether they understand the problem or not. A rule-based 
decision is explained by Boyes (2000) to be one where the key factor is situation 
recognition, because once a situation is recognised, the response is relatively 
automatic. The quality of the decision in this case is dependent on the experience 
level of the pilot and the adequacy of the match between the characteristics of the 
situation and the rule-based solution that is implemented. This focus on situational 
awareness and then assessment is crucial in understanding how proficient 
decision-makers call up suitable solutions to problems from past experiences 
(Endsley 1995, 1997; Klein, 1989). 
Boyes (2000) adapted the NDM work to construct a model of how instructors in 
charge of outdoor adventure activities made decisions. His decision-making 
model is based around an outdoor leader's situational awareness and an attempt to 
provide an appropriate level of challenge for participants (Figure 23). He designed 
a research study to investigate whether his proposed model could be supported 
through empirical data. The study involved having outdoor leaders making 
decisions based on a range of simulated outdoor case studies. The results of this 
led support to the validity of the NDM based model in an outdoor educational 
setting. 
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Figure 23. Framework model of outdoor adventure decision-making (Boyes 2000 
p.53) ' ' 
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The NDM models of decision-making rely on judgments being made by those 
involved often having little time in which to make the decisions, and having to 
make the decisions in environments that may be hostile. In this case, the 
judgments may not involve the careful analysis of quantised measures of utility, 
as is proposed by traditional models of decision-making. Rather, because of time 
pressures, decision-making may involve the implementation of previously used 
solutions based on the recognition of similarities in the situations. NDM methods 
still involve the stages of information gathering (situational awareness) and 
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assessment of that information ( situational assessment) before a judgment is made 
- no matter how quickly. Once the judgment is made, the chosen solution is 
implemented and the person involved receives feedback on how well that solution 
works at resolving the problem that has been identified. The decision-making 
process in this naturalistic model is therefore viewed as essentially iterative, 
emergent and reactive. 
4.4.1.3 A Conceptual Model of Judgment 
Many models and theories of the judgment process exist. Hogarth ( 1980) presents 
a conceptual model of judgment (Figure 24) that contains the generic elements of 
many other models. Hogarth's model shows thatjudgment occurs in a so-called 
task environment (box 1 ). Within the task environment is what is called the 
person's schema (box 2). The schema symbolises the person's beliefs concerning 
the task environment and his / her representation of it; i.e. how he I she perceives 
the judgmental task. The schema is created both by the person's memory and the 
characteristics of the judgmental task. 
In this model the judgment of the person is seen in the external (task environment) 
world to be the output (box 5). The judgment itself is the result of information 
being acquired, processed and then output (boxes 3, 4 and 5). At this stage a 
decision has been made as to the best option or options available and then an 
action is taken. The output (judgment) is internal to the person, but may be 
verbalised - which is why the output box is shown spanning the schema and task 
environment fields. The external expression of this is the action. To the observers 
there is often no apparent difference between the output and the action. 
The model in Figure 24 demonstrates where bias can enter the judgment process 
and therefore cause the final judgment to be of lower quality. 
"Bias in judgment can be thought of as intervening at the different stages 
of information processing outlined above. First, the acquisition of 
information from both the environment and memory can be biased. The 
crucial issue here is how certain information does or does not become 
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salient. Second, the manner in which information is processed can be 
biased; for example, if the individual simplifies the judgmental situation 
by using an inappropriate mental strategy. Third, the manner in which the 
person is required to respond can induce bias ... Finally ... outcomes of 
judgment can induce bias in both (1) interpretation of their significance 
(for example, is the outcome attributable to one's action or simply a 
chance fluctuation?), and (2) learning relationships for predictive ability" 
(Hogarth, 1980 p.158). 
Figure 24. Conceptual model of judgment task environment. (Hogarth, 1980 p.157) 
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4.4.1.4 Summary 
This section has briefly looked at two theories of decision-making (traditional and 
NDM approaches) and a theory of judgment. The key point of this investigation is 
that common elements have been revealed. Despite differences in terminology and 
the contexts in which the various models are purported to work; simple or 
complex task environments, the static or dynamic nature of the environment in 
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which decision-makers find themselves, and whether time pressures are involved, 
all decision-makers still have to: 
• Gather data about the situation; 
• Assess these data; 
• Choose an appropriate solution to the problem from a range of options and 
implement it; and 
• Reflect on the consequences of that decision ( even if this reflection is 
sometime after the fact). 
These four stages in the judgment process indicate places where bias (human 
errors) can enter that process and lead to less than optimal judgments being made. 
The following section will look at ways that bias can enter each of these stages of 
the judgment task. These sources of bias can be considered the root causes leading 
to errors injudgment. For simplicity, the four stages investigated will be named: 
• Acquisition of Information ( situational awareness) 
• Processing of Information (situational assessment) 
• Output 
• Feedback 
4.4.2 Sources of Bias in the Judgment Process. 
In trying to identify the root causes of errors in judgment, the approach I am going 
to use is to look for sources of bias in the stages of the judgment process identified 
in the previous section. The following is a list of bias sources summarised by 
Hogarth ( 1980) that I have augmented with information from other sources. 
4.4.2.1 Sources of Bias in the Acquisition of Information (Situational Awareness) 
The issue of bias in information acquisition is about when and why information 
becomes salient to an individual (Hogarth, 1980). Brunswik ( 1955) proposes a 
lens model for judgment shown in Figure 25. Although Brunswik's model is close 
to 50 years old, it is still firmly embraced in recent literature on judgment in social 
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contexts ( e.g., Cookrey, 1996; Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971; Stewart, 1988). In the 
Brunswik model a person makes judgments based on 'cues'. The judgment will be 
accurate to the extent that the individual's picture of reality andjudgmental rules 
match what exists. Brunswik stresses that judgment takes place in a probabilistic 
environment and so the relationships between cues in the environment and the 
target outcome can't be represented by strict functional rules but rather by 
probabilistic rules (Hogarth, 1980). The cues can come from both the individual's 
memory and the task environment. Thus the salience of information can be a 
function of both memory and features of the task environment. 










One other important concept of searching for cues, is that people attach meaning 
or emotions to events and concepts. Such meaning can even guide the search 
process in the first place (Hogarth, 1980). These attachments of personal 
meanings are the equivalent of the 'schema' in Figure 24. 
As the NDM model has shown, good judgment is reliant on people identifying 
appropriate cues on which to base decisions, especially in time-dependent 
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situations. Bias can therefore enter the judgment process because of the 
mechanisms by which cues become salient to individuals. These biases include: 
4.4.2.1.(a) Availability 
The ease with which information can be recalled from memory is a clue people 
use to predict the frequency of an event. Thus for example, events that are well 
publicised such as death by lightning strike or in an air crash make people believe 
these are more common than they actually are. 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1973) argued that if you can think of or see several 
instances of one kind of event as opposed to another, you can be led to believe 
that the former is more frequent than the latter. Therefore if our environment 
somehow emphasises certain aspects, our judgment will be biased by the ease 
with which we recall instances and thus estimate their frequency. While this is 
often a valid rule for prediction (i.e. events which occur frequently will usually 
occur frequently in the future), research (Estes, 1976) indicated that people often 
base estimates of proportions on the basis of their experience of absolute as 
opposed to relative frequencies. Or, to put it another way: 
"If there were a thousand similar events, we would tend to remember them 
as one composite prototype. If there were just one discrepant event, we 
would remember it too, for by being discrepant it didn't get smudged up 
with the rest. But the resulting memory is almost as if there had only been 
two events: the common one and the discrepant one. The common one is a 
thousand times more likely, but not to the memory; in memory there are 
two things, and the discrepant event hardly seems less likely than the 
everyday one" (Norman, 1988, p.118). 
4.4.2.1.(b) Selective Perception 
Perception of information is not comprehensive but selective. Because we don't 
have the ability to perceive all the information our senses are receiving we have to 
select; however to select it is necessary to know what to select. Anticipation plays 
a large part in what we actually 'see'. Physical as well as motivational reasons 
account for why people only see what they want to see. Styles ( 1997) described 
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this phenomenon as a 'mental set' where a person prepares to respond to a 
particular set of stimuli, ignoring others at the expense of those that are selected 
for attentional processing. 
People structure problems on the basis of their own experience. There is also the 
tendency to consider one's own range of experience as normal and thus to make 
erroneous attributions in judging others behaviour as deviant. People seek 
information consistent with their own views and hypotheses. In addition people 
downplay or disregard conflicting evidence. This is confirmed by experiments 
reported by Slovic ( 1966). 
Legrenzi, Girotto & Johnson-Laird (1994) described this effect as 'focusing'. 
They believe that people make mental models of how the world works. People 
make as few models as possible in order to minimise the load on the working 
memory. Once these models are created people tend to focus on information 
explicit in their models and fail to consider other alternatives. This is very similar 
to the work of Pennington and Hastie ( 1994 ), who, instead of mental models, 
talked of explanation-bas~d decision-making. They believe that people create 
stories to explain facts around them and will choose a best-fit story for the 
situation and use this to make a decision. Once the best-fit story is chosen then the 
same aspects of selective perception apply. 
"There is a tendency to see what you expect to find; during one period, 
technical faults were in focus as causes of accidents, then human errors 
predominated, whereas in the future the focus will probably move 
upstream to designers and managers" (Rasmussen, 1990, p.452). 
4.4.2.1.(c) Frequency 
A cue used to judge the strength of predictive relationships is observed frequency 
rather than observed relative frequency. Information on non-occurrences of an 
event is often unavailable and frequently ignored when available. Sampling theory 
suggests that confidence in judgment should be related to the amount of 
information sampled. However, this was under the restriction that each item of 
information sampled was independent of the other. Consistency of dependent data 
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sources is not a good criterion for determining confidence in judgrnent. 
Oskamp ( 1965) carried out a study where the judgments of clinical psychologists 
were studied as a function of the amount of information presented to them about 
various cases. As the amount of information increased, so did the psychologists 
confidence in their judgments, however there was no corresponding increase in 
predictive accuracy. Humans don't necessarily discriminate whether information 
is redundant or not. This is also confirmed by Estes (1976) who carried out 
several experiments that indicate, for predictive purposes, the frequency of an 
event is more salient in memory than relative frequency. 
4. 4. 2. I. ( d) Concrete information (ignoring base-rate or prior information) 
Concrete information or case data (i.e. based on experience/ incidents) dominates 
abstract information ( e.g., summaries, statistical base rates, etc ). The general 
finding, albeit with exceptions, is that when people are faced with both base-rate 
and case data, they ignore the former and predict almost entirely with the latter. In 
fact probability theory argues that one should modify base-rate data by case data 
therefore ensuring that the ensuing judgrnent reflects both ( e.g., weather forecast 
predicts rain, go outside and see blue sky, what do you do?). Evidence indicates 
that available base-rate data will be incorporated into judgrnent if they are 
causally linked ( or make sense in relation to) specific data. Otherwise base data 
are ignored. Therefore whereas people give meaning to information, the laws of 
probability do not and this is the difference between intuitive and statistical 
reasoning. (For example when buying a car, advice from a neighbour who has had 
a positive or negative experience with a particular model is liable to weigh more 
heavily than more extensive data published about that model in a motoring 
magazine). 
4.4.2.1.(e) Illusory Correlation 
This is the belief that two variables co-vary when in fact they do not. Chapman & 
Chapman (1969) described this tendency to see relationships between variables 
where none exist. They believe that it is particularly disturbing that people 
continue to believe in these illusory correlations when it is hoped that people will 
learn from experience. There are two possible explanations for this. The first is 
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that because of 'selective perception', people will selectively forget instances 
where their judgment was incorrect, or in other words have a bad memory for 
their predictive failures. Secondly, where people receive bad feedback concerning 
their judgments and others share the same illusions, then this illusion is 
reinforced. Hogarth ( 1980) noted that in many organisations, common beliefs are 
precisely of this nature. 
4. 4. 2. 1. (I) Data presentation 
People are influenced by the order, type and method in which information is 
presented. 
• Order effects (primacy/ recency): sometimes the first items in a 
sequential presentation assume undue importance and sometimes the 
last items presented do. This effect is also mentioned by Kaplan ( 197 5) 
who additionally noted the phenomenon of"rigidity of first 
impressions" (p.144) where it is difficult for people to change a 
judgment once one has been made. 
• Mode of presentation: people find it easier to access sequential versus 
intact displays for example. Wason & Johnson-Laird (1972) found that 
information presented in negative statements was more difficult to 
process and understand. 
• Mixture of types of information: some people prefer quantitative over 
qualitative data, or vice versa. This is confirmed by experiments 
reported by Slovic ( 1972). 
• Logical presentations: apparently complete 'logical' data displays can 
blind people to critical omissions (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 
1978). 
• Context effects on perceived variability: Assessments of variability, of 
say a series of numbers, is affected by the absolute size ( e.g., mean 
level) of the numbers. 
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4.4.2.1.(g) Summary of biases in the acquisition of information 
This section has reviewed the forms of bias that can affect the information being 
gathered that is used in the decision-making process. Biases that affect the 
information gathered will affect the quality of any judgment in this process. 
From the biases identified, those that seem pertinent to the outdoor education 
sector, especially to judgments being made in the field, include: 
•Availability- the ease with which information can be recalled. 
•Selective perception - people tend to see what they are expecting to see and not 
see things that are not expected. 
•Frequency- the number of times that something is observed can be a cue to 
predictive relationships. 
• Illusory Correlation - the mistaken belief that relationships exist between 
variables. 
•Concrete information - immediately available information is given more 
credence than other data. 
The way that data were presented has also been shown to bias the relevance of the 
information to those being presented with it. However, this form of bias is much 
more relevant to the presentation of quantitative and written data, as opposed to 
gathering information that relates to the management of an outdoor activity in the 
field and therefore will not be used in a taxonomy of root causes of outdoor 
education incidents. 
4.4.2.2 Sources of Bias in the Processing of Information (Situational Assessment) 
An individual's choice of a decision I information processing rule, or, the series of 
mental processes that the person applies to the information that has been accessed, 
can bias the eventual judgment made. Bias in processing can be induced by both 
memory and task characteristics. 
Memory bias is generally due to 'availability' of certain rules or habits as 
explained above. The bulk of processing biases noted in literature, however, result 
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from either an inconsistency in applying a judgmental rule, task variables, or an 
unwillingness to expend mental effort. 
4.4.2.2.(a) Inconsistency. 
This relates to the inability to apply a consistent judgmental strategy over a 
repetitive set of cases. This is a major source of processing bias and several 
studies show that the validity of judgment is considerably attenuated by this 
particular fallibility (Hogarth, 1980). 
4. 4. 2. 2. (b) Conservatism 
This term refers to the failure to revise opinion on receipt of new information to 
the correct extent (Bayes' theorem). Edwards ( 1968) also confirmed that people 
have difficulty in adjusting base-rate probabilities by specific information in cases 
where differential meaning is not an issue. Specifically, people in these instances 
have been found to be conservative information processors in that they fail to 
allow the specific information to adjust the base-rate sufficiently. 
4.4.2.2.(c) Non-linear extrapolation I explaining away hazards 
Those in the position of gathering information and making judgments are often 
unable to extrapolate growth processes and there is a tendency to underestimate 
joint probabilities of several events. Norman (1988) describes this type of bias as 
'explaining away errors' (in outdoor education activities this would be the 
equivalent of explaining away hazards). He makes the point that mistakes in 
assessing the importance of information and accumulating errors can take a very 
long time to be discovered unless a major incident occurs. This is because the cues 
to an impending incident, might be noticed but are then often ignored or explained 
away as an anomaly. Most of the time those people making these sorts of 
misinterpretations are not corrected because no incident results. Norman states 
that when an incident does happen, explaining away the signs of the impending 
disaster which seemed logical to those making the decision at the time seem 
implausible to others reviewing the incident. Afterwards there is a tendency to 
read about what has taken place and to criticise. Norman uses the example of the 
Three Mile Island nuclear generator near meltdown. Operators at Three Mile 
Island made numerous errors and misdiagnoses, but each one was logical and 
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understandable at the time but now their judgment can be seen to be erroneous. 
The major accident followed a series of breakdowns, yet no single step was seen 
to be serious. In many of these cases, the people involved noted the problem but 
explained it away, finding a logical explanation for the otherwise deviant 
observation. 
4.4.2.2.(d) Heuristics used to reduce mental effort 
Shanteau ( 1989) discussed research findings that showed that often decisions 
made by experts lacked both validity and reliability and furthermore that the 
experts were unaware of their various shortcomings. 
"One frequent explanation for this low level of performance is that experts 
reportedly rely on heuristics (or mental rules of thumb) in makingjudgments. 
Heuristics are necessary because of the limited cognitive processing capacity 
of the human brain. These heuristics often lead to biases or judgment errors 
relative to normative standards. Moreover, similar heuristics and biases have 
been reported for both novice and expert decision makers" (Shanteau, 1989, 
p.204). 
The NDM models discussed in Section 4.4.1.2 also show how simple rules, or 
heuristics, are often employed by decision-makers, especially when time is at a 
premium, to reduce the effort and length of the decision-making process. 
Some examples of heuristics are: 
• Habit/rules of thumb: Choosing an alternative because it has previously 
been satisfactory. However there is no guarantee that because that 
judgment choice has worked in the past that it will work in this particular 
task environment. 
In fact Rasmussen ( 1990) argued that if individuals are constrained by an 
inadequate rule system in their organisation, to get rid of choice or 
decision-making during normal work, then they will have trouble adjusting 





/ adapting to aberrations in the norm and won't be able to handle novel and 
unique situations. 
Anchoring and adjustment: Prediction made by anchoring on a clue or 
value and then adjusting to allow for the circumstances of the present case 
Representativeness: Judgments of likelihood of an event by estimating 
degree of similarity to the class of events of which it is supposed to be an 
exemplar. Kahneman & Tversky ( 1972) labelled the mental strategy of 
stereotyping by degree of similarity, 'representativeness'. Unfortunately it 
is only valid to the extent that data sources are not redundant or that it 
doesn't induce you to ignore other information. 
Law of small numbers: Characteristics of small samples are deemed to be 
representative of the populations from which they are drawn. 
Justifiability: A processing rule can be used if the individual finds a 
rationale to 'justify' it. 
• Regression bias: Extreme values of a variable are used to predict extreme 
values of the next observation of the variable (thus failing to allow for 
regression to the mean). In other words people fail to understand that when 
observations vary irregularly around some average value or trend, then 
extreme values are likely to be followed by less extreme values. 
• Best guess strategy: Under conditions involving several sources of 
uncertainty, simplification is made by ignoring some uncertainties and 
basing judgment on the most likely hypothesis. Gettys, Kelly & Peterson 
( 1973) identified this as strategy resulting from the limited information 
processing ability of humans. They saw people tending to eliminate 
subjectively some of the uncertainties and focus attention on what they 
consider to be the most likely different combinations of outcomes. 
• Expert opinion: It is common to make a decision based on the opinion of 
someone who is considered to be an expert by the person in the decision-
making role (Petty, Cacioppo, Strathman & Priester, 1994). This heuristic 
appears quite reasonable as it involves the adoption of a credible source 
even if there hasn't been careful scrutiny of the arguments (Ajzen, 1992). 
4.4.2.2. (e) Consistency of Information Sources 
If the same information is 'observed' over time, or through differing sources, this 
can lead to increases in confidence in judgment but not to increased predictive 
accuracy. People often like to have more information, even though it is redundant. 
In their classic study of how people acquire concepts, Bruner, Goodnow and 
Austin ( 1956) noted what they termed a 'thirst for confirming redundancy'. This 
means that once people have acquired a concept, they continue to test it several 
times in order to really confirm it for themselves, and often redundantly. Thus 
there is a strong tendency to accumulate several instances of confirming evidence, 
which are redundant, and in so doing to gain artificially greater confidence in their 
hypothesis. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1973, p.240) have termed this phenomenon "illusion of 
validity". 
" ... factors which enhance confidence, for example consistency and 
extremity, are often negatively related with predictive accuracy. Thus 
people are prone to experience much confidence in highly fallible 
judgments, a phenomenon that may be termed illusion of validity. Like 
other perceptual and judgmental errors, the illusion of validity often 
persists even when its illusory character is recognised ... " 
4.4.2.2.(/) The decision environment: 
The environment in which a person has to make a judgment can have a major 
impact on the quality of the judgment made. Many of the factors identified by 
Petersen ( 1988) in his Causation Model (Figure 15) as being root causes of 
incidents, are factors in the decision environment leading to overload conditions 
on the decision-maker or other psychological pressures to make certain decisions. 
Factors in the decision environment that can lead to biases occurring in the 
judgment process include: 
• Complexity: complexity induced by time pressure, information overload, 
distractions leads to reduced consistency of judgment. 
• Equipment traps: Norman ( 1988) believes that the design of equipment 
can in itself be a 'trap' that will lead people to make errors. He believes 
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this occurs because the world is a complex place and the human mind is 
perfectly adapted to making sense of this changing environment. However 
the human mind uses simplification and rules of thumb to make sense of 
this complexity as described in the earlier section on heuristics. Norman 
believes that the design of many objects, machines and items of equipment 
cause the human mind to make incorrect assumptions about how to use the 
objects and this leads to error. 
"The human mind is exquisitely tailored to make sense of the 
world. Give it the slightest clue and off it goes, providing 
explanation, rationalisation and understanding ... Well designed 
objects are easy to interpret and understand. They contain visible 
clues to their operation. Poorly designed objects can be difficult 
and frustrating to use. They provide no clues - or sometimes false 
clues. They trap the user and thwart the normal process of 
interpretation and understanding .... the result is a world filled with 
frustration, with objects that cannot be understood, with devices 
that lead to error." (Norman, 1988, p.2) 
Norman works on the principle that when using a device, 
"If an error is possible, someone will make it. The designer must 
assume that all possible errors will occur and design so as to 
minimise the chance of the error in the first place, or its effects 
once it gets made. Errors should be easy to detect, they should have 
minimal consequences, and, if possible, their effects should be 
reversible." (Norman, 1988 , p.36) 
Interestingly, having studied people making errors with mechanical 
devices, Norman notes that people feel guilty and either try to hide the 
error or blame themselves for stupidity or clumsiness. Even if it is pointed 
out that the design is faulty and others make the same error, if the task 
appears simple or trivial then people blame themselves. This is a direct 
result of causality, where people will assign a causal relationship if two 
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things happen in close succession (If I do some action A just prior to some 
result R, then I conclude that A must have caused R). This relationship 
may not exist at all; it may in fact be due to the design. However, because 
people perceive that they should be able to use an everyday device easily, 
they perceive the fault to be theirs, and this creates a," ... conspiracy of 
silence maintaining the feelings of guilt and helplessness among users" 
(Norman, 1988, p.41). Strangely, this tendency to blame ourselves for 
failures with everyday objects goes against normal attribution theory 
discussed earlier where people attribute their own problems to the 
environment and those of other people to their personalities. 
Norman believes that the equipment traps can be avoided by adopting 
design characteristics that will lead to clear interpretation by the human 
brain. 
• Emotional Stress: Emotional stress reduces the care with which people 
select and process information (panic judgments). A major emotional 
aspect of behaviour is the individual's psychological regret for taking or 
failing to take an action. In an interesting series of experiments, Kahneman 
and Tversky ( 1979) showed a mirror image of regret in cases where people 
were faced with certain losses. Confronted with a choice between a certain 
loss, on the one hand, and a probabilistic prospect of either avoiding that 
loss or incurring a slightly larger one, people tended to opt for the choice 
of avoiding the loss. That is, when confronted with losses, the regret of 
failing to take an option that could possibly extract one from the situation 
is too strong. Emotional factors such as anxiety, for example fear of 
potential outcomes of one's actions, can also cause people to block out 
relevant arguments, over-emphasise different arguments in favour of 
preferred alternatives, fail to search for new alternatives, and even 
psychologically prepare themselves for negative consequences of their 
decisions. 
Kaplan ( 1975) discussed what he called "Transient situational states" 
(p.152) where a person in a judgment situation will make different 
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judgment choices based on states bought about by situational conditions. 
Kaplan described these states as "moods". He quoted experimental 
manipulations that have been shown to temporarily influence levels of 
evaluative judgment. The transient states in these experiments were 
induced by: prior expectations (Kelley, 1950); instructions to assume 
certain roles (Jones & De Charms, 1958); physical discomfort (Griffitt, 
1970); crowding (Griffitt & Veitch, 1971 ); and overheard propaganda 
(Kaplan & Major, 1973 ). 
• Social Pressures: Social pressures, ( e.g., of a group), can cause people to 
distort their judgments (The majority in a group can unduly influence the 
judgment of others). Norman (1988) stated that social pressure is a subtle 
issue that can lead to misinterpretation, mistakes and accidents in 
industrial settings. The pressures from peers and colleagues to either do 
something you shouldn't, or not do something you should, is strong and 
has been shown to contribute to incidents. An example that Norman gives 
is the 1983 flight of Korean Flight 007. Flight 007 strayed over the Soviet 
Union and was shot down, probably because of an error in programming 
the flight path into the inertial navigation system (INS). Although each 
checkpoint was discrepant, apparently the deviations were easily explained 
away if the crew substituted for each point the checkpoint reading for the 
previous INS point. But there were significant social pressures operating 
as well. 
The crew of flight 007 probably misprogrammed the INS, but the INS 
couldn't be reprogrammed in flight: if an error was detected the aircraft 
would have to go back to the original airport, land Uettisoning fuel to get a 
safe landing weight), and then reset the INS and take off again - an 
expensive option. Three Korean Air Flights had returned to the airport in 
the previous six months and the airline had told its pilots that the next pilot 
to return would be punished. 
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Fazio and Roskos-Ewoldson (1994) described social 'norms' where beliefs 
about how one should or is expected to behave in a situation, "can exert a 
powerful influence upon behaviour" (p. 76). 
Rasmussen ( 1990) addressed the issue of social pressures on those making 
judgments, especially when there is a boss versus worker pressure. He 
discussed the issue whereby operators are often conditioned by the 
conscious decisions made by work planners or managers. This will 
influence their "power of control" when making decisions in the "dynamic 
flow of events" (p.453). He also states that this conditioning ofresponse is 
often missed in causal analysis of incidents because it is not in the main 
branch of the causal tree of the dynamic flow. 
It is easy to imagine that other social interactions such as power issues 
between instructors, especially if there is a gender difference in a co-
instructor situation, could influence judgments being made. 
• Beliefs or Values: Hogarth (1980) discussed the effect of individual's 
schemas in a task environment. A person's beliefs or values can alter the 
preferred goal for the individual which can lead to judgments being made 
that seem erroneous when compared to the original goal. Karlsson ( 1989) 
discussed this in his study of decision and choice, describing the 
phenomena of a 'conflicting project' and the 'motive in decision-making'. 
In considering how decision makers resolve the conflict when faced with 
choice between equally attractive options Shafir, Simonson & Tverky 
( 1994, p.14) found evidence that rather than random choices, people 
tended to choose the alternative that was, " ... higher on the dimension that 
the subject considered more important". Slovic ( 1975, 1990) also 
discussed the influence of values and beliefs when making choices. 
Kaplan (1975, p.144) talks of, "differences in information valuation" 
where those in the position of making judgments already have predefined 
subjective valuations placed on different categories of data and their 
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sources. 
In a lecture I attended on ethics in the outdoors, Jasper Hunt raised the 
issue of people making decisions based on their perception of the 
"sum mum bonum" or greatest good, as they see it, in terms of the 
outcome. Their values will affect their decision choice. In much the same 
way Upshaw (1975, p.204) stated that, 
"An issue, then, is resolved for the person when he discovers a 
satisfactory strategy for achieving whatever goals and maximising 
whatever values have been aroused in the situation." And further 
(p.218), "These goals and values, when directed to an issue, define 
the person's attitude. Hence, attitude is probably the most 
important determinant of the precise way in which the person 
combines stimulus attributes to produce a preference ordering." 
• Ego: Other writers ( e.g., Dawes, Kragt & Orbell, 1989) discussed the drive 
to maximise internal positive utilities such as egoistic incentives, self 
esteem and altruism in making decision strategies. In enhancing these 
internalised utilities, the benefits to the group or group process may be 
lost. 
• Risky Shift: Because group decisions often require consensus and 
compromise, it might be expected that the outcomes of a group process 
would be more conservative, prudent or cautious than individual decisions. 
Stoner ( 1961) reported an effect that conflicted with this assumption when 
he discovered that individual opinions become riskier after group 
discussions. This phenomenon is now termed risky shift: where the risk 
taking propensity of individuals is shifted upwards in a group situation. 
The same individual would make a less risky decision (take a less risky 
alternative) if they were on their own (Kozielecki, 1981 ). 
Research following the original work of Stoner found that the results of 
group discussions were not always increases in risk taking. Sometimes the 
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outcomes were more cautious than the individuals would have taken 
before taking part in the group discussion (Moscovici & Zavalloni, 1969; 
Myers & Lamm, 1976). The finding of this further research was that, 
" ... discussion leads members to make more extreme decisions in the 
direction toward which they were initially inclined" (Kitayama & 
Burnstein, 1994). The term 'group polarisation' was used to describe this 
effect rather than 'risky shift'. However, in the discussion of biases 
involved in judgment affecting decision-making in the outdoors, more 
cautious decisions are not relevant, as conservative decisions are not likely 
to lead to incidents. Thus, risky shift is still the appropriate term to use in 
the discussion of this bias. 
• Illusion of Invulnerability: Various writers have identified the concept of 
the illusion of invulnerability whereby a person, through many successes 
in the past, can come to believe they can take bigger and bigger risks 
without any negative outcome. This can even become part of a group or 
organisational mentality. For example it is believed that the illusion of 
invulnerability was a factor in the Space Shuttle Challenger disaster as 
there was a blind faith within NASA in the ability of the organisation to 
overcome any obstacle (Pidgeon, 1989; Janis, 1972). 
• Individual Risk Taking Preference: Coombs ( 1975) discussed the 
shortcomings of Expected Utility Theory and proposed an alternative 
theory that he termed Portfolio Theory (Also: Coombs, 1969; Coombs & 
Bowen, 1971 a, 1971 b; Coombs & Meyer, 1969). Portfolio Theory is an 
alternative theory of risky decision-making and states that a choice among 
risky decisions is a compromise between maximising expected utility and 
optimising the level of risk. The assumptions of this theory include the 
premises that each individual has an individual optimum risk taking level 
and that the there is a single-peaked preference function over risk when 
expected value is constant. 
"The psychological idea here is that for a fixed expectation an 
individual has an optimum level of risk and that his preference falls 
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off as risk increases or decreases ... With expected value fixed then, 
a gamble reflects a conflict between greed and fear, an approach-
avoidance conflict, and this condition means that for each 
individual there is an optimum level at which greed and fear are in 
unstable balance - at a lower level of risk greed drives him on, and 
at a higher level of risk fear holds him back - so preference falls 
off in either direction from the optimum level" (Coombs, 1975, 
p.71). 
Coombs carried out two experiments, both of which produced results that 
supported Portfolio Theory. Translated to outdoor instruction this theory 
indicates that an individual will have a preference for an optimum risk 
level. Whether this is high or low will have an impact on decisions made 
in activities. It is likely that incidents will occur to those whose risk taking 
optimum level is high and exceeds their skill level for the situation. 
4.4.2.2. (g) Summary of biases in the processing of information 
The literature review has identified a number of biases that can impact on the 
processing of information in the decision-making process leading to impaired 
judgments. Those that are applicable to outdoor education activities are: 
•Inconsistency- the inability to be consistent in applyingjudgment strategies 
over a number of cases. 
•Conservatism - failure to revise an opinion or judgment based on the receipt of 
new information. 
•Explaining away hazards - making mistakes in assessing the importance of 
information or failing to extrapolate properly. 
• Heuristics - techniques of simplification of the problem or the use of simple 
rules to reduce the effort of decision-making. 
•Consistency of information sources - if a number of information sources 
suggest a certain outcome then this can lead to increased confidence in a certain 
judgment. 
•Factors in the decision environment. These factors fall into two main areas: 
those causing overload conditions on the person making the judgment 
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(Complexity, equipment traps, emotional stress) and those placing psychological 
pressure on the person making the judgment to alter their decision in a manner 
that results in increased risk (social pressures, personal beliefs/ values, ego, 
risky shift, illusions of invulnerability, individual risk taking preferences). 
4.4.2.3. Sources of Bias in the Output Process: 
The way in which people express their choice or judgment can also bias the 
judgment that they are expressing. The literature identifies the following biases in 
judgment due to the output process. 
4.4.2.3.(a) Question Format and Scale effects 
People's estimates of probabilities have been found to differ according to the 
method with which people have been asked to respond as well as the scale used to 
measure responses (Hogarth, 1975, 1980). 
4.4.2.3.(b) Wishful thinking 
People's preferences for outcomes of events affect their assessment of the events. 
People sometimes assess the probability of outcomes they desire higher than their 
state of knowledge justifies. 
Savage ( 1954) discusses the well developed theory of rational choice ( or decision 
theory) under conditions of uncertainty. Three pertinent practical aspects of the 
theory are: ( 1) it embodies a number of commonsense principles that are worth 
emphasising; (2) it states that if a person is coherent, then his or her beliefs 
(predictive judgments) and preferences (evaluative judgments) can be expressed 
by probabilities and utilities; and (3) maximising expected utility is the sole 
criterion of rational choice. The theory is built upon the principles that people are 
capable of expressing both consistent preferences and consistent beliefs. 
Furthermore, preferences and beliefs should be independent of each other in the 
sense that you should not allow what you are think is going to happen (beliefs) to 
affect what you would like to happen (preferences) and vice versa. In other words, 
independence of preferences and beliefs is a statement for realism, for warning 
people against engaging in 'wishful thinking' or conversely 'persecution mania'. 
People do not necessarily follow these principles. Perhaps the most striking 
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feature of this discussion is that although people are willing to accept the 
principles when they are stated abstractly, they do not realise that they violate 
them through their actual expressions of choice. 
4.4.2.3.(c) Illusion of control 
Activity concerning an uncertain outcome can, by itself, induce in a person 
feelings of control over the uncertain event. Activities such as planning or even 
the making of forecasts can induce feelings of control over the uncertain interplay 
of humans in a hazardous environment.. 
Pidgeon ( 1989) discussed this phenomenon in the context of individuals or groups 
carrying out intensive risk analysis or problem structuring techniques where there 
are incomplete, ill-defined or complex risk issues. Once the structure is finally 
formalised the model may engender undue confidence; what is out of sight is 
effectively out of mind (Fischhoff, Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1978). In current risk 
assessment practices this tendency towards overconfidence in spite of many 
unknowns is guarded against by building probability distributions into any 
assessment. Levi ( 1981, p.408) suggested that an essential safeguard against 
overconfidence in the modeling effort is to, "be mindful of our ignorance even 
when it hurts". 
4.4.2.3.(d) Summary of sources of bias in the output process 
A number of biases have been identified that are associated with how an 
individual communicates the judgment in the decision-making process, such that 
the judgment itself is affected. Two of these biases have application in the outdoor 
education sector: 
•Wishful thinking- where people's preferences for outcomes affect their 
assessment of events and their communication of the final option chosen. 
• Illusion of control - where so much effort has been put into the planning of the 
event that the result is undue confidence in the final judgment. 
A third bias was identified which related to the scales used to measure responses. 
This bias is more applicable to situations involving quantitative measures of 
probability which is not the case in this study. 
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My own belief is that these biases that have been linked to the output process 
could equally well be considered factors that influence the processing of 
information and be included in Section 4.4.3.2. 
4.4.2.4. Sources of Bias in the Feedback Process 
Future judgments a person makes are affected, or biased, by feedback received 
following judgments, especially in what is identified by that person as appearing 
to be a similar situation. If no feedback occurs, or that feedback is itself biased in 
some way, then learning will be affected and future judgments based on that 
feedback may be inappropriate. 
4.4.2.4.(a) Outcome irrelevant learning structures 
If observed outcomes of experiences yield inaccurate or incomplete information 
concerning predictive relationships, this can lead, inter alia, to unrealistic 
confidence in ones own judgment. 
Estes ( 1976) has emphasised that in order for learning to occur about predictive 
relationships, then there is the need for what he calls the 'alternative event' to 
occur and for people to pay attention to and encode 'all the alternative events with 
equal efficiency'. However Estes' conditions clearly cannot apply in situations 
where judgments lead to actions which preclude observation in the alternative 
event. 
Goldberg ( 1968) listed three conditions for learning predictive relationships: ( 1) 
Feedback - which is necessary but not sufficient; (2) ability to rearrange cases so 
that hypotheses can be verified or discounted - however this condition is of 
limited practical value to decision makers faced with a range of essentially non-
repetitive predictive situations: and (3) the ability to record one's predictions and 
their outcomes. 
Castellan ( 1977) concluded that research indicates that feedback based on 
observation of outcomes in learning situations is ineffective. Some studies 
(Hammond, Summers & Deane, 1973) have shown that feedback that emphasises 
the process, i.e. the structure of the judgmental task, is more effective than mere 
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outcome feedback. The suggestion is to record in writing not only the prediction 
but the cues they used in the judgment, causal assumptions, etc. This forces 
people to consider both the basis of their judgment and the structure of the task. 
Einhorn & Hogarth ( 1978) carried out a simulation study that indicated if a person 
has only a modest degree of judgmental ability, then positive feedback and high 
confidence in judgment will often be the result of predictive activity. This is not 
necessarily due to emotional factors such as 'motivated forgetting', but can be 
accounted for simply by the structure of the judgment task where there are more 
often positive outcomes than negative. 
4. 4. 2. 4. (b) Misperception of chance fluctuations 
Also known as Gambler's Fallacy. After seeing a sequence of successes or 
failures in a situation known to be random in nature, people tend to believe that 
the event that has not appeared recently becomes more probable 
4.4.2.4. (c) Success/failure attributions 
The tendency to attribute success to one's skill and failure to chance or bad luck. 
(also related to illusion of control). Langer (1977) observed that in chance-skill 
situations there is a strong tendency to assign observation of success to skill and 
the observation of failure to chance. 
4.4.2.4.(d) Logical fallacies in recall 
Inability to recall details of an event leads to 'logical' reconstruction which can 
be inaccurate. This is typical in eyewitness testimony (Hogarth, 1980). 
4.4.2.4.(e) Hindsight bias 
In retrospect people are not surprised about what has happened in the past. They 
can easily find plausible explanations. 
Hogarth ( 1980) contended that looking forward or prediction requires 
considerable powers of imagination and both the willingness and ability to 
entertain several hypotheses simultaneously. Keeping one's options open is not a 
tidy exercise and can induce considerable anxiety. Post-diction or hindsight on the 
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other hand, requires little imagination and is an invitation to impose causal 
structure on a sequence of past events. Furthermore, subjectively there is less 
uncertainty than in prediction problems concerning the events that 'caused' what 
happened. One can believe any chain that seems plausible since it was seen to 
precede the event. 
Because of this it is easy to judge others with hindsight and the decision in 
question may seem to have been a terrible mistake. At the time the decision was 
taken however it might have been quite reasonable given what was known and 
interpreted by the person on the spot. 
Hogarth explained that there are several implications in the inability to learn from 
experience by people failing to be surprised by outcomes. The first, if people are 
not surprised this means that they apparently thought they had little to learn in the 
first instance. In other words, outcomes are not instructive. However, predictive 
'track records' often indicate considerable inconsistencies and the expression of 
excessive confidence in predictive judgment is a common human failing. Leaming 
from experience is thus not evident, and memory distortions may also often be 
functional for the individual. 
A second implication of lack of outcome surprise concerns people's ability to 
construct causal explanations. There can be little doubt that the ability to construct 
good causal explanations is important in prediction, since accurate prediction 
depends on identifying the variables in the environment and their relationship to 
the event predicted. However, if people are unduly influenced by knowledge of 
outcomes in explaining the past, this means they will accept sufficient ( although 
not necessary) explanations too easily; and if people accept outcome explanations 
too easily, this reduces the discipline of seeking alternative explanations for 
phenomena observed in the past and, as a consequence, the ability to imagine and 
create alternative causal schemes for predicting the future. As already discussed 
people rarely seek information that could negate their preconceptions, rather they 
look for possible confirming evidence. This tendency clearly interacts with the 
fallibility of memory discussed here in producing biased conceptions of the world 
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"Analysts come in well after the fact, knowing what actually did happen; 
with hindsight, it is almost impossible to understand how the people 
involved could have made that mistake. But from the point of view of the 
person making the decision at the time, the sequence of events is quite 
natural" (Norman, 1988, p. 43). 
Fischoff (1975) studied explanations given in hindsight, where events seemed 
completely obvious and predictable after the fact but completely unpredictable 
beforehand. He presented people with a number of situations and asked them to 
predict what would happen. They were only correct at the chance level. He then 
presented the same situation along with the actual outcome to another group of 
people, asking them to state how likely the outcome was. When the actual 
outcome was known, it appeared to be plausible and likely, whereas the others 
appeared unlikely. When the actual outcome was unknown, the various 
alternatives had quite different plausibility. It is a lot easier to determine what is 
obvious after it has happened. 
"Acts that are quite rational and important during the search for 
information and test of hypothesis may appear to be unacceptable mistakes 
in hindsight, without access to the details of the situation" (Rasmussen, 
1990, p.456). 
Hogarth ( 1980) concluded that making consistent judgments, determining whether 
or not information sources are redundant and handling apparently inconsistent 
information is a difficult task and often beyond the intuitive information 
processing capacity humans. Add to this complexity, time pressures and the 
results can be even worse. He advocated the use of mechanical means or 
computers to give more consistent results. In fact he quoted research (Libby, 
1976) where statistical models had been constructed to represent the judgment of 
people and were found to predict uncertain events more accurately than the 
judgments of the people they were supposed to represent. 
However , it is hard to imagine these mechanical models replacing intuitive 
judgment in the outdoor sector. Although it may be feasible to programme 
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decision-making models into palmtop computers that would query an outdoor 
leader for specific cues and then suggest a best judgment for that situation, the 
number of possible decision-making situations and variants, would make this nigh 
impossible in practice. Hogarth recognised the limitations of these mechanical 
means when he conceded that, 
" ... there are of course, many situations where statistical models cannot be 
built and information combination must be done intuitively. For example, 
many actions have to be taken on the basis of so-called 'snap judgments'. 
What advice can be offered here? First, it is necessary to be aware of the 
nature of judgment and the kinds of biases that have been described ... It 
is also necessary not to be under illusions about one's judgmental ability 
... Second it is unlikely that you will make good judgments unless you 
have thought about the process of judgment and consciously tried to avoid 
some of the traps ... " (Hogarth, 1980, p.50). 
4. 4. 2. 4. (I) Summary of biases in the feedback process 
This literature review has identified a number of issues that can arise in feedback 
following judgments that can bias future judgments by that same person or others 
observing the situations. These problems in feedback that can bias future 
judgments include: 
•Outcome irrelevant learning structures - If a certain judgment leads to success in 
a situation, but in fact a failure was a strong possible outcome of that judgment, 
the person who made the judgment receives reinforcement that they made the 
correct choice in the situation and will likely use the same judgment strategy in a 
similar situation in the future. 
•Misperception of chance fluctuations - wrongly believing that a success must 
follow a series of failures, or vice versa, without changing the strategy. 
•Success/failure attribution - the tendency to attribute success to one's skill and 
judgment while attributing failure to chance or other external factors. 
• Logical fallacies in recall - inability to recall details of an event which results in 
an inaccurate reconstruction of that event. 
•Hindsight bias - finding plausible explanations for what occurred after the fact. 
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4.4.3 The Elaboration Likelihood Model 
Much of Section 4.4.2, where various sources of bias were identified that 
impacted the quality of judgments, was based on research that is over twenty 
years old and carried out in the time when the traditional approach to decision-
making was dominant. Although the research results, and therefore the identified 
biases, are still valid today and many have been supported with research from the 
NDM era, it is useful to look at another contemporary model from cognitive 
psychology to see if further support can be lent to the approach adopted to 
identifying biases in the judgment process. 
Judgments that individuals make, and the subsequent actions based on those 
judgments, can be considered to be behaviours. There is a well documented pool 
of research that behaviour is often influenced by the attitudes held by that person 
(Manfredo, 1992). Equally there are times when attitudes do not influence 
behaviour. Vincent and Fazio (1992) argue that there are times when attitudes are 
not retrieved from memory and at these times situational and normative influences 
will dominate. A large amount of research has been carried out in the field of 
cognitive psychology as to what influences behaviour in the light of pre-existing 
attitudes. This is the study of persuasion. Understanding the way individuals and 
groups of people can be influenced to carry out certain behaviours is the study of 
persuasion and is important across all forms of human endeavour and business 
from sales and advertising campaigns, to mass media persuasion in electioneering, 
to trying to influence individual social judgments and behaviours when people 
visit environmentally sensitive wilderness areas. In this study the relevance is in 
understanding what would influence an experienced outdoor instructor to make a 
judgment that was less than optimal. 
One theory that has attained prominence among contemporary theories is the 
Elaboration Likelihood Model of Persuasion (ELM) (Petty & Cacioppo, 1981, 
1986). The ELM is based on the concept that people want to have correct attitudes 
and beliefs since these will normally be the most helpful in dealing with everyday 
problems. However the model describes two different ways in which a person 
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might come to hold an attitude that seems reasonable or right to the person and 
then act on that belief (Petty, Cacioppo, Strathman & Priester, 1994). 
Figure 26. The two routes to persuasion according to the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM). From Petty, Cacioppo, Strathman & Priester, 1994. 
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Attitude is relatively enduring, resistant and 
predictive of behaviour. 
The two different ways in which a person might come to hold a reasonable 
attitude are shown in Figure 26. The 'central route to persuasion' involves 
carefully thinking about and examining information that is pertinent (or central) to 
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the topic. The second strategy, called the 'peripheral route to persuasion', involves 
less effort and the person often relies on a simple cue in the situation to come to a 
decision. The name of the model (ELM) refers to the likelihood of the person to 
carefully consider (elaborate) the information presented in order to come to a 
decision. 
The ELM model suggests that careful consideration of an issue is more likely to 
occur when the problem has high personal relevance to that person, where he / she 
has a good level of intelligence in relation to the problem and where there are few 
distractions. If these factors aren't present it is likely that the peripheral route is 
chosen and any decision will be based on cue recognition and the implementation 
of a simple rule (heuristic). Furthermore experimental research into the ELM 
model shows that biased attitudes are more likely to result when the person is 
forewarned of the intent of any message or the issue is relevant to them through 
their already developed schema (Petty, et al., 1994 ). 
This model and theory of persuasion has relevance to the search for biases in the 
judgment process. The following points are transferable and support earlier biases 
identified in this chapter: 
• Although any instructor in charge of an outdoor education experience will be 
motivated to think about the situation (high personal relevance, high 
personal responsibility), that instructor will often be in a situation where 
they don't have the ability to expend a high degree of cognitive thought on a 
problem situation that may eventuate. ELM theory suggests the following 
issues could affect an instructor's ability to process: there may be multiple 
distractions, time pressures, he / she may be in an inappropriate state of mind 
or mood, or may not even have the necessary intelligence for the situation. 
In this case the instructor will not be able to take the central route (high 
degree of thinking) to come to a judgment on the best solution for that 
situation. When these conditions are present (time pressures and multiple 
distractions are regularly present in outdoor education environments) an 
instructor is more likely to adopt the peripheral route to making a decision, 
rely on cue recognition and the implementation of an heuristic solution. This 
is very similar to the prediction made by the NDM model in Figure 22 for 
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the way someone under time pressure, or with a 'rule' available will choose 
a solution. The issues affecting the ability of a person to take the 'central 
route' to a decision, have already been identified in Section 4.4.2.2.(f) as 
those factors in the decision environment that can bias a judgment. 
• Biases that affect the search for appropriate cues and then biases affecting 
the assessment of those cues are both very relevant according to this model 
and are reflected in Sections 4.4.2.1 and 4.4.2.2 respectively. 
• If the individual has an existing personal schema of the situation, or 
appropriate solutions for such a situation, then this will introduce biases into 
the decision-making process. This reinforces the concepts of personal values 
and beliefs affecting the assessment of situations in Section 4.4.2.2.(f). 
• After any incident has occurred and the instructor has time to reflect on the 
incident, then the central route to persuasion will be followed. If the 
instructor implemented a solution that resulted in a positive outcome, even 
though that solution may (unbeknown to the instructor) in similar 
circumstances lead to unfavourable outcomes, the ELM model suggests that 
this result will reinforce the attitude that the solution is good and will be 
predictive of future behaviour. This supports the biases that can affect 
judgment in the feedback process that have been identified in Section 
4.4.2.4. 
In summary, the ELM model, which is a contemporary theory of cognitive 
psychology that is regularly applied to social judgment theory, supports the 
approach taken to search for the root causes of errors in judgment by outdoor 
educators. 
4.4.4 Categorising the Types of Root Causes of Poor Judgment. 
The discussion in Section 4.4.2 has identified a large number of potential biases 
that can enter the process of making a judgment. These biases can be thought of as 
potential root causes of the instructor errors shown in Figure 18 as the biases can 
all lead to inappropriate judgments being made. These biases have been identified 
through both the traditional theories of judgment and decision-making, based 
largely around statistical/numerical models, theories and experiments, and the 
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more recent NDM research on human behavior in time critical situations. One of 
the more recent and highly regarded models of human behaviour, the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model of persuasion, also supports these findings. The language 
describing these biases is far from appropriate for outdoor educators to be able to 
understand and apply, and many are at the level of tokens as opposed to types of 
root cause. It is necessary to identify major types of root causes from the 
discussion above and put these into language that can be easily interpreted by an 
outdoor educator. 
The approach used in this research is to categorise the basic types of error and 
group the root causes under these headings. 
4.4.4.1 Slips and Mistakes 
Norman ( 1988, p.105) believed that "People make errors routinely" and that those 
errors could be broken down into two types: slips and mistakes. Using Figure 27 it 
is easy to explain the difference between a slip and a mistake: Form an 
appropriate goal but mess up the performance and you've made a slip. Slips result 
from automatic behaviour, when subconscious actions that are intended to satisfy 
our goals are waylaid enroute. Slips are almost always small things, a misplaced 
action, a desired action undone; they are generally easy to detect or monitor. Form 
the wrong goal and you've made a mistake. Mistakes can be major events and can 
be difficult or impossible to detect as the action performed is appropriate to the 
goal. 
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Figure 27. The seven stages of human action. 
(Based on Figures 2.2-2.5 Norman, 1988, p.47) 
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Norman categorises slips into six categories: 
1) Capture errors: where a frequently done activity takes charge instead of 
(captures) the one intended. Capture errors appear when two different 
action sequences have their initial stages in common, with one sequence 
being unfamiliar and the other common. The common one "captures" the 
uncommon. ( e.g., get into your car on the weekend to go to the store and 
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2) Description errors: This occurs where the intended action has much in 
common with several other actions. As a result, unless the intended action 
sequence is completely and precisely specified, it might fit a range of other 
actions. ( e.g,. Planning to pour orange juice into a glass but pour it into a 
coffee cup beside it). They are called description errors because the 
internal description of the intention was not sufficiently precise and result 
from performing the right action on the wrong object. 
3) Data-driven errors: Many actions are automatic in reaction to some input 
(sensory data). But sometimes data-driven activities can intrude into an 
ongoing sequence, causing behaviour that was not intended. ( e.g., phoning 
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someone, but dialing in the number that is on the cardboard box in front of 
you by mistake). 
4) Associative activation errors: Just as external data can sometimes trigger 
actions, so too can internal thoughts and associations ( e.g., the phone 
rings, you pick it up and say "come on in"). 
5) Loss of activation errors: One of the more common slips is forgetting to do 
something. Even more interesting though, is forgetting part of the act 
while remembering the rest (e.g., going across the house to the bedroom, 
and then forgetting why you went there in the first place). Lack of 
activation errors occur because the presumed mechanism, the 'activation' 
of the goals, has decayed. 
6) Mode errors: Caused when devices have several different modes, and the 
action for one mode has different meanings in other modes. These are 
inevitable in equipment that has more possible actions than controls, so the 
controls have to double up. Mode errors are common with digital watches, 
videos, computers, etc. Several accidents in commercial aviation can be 
attributed to mode errors, especially in the use of automatic pilots which 
have a number of complex modes. 
4.4.4.1.(b) Mistakes as errors of thought 
Mistakes are the result of the choice of an inappropriate goal. These mistakes are 
commonly described as, 
" ... making a poor decision, misclassifying a situation or failing to take all 
the relevant factors into account. Mistakes arise from the vagaries of 
human thought, often because people tend to rely upon remembered 
experience rather than on more systematic analysis ... memory is biased 
towards overgeneralisation and overregularisation of the commonplace 
and overemphasis on the discrepant" (Norman, 1988, p.114 ). 
Norman makes the point that too much emphasis is placed on human thought 
being rational, logical and orderly. He argues that life is not neat and orderly. It 
does not proceed smoothly and gracefully in neat logical form. Instead it hops, 
skips and jumps its way from idea to idea, tying together things that have no 
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business being put together; forming new creative leaps, new insights and 
concepts. Human thought is not like logic; it is fundamentally different in kind 
and spirit. The difference is neither worse nor better. But it is the difference that 
leads to creative discovery and to great robustness of behaviour. 
He believes that the structure of the task influences the response and effort we put 
into problem solving. Tasks can be divided into shallow/ deep and wide/ narrow 
categories. Shallow task structures are those where there are few decisions to 
make after the single top-level choice. Deep task structures have a cascading 
number of decisions. Wide task structures are those with many alternatives at each 
level as opposed to narrow structures where there are few alternatives at each 
level. For example, choosing an ice cream cone from an ice cream shop offering 
good choice of flavour is a wide, shallow task. A recipe to bake a cake is an 
example of a narrow deep structure. 
Norman's point is that most tasks in daily life are routine and involve little 
thought or planning. These tasks are either shallow or narrow. They are done 
relatively quickly with little mental effort. Much of this effort is done 
subconsciously. Norman believes these decisions are made by 'matching 
patterns', by finding the best possible match of one's past experience to the 
current one. 
"Subconscious processing is one of our strengths - we are good at 
detecting general trends, at recognising the relationship between what we 
now experience and what has happened in the past. And it is good at 
generalising, at making predictions about the general trend based on few 
examples. But subconscious thought can find matches that are 
inappropriate, or wrong, and it may not distinguish the common from the 
rare. Subconscious thought is biased toward regularity and structure and it 
is limited in formal power" (Norman, 1988, p.125). 
"Recreational activities should be wide and deep, for we do them when we have 
the time and wish to expend the effort" (Norman, 1988, p.125). Wide and deep 
tasks require considerable conscious planning and thought. Conscious thought is 
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different in that it is slow and laboured. It is serial and rational. Conscious thought 
tends to involve short term memory and is therefore limited in the amount of 
information that is readily available. Norman (1988) believes that five or six items 
are all that can be kept available at any one time. The way this limitation is 
overcome is by organising them into a structure and in this way only one structure 
must be kept in the memory. As a result of this power of organisation to overcome 
the limits of working memory, explanation and understanding become essential 
components of conscious thought. Mistakes are made by mismatch, by taking the 
current situation and falsely matching it with something in the past, and by falsely 
bringing to mind either regularities in the past or discrepant events that stand out 
in the past. Also ifwe come across a rare/ uncommon event, we can't classify and 
have trouble dealing with it. 
4.4.4.2 Lapses and Violations 
Reason (1990) has further developed the work of Norman in categorising error 
types as shown in Figure 28. Rather than Norman's two categories of slips and 
mistakes, Reason now suggests four categories (i.e. slip, mistake, lapse and 
violation) based on the "intention" to act or not and then by the "cause of failure". 
The direction of the arrows in Figure 28 are used by Reason to show an error 
classification system; from unsafe acts to their root causes. It is more sensible to 
reverse the arrows if contemplating the diagram to understand the sequence of 
cognitive error to unsafe act. 
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Figure 28. A summary of the psychological varieties of unsafe acts. 
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"Error will be taken as a generic term to encompass all those occasions in 
which a planned sequence of mental or physical activities fails to achieve 
its intended outcome, and when these failures cannot be attributed to the 
intervention of some chance agency" (Reason, 1990, p.9). 
"Slips and lapses are errors which result in some failure in the execution 
and I or storage stage of an action sequence, regardless of whether or not 
the plan which guided them was adequate to achieve its objective" 
(Reason, 1990, p.9). 
"Mistakes may be defined as deficiencies or failures in the judgmental and 
I or inferential processes involved in the selection of an objective or in the 
specification of the means to achieve it, irrespective of whether or not the 
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actions directed by this decision-scheme run according to plan" (Reason, 
1990 ,p.9). 
"Violations can be defined as deliberate - but not necessarily 
reprehensible - deviations from those practices deemed necessary (by 
designers, managers and regulatory agencies) to maintain the safe 
operation of a potentially hazardous system" (Reason, 1990, p.195). 
4.4.4.3 A Categorisation System for the Root Causes of PoorJudgment 
Reason's ( 1990) model of the psychological varieties of unsafe acts (Figure 28), 
and the earlier discussion of Norman (1988), are the first time that 'slips' and 
'lapses' have been discussed. Until now this literature review has been looking at 
reasons underlying poor judgments (a mistake or violation) rather than why a 
good judgment I decision was not implemented correctly. Petersen's (1988) 
causation model of an incident (Figure 15) hints at this through the category 
described as 'unconscious decision to err'. 
Combining the factors affecting human error from Petersen' s causation model in 
Figure 15, the discussion on biases in judgment / decision-making in the previous 
section and Reason's summary of psychological varieties of unsafe acts in Figure 
28, identifies the categories of root causes of poor instructor judgment or 
performance as shown in Figure 29. 
Figure 29 is the first attempt at providing the contents of the box labeled "Error 
producing factors" in the proposed model of an outdoor incident shown in Figure 
18. A number of types ofroot causes are described that will lead to instructors 
making slips, lapses, mistakes or violations. 
Chapter Four - Review of Literature 
Figure 29. The root causes of poor instructor judgment or performance. 
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The types of root causes are shown with round bullet points, and the tokens of 
those types are indicated as indented lists where appropriate. For clarity, I have 
retained the original names used for the tokens while recognising that more 
suitable names may be necessary for application in the outdoor sector. 
The role of instructor overload is also shown. It is a factor which increases the 
likelihood of an instructor making an error in judgment. Overload is defined as a 
mismatch of capacity with a load in a state. Thus the overload can be due to lack 
of capacity (physically or mentally not up to the task), the load or task itself can 
be too large ( environment, students, environment or work time) or the state of the 
instructor can be inappropriate ( fatigue, stress, etc.) These overload factors can 
lead to poor performance of skills, poor judgment and can aggravate motivational 
problems. Thus the factors leading to overload can be considered to be root causes 
of outdoor incidents. As shown in Figure 18, there may be problems in the safety 
management system that can lead to instructor overload occurring. The safety 
management errors will be identified in the following section. 
4.4.5 Identifying Management System Errors 
Identifying errors in the quality management system of an organisation is a much 
simpler task as the components of a good quality management system are well 
documented. 
In March 2004, Outdoors New Zealand launched a quality assurance scheme for 
the safety management systems of organisations offering outdoor educational and 
recreational experiences. This voluntary scheme is known as OutdoorsMark. To 
be accredited with the OutdoorsMark, an organisation must meet minimum 
standards in a comprehensive range of components of a structured safety 
management system. This compliance to a minimum standard is vetted by an 
auditor from a pool of outdoor experts trained in auditing skills. All expert 
auditors are registered in the Register of Outdoor Safety Auditors (ROSA) run by 
Outdoors New Zealand. The OutdoorsMark programme is based on the licensing 
documentation used by the United Kingdom's Adventure Activity Licensing 
Authority. The OutdoorsMark criteria for a comprehensive safety management 
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system have therefore been scrutinised by experts from both the United Kingdom 
(in the AALA form) and in New Zealand by the ROSA pool. 
It seems reasonable to assume that the management system errors that need to be 
identified can be detailed as those that could be classified as "less than adequate" 
in the components of the OutdoorsMark scheme. 
Table 13 shows the audit components of the OutdoorsMark scheme and my 
interpretation of the management system error that would be an indication of a 
"less than adequate" quality management system being in place. 
Table 13 
Management System Errors Derived from the OutdoorsMark Quality Assurance 
Components. 
0UTD00RSMARK COMPONENT MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ERROR 
A 1 Safety management administration No one accountable for safety efforts of 
organisation 
A2 Activity leader qualifications Less than adequate (LT A) systems to 
A3 Approved technical advisors ensure each activity is supervised by 
A4 Staff qualifications and experience appropriately skilled staff 
matrix 
A5 Task analysis or activity 
specifications matrix 
A6 Daily Assigning of leaders for 
activities 
A 7 Clarity of responsibility Responsibilities not clear 
A8 Recruitment of activity leaders LTA Staff recruitment systems 
A9 Induction of activity leaders LT A Induction of staff 
AlO Monitoring and appraisal LT A Staff monitoring and appraisal 
systems 
A 11 Activity leader and instructor LT A Staff training systems 
training 
A 12 Support staff training 
A 13 Recording of professional 
development 
A14 Contract and volunteer staff 
B 1 Operational activity procedures LT A policies and procedures 
B2 Updating operational procedures 
B3 Formal risk assessment LT A Risk assessment systems 
B4 General meetings for activity LT A Meetings\participation to discuss 
leaders safety issues 
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matters 
B6 Emergency procedures LT A Emergency procedures 
B7 Hazard identification and reporting LT A Hazard reporting procedures 
B8 Incidents reporting LT A Incident reporting and analysis 
B9 Incidents investigation and review systems 
B 10 Ease of contact and LT A Communication systems 
communication between management 
and activity leaders 
B 11 Communications with expeditions 
B 12 Location of overdue activity See above - LT A policies and 
groups procedures 
B 13 Modification of site or activity 
B 14 Modification of site of activity 
because of weather, etc 
B 15 Reviewing management and field 
activities 
C 1 Activities LT A Activity range for needs of group 
C2 Range of equipment LT A Equipment systems - not enough, 
C3 Hired equipment in poor repair, unsuitable or contains 
C4 Participant equipment traps. 
C5 Use of activity leader's personal 
clothing and equipment 
C6 Inspections and maintenance of 
equipment 
C7 First aid equipment 
C8 First aid qualifications See above for qualified staff 
C9 Supervision of activities See above - LT A policies and 
C I O Unaccompanied activities procedures 
management 
Cl 1 New or unfamiliar sites 
C 12 National Standards Body See above for qualified staff 
accreditation and approval schemes 
C 13 Other safety related statutory LT A Compliance to statutory 
requirements requirements 
NB: LTA = Less than adequate 
This list of management system errors covers all of the system errors identified by 
Petersen (1988) in Figure 15 with the exception of the category identified as 
'medical'. While this might be covered under the broad category of policies and 
procedures, Petersen believes it is worthy of special mention and therefore I will 
add a management system error to the list: Less than adequate (LTA) screening of 
medical / health information - staff and clients. 
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Also intrinsic in the OutdoorsMark programme is that the organisation undertakes 
regular external review of its safety management system. Not having such a 
review process would also indicate a substandard safety management system. 
Following this analysis, the identified management system errors that are root 
causes in the model of an outdoor incident in Figure 18 are shown in Table 14. 
Table 14 
Root Causes of Outdoor Incidents from Management System Errors 
ROOT CAUSES - MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ERRORS 
LT A Accountability for safety system 
LT A Clarity of safety responsibilities 
LT A Staff recruitment systems 
LT A Staff induction systems 
LT A Staff training systems 
L TA Staff monitoring and appraisal 
LT A Risk assessment systems 
LT A Emergency systems 
LTA Incident reporting and analysis 
LT A Hazard reporting procedures 
LT A Activity policies and procedures 
LT A Activity range for client group 
LTA Systems matching of instructor to activity/group 
LT A Communication systems 
LT A Equipment systems 
LT A Meetings / participation to discuss safety 
LT A Medical / health screening staff and clients 
LT A Compliance to statutory requirements 
LT A Regular review of safety management system by external experts 
NB: LTA = Less than adequate 
4.4.6 Summary 
Following careful analysis of the literature I have identified that the root causes of 
outdoor incidents fall within two major categories of either: errors leading to poor 
instructor performance or judgment (instructor error); and, management system 
errors. 
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Study of the literature of safety management and the psychology of decision-
making revealed a number of biases that can lead to judgments that are less than 
optimal. These biases were considered to be either tokens or types of root causes 
of instructor error. Furthermore the instructor error itself could be classified as 
either: slips, lapses, mistakes or violations depending on the intention of the 
person involved. The root causes of instructor error were able to be listed in 
Figure 29. 
The root causes due to management system errors were much easier to identify 
and were available from a range of sources. The categories used in the _ 
OutdoorsMark quality assurance system were used as it was felt that this would 
offer a better match with the outdoor education application than any industrial 
vers10n. 
Through the process outlined above a first version of a taxonomy ( or list) of error 
for outdoor education incidents has been produced (Figure 29 and Table 14). 
4.5 Testing the Root Causes of Incidents Identified Through Outdoor 
Education Literature with the Proposed Taxonomy 
In section 4.2.2 a number of possible root causes of outdoor incidents were 
identified through a study of outdoor education literature. Each of these is 
considered in tum in Table 15 to identify if they are in fact types or tokens of 
already identified root causes in Figure 29 and Table 14, or if they represent types 
or tokens of new root causes. 
Table 15. 
Comparison of the Possible Root Causes of Incidents Identified through Outdoor 
Education Literature with the Proposed Taxonomy of Root Causes. 
POSSIBLE ROOT CAUSE FROM ALREADY EXPLANATION. 
SECTION 4.1.2 IDENTIFIED? 
New or unexpected situations - which Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
could include new sites, activities, "Lack of skill and experience". 
group dynamics, etc., which an 
inexperienced instructor would have 
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less competence to deal with. For this 
reason Meyer ( 1979) is a proponent of 
pre-site visits. 
Inappropriate attribution - the Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
psychological tendency of people to "Poor processing of past 
take credit for successful outcomes but feedback/ results". 
transfer the blame for poor outcomes 
may prevent instructors from realising 
accidents can happen to them and 
therefore be alert to dangers. 
Relaxed concentration - being less Yes Fatigue= token of root cause, 
aware to dangers due to fatigue, "arousal / physical state not 
distraction, familiarity, etc appropriate" 
Distraction = root cause, "prone 
to distractions" 
Familiarity= token of root 
cause, "Inaccurate assessment of 
risk." 
Smelling the barn - Willing to take Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
greater risks when the end is in sight or "Accepting a higher than normal 
in order to meet a schedule. level of risk". 
Risky shift - People in groups tend to Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
take higher risks than if they were by "Accepting a higher than normal 
themselves. Some participants level of risk". 
abandon personal responsibility and 
transfer the responsibility for taking 
risks to the group. 
Poor or unsound j udgment - often Yes This is an example of either, 
through misperception of what is "Poor situational awareness", 
occurring and/or, "Inaccurate assessment 
of risk". 
Appropriate safety policies, No Management system error - see 
philosophies, goals, learning discussion (I) below 
objectives, etc., written in a staff 
manual 
Risk management plans for field Yes Management system error 
activities including crisis response 
plans. 
Accident report forms and analysis Yes Management system error 
systems to learn from mistakes. 
Safety reviews carried out on your Yes Management system error 
programme by external peers. 
Staff who have the appropriate skills to Yes Management system error 
work in the field. 
Risk assessment - correctly identifying Yes Root cause, "Poor situational 
factors that contribute to risk awareness." 
Judgment and decision-making - Yes Various root causes leading to 
making good decisions in a dynamic "Poor instructor 
environment entails skills in situational decision/j udgment". 
awareness, situational assessment, 
option selection, resource management 
and reflecting on outcomes. 
Having appropriate rules, policies and Yes Management system error 
guidelines 
Using appropriate leadership styles No See discussion (2) following 
Knowing the group Yes Token of the root cause, "Poor 
situational awareness". 
Offering challenge by choice NIA This is an organisational value 
or belief which mav or mav not 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p. /75 
be held by a particular 
organisation it is not a root 
cause of accidents. 
Teaching by progression No See discussion (2) following 
Having competent leaders Yes Management system error 
Checking equipment Yes Management system error 
Social and psychological factors such Yes All tokens of previously 
as: being too familiar with the identified root causes with the 
situation, risk shift (sic), dropping your exception of"Wild cards", 
guard, get home-itis, wild cards, which I don't believe exist. See 
attribution theory, and risk discussion below. 
homeostasis. 
Meyer & Williamson's "unsafe NIA These are not root causes but are 
conditions" listed in Table 6 in fact hazards in the 
environmental conditions and 
resources which must be 
managed appropriately by the 
instructor, as shown in figure 13 
Meyer & Williamson's "unsafe acts" NIA These are not root causes but 
listed in Table 6 instead are the "Immediate 
causes" shown in figure 13, and 
reinforces the base contention of 
this study that in the outdoor 
sector we tend to focus on the 
obvious/visible causes of 
accidents rather than the root 
causes 
Meyer & Williamson's "errors in 
judgment" listed in Table 6. (Note: 
only errors not already listed above in 
this table are shown) 
• Trying to adhere to a schedule Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
"Accepting a higher than normal 
level ofrisk". 
• Miscommunication No See discussion (2) following 
• Disregarding instincts NIA I don't believe this is a root 
cause any more than, "following 
an incorrect instinct", would be. 
An instructor may get bored operating Yes Either a token of, "Arousal/ 
with students on activities well below physical state not appropriate", 
their own personal level of skill and or , "Personal values / beliefs 
challenge. To counter this boredom followed". 
they may choose to undertake an 
activity with a higher level of risk. 
This following of personal goals rather 
than the organisational goals, which 
are student oriented, can lead to 
accidents. 
Hubris refers to overbearing pride, Yes Either a token of, "Inaccurate 
presumption or arrogance in a person's assessment of the risk", or, "Ego 
character. Hunt believes hubris can issues". 
lead to accidents when instructors lose 
the respect they once had for the 
dangers and seriousness of wilderness 
areas, often because of their past 
successes in a particular area and the 
fact that they now have higher skill 
levels. 
Incorrect assumptions - assuming a Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
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slope is safe based on prior "Poor situational awareness". 
information which may be incorrect. 
Rather than seeking new information 
in the field to revise the assumption, 
they look for other information that 
reinforces their already held 
assumption. 
The herding instinct - People are more Yes Another name for the token, 
bold in a group than on their own, yet Risky shift 
in avalanche terrain the more people 
the greater the hazard. 
Attitude - Pride, ego, hubris can easily Yes This is a token of, "Inaccurate 
produce unyielding behaviour in the assessment of the risk 
face of contrary evidence. People with 
high risk-taking attitudes can filter 
information about potential hazards 
and draw unrealistically optimistic 
conclusions. Attitude; ego and goal 
orientation can all lead to a tunneled 
v1s1on. 
Testosterone - Males tend to make Yes This is a token of"Ego issues" 
riskier decisions than females. 
Weather and perception - A Yes This demonstrates two tokens. 
disproportionate number of avalanche One of"lnaccurate assessment 
accidents occur on blue-sky days. The of risk", and the other of, 
authors believe sunny days make us "Accepting higher levels of risk 
feel good and we can ignore objective than normal". 
information from the snow pack. In 
contrast if people are traveling in 
stormy conditions they can also cut 
comers in hazard evaluation to get 
home and expose themselves to higher 
risk as well. 
City thinking versus mountain thinking Yes This demonstrates two tokens. 
-The avalanche doesn't care ifwe One of"lnaccurate assessment 
have a meeting to get back to, if we of risk", and the other of, 
paid a lot of money to fly into the hills, "Accepting higher levels of risk 
if we are lost in conversation - the than normal". 
hazards have to be assessed 
continually and on the mountains 
terms. 
Avalanche skills versus travel skills - Yes This is a token of the root cause, 
Most people getting caught in "Inaccurate assessment of risk". 
avalanches are very skilled at their 
sport (skiing, snowboarders, 
snowmobilers) but their skill level has 
outpaced their avalanche skills, and 
they often vastly overestimate them. 
Communication - Poor No See discussion (2) following 
communication is a common 
denominator in almost all 
mountaineering accidents. 
Table 15 confirms that the types of root causes identified from the outdoor 
education sector have, in the main, been identified by studying the literature of 
safety management. There are some root causes identified through the outdoor 
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education literature however, that currently don't fit under the current list of types 
of root causes. These are: 
( 1) Appropriate safety policies, philosophies, goals, learning objectives, 
etc., written in a staff manual. While having appropriate safety policies 
is covered under the current list of Management System Errors, having 
an appropriate match of philosophies, goals and learning objectives to 
the client abilities is not covered. This needs to be included as an 
addition to the list. 
(2) The outdoor education literature refers to inadequacies in the 
instructor's use ofleadership style, teaching progression and 
communication as root causes of outdoor incidents. While it could be 
argued that these are covered as tokens of the root cause, "Skills / 
experience level inappropriate", leading to an overload situation for the 
instructor, I don't believe this is completely valid. If overload was to 
occur, according to Figure 29 this should lead to the instructor making 
either a slip, lapse, mistake or violation. In this case however, we are 
addressing the misapplication or lack of skill causing an instructor 
performance issue, resulting in what may have been a good plan 
failing. For this reason I believe clarity will be improved in the model 
of root causes in Figure 29 if a further basic error category is 
introduced. I will term this category of error a failure. 
Failure is defined for this research as a plan not achieving the desired 
objective due to the misapplication of a skill on the instructor's part. 
The skill misapplied may be any of hard skill, soft skill or metaskill. 
Priest & Gass ( 1997, pp. xvi-xvii) offer definitions of these three skill 
types: 
a. Hard skills being the technical skills that are tangible, 
measurable and easier to train and assess. Examples given are 
abilities of leaders to climb, paddle, and peddle; to find their 
way from origin to destination without getting lost or injured; 
and to camp along the way without leaving a mess. 
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b. Soft skills are more amorphous, intangible and harder to 
measure. They include the ability to instruct, organise and 
facilitate goal achievement in people. 
p.178 
c. Metaskills are those areas that combine hard and soft skills into 
a workable design. Examples given include leadership style, 
effective communication, ethical behaviour, etc. (Note: 
judgment is also considered a metaskill but this is being treated 
separately in this study). 
Because of the importance of this facet in the outdoor education context, it 
is essential to add this new category 'failure' as a root cause of instructor 
error. 
4.6 Proposed Model of an Outdoor Education Incident Including an Interim 
Taxonomy of Root Causes 
Based on the combined knowledge gained from the literature review, a simplified 
model of an outdoor education incident is presented in Figure 30, with a more 
detailed version in Figure 31. These models are adapted from those already in 
existence in safety management literature, with modifications to allow for the 
inclusion of specific knowledge unique to outdoor education contexts. 
Figure 31 not only shows a model of an outdoor incident, it also provides a 
taxonomy of error leading to that incident. As discussed in Chapter 3, phases two 
(Chapter 6) and three (Chapter 7) of this research investigate the validity of this 
model by comparing it to the analysis of the root causes of actual incidents that 
have occurred in the outdoor education sector. 
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Figure 30. Proposed model of an outdoor education incident (Simple version) 
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Figure 31. Proposed model of an outdoor education incident (Full version) 
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4. 7 A Tool to Analyse Root Causes in Outdoor Education Incidents. 
4. 7.1 Criteria for an Effective Incident Analysis Tool 
In order to carry out the analysis of root causes of actual outdoor education 
incidents, it is necessary to have a way of depicting any incident so that those 
analysing the incident can understand the interplay of events and immediate 
causes, and how these lead to identifying the root causes. It is widely held in 
safety management literature that the right tool applied in the right situation can 
make a significant contribution to the efficiency and effectiveness of that 
investigation (Frei, Kingston, Koomneef & Schallier, 2004). As explained in the 
earlier sections of this literature review, the immediate causes of incidents are 
more easily identified by practitioners and therefore these causes need to be 
included in any analysis. Subsequently, those viewing the depiction of the 
incident can be forced to look further for the root cause leading to those 
immediate causes. 
The tool that is required must be easily interpreted by an outdoor education 
practitioner with little in-depth knowledge of safety theory. For this reason it 
should include a chronological flow of events that occurred, should document the 
immediate causes as explained above and should lead the reader to look for the 
root causes in the two categories of instructor performance / judgment and the 
management system (Figure 30), which lead to instructor and management system 
errors. 
4. 7.2 Existing Tools in the Field of Safety Management 
It seems logical to look for an appropriate tool from the extensive literature in the 
field of safety management that can be adapted for use in the outdoor education 
sector. A number of risk analysis and accident analysis techniques exist that are 
in common usage. These techniques are many and diverse. Keong (2004a; 2004b) 
classifies most of the common tools under the respective headings as shown 
below: 
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Risk Analysis Methodologies 
• Qualitative Methodologies 
o Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA) 
o Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) 
o Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) 
• Tree Based Techniques 
o Fault Tree Analysis (FT A) 
o Event Tree Analysis (ET A) 
o Cause-Consequence Analysis (CCA) 
o Management Oversight Risk Tree (MORT) 
o Safety Management Organisation Review Technique 
(SMORT) 
• Techniques for Dynamic Systems 
o Go Method (GM) 
o Digraph/Fault Graph (DFG) 
o Markov Modelling (MM) 
p./82 
o Dynamic Event Logic Analytical Methodology (DELAM) 
o Dynamic Event Tree Analysis Method (DETAM) 
Accident Analysis Techniques 
• Traditional Approaches 
o Sequence of events (Domino effect) 
o Known precedent 
o Hartford EMP 
o Multilinear Events Sequencing 
o Technique of Operations Review (TOR) 
o Change Analysis 
• System Safety Approach 
• Accident Framework 
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4. 7.2.J Qualitative Methodologies 
These are a group of qualitative techniques that focus on possible hazards and 
causes of failure with individual components or entire plants. These 
methodologies are generally centred on hardware issues rather than incorporating 
the causes of human error. FMEA is a more time intensive analytical technique 
that explores the effects of failures or malfunctions of individual components in a 
system and can be used to give quantitative results (Institution of Electrical 
Engineers, 2004c; Petersen, 1980). 
4. 7.2.2 Tree Based Techniques 
Although these can be used to analyse incidents in retrospect, these diagrams are 
more usually employed to assess risks and assign quantitative measures to 
statistical likelihood of major events occurring (Institution of Electrical Engineers 
[IEE], 2004a, 2004b; Johnson, 1980; Petersen, 1980). These techniques employ 
either binary or Boolean arithmetic and assign quantitative statistical probabilities 
to events occurring. 
4. 7.2.3 Techniques for Dynamic Systems. 
These are extensions of tree based techniques that can be applied to dynamic 
systems that allow probabilities of loss events to be calculated; although they 
require significant computer power. 
4. 7.2.4 Traditional Approaches 
This is a group of well used analytical techniques that are employed to identify 
incident sequence and seek unsafe acts and conditions leading to the incident 
event. 
• Sequence of events (Domino effect) analysis can be shown to date back 
to the early work of Heinrich in 1929 (Ferry, 1988). It seeks to trace 
underlying factors back through the causal chain illustrated in Figure 8. It 
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does not give an overview of the chronology of the incident or show how 
multiple root causes interact to produce the incident. 
• Known precedent. This technique uses historical data of similar events to 
identify clues for the new mishap. It is based on the precept that there are 
no new causes that can be identified. 
• Hartford EMP. This technique asks questions to identify causal factors 
under the headings of equipment, material and people. Although causal 
factors will be identified, there is no chronological depiction of the 
incident produced and root causes are not established using this technique. 
• Multilinear events sequencing. This technique charts incident process 
with every event and condition leading to the incident charted in 
chronological sequence. Root causes can be investigated by examining 
each of the individual events to understand what may have brought them 
about and what changes could be introduced to alter the process. Two of 
the more common examples of this technique are: 
o Cause and Effect Diagrams - Known variously as Ishikawa 
diagrams after their creator, or fishbone diagrams after 
their appearance, these establish an hierarchical 
relationship between the effect, the main causes of the 
effect, and their subsequent relationship to the sub causes. 
Cause and effect diagrams provide a systematic graphical 
representation of the trail that leads ultimately to the root 
cause of a quality concern or problem (Brigham Young 
University, 2004; Mindtools, 2004). Although this sounds 
suitable for use in this research, the technique is most 
commonly used as a brainstorming tool for a team wanting 
to analyse possible causes for problems, often before any 
event. 
o Events and causal factor analysis (ECF A) is a stand alone 
technique for the investigation of incidents but can be used 
in conjunction with other tools for very powerful results. It 
is specifically designed so that incident investigators can 
probe deeply into both the events and conditions that create 
incident situations so that root causes can be identified. 
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• Technique of operations review is generally used as a diagnostic training 
and mishap prevention tool directed at finding management oversights. 
• Change analysis compares the incident situation with a comparable 
incident-free situation, analyses the differences and from this suggestions 
for change are made. 
4. 7.2.5 System Safety Approach 
This approach uses a combination of FTA, FMEA, PHA and MORT to investigate 
a system for causal factors and remedies. 
4. 7.2.6 Accident Framework 
Pate-Cornell (1993) has developed an analytical framework to establish the causal 
relationship between the basic events, decision and actions, and organisational 
factors leading to an incident. From this risk reduction methods can be formulated 
based on the causal relationships between the stages. 
4. 7.2. 7 The Most Applicable Tool for the Investigation of the Root Causes of 
Outdoor Education Incidents 
As explained in the introduction to this section, a successful tool for use in this 
study is one that: shows the chronological flow of events leading up to the 
incident itself; documents the immediate causes of the incident; and, allows the 
identification of the root causes of the incident in the two categories shown in 
Figure 30 (Instructor judgment / performance error and management system 
error). 
Of the techniques outlined above, most may be discounted: 
• 'Qualitative Methodologies' focus on hardware issues rather than human 
errors and are therefore inappropriate; 
• 'Tree Based Techniques' and extensions of these for 'Dynamic Systems' are 
concerned with calculating mathematical probabilities of loss occurring 
through sophisticated statistical methods. This is not the aim of this research. 
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• 'Systems Safety Approaches' and the 'Accident Framework' use 
combinations of the methods already discounted. The inappropriateness of 
the individual methods for use in this study remain in combining the 
methods. 
The only group of methods that can not be discounted as being applicable for use 
in this study are the 'Traditional Approaches'. Of these the 'Known precedent' 
technique does not allow for new causes to be identified and is therefore 
unsuitable, and both the 'Hartford EMP' and 'Cause and Effect Diagrams' do not 
produce a chronological sequence and can therefore be eliminated. The 'Sequence 
of Events' technique meets many of the criteria for use in this study and has been 
used by Haddock (2003) in examples of outdoor education incidents. It is 
inadequate in its ability to direct an incident investigator to the categories of root 
causes as required in this study. Both the 'Technique of Operations Review' and 
'Change Analysis' do not seek to identify the categories of root causes of 
incidents. 
The one remaining 'Traditional Approach' is the 'Events and Causal Factor 
Analysis' (ECFA). This meets all of the criteria established to be useful in this 
study. 
4. 7.2.8 Summary 
A comprehensive review of incident investigation tools has shown that the ECF A 
tool is the most applicable for use within outdoor education as it best meets the 
criteria identified for a successful outcome in establishing root causes in outdoor 
incidents. 
4. 7.3 Events and Causal Factor Analysis (ECF A) 
4. 7. 3.1 Uses and Advantages of ECF A 
ECF A is a tool designed to identify root causes by understanding the interaction 
of events and causal factors through a chronological chain of activity starting with 
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an initiating event through to the final loss-producing occurrence. The incident 
causing factors emerge through this process as sequentially or simultaneously 
occurring events that interact with existing conditions. This tool is able to deal 
with and express logically the multi factorial causes of any incident and define the 
sequences of events which could involve performance errors, changes, oversights 
and omissions (Buys, Clark, Kingston-Howlett & Nelson, 1995). 
Buys et al. (1995) believe this tool is ideal for the investigation of incident 
causation and presenting factual findings, probable causes and contributing factors 
in a logical sequence that can be used to validate or dismiss ideas among those 
investigating the incident. The events and causal factors will usually not be 
uncovered in sequence and so a skeleton chart will be produced initially which 
can be augmented as more information is collected. The chart will also indicate 
further areas that should be investigated. Buys et al. (1995, pp. 7-8) point out that 
the specific purposes of the ECF A technique include: 
• Aiding in developing evidence, in detecting all causal factors through sequence 
development, and in determining the need for in-depth analysis; 
• Clarifying reasoning; 
• Illustrating multiple causes. As previously stated, incidents rarely have a single 
"cause". Charting helps illustrate the multiple causal factors involved in the 
accident sequence, as well as the relationship of proximate, remote, direct and 
contributory causes; 
• Visually portraying the interactions and relationships of all involved 
organisations and individuals; 
• Illustrating the chronology of events; 
• Providing flexibility in interpretation and summarising collected data; 
• Communicating empirical and derived facts in a logical and orderly manner; 
• Linking specific incident factors to organisational and management control 
factors. 
The above attributes recommend the ECF A technique over other common 
approaches in investigating the root causes of outdoor education incidents. 
4. 7.3.2 Description of the ECFA Technique 
The ECF A technique produces a chart or diagrammatic interpretation of the 
incident by utilising a set of stringently applied conventions to depict the various 
events, and causal factors, and how they are linked. 
Buys et al. (l 995) used the terms 'event' and 'condition' in a different way than 
these terms have been used earlier in this thesis (e.g., Figure 8). An 'event' is 
described as an occurrence or happening (pipe ruptured) and not a condition, state, 
circumstance, issue, conclusion, or result (pipe had a crack in it). In an ECF A 
diagram each 'event' should describe a single discrete occurrence and be 
expressed precisely in a short sentence with one subject and an active verb. 
Buys et al. (1995) discussed 'conditions' which differ from 'events'. 'Conditions' 
describe states or circumstances rather than happenings or occurrences and are 
passive rather than active. In the terms identified in Figure 8 to describe the causal 
sequence of any incident, 'conditions' are equivalent to the 'causal factors' of 
incidents. For consistency, the term 'causal factor' will be used in this study rather 
than 'condition' in the description of the ECF A technique. As far as practical, 
when producing an ECF A diagram, the causal factors should be described, 
quantified, posted with time and date and be derived from the causal factors 
preceding them. 
'Events' are depicted by rectangles and 'causal factors' by ovals. Solid objects 
represent 'events' or 'causal factors' that are known to be factual while dashed-
line objects represent those that are presumptive (See example in Figure 32). 
'Events' are arranged chronologically from left to right and joined by solid 
arrows. The primary sequence of events should be depicted in a straight horizontal 
line ( or lines in confluent or branching primary chains). Secondary event 
sequences, contributing factors, and systemic factors should be depicted on 
horizontal lines at different levels above or below the primary sequence. 'Causal 
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Buys et al.( 1995) described key elements in applying the ECF A tool to achieve 
high quality incident investigations: 
• Start a "working chart" of events and causal factors as soon as you start 
accumulating factual information on events and conditions related to the incident. 
• Use the conventions described above for reconstructing the sequence of events 
but remember that they are not hard and fast rules and if a unique situation 
presents itself then be prepared to deviate from the guidelines for the sake of 
clarity and simplicity. 
• It is usually easiest to use the incident or loss event as the starting point and 
reconstruct pre-incident and post-incident sequences from that vantage point. 
Initially there will be many gaps and deficiencies in the chart. Efforts to fill these 
gaps will lead to deeper probing by investigators that will uncover the generally 
agreed 'facts' involved. 
• As additional events and causal factors are uncovered and analysis of these 
identify further causal factors, the working chart will need to be updated. Choose 
a format which displays emerging information in an easily modified form. The use 
of post-it notes has proved a useful technique to accomplish this goal. 
• Select the appropriate level of detail and sequence length for the chart. Whether 
the chart finishes at the loss-producing event or whether the amelioration phase 
should be included will depend on the incident. Certainly, if further incidents 
occurred during rescue attempts or emergency action, or if there were other 
specific or systemic problems revealed, then the ECF A should include this phase. 
• The ECF A chart will generally contain much more detail than required for an 
investigation report. An executive summary chart can be prepared showing the 
major issues to be addressed if this is relevant for clarity. 
4. 7.3. 3 Adapting the ECF A Technique for the Analysis o_f Outdoor Education 
Incidents 
The ECF A technique was used in the second phase of the data collection of this 
research to establish the root causes of a number of outdoor incidents. These root 
causes were then compared to the taxonomy of root causes contained within the 
proposed model of an outdoor education incident shown in Figure 31. 
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I modified the conventions of the ECF A chart to improve the clarity of the final 
analysis and to make it easier for an outdoor educator reading the chart to 
recognise immediate causes, root causes leading to poor instructor performance or 
judgrnent, and root causes that are management system errors. 
Causal factors were differentiated into immediate causes, root causes due to 
instructor performance / judgrnent errors and root causes due to errors in the 
management system. 
From the discussion earlier in this chapter ( e.g., Figure 30), immediate causes can 
be either unsafe acts (instructor, students or others) or unsafe conditions 
(equipment, resources, or environment). The unsafe acts of instructors were 
treated differently from other immediate causes in this study and placed in the 
'event' sequence using a unique shaped box. This was done to pay special 
attention to the instructor judgrnent I performance in order to analyse this special 
event for root causes, and to separate instructor actions from other 'immediate 
causes' that are within the instructor's role to manage (consistent with Figure 30). 
Any unsafe act by the instructor in the event sequence was represented by an 
octagonal box. I chose to use this symbol because it is also the shape used in 
traffic stop signs and so subliminally conjures a warning message. 
All other classes of immediate causes were shown as ovals according to the 
standard ECF A conventions. 
Root causes that lead to poor instructor performance or judgrnent were 
represented by parallelograms and those root causes representing management 
system errors were represented by rectangles with rounded corners. 
The event sequence was linked with solid arrows, chronologically from left to 
right, while immediate causes and root causes were linked by arrows with dotted 
lines. 
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Any causal factors (immediate or root causes) that had factual confirmatory 
evidence were shown as solid shapes, while those that were speculative or 
subjective in nature were shown as dotted-line objects. 
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An example of this is shown by producing an ECFA chart (Figure 33) for the 
simple incident described in Haddock (2003 ). 
"A pair of children was missing at the end of the walk through the 
sanctuary. Although the children were buddied-up, and adults were 
assigned groups to look after, some children couldn't see anyone in front 
or behind them as the party spread out near the end of the walk. 
Consequently, one pair took a wrong turn at a junction "(Haddock, 2003, 
p.56). 
Note that in Figure 33 all of the root causes and two of the immediate causes were 
considered to be speculative (shown as dotted-line objects) because the narrative 
did not give any firm evidence of their 'factual' status. If further evidence became 
available to support these causes, they could have been drawn as solid objects. 
4. 7.4 Summary 
A large range of tools exist to analyse the causes of incidents or to manage risk 
leading to incident potential. Some of these are more suitable for pre-activity 
analyses, while others are more suitable for post-incident evaluation. Careful 
investigation of the range of available tools led to the Events and Causal Factors 
Analysis (ECF A) system being adopted for use in this research. This tool was 
chosen from the many on offer because it most closely represented an incident in 
a way that was understandable to an outdoor educator while allowing the depth of 
causal analysis required for the study of outdoor education contexts. The ECF A 
technique was adapted to make it more usable in outdoor education situations and 
more suited to the identification of root causes in this setting. 
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Figure 33. Example of modified ECF A for use with outdoor education incidents· 
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4.8 Summary of the Literature Review 
Little information could be found in the outdoor education literature from any part 
of the world that profiles the type, occurrence and frequency of outdoor incidents. 
There was almost no literature that was specific to New Zealand outdoor 
education. An initiative by the Wilderness Risk Management Committee to 
collect data across a range of outdoor education providers in the USA has been 
limited by small numbers and sampling inconsistencies. Nevertheless, this 
initiative has produced some preliminary data that can be compared with New 
Zealand statistics compiled as part of this study. 
The outdoor education literature also shows that models of outdoor education 
incidents and their causal sequences are poorly developed. There is a general 
mixing of events, conditions and underlying root causes in both the models and 
accompanying explanations of the causal factors. This confusion leads to a lack of 
understanding of causes and a difficulty for managers in setting priorities to 
correct weaknesses in their safety systems. This lack of literature confirms the 
need for the present research. 
Contrasting with the outdoor education literature, there are many existing models 
of incident causality in the literature of safety management. These models all have 
the common elements of: 
• multiple causality: where an accident is rarely due to one thing but usually 
due to a number of factors coming together and combining to produce an 
incident potential; 
• levels of causality: where the causes of an accident can be traced back from 
more easily observable factors to the underlying root causes of error. 
Addressing these root causes will lead to long-term solutions for removing 
incident potential. 
These existing models were adapted, taking into account specific information on 
outdoor education incidents, to provide a model of an outdoor education incident. 
This model (Figure 31) provides a diagrammatic representation of how the root 
causes of error combine to produce an incident. The root causes of any incident 
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are shown to fall under the headings of either: factors leading to poor performance 
or judgment by the instructor, or; management system errors. In Chapter 7 of this 
research, the model is compared with the root causes of actual outdoor education 
incidents identified in Chapter 6 to test the validity and completeness of the 
model. 
A potential trap was discovered in trying to list root causes of outdoor education 
incidents: In identifying the root causes of incidents it is easy to be overspecific 
and the list of root causes can then become very large and of limited practical use. 
It is therefore more sensible to try to list categories (types) rather than the many 
possible individual (tokens) root causes. 
Finally, a tool to diagrammatically represent an outdoor education incident was 
required for this study. The Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECF A) system 
was chosen and adapted because it diagrammatically represents an incident in a 
chronological sequence while clearly identifying the events, the immediate causes, 
and the root causes leading to the incident. This should make the causal factors of 
the incident understandable to an outdoor educator while allowing the depth of 
analysis required for this study. 
The results of this literature review will be used in the chapters that follow. The 
statistical information gathered about the outdoor education incidents will be 
compared against empirical data about New Zealand outdoor education incidents 
in Chapter 5. The ECF A system developed in this chapter will be used in Chapter 
6 to combine and share the thoughts of a number of experts involved in a Delphi 
process to analyse serious outdoor education incidents. Through this process the 
root causes of a number of serious outdoor education incidents will be identified 
and collated. In Chapter 7 the taxonomy of error (Table 14) and model of an 
outdoor education incident (Figure 31) will be used as a 'lens' to focus the results 
of Chapter 6 into a proposed model and taxonomy of error for outdoor education 
incidents. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
A PROFILE OF NEW ZEALAND OUTDOOR EDUCATION INCIDENTS 
1996-2000 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter the incident data gathered from outdoor centres for the period from 
1996 - 2000 are analysed. 
The sample of the outdoor education sector studied was restricted to larger 
outdoor education centres that were more likely to have incident reporting systems 
and employ full-time staff who would be able to respond in a timely manner to 
enquiries. Of the 25 centres that were identified from the Outdoors New Zealand 
database that met the criteria of having three or more full-time staff, 12 agreed to 
contribute incident data. That data was input into a specifically designed Access 
database. 
These data were analysed using quantitative techniques to establish a profile of 
outdoor education incidents for the period studied. The same techniques were 
used to identify factors that are predictors of incidents with high potential for 
senous mJury. 
5.2 A Profile of New Zealand Outdoor Education Incidents 1996- 2000 
5.2.1 Breakdown of Data According to Incident Type 
When all data had been entered from the 12 contributing organisations, 1908 
incidents were recorded and classified according to "Incident Type" as shown in 
Table 16. 
As already discussed in Chapter 3, the data in Table 16 and the analysis that 
follows, is a self-selected sample from the outdoor education sector in New 
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Zealand. Also, each organisation recorded incidents according to its own criteria, 
and these varied from one centre to another. The potential for bias in the results is 
thus considerable and any generalisations to the greater population of outdoor 
education providers in New Zealand need to be made with caution. 
In terms of completeness of data for each of the 12 organisations surveyed, it is 
assumed that the data for deaths and injuries are likely to be more accurate as a 
complete record than for any of the other categories. This belief is based on the 
premise that all organisations collecting data would believe it important to record 
data on deaths and injuries, especially injuries of moderate or major severity. 
Other categories of incident type mentioned above are less likely to be recorded 
unless either the organisation has a rigorous reporting process in place, or the loss 
is significant. For example, the one reported incident of environmental damage 
resulted in fire destroying a large area of vegetation and the fire had potential for 
even worse consequences. Many other environmental incidents with less serious 
outcomes may have occurred without being reported. Recording of near misses 
comes down to the openness of instructional staff to share these incidents with 
others and this openness can be significantly affected by the culture in the 
organisation concerned and what is done with the data. Most of the following 
analysis is restricted to the top three rows of Table 16 (Deaths, Injuries and Near 
misses) because of the assumed incompleteness of the other data. 
Table 16 
Number of Recorded Incidents Grouped According to Incident Type for the 12 
Participating Organisations (1996- 2000) 
Incident Type Number of Recorded 
Incidents 1996 - 2000 
Death 0 
Injury 1154 
Near Miss 448 
Illness 219 
Loss of Process 2 
Emotional/psychological 25 
Damage to Equipment 59 
Environmental Damage 1 
TOTAL 1908 
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There were no recorded deaths in the years surveyed. This may be an anomaly of 
the survey years rather than any global measure of success in managing risk, as 
there have been deaths and other very serious incidents in some of the 
contributing organisations outside the surveyed years. As shown by Table 7 in 
Chapter 4, The New Zealand Mountain Safety Council (MSC) keeps records of all 
deaths in the New Zealand outdoors. These records are compiled from the 
findings of Coronial Inquests. At the time of writing the records have been 
completed only up to the year 1998. Coroners' reports have been collected for 
1999 and 2000 but there has been no human resource available to update their 
records. The data to 1998 record 140 deaths in the category of Instruction, 
Guiding or Professional Care (IGPC) over the 20 year period: an average of seven 
per annum. However, when allowance is made for two exceptional tragedies in 
1991 (Ruapehu) and 1996 (Cave Creek) that may be regarded as statistical 
outliers, the average reduces to 120 deaths or six per annum. Furthermore, when 
non-educational IGPC incidents are excluded the total is 59 ( excluding the 
Ruapehu and Cave Creek accidents) or three per annum. 
5.2.2 Ratios of Accident Severity- The Accident Triangle 
Often quoted in the safety management literature is a landmark study of industrial 
accidents undertaken in the USA in 1969 (Bird & Germain, 1989). This study 
was an analysis of 1,753,498 accidents reported by 297 cooperating companies. 
The companies represented 21 different industrial groups employing I, 750,000 
employees who worked over three billion person-hours during the exposure 
period analysed. The study revealed the ratio shown in Figure 34. 
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The authors of this study emphasised that the ratios listed represent only those 
incidents that were reported, rather than the number that actually occurred and 
also that the ratio may not hold for any particular occupational group or 
organisation. Further, the authors pointed out that the significance of this study is 
that major incidents are rare events and that there are many more opportunities to 
study less serious incidents and take actions to prevent the major losses from 
occurring. An important corollary to this statement is that action is most effective 
when effort is directed at incidents that have a high loss potential. 
Unfortunately this study, and the diagram shown in Figure 34 is sometimes 
misrepresented. At safety seminars and risk management courses, tutors have 
been observed explaining to students that 600 near accidents lead to 30 property 
damage incidents, which lead to I O minor injuries, which in tum leads to I major 
injury. They summarise by stating that the way to stop major incidents is 
therefore to study and stop the minor incidents. For example, 
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"The importance of such a triangle is that many lessons can be learnt from 
the bottom line and no one has suffered any injuries. If we can prevent the 
near misses from occurring then we can also prevent the minor or major 
injuries from occurring" (Wharton, 1996). 
What Figure 34 was intended to indicate is that accidents are the culmination of a 
number of factors coming together to produce an accident potential. Once the 
sequence has been initiated, the type and degree of loss are somewhat a matter of 
chance, depending partly on fortuitous circumstance and partly on actions taken to 
minimise the loss (Bird & Germain, 1989). What is needed to prevent serious 
accidents therefore, is to look not only at the causes of the serious accidents that 
have occurred, but also at incidents that have high potential for serious loss. 
Unfortunately, of all the organisations surveyed for the New Zealand outdoor 
education sector, only one recorded some form of severity rating for the incident 
concerned and its potential outcome. Even this organisation did not 
systematically categorise incidents according to potential severity and analyse 
those incidents with high potential severity in a different manner to other recorded 
incidents. 
For all 1908 incidents recorded, a rating of the actual severity of the outcome was 
assigned and also its potential severity. The potential severity ranking that was 
assigned was the author's subjective view of what might have eventuated due to 
the sum of hazards present at the time. To assign a severity rating, the Severity 
Scale shown in Table 4 in Chapter 3 was used. This scale was developed based 
on a model devised by Priest ( 1996a ). 
Restricting the cases to only those where an actual injury occurred while a group 
of students was under instruction, produces the severity distribution shown in 
Table 17. 
The results shown in Table 17 represent the New Zealand outdoor education 
sector's version of the accident ratio study and can be compared with the top two 
sections of Figure 34. The ratio of serious to less than serious incidents is fairly 
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comparable between the major USA safety study and the outdoor education sector 
analysed in the current study. The outdoor education sector has produced a ratio 
of 1: 16 (Actual data 6:94 ), which is in a similar order of magnitude to the 1: 10 
ratio shown in Figure 34. 
Table 17 
Number of Injuries, Sorted by Severity, for Incidents Occurring While Under 
Instruction for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996 - 2000) 
RATING OF NUMBER OF SEVERITY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 
THE ACTUAL INJURIES GROUPING OF TOTAL 
SEVERITY OF REPORTED 
INJURY 
I 26 Any injury 929 94 
2 228 less than 
3 323 senous 
4 165 
5 187 
6 55 Serious or 59 6 




NB:N = 988 of the 1154 injuries indicated in Table 16. The remaining 166 were injuries that 
occurred outside of the time supervised by an instructor. Also, 7 of these injuries were to 
accompanying teachers or the staff member 
Serious Injuries: 32 fractures, 21 dislocations, 2 spinal damage, 2 bums, I concussion, I 
contusion 
Table 18 
Near Misses Grouped According to the Potential Severity of their Outcomes, for 
Incidents While Under Instruction for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996 -
2000) 
RATING OF NUMBER OF SEVERITY NUMBER PERCENTAGE 




1 0 Potential for 228 51 
2 12 an injury that (Near misses 
3 38 is less than without 
4 44 senous potential for 
5 134 serious injury) 
6 104 Potential for a 220 49 
7 35 
.. 
(Near misses senous mJury 
8 33 with potential 
9 46 for serious 
10 2 injury) 
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There have been at least two attempts to measure this ratio for the outdoor 
education sector in the past. Wharton (1996) suggested a ratio of 1 :50 based on a 
subjective interpretation of an industrial study by Heinrich ( 1980). Wharton 
produced no empirical evidence to support his estimate. Brackenreg ( 1997) 
produced what he termed an 'indication' of the ratio by comparing the ratio of 
assisted evacuations to overall medical incidents on National Outdoor Leadership 
School (NOLS) courses over a ten year period. The assumption is that all serious 
incidents would require an assisted evacuation. This comparison produced a ratio 
of 1:49. 
For each incident recorded I also assigned a potential severity rating. This used 
the same severity scale (Table 7) but was based on my subjective view of the 
potential outcome that could have been reasonably expected given the hazards that 
were encountered. By doing this it is possible to assess the value of investigating 
incidents with minor injuries as a way of preventing major injuries. 
Of the 742 incidents that resulted in an actual injury with a severity rating of four 
or less, only 27 had the potential to result in an injury with a severity rating of six 
or more. This is only 3 .6 per cent of all cases. It seems clear that there is little 
point in studying minor injuries in general as a means to prevent major injuries. 
Intuitively it makes sense that studying 300 stubbed toes is not going to prevent 
someone falling off a cliff. It seems useful to discriminate among accidents and 
restrict our efforts to those that warrant investigation by virtue of either causing 
major injury, or having the potential to do so. 
Some researchers suggest that the probability of occurrence of the high severity 
outcome should also be considered (Bird & O'Shell, 1969; Haddock, 1999a; 
Johnson, 1980). My contention is that rating probabilities of occurrence is not a 
useful exercise other than through the simple test: Is there a reasonable probability 
that a serious injury could result? Once a hazard potential passes this test, every 
effort should be exerted to reduce the hazard. Another way of looking at this is by 
considering the Four Windows Matrix (Haddock, 1993) shown in Figure 35, 
which is commonly used to discuss risk management strategies in the outdoor 
sector. 
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My contention is that those incidents producing situations where the potential 
severity is high (Types II and IV) should be treated differently from those where 
the potential severity is low (Types I and III), irrespective of frequency. Certainly 
there is a case for acting on recurrent, low severity injuries (Type I), especially 
where a common cause can be established, but not with the same urgency or 
rigour. It is important to classify the different types of incidents after they have 
been reported as either having high potential severity or low potential severity. 
None of the accident/ incident recording systems surveyed in this study 
discriminated between these two categories. 
As shown in Table 16, there were 448 near misses recorded. These near misses 
were also rated for their potential severity and the results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 18. Table 18 shows the value of reporting near misses. Those 
reported have an almost 50 per cent chance of signaling conditions that might lead 
to serious incidents as opposed to investigating all actual injuries where, as Table 
17 shows, only 6 per cent were serious. It seems that instructors are reporting 
incidents that left an impression on them and which they realised at the time had 
potential for serious consequences. This is to be encouraged and management 
should be following up on these incidents. 
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Assigning severity ratings to incidents and comparing the percentage of reported 
incidents in each severity category, shows distinct differences in the reporting 
protocols of the different organisations. 
The organisation profiles are shown in Figure 36. Figure 36a suggests that 
organisations F and K don't report many minor incidents, only major ones. This 
is further evidence to support the establishment of a common, standardised 
reporting protocol across the entire sector. Figure 36b shows that organisations E, 
G & I have a history from 1996 - 2000 of running activities that have not resulted 
in reported incidents that had the potential for serious injury. Organisations C and 
H on the other hand, are either running higher risk activities, or managing them 
poorly. 
Figure 36. The number of incidents of differing severity as reported by the 12 
participating organisations ( 1996 - 2000) 













Org A Org B Org C Org D Org E Org F Org G 
Organisation 
Org H Org I Org J Org K Org L 
Actual Severity Rating 
I m1&2 D3&4 D5&6 m1&s •9&10 I 
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Figure 36b: Organisational Profiles of Potential Severity of 
Incidents Recorded 
~A ~B ~C ~D ~E ~F ~G ~H ~I ~J ~K ~L 
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Organisation Potential Severity Rating 
I Elll 1&2 ml3&4 D5&6 fi:17&8 •9&10 I 
In summary, while the Accident Triangle is supported as being valid for the 
outdoor sector (for the top two rows of the triangle), it has been shown that if the 
aim is to prevent serious incidents, it is neither effective nor efficient to follow up 
all minor incidents. To prevent serious incidents, all reported incidents should be 
classified according to potential severity of the outcome, and those incidents that 
show a potential severity rating of greater than six should be studied in more 
detail for underlying causes. 
5.2.3 Activities as a Predictor of Injury 
Table 19 shows a list of activities surveyed across the participating outdoor 
education centres that are ranked in order of those that either caused, or had the 
potential to cause, the most serious injuries. Unfortunately incident records 
analysed did not track the number of students taking part in any particular activity 
nor an overall estimate of student days. For this reason injury rates for the various 
activities cannot be calculated and compared to the WRMC results shown in 
Chapter 4, Table 11. The results shown in Table 19 must be interpreted with 
caution as some activities will take place with much more frequency than others. 
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Table 19 
Activities Ranked by Number of Serious Injuries, or those with Potential for Serious 
Injury for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996- 2000) 
Activity SERIOUS INJURIES INJURIES REPORTED ALL RECORDED 
REPORTED WHILE WHILE UNDER INCIDENTS THAT 
UNDER INSTRUCTION THAT RESULTED IN OR HAD 
INSTRUCTION RESULTED IN OR POTENTIAL FOR 
HAD POTENTIAL SERIOUS INJURY 
FOR SERIOUS (Note: This column 
INJURY includes near misses 
not shown in the 
previous columns) 
Ropes course 2 2 43 
Kayaking 13 15 38 
Rockclimbing 4 6 32 
Tramping 7 11 29 
Sailing 1 5 27 
Vehicle 0 0 22 
Snowsports 12 19 19 
Abseiling 3 4 17 
Camping 1 3 16 
Mountaineering 3 6 16 
At Base Facilities 1 2 15 
Rafting 0 2 12 
Tube Rafting 0 3 11 
Cooking 0 I 9 
Swimming 3 4 9 
Gorging/canyoning I 2 7 
Canoeing 0 I 6 
Other 0 0 6 
Sea Kayaking 0 2 6 
Games 4 5 5 
Cycling 2 4 4 
Flying Fox I 3 4 
Free Time/Play 0 0 4 
Rock Wall (Artificial) 0 0 4 
Running 0 0 4 
Maintenance 0 I 3 
Community Work 0 0 2 
Office 0 0 2 
Bridge Swinging* 0 I 1 
Caving 0 0 1 
Initiatives 1 I 1 
Solo 0 0 1 
Tyrolean* 0 0 1 
Bio/Field Trip 0 0 0 
TOTAL 58 103 377 
NOTES: 
Shaded areas indicate the ten activities with highest (top) and lowest (bottom) incidence of actual 
or potential serious injury 
* denotes activities carried out by only a small number of the sampled group. 
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One of the surprising aspects of Table 19 is that activities such as ropes courses 
and abseiling that would not be expected to appear as significant incident-
producers, irrespective of the numbers taking part, are both in the top ten activities 
for incidents with the potential to produce serious injury. Both of these activities 
are considered by many instructors as safe, or low risk, due to being in controlled 
settings where close supervision and strict management controls should operate, 
while appearing at face value to participants as being high risk. Table 19 therefore 
suggests that these activities are not as safe as commonly perceived. This evidence 
is supported by the USA study shown in Chapter 4, Table 11. In this research 
supposedly lower risk activities such as initiative team challenges and ropes 
courses still produce a significant number of injuries. Further research will be 
required to establish if this is generally true and what factors combine to produce 
the incidents reported here. It is interesting to note a similar conclusion being 
reported by the Adventure Activities Licensing Authority where they note that, 
"most accidents, even most serious and fatal accidents, occur on activities which 
were considered beforehand to be the lowest risk" (Bailie, 2003a). 
If, as these data suggest, the instructor's judgment of the risk present in any 
activity cannot be used as an accurate predictor of potential for serious injury, is 
there anything that can? Petersen ( 1988) stated that in industrial safety 
management, there were certain sets of circumstances which could be predicted to 
produce severe injuries. These circumstances are shown in Figure 3 7 and Petersen 
believes they can be identified and controlled. 
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Figure 37. Predictors of serious injury 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH CAN BE PREDICTED TO PRODUCE SEVERE 
INJURIES IN INDUSTRIAL SETTINGS (PETERSEN, 1988) 
1. Unusual, nonroutine activities 
2. Non-productive activities 
3. High energy sources 
4. Certain construction situations. 
PREDICTORS OF SERIOUS INJURIES IN OUTDOOR EDUCATION ACTIVITIES 
Extrapolated by the author from Petersen ( 1988) 
1. Activities run by instructors new to an activity, or overly familiar 
with an activity 
2. Activities with low levels of supervision or no supervision at all 
3. Activities involving high energy sources such as height, speed, 
extreme weather, moving water, fire or heat 
4. Any activity involving water 
NB: While there are some preliminary data in this research to support the 
validity of predictors 2,3 and 4, all of these predictors need further 
research. 
Examination of Petersen's categories in relation to the outdoor sector, if 
extrapolated, reveal some parallels 
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1. Unusual, non-routine activities: Unfortunately the data recorded in incident 
records do not include information about the experience level of the instructor 
in charge or how familiar they were with the activity or the setting. A hand 
poll of participants at the Risk 2002 Conference in New Zealand showed that 
the vast majority of those attending believed that newer staff have higher 
incident rates than those who are more experienced. As a corollary to this 
however, they also believed that overfamiliarisation with an activity could also 
lead to higher risk. Any relationship between the level of experience and 
incident rates needs further research. 
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2. Non-productive activities: From Table 19 it can be seen that the cumulative 
impact of students being around Base Facilities, Free-time and Games add up 
to a significant number of incidents (24 potentially serious incidents). This is 
likely to be due to a lack of supervision. Inspection of the incident reports for 
many of the serious incidents that occurred during other activities in Table 19, 
including the activities such as ropes courses mentioned above, did so when 
supervision was reduced or non-existent. The concept that reduced levels of 
supervision is a predictor or serious injury or fatality is supported by the work 
of Brookes (2003b). His analysis of 114 fatalities that have occurred in 
Australian outdoor education in the years 1960-2002 led him to make 'strong 
considerations for fatality prevention,' which included (p.38): 
"Indirectly supervised (i.e. not directly supervised) expeditions for 
teenagers present a clear fatality risk if there is a possibility of the group 
encountering moving water or steep ground." And 
"The tight supervision that organised instruction necessitates (in activities 
such as abseiling or canoeing) should be in place while students are near 
steep ground or moving water, i.e. not only while the activity is in 
progress. The fact that students may actively escape supervision or take 
advantage of a supervisor's inattention should be considered." 
Not only do these comments support the findings from this research about 
reduced levels of supervision, but they also lend weight to categories (3) and 
(4) below when combined with the other findings of Brookes about the impact 
of water and cold on fatalities. 
3. Petersen's third category, High Energy Sources, seems especially pertinent to 
the outdoor sector. Incidents that result, or could result in serious injuries seem 
to be the downstream effect of one or more of the following factors (high 
energy sources) being present: 
3.1. Height - Ropes courses, abseiling, mountaineering and rock climbing 
incidents generally result from people being exposed to falls or objects 
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falling from heights. Tramping incidents often occur when cliffs or steep 
terrain are encountered. 
3 .2. Speed - Snowsports and traveling in vehicles - are two examples where 
speed can lead to serious injuries in outdoor education. 
3.3. Changes in weather resulting in cold, wind, lightning, etc., - of 
unexpected severity - most sailing and sea kayaking incidents occurred 
when wind increased. Strong winds are also an important contributory 
factor in incidents in mountaineering, tramping and other activities. 
3.4. Moving water where activities such as kayaking, rafting and have the 
potential for people to be trapped under water against obstacles. 
3.5. Fire or other heat sources - bums are common across activities. 
4. Certain construction situations - generally irrelevant to outdoor education. 
However outdoor education activities carried out in water environments 
warrant special attention as water accentuates any risk due to the potential for 
hypothermia and drowning. There is also very little time to resolve a serious 
situation in a water environment. 
The WRMC results shown in Table 11, Chapter 4, can be used to test the validity 
of these suggestions. The highest injury rates recorded over the study periods are 
in: caving [889], sports and recreational games [79.98], biking (mountain) [64], 
biking (touring) [33.33], water (swim, wade, snorkel) [22.64], skiing (touring) 
[22.21] and mountaineering [ 18.18]. The extremely high incident rate in caving is 
due to only two recorded injuries and is indicative of the very low participation 
rate. Therefore caving is an infrequent activity and thus fits into predictor category 
1 (Figure 37). Sports and recreational games, as already discussed, tend to have 
lower levels of supervision and involve participants running at high speed near 
each other; fitting into predictor categories 2 and 3. Biking and skiing are 
activities involving speed and fit into predictor category 3. Mountaineering 
involves height and possible falls fitting into predictor category 3. Water activities 
fit into predictor category 4. 
While further research is required to validate these suggestions, these data indicate 
that there may be certain outdoor circumstances that are more prone to serious 
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injuries. However, the foregoing analysis suggests that the conditions prevailing 
in these various circumstances can all be identified in advance and mitigated. 
These broad predictors can be used as an indication of those activities in which 
extra management and higher supervision are required. They should not be used 
as a reason to avoid a particular outdoor activity as that would remove the very 
media in which outdoor educators work - cliffs, mountains, rivers, lakes and 
caves. 
In summary, while further research is required, preliminary analysis suggests that 
a safe experience cannot be guaranteed by choosing activities that have 
traditionally been seen as having high perceived risk for participants and low real 
risk as judged by instructors (e.g., high ropes courses). Instead there are 
predictors that have been suggested in Figure 3 7 where the potential for serious 
injury is increased. In activities where one or more of these predictors is 
encountered, greater care and supervision is required. 
5.2.4 Gender of Instructor as a Predictor of Injury 
There is some difficulty in exploring the effect of gender on incident rates because 
of the lack of data. Although ten of the 12 contributing organisations kept records 
of the gender of the supervising instructor, none recorded the number of student 
days run by female versus male instructors in a given period. The data do allow a 
comparison of the number of serious versus non-serious incidents by gender. As 
the reporting protocols are established by the organisations concerned and are not 
gender specific, it is reasonable to assume that the reporting characteristics of both 
genders is the same for the data being compared. 
Ifthere was no difference in the risk-taking propensity of men and women 
instructors, then we would expect the same ratio of serious to non-serious 
incidents for groups instructed by men and women. The comparative results are 
shown in the cross-tabulations of Tables 20a - 20d. 
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Table 20 
Effect of Instructor Gender on the Severity of Injury or the Potential Severity of 
Injury for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996- 2000) 
20a. Gender by Actual Severity of Injuries for Incidents under Instruction, 
grouped by Severity 
Less Serious Injury Serious Injury 
(Severity Rating <6) (Severity Rating >=6) 
Male Instructor in Charge 329 40 
(n = 369) 
Female Instructor in 201 14 
Charge (n = 215) 
(Chi-square result p = 0.004) 
20b. Gender by Potential Severity of Injuries for Incidents resulting in Injury 
while under Instruction, grouped by Severity 
No Potential for Serious Potential for Serious 
Injury Injury 
(Severity Rating <6) (Severity Rating >=6) 
Male Instructor in Charge 299 70 
(n = 369) 
Female Instructor in 191 24 
Charge (n = 215) 
(Chi-square result p < .0001) 
20c. Gender by Potential Severity of Near Misses while under Instruction, 
grouped by Severity 
No Potential for Serious Potential for Serious 
Outcome Outcome 
(Severity Rating <6) (Severity Rating >=6) 
Male Instructor in Charge 104 134 
(n = 238) 
Female Instructor in 48 42 
Charge (n = 90) 
(Chi-square result p = 0.004) 
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20d. Gender by Actual Severity of Final Injury for All Injury-causing Incidents 
where there was Potential for Serious Injury 
Cases where there was Cases where there was 
Potential for Serious Potential for Serious 
Outcome but only Non- Outcome and Serious 
serious Injury Resulted Injury Resulted (Severity 
(Severity Rating < 6) Rating >=6) 
Male Instructor in Charge 30 40 
(n = 70) 
Female Instructor in 10 14 
Charge (n = 24) 
(Chi-square result p = 0.808) 
Considering only those reported incidents that resulted in an actual injury, Table 
20a shows that there is a significant difference between the ratio of serious to less 
serious injuries reported among groups led by male ( 40:329 or 1 :8) compared to 
female ( 14:201 or 1: 14) instructors, with men leading groups where a greater 
proportion of serious injuries occurred. This is further confirmed by Table 20b 
where there is an even stronger indication that men put their groups in situations 
where the potential for serious injury is greater (male 70:299 or 1 :4 compared to 
female 24:191 or 1:8). 
Table 20c compares the ratio of those incidents with no potential for serious 
outcome to those with potential for serious outcome for all reported near misses 
across the two instructor genders. Again there is a significant difference 
suggesting that male instructors are exposing their groups to a greater proportion 
of potentially serious situations ( 134: 104 or 1.3: 1) than female instructors ( 42:48 
or 0.88: 1). 
Table 20d looks at the number of injury-causing incidents that had the potential 
for serious injury by gender. There is no significant difference indicating that 
neither gender is better at resolving an incident that is likely to result in serious 
outcomes. 
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In summary, the data collected for this study suggest that groups instructed by 
men have a greater ratio of high severity injuries compared to low severity injuries 
compared to groups instructed by women. Once a group is in a situation of high 
potential injury, both genders of instructors have the same likelihood of resolving 
the situation successfully. A significant body ofresearch exists that shows there is 
no difference in the vigilance performance between men and women (Berch & 
Kanter, 1984). One possible explanation for the findings in this study is that male 
instructors are prepared to accept higher levels of risk with their groups than 
women instructors. This is conjecture at present and requires further research to 
investigate any relationship between gender and risk-taking preference with 
groups. As noted earlier, more convincing analyses would be possible if records . 
were available documenting overall time involved in instruction differentiated by 
gender. 
5.2.5 Time of Day as a Predictor of Injury 
Of the 12 organisations contributing data, seven consistently recorded the time of 
day of the incident, four sometimes recorded the time and one almost never 
recorded the time. Table 21 shows the breakdown of incidents versus time of day. 
Figure 38 shows these results in graphical form. Most incidents occur during the 
period between 9am and 5pm when the majority of activity in outdoor education 
takes place. However, there is a discemable peak evident in all categories in the 
two-hour time slot between 2:30pm and 4:29pm. 
If it is assumed that most activities will take place between 8:30am - 12:29pm and 
12:30 -4:29pm in the afternoon, then it is possible to compare incident numbers 
in these two, four-hour time slots. 
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Table 21 
Effect of Time of Day on Incident Frequency for the I 2 Participating Organisations 
(1996 - 2000) 
INJURIES UNDER NEAR MISSES OR INJURIES 
INSTRUCTION WHILE UNDER INSTRUCTION 
TIME OF DAY ALL INJURIES SERIOUS ALL NEAR POTENTIALLY 
INJURIES MISSES OR SERIOUS 
INJURIES 
12:30-2:29am 2 0 2 0 
2:30 - 4:29am 1 0 2 2 
4:30 - 6:29am 4 1 6 2 
6:30 - 8:29am 25 1 26 3 
8:30 - 10:29am 59 4 83 17 
10:30 - 107 7 175 54 
12:29pm 
12:30 - 2:29pm 135 14 204 60 
2:30 - 4:29pm 157 17 229 66 
4:30 - 6:29pm 61 4 101 32 
6:30 - 8:29pm 32 3 45 11 
8:30 - 10:29pm 19 0 26 2 
10:30 -12:29am 2 0 3 1 
Figure 38. Graph of incidence of actual and potential severity of injury versus time 
of occurrence 
Actual and Potential Injury by Time of Day 
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The results shown in Tables 22a and 22b show that there is a greater likelihood of 
having an incident while being instructed in the afternoon compared to the 
morning. This suggested correlation between time of day and frequency of 
incident needs more study as it may relate to other variables. For example, groups 
could be spending more time walking or driving to activities in the morning, 
whereas they may be more actively involved in the activity in the afternoon. If this 
was the case then the number of incidents may not vary in frequency in proportion 
to the number of students on an activity, with the peak in Figure 3 8 merely 
mirroring a peak in the number of students involved in activity. My own 
experience causes me to reject this second explanation however as I believe 
almost all students would be involved in activities by I O:OOam in the centres 
surveyed. 
Table 23 analyses the ratio of serious to non-serious incidents occurring by time 
of day. Despite the increased number of incidents occurring in the afternoon, 
Tables 23a and 23b show that there is no significant difference between the 
seriousness of incidents that occur in morning and afternoon sessions. 
These results both support parts of, and vary from parts of, earlier research carried 
out in both the USA and Australia. Furlong et al. ( 1995), as part of a twenty year 
study into injuries occurring on Project Adventure programmes in the United 
States, examined the frequency of injuries at various times of the day. They found 
two dramatic peak times when the injury frequency was far higher. These 
occurred between I Oam and 12pm and between 2pm and 5pm. While these 
periods corresponded with times of highest levels of participation, they also 
believed other factors were involved in that the incidents were occurring when 
participants were weary and probably hungry. 
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Table 22 
Comparison Between Number of Incidents Occurring in Morning and Afternoon 
Activity Sessions.for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996 - 2000) 
Table 22a Number of Incidents occurring by Time of Instructional Session for 
Injuries Reported while under Instruction. 
All Incidents 
I Morning 8:30am - 12:29pm 166 
I Afternoon 12:30 - 4:29pm 292 
(Chi-square result p < .0001) 
Table 22b Number of Incidents occurring by Time of Instructional Session for 
Near Misses and Injuries reported while under Instruction. 
All Incidents 
Morning 8:30am - 12:29pm 258 
Afternoon 12:30 -4:29pm 433 
(Chi-square result p<.0001) 
Table 23 
Comparison of the Seriousness of Incidents by Time of Instructional Session for 
the 12 Participating Organisations (1996 - 2000) 
Table 23a Seriousness of Injuries by Time of Instructional Session for Injuries 
reported while under Instruction. 
Less Serious Injuries Serious Injuries 
(Severity Rating < 6) (Severity Rating >= 6) 
Morning 8:30am - 155 11 
12:29pm 
Afternoon 12:30 - 4:29pm 261 31 
(Chi-square result p = 0.08) 
Table 23b Potential Seriousness of Injuries by Time of Instructional Session for 
Near Misses and Injuries reported while under Instruction. 
Less Potentially Serious Potentially Serious 
Incidents Incidents 
(Severity Rating < 6) (Severity Rating >= 6) 
Morning 8:30am - 187 71 
12:29pm 
Afternoon 12:30-4:29pm 307 (71 %) 126 
(Chi-square result p = 0.58) 
Chapter Five - Results and Discussion: A Profile of NZ OE Incidents p.218 
Research carried out by Outward Bound Australia in the late 1980s and reported 
by Brackenreg ( 1997, p.12 ), found that: 
" ... different ages had different, distinct peak times. School groups ( 10-16 
years old) had peaks at 12pm, 2pm, and 6pm, while standard course 
participants between 17 and 29 years old had peaks at 1 Oam and 2-3pm. 
Of interest here is that the older group generally start their day about two 
hours earlier, so that the time since breakfast was consistent. Outward 
Bound Australia consequently recommended that instructors consider 
actions such as having a substantial break a couple of hours after breakfast, 
or having an earlier lunch rather than pushing on for an extra hour. The 
6pm peak for school aged participants was probably due to their higher 
rate of incidents while cooking." 
The lack of a peak in incident occurrence in the mornings in this research 
contrasts with the findings of the earlier research, while the afternoon peak is 
similar. At the Risk 2002 Conference, a national conference for outdoor educators 
on risk management, Rick Curtis of Princeton University Outdoor Action and 
OutdoorEd.com in the USA suggested an hypothesis that the British tradition of 
morning and afternoon teas, which has been extended to the colonies, may explain 
the difference. Stopping for a substantial break and snack at morning tea time is 
enough to boost blood sugar levels and concentration spans. The cumulative effect 
of a lengthy day of activities, and possibly less food and desire to eat nearer the 
end of the day does not have the same restorative effect. The recommendation 
from the Outward Bound Australia research quoted above would indicate that 
morning breaks were not commonplace in those programmes and would therefore 
lead to a morning peak in accident occurrence. 
The researchers mentioned above all suggested the incidents occurred because of 
students' tiredness, hunger and subsequent lack of attention. They did not discuss 
a similar lack of food and tiredness impacting on the instructor and therefore 
leading to reduced levels of attention and situational awareness, etc., resulting in 
increased incident rates. The factors leading to these higher incident rates at 
certain times of the day requires further research but it seems sensible to ensure 
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food and rest breaks are included into any outdoor education programme at 
regular intervals. 
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In summary the data collected here provide evidence that incidents are more likely 
to occur in the late afternoon compared to earlier in the day in outdoor education 
programmes in New Zealand. However, there seems to be no evidence to suggest 
that the outcome will be any different in severity between morning and afternoon 
sessions. I would suggest that the increased rate of incidents is due to general 
weariness and lack of blood sugar in both students and instructors. These factors 
will lead to decreased concentration and increased incidents. 
There was no corresponding peak in incident occurrence in the late morning that 
had been shown to exist in overseas research. This lack of a morning peak may be 
due to the New Zealand practice of stopping for morning tea breaks. The 
cumulative effect of the day's activities and possibility that most of the food 
carried has been eaten by the time for an afternoon break, means that incidents 
occur later in the day. 
Further research will be needed to investigate the factors leading to the afternoon 
peak in incident occurrence but it would be prudent for those leading outdoor 
education programmes in New Zealand to ensure that regular food and rest breaks 
are taken throughout the day. 
5.2.6 Outdoor Education Accident Rates 
There is a common public perception that outdoor education in New Zealand 
exposes students to unnecessary risks. This is not surprising as most media 
attention is generally negative in the wake of an accident. Research on accident 
rates in outdoor education in New Zealand is not available, however statistics 
have been published for American organisations in the various Wilderness Risk 
Management Conference Proceedings and are summarised in Tables 10 and 11 in 
Chapter 4. 
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The data collected in this New Zealand study for the five year period 1996 - 2000 
correspond to 532,912 student days of instructing over the 12 contributing 
organisations. This converts to 4.3 million student hours (assuming a conservative 
eight hour day). The combined data for the 12 outdoor education centres that 
contributed to this study produces incident rates as shown in Table 24. 
Table 24 
Injury Rates for the 12 Participating Organisations (1996 - 2000) 
INJURY RATES PER 1,000 PARTICIPANT DAYS AND FATALITY RATES PER 
1,000,000 PARTICIPANT DAYS 
ACTIVITY INJURY /1000 FATALITY/MILLION 
PARTICIPANT DAYS PARTICIPANT DAYS 
Outdoor Education in NZ: 2.165 0 
Results from the study of 12 
large centres for the years 1996 -
2000 
(All Injuries) 
Outdoor Education in NZ: 0.11 0 
Results from the study of 12 
large centres for the years 1996 -
2000 
(Serious Injuries only) 
As can be seen by comparing Table 24 with Tables 10 and 11, the New Zealand 
outdoor education accident rates are comparable with the organisations in the 
USA that are regarded as being of the highest standard - the National Outdoor 
Leadership School (NOLS), and the five Outward Bound Schools (OB). The 
injury and fatality rates are less than training or playing American Football and 
adolescents driving in the USA. 
New Zealand Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) statistics for 
2001 ( Accident Compensation Corporation, 2001) state that the rate of claims for 
all non-work related injuries was 2,639 per 100,000 people. The rate of claims for 
all work-related injuries was 1,726 per 100,000 people. Assuming that the 
100,000 people could be exposed to both work and non-work related hazards 365 
days of the year (which is conservative as an individual cannot be at work and not 
at work for all of the same day) this translates to a claims rate of0.11 per 1000 
participant days. To make a claim to ACC, the injury would need to be relatively 
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serious. The serious injury rate recorded in the study of NZ outdoor education 
centres is also 0.11 per 1 OOO participant days. It seems then that outdoor 
education in New Zealand is no more dangerous than the cumulative risks 
encountered in normal, everyday living. 
5.2. 7 Further Discussion and Recommendations 
Attempts to analyse the available data to identify factors that might be predictors 
of outdoor education incidents were hindered by the lack of information currently 
recorded by outdoor education organisations in their incident reports. Almost all 
of the 12 participating organisations had their own unique form for recording 
incident data, although several used the Outdoor Safety Institute's (OSI) reporting 
form (Davidson, 1993) for more serious incidents. In all cases the incident forms 
were completed by the instructor who was in charge of the group at the time of the 
incident, with seemingly little quality control by management over the standard of 
completion. This lack of quality control was manifested in incomplete 
information, scanty detail in narratives of incidents and, in some cases, illegibility. 
The variety and incomplete nature of many of the incident forms provided only a 
limited amount of data common to all incidents. Similarly, having no consistent 
organisation-wide protocols for deciding which incidents, and what characteristics 
about them should be recorded, produced data of limited usefulness. 
It is clear that in order to be able to carry out meaningful research into trends in 
incident occurrence in the outdoor education sector, and communicate it 
throughout the sector, a consistent approach needs to be adopted to the recording 
of incidents. What is required is a National Incident Database (NID) for the 
outdoor education sector that is administered by a recognised impartial body. That 
body will need to be empowered to set national protocols for the collection of 
such data and be adequately resourced to analyse and communicate findings 
widely, both within the outdoor sector and to wider audiences. As part of such a 
data collection system, each incident should be rated for potential severity by the 
organisation reporting the incident as that organisation is most able to assess the 
various hazards at play. The annual trends from the NID should be distributed 
throughout the outdoor education community and beyond to provide information 
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to improve risk management practices and develop understanding among the 
public and politicians of the positive aspects of outdoor experiences, dispelling the 
idea that participation is unduly dangerous. 
While presenting the preliminary findings from this research at the New Zealand 
Risk 2002 Conference, I made the case for the establishment of such a database. A 
collective of outdoor organisations led by the NZ Mountain Safety Council 
(MSC), Outdoors New Zealand (ONZ) and Education Outdoors New Zealand 
(EONZ) has recently (2004) committed to establishing such a database which is 
likely to be administered by the MSC. Data from contributing outdoor education 
organisations will be entered through a web-based interface. 
5.3 Summary 
This study has collected and analysed data about incidents based on a sample of 
the larger outdoor education centres in New Zealand. This has enabled the 
calculation of accident rates for the outdoor education sector which can be 
compared with accident rates in other countries, sectors and with everyday living. 
Although the quality of the data restricts the level of analysis, there is some 
evidence to suggest variables that might be used as predictors of outdoor 
incidents, and therefore managers could develop strategies based on these to 
reduce those incidents. These findings are summarised: 
1. The outdoor education sector follows the Bird & Germain ( 1989) Accident 
Study Triangle at least in part, with one serious accident for every 16 non-
serious accidents reported. 
2. Studying non-serious accidents to try to prevent serious accidents is wasteful 
of time and energy. Non-serious accidents are not necessarily a predictor of 
serious accidents with only 3. 7 per cent of accidents with an actual severity 
rating less than five having the potential for resulting in a serious injury with 
a rating of six or more. 
3. Near misses and accidents should be assessed for their potential for serious 
outcomes. Those that are assessed as having the potential for serious injury 
should be studied in greater detail to help prevent further serious accidents. 
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4. While more research needs to be carried out, some evidence is presented in 
this study to suggest that we can extrapolate Petersen's (1988) model to the 
outdoor sector. This model suggests that serious accidents are more likely to 
occur in activities: 
1. where there is limited or no direct supervision; 
11. involving high energy sources such as: 
a. Height 
b. Speed 
c. Unexpected changes in weather - Wind, cold, lightning, etc 
d. Moving water 
e. Fire or other heat. 
m. that involve a water environment. 
Instructor training programmes and centre managers should be cognisant of 
these predictors and act to minimise the increased hazard whenever one or 
more of these factors is present. 
5. Activities such as high ropes course, abseiling and tramping, which are often 
used in outdoor education as they are considered low risk by instructors 
while challenging participants mentally and physically, can have potential 
for serious injury if one or more of the above predictors is present. 
6. The ratio of reported serious to non-serious injuries is higher for groups 
supervised by male instructors compared to female instructors. The data 
suggests that neither gender is better than the other at resolving potentially 
serious situations once they have been encountered. One possible 
explanation for the higher ratio of serious to non-serious injuries for male 
instructors is that they are prepared to place their groups in situations of 
higher risk. If this is true then special attention needs to be given in the 
training of male instructors to their assessment of risk, and subsequent 
management of that risk, in various situations. Further research is required to 
investigate any relationship between gender and risk taking preference with 
groups. 
7. Injuries happen more often during afternoon sessions compared to morning 
sessions, with the segment of the data between 2:30pm and 4:29pm having 
the greatest number of injuries. While more research is needed to investigate 
the causes of this suggested peak in incident rate, it would be prudent to 
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ensure that adequate rests are incorporated into any outdoor education 
programme to eat and recuperate before further activity. These regular 
breaks are desirable for both instructors and students. There is no evidence 
to suggest that an incident will be more or less serious if it occurs in the 
morning or the afternoon. 
8. The overall injury rate for NZ outdoor education centres is comparable with 
USA counterparts that tend to be conservative due to the threat of litigation. 
This rate is comparable with the risk faced in everyday life when compared 
to ACC statistics. 
9. These results indicate several areas for future research including: 
- The relationships between the familiarity of an instructor with a 
particular activity and site and incident rates; 
- The relationships between gender and incident rates; 
- The relationships between gender and risk-taking preference while in a 
leadership role; 
- The relationships between the predictors of serious accidents 
extrapolated from Petersen's model and incident rates; and 
- Exploring the factors causing the observed correlation between time of 
day and incident rate. 
10. There is a need, a) for the outdoor sector to be better informed to help 
prevent further incidents, and b) to provide the community with a more 
realistic understanding of the risks of participation in outdoor education 
experiences. The lack of available data on outdoor education incidents, and 
the lack of consistency in reporting of the data that does exist, frustrates the 
achievement of these goals. The formation of a National Incident Database 
for outdoor education activities, which was empowered to collect data from 
the range of organisations in New Zealand and distribute annual and trend 
data throughout the sector and to interested decision makers and community 
members, would go a long way to addressing these needs. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
IDENTIFYING THE ROOT CAUSES OF 




This chapter presents the results of the qualitative investigation of 18 case studies 
of outdoor education incidents that had the potential for serious injury. The aim of 
this phase of the research method is to identify the root causes of the 18 incidents 
by using a Delphi technique, and from the combined results compile a taxonomy 
of the root causes of error for the 18 incidents based on empirical data. 
This is Phase Two of the research method. A detailed description of this phase of 
the research method is given in Chapter 3. Briefly, from the database of incidents 
gathered in the first phase of the research, 18 incidents were selected that 
represented: 
• A range of outdoor education activities; 
• A balance of instructor gender; 
• A spread of organisation / settings of incidents; 
• Incidents that had the potential for serious injury; and 
• Incidents where the instructor concerned was willing to be 
interviewed. 
The instructor of each selected incident was sent a computer assisted interview 
(CAI), which asked questions about the sequence of events leading to the incident 
under study. Each interview response was analysed for root causes by a Delphi 
panel of six outdoor education experts in an iterative process until all experts 
agreed on the results of the analysis. The instructor was involved in later iterations 
of this process so that they could have input and give feedback on the panel 
members interpretations of events. 
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The outcome for each incident studied was an Events and Causal Factors Analysis 
(ECF A) which gave a diagrammatic representation of each incident where events 
that occurred leading up to the incident were listed in chronological sequence. The 
immediate and root causes identified were listed in layers under the event 
sequence and linked to the events by arrows. 
This chapter is structured in the following way: 
• Section 6.2 gives an in-depth example of the analysis of a CAI for one of 
the incidents so that the analysis process can be thoroughly understood. 
The way Delphi panel members provided feedback and the method used to 
sort this feedback to generate an ECF A diagram is explained. 
• Section 6.3 provides the ECF A results for the further 17 incidents studied 
along with observations made during the Delphi process. 
• Section 6.4 provides an analysis of the combined results from all ECF A 
diagrams to provide the first attempt at establishing an outdoor education 
taxonomy of error derived from empirical sources. 
• Section 6.5 provides a summary of the Chapter. 
6.2 The Delphi Analysis of CAI Data - A Case Study of Incident 1471 
6.2.1 Introduction 
The instructor in charge of each group at the time of the selected 18 serious 
incidents was sent a computer assisted interview ( CAI). The interview questions 
and format are enclosed as Appendix 2. Instructors were asked to ensure that they 
allocated adequate time and were in an appropriate frame of mind to revisit this 
potentially stressful event. 
They were prompted with a brief description of the incident under study and then 
asked to: 
• Give their thoughts on the background leading up to the activity; 
• Write a narrative of the incident as it appeared to them; 
• Put together an incident timeline; 
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• 
• 
Go backwards through the timeline to identify key decisions that they 
made that, with the benefit of hindsight, they would change; and 
Provide any other relevant comments . 
Each incident had a unique identification number within the greater incident 
database generated in Phase One of the research. The following case study details 
the analysis of Incident 14 71. All identifying information of individuals and 
places have been removed to preserve anonymity of the respondent and the 
organisation involved. 
6.2.2 The CAI Data -Incident 1471 
6.2.2.1 Setting the Scene 
The instructor was asked to reflect on the following incident: 
Incident 14 71: The incident in question happened around December 1998. It was 
described as students trying to land from a sea kayaking journey. Conditions 
quickly changed to large surf; ten students were thrown out of their kayaks and 
one student was washed against rocks. 
The instructor was requested to cast their mind back to the incident which had 
taken place at least two years ago. They were asked to try to remember as much as 
they could about what was happening for them that month, week and then on the 
day that the incident took place. 
Instructions continued as follows: 'Write down as accurately as you can what the 
background was for you going into that activity. Some cues to help ... 
How were you feeling? 
How did this activity fit into the programme? 
Had you done this activity many times before? 
What was the group like? 
Were you looking forward to this activity? 
What were you hoping to get out of the activity? 
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Were there any particular issues you had on your mind? 
Were there any time constraints? 
What was the weather like? 
What were your equipment/resources like?' 
Your thoughts on the background here .... 
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"This was one of my 'first instructs', I had the lead, with a senior 
instructor observing me. It was the last day of a kayak programme. We had 
been out on flat water and rivers. The final day was to be at the beach. 
There was no surf, so the preferred option of surf kayaking was out. A 
paddle along the shore line and exploring of sea caves was the logical 
alternative. 
I remember discussing it with the senior instructor. We observed the 
conditions - slight swell and a light on-shore wind. I had done this trip 
before during my induction the month before. I was feeling okay about 
going out although I also remember a feeling of being slightly 'on guard'. 
The distance is not very long (approx. one km.), but the coastline is 
exposed with not many places to land. 
The group was a mixed bunch. I still remember three students quite 
clearly: A young water-confident, blond long-haired surfie; a quite solid, 
very shy young Maori woman, battling with a low self esteem; and a very 
slight Singaporean girl, who was always cold, and did not have a very 
good grasp of English. They all got on okay, however the Maori girl was 
the only student sent by WINZ and in general was a bit on the outside of 
the group. 
I am trying to remember what I was hoping to achieve, and right now I 
don't seem to get any further than that it was the logical thing to do. We 
were there, the surf was no good, and so a little journey it was. A beautiful 
and impressive environment and it would be good for the group to work 
on their group management skills. 
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Things on my mind: one was the Maori girl; she was quite unstable and 
would rather be swimming than sitting in a kayak. The students were 
buddied-up (a confident one with a not-so-confident). The other instructor 
stayed very close to her in particular. 
I was hoping to go through one of the sea caves. This is quite exciting, and 
you had to get out of your boat and pull it through the cave and exit on the 
other side. I remember getting to the first bay and deciding that it would be 
better to approach the cave from the other side. The Big Bay [ name 
changed by researcher] has a bigger beach to land on and when you get out 
of the cave you can see the waves and time your exit, as opposed to being 
pushed into this narrow opening with waves coming from behind. I 
discussed this with my co-instructor and we both agreed. It is also one of 
those trips where when you come around the comer, you have to assess 
whether it is okay to continue. We decided it was fine to continue. 
There were no time constraints and I believe the kayaks and other 
equipment we had were adequate for the trip." 
6.2.2.2 Narrative of the Incident 
The instructor was then asked to: 'Write a narrative of the incident as it happened 
through your eyes. Start at whatever point in the activity you think is appropriate 
and finish at the time when control was re-established.' 
Your narrative here .... 
"We were sneaking our way through the big rocks in our approach to The 
Big Bay. This was quite sheltered. When we arrived there I called the 
group together and told them what the plan was - which was to land on the 
little beach and exit via the cave. I was surprised to see the waves breaking 
on the beach. I told them that we would go in one by one and as soon as 
they landed to get out and help other students coming in. I told them that 
as they surfed in they might fall out but that that would be fine. I asked 
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them if they felt okay about it. They had all demonstrated their wet exits 
and felt okay about doing this. 
The most confident and skilled student would go first (the surfie); he had 
done quite a bit of paddling before. I told the rest to stay well behind the 
break, raft up in little groups and wait for my signal 
The first student went on shore and he capsized. I think he did an endo 
(kayak looped end over end) and I vaguely remember being a little 
surprised at this. Anyway he came out quickly and got on shore with his 
gear and gave us the thumbs up. 
I was sitting between the students and the beach at this stage, with my 
back to the beach facing the students, giving them their final instructions. 
The next thing I remember is this wave rolling in, breaking a lot earlier 
and being a lot bigger then I expected. The next thing I see is almost the 
entire group, some in little rafts of three, being picked up and dumped. The 
Singaporean girl was surfing backwards towards the beach. I got endoed 
backwards, and when I rolled up I saw most of the students swimming and 
the Singaporean student still in her boat being washed onto the rocks. 
The other instructor was a little further back and had escaped the break -
she was still rafted up with the Maori girl. I remember frantically counting 
heads and yelling instructions to people to swim for shore and not worry 
about the equipment, and try to avoid the rocks. I can't remember how the 
Singaporean girl got herself off the rocks but she did. Pretty quickly 
(maybe 5-10 minutes) all students were on shore. We collected all 
equipment, nothing was lost and no one was physically hurt". 
6.2.2.3 Incident Timeline 
The instructor was then asked: 'Now put together a simple time line of the event, 
as accurately as you can, by building a list of approximate times with key events 
that were happening.' 
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Your timeline here .... 
"O mins Decision was made to continue around to the Big Bay. 
10 mins Students were gathered and plan explained. 
15 mins First student goes on shore and swims. 
17 mins Final instructions to other students to stay behind the break. 
18-19 mins 'The Wave' 10 students swimming, one boat on rocks, one 
student still upright and two instructors still in one piece. 
20-30 mins All students on land." 
6.2.2.4 Decision Point Identification 
The instructor was then asked: 'With the benefit of hindsight, can you identify 
points on the timeline at which key decisions were made that influenced the 
outcome in this case? Work backwards through your timeline and list the decision 
points, and for each decision point consider: 
What decision you made at the time; 
What you were trying to do in making that decision; 
What information you had that led you to make the decision; 
What you would do differently, if anything, at that decision point 
given the benefit of hindsight; 
What other information / skills could you have had at the time that 
would have helped make the decision you would make given the 
benefit of hindsight.' 
List your decision points here .... 
"Decision 1: 
Going out on a little sea paddle. 
Good alternative for surf kayaking. 
Observing the sea and weather conditions and ability of group. 
I would do this again; conditions were definitely fine to go out. 
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Decision 2: 
Continue around to The Big Bay. 
To try and make the passage through the cave friendlier and easier to 
manage. 
Based on the amount of swell that was present. 
I think that was a good decision. 
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If I had more knowledge I experience of the effects that this size of swell 
(approx. half a metre) had at The Big Bay, we might have changed the 
approach route to going out wider/ further away from the rocks, and thus 
avoid the break and as a result being able to fully assess the situation at 
The Big Bay. 
Decision 3: 
Send a student in first. 
Based on the presence of relatively small breaking waves, the skill and 
confidence levels of the students, and to prevent having more than one 
student swimming at the same time. Also an opportunity for them to help 
each other getting onto the beach and making this process more efficient. 
The information I had, was based on what I could see, and more 
importantly my interpretation of this information. The other thought I had 
was that by sending a student first ( one who was confident and relatively 
competent) I could stay on the water, this would free up the other 
instructor to keep an eye on the Maori student, and I would be of more use 
on the water. 
Maybe with hindsight it would have been better for me to go and check it 
out first, but I don't think this is where the problem arose. As the students 
were already in the wrong place, it just would have changed my position, 
but the result would have been the same. 
Decision 4: 
To continue the plan of sending students in one by one. 
I think that at this stage I was focused on achieving the physical goal of 
getting everybody on land so that we could continue through the cave. Not 
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based on the events of that particular moment, but clouded by my desire to 
achieve the goal. It was the logical next step in the plan. 
In hindsight, seeing my most competent student flip should have made the 
alarm bells ring, made me realise that this surf was bigger than I thought, 
and that altering the plan might be in order. 
At this stage I did believe that the students were in a safe place in relation 
to the breakers. 
Knowing what I know now I should have told the students to retreat to a 
greater distance from shore, or paddle back the way we had come, raft up 
at a safe place, then me going on shore and checking out my beached 
student." 
6.2.2.5 Other Comments 
The instructor was then asked: 'If you have any other comments you want to 
make about the incident in general that you haven't had the opportunity to do so 
already, then please do so here ... ' 
"Looking back at the incident, I remember my genuine surprise at the 
change in conditions at the time and that in my eyes this wave appeared 
out of nowhere as a freak of nature. Looking back at it now however, I am 
more inclined to say that this incident happened as a result of my 
inexperience with the conditions in this area, resulting in bad judgment. 
Not so much by going out there but by taking the wrong approach route 
and not recognising this. 
Maybe there might have been an element of pressure, placed on myself by 
myself, to give the students a challenging experience - after all that is what 
this programme was / is about. I could not have had a more supportive 
senior instructor so I think this pressure definitely did not come from her. 
But I guess partly by the reputation/ expectation and more importantly my 
interpretation of the programme. Although this would have added to the 
sequence of events, I would like to stress that this was in this scenario a 
smaller contributing factor to the incident." 
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6.2.3 Delphi Panel Analysis of the CAI Data -Incident 1471 
6.2.3.1 First Delphi Iteration 
6.2.3.1.(a) Instructions to Delphi Panel 
The panel of six outdoor experts were sent the CAI data for the interview in an 
unaltered form. The instructions given to the Delphi panel members are included 
as Appendix 3. They were asked to identify 'conditions' that were present that 
contributed to the incident being investigated: the conditions falling into 
categories of 'people', 'equipment' and 'environment'. 'Conditions' in this case 
are the 'immediate causes' of the incident (Figure 30). However it was thought 
that the outdoor expert would better understand the term 'conditions' rather than 
explaining what 'immediate causes' were. The experts were also asked to identify 
what they believed were the 'root causes' of the incident. They were asked to 
think as widely as possible in interpreting the CAI data and to use their intuition 
based on years of outdoor experience. If the root cause was identified through 
evidence in the CAI then they were to quote the passage from the CAI that 
signaled that root cause. If however, the root cause was identified through a 
subjective interpretation of the overall incident, then they were to indicate in their 
feedback that this was the case. 
6.2.3.1.(b) Response from Delphi Panel 
The response from the six experts follows: 
Expert One: 
Conditions: 
1. Mixed group, some not confident. 
2. Exposed coastline, not many places to land. 
3. Some students unstable in kayak. 
4. Some students did not have a very good grasp of English. 
5. Waves breaking on the beach - bigger than expected. 
Root Causes (supported by evidence): 
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6. First time being in charge of the group. (First 'instructs') 
7. Instructor not familiar with the area and conditions (surprised to 
see waves breaking, surprised to see student capsize and said the 
waves were bigger than expected). 
8. Instructor couldn't clearly identify what they were hoping to 
achieve (instructor goals vs. group goals?). 
9. Instructor identified that they had minimal knowledge and 
experience of the effects of swells, and general inexperience with 
the conditions in the area. 
10. Order oflanding (most confident first), and then action taken when 
that student capsized - instructed rest of group to go ahead instead 
of stabilising group and checking out the situation indicated poor 
judgment. 
Root Causes (subjective): 
11. Procedures for matching group ability vs. goals should be clearly 
set prior to any trip leaving - is there such a process in place by the 
organisation? 
12. Staff training prior to leading a group - may not be sufficient. 
13. Instructor experience in the conditions was lacking - if a senior 
instructor was present why did they not offer more advice and 
guidance? What are the organisational criteria relating to the role 
of the senior instructor when safety issues are concerned? 
14. Instructor interpretation of programme goals vs. sound practice did 
not match, indicating a missing link in the training process for new 
instructors. 
Other Comments: 
15. The instructor observations on their own performance were very 
perceptive and serve as a useful learning/ evaluation opportunity, 
however the organisation's procedures that allowed a new 
instructor to become involved in this incident, with a senior 
instructor present ( what were they doing all the time the students 
were falling out?) would have to be questioned. 
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Expert Two: 
Conditions: 
1. Fine weather (a 'nothing can go wrong' day). 
2. Party keen, but of diverse skill range. 
3. Length of paddle journey (fitness). 
4. Not taking the 'safe option' when faced with a choice. 
Root Causes (supported by evidence): 
5. Instructor inexperienced as a leader, by his own admission. 
6. A change in conditions will often be a signal to change plan. 
7. Activity and route not suited to the whole group. 
8. Lack of local knowledge - a change in coast topography can mean 
a change in the wave action. 
9. Decision point - take the 'safest' option, it's always the best for 
health. 
10. While it's a team thing, the judgment of the students should not 
affect the decision of the leader (Deal in facts!). 
Root causes (subjective): 
11. Instructor / leader admitted a lack of experience for the leadership 
role. 
12. The instructor did not refer to any safety management process, 
RAMS etc. 
13. There was no mention of a contingency plan. 
14. It was one of the instructors 'first instructs'. An experienced leader 
should have accompanied the group. 
15. If described as 'exciting' by the instructor, that may mean 
terrifying for the students?! 
Other Comments: 
16. Being tipped over while sea kayaking is always a strong possibility 
for any participant. Taking a 'dip' is not always a serious incident. 
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17. A similar incident could easily happen to a much more experienced 
leader and may even go unreported. 
18. Having a sound plan and contingency action is very valuable. 
19. What was the main role of the co-instructor and how senior were 
they? 
20. While the instructor was inexperienced the narrative was focused, 
detailed and did deal with the facts. 
Expert Three: 
Conditions: 
1. Weather / water; slight swell with a light on shore wind. 
2. Inexperienced instructor. 
3. Mixed bag group of students. 
Root Causes (supported by evidence): 
4. Undefined outcomes; "I am trying to remember what I was hoping 
to achieve ..... " 
5. Lack of knowledge of the environment; "I had done the trip before 
during my induction a month before" and, " ... all I remember is 
this wave rolling in, breaking a lot earlier and being a lot bigger 
than I expected." 
6. Student requiring exclusive attention of one instructor; "this would 
free up the other instructor to keep an eye on the Maori student" 
and "the other instructor was a little back and behind the break, she 
was still rafted up with the Maori girl." 
7. Not completely inspecting beach/ hazard; "The information I had 
was based on what I could see" and "Maybe with hindsight it 
would have been better for me to go and check it out first." 
8. Collecting students in the impact zone; " .. .I remember is this wave 
rolling in, breaking a lot earlier and being a lot bigger than I 
expected." and "I did believe that the students were in a safe place 
in relation to the breakers." 
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9. Not responding to a change in situation I condition; "The first 
student went on shore and capsized." 
p.238 
10. Instructor decision "To continue the plan of sending students in one 
by one." 
Root Causes (subjective): 
11. No escape plan. 
12. In the narrative no mention is made of what students were to do to 
avoid the rocks or of any other plan for multiple capsize. 
13. Insufficient experience of the supervisor. Why didn't the Senior 
Instructor identify the potential for an incident and intervene? 
14. Insufficient documentation; Activity guidelines/ procedures, 




I. Unpredictable shore. 
2. Beginners in sea kayaks. 
3. Inexperienced instructor(s) in their roles. 
Root causes: 
4. Senior instructor not experienced to either identify the hazard or 
step in and take over - management issue with identification of 
people and roles of senior instructors. 
5. Failure to alter plan even when strongest student was capsized on 
the beach and it seemed unlikely other were going to succeed. 
6. Possible management failure to identify or collate collective 
experience from that particular beach. 
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Expert Five: 
Root Causes: 
1. I agree with all of the comments the instructor made "in 
retrospect". 
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In particular, the statement where he should have landed first. 
Also the notion of moving further along the beach to get a better 
look at the surf seemed a good idea. 
2. I'm interested why the second "more senior" instructor didn't 
proffer an opinion! Seems a lack of leadership on their part. After 
all they were there for a reason. 
3. It appears to me that the organisation had not properly prepared the 
instructor. 
4. The senior instructor should have taken charge earlier - may have 
been a different result. 
5. If the senior instructor didn't feel the need to take charge she 
should have been more assertive. 
6. I'm unsure whether her local knowledge was any better than the 
new instructor's. 
7. I guess there is a common thread of management inadequacies 
between the two incidents so far. 
8. I would have thought more information would have been available 
to the new instructor, both from the senior instructor and the 
organisation. 
9. It is a common failing to want to give people an experience by risk. 
taking and not being properly informed and prepared. 
Expert Six: 
Conditions: 
1. Instructor experience. 
2. Perceived mixed ability/ motivation group, participant level of 
expenence. 
3. "Coastline is exposed with not many places to land." 
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4. "Slight swell and a light on-shore wind." 
Root causes (supported by evidence): 
5. Instructor inexperience ... "This was one ofmy 'first instructs', I 
had the lead with a senior instructor observing me." And, "If I had 
more knowledge / experience of the effects that this size of swell 
(approx Yim) had at The Big Bay, we might have changed the 
approach route to going wider/ further away from the rocks ... " 
"feeling slightly 'on guard'." "I am trying to remember what I was 
hoping to achieve, and right now I don't seem to get any further 
than it was the logical thing to do .. .it would be good for the group 
to work on their management skills." See also below. 
6. Nature of programme ... 1. "The final day was to be a beach day." 
"A paddle along the shoreline and exploring of the sea cave was 
the logical alternative." "Maybe there was an element of pressure, 
placed on myself by myself, to give the students a challenging 
experience - after all that is what this programme was / is 
about. ... But I guess partly by the reputation/ expectation and more 
importantly my interpretation of the program." 2. "The group was a 
mixed bunch ... quite solid ... low self esteem ... sent by WINZ ... in 
general a bit on the outside of the group, very slight. .. always cold, 
water confident surfie." 
Root causes (subjective): 
7. A little bit of an extension of the 'Nature of the programme' 
above ... a culture that is both explicit and implicit, formalised and 
informal, leading to a training or induction pathway done 'by the 
numbers, join the dots approach' i.e. 'If you do this or follow this 
procedure, then this will/ won't happen' to the extent that even· 
senior instructors might let some 'growth' happen for the instructor 
at the expense of client physical and emotional safety? 
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6.2. 3.1. (c) Researcher sorting of Delphi results 
I sorted the comments from all six experts and collated them into the three 
categories of conditions (immediate causes), and the two major classes ofroot 
causes (Instructor and Management system errors). Table 25 shows a summary of 
this collation for Incident 14 71. Table 25 should be read with an understanding of 
the following: 
• Column one shows the responses from the various Delphi panel members 
coded in relation to the order ofresponses above in section 6.2.3 .1 (b ). For 
example code 3(2) is interpreted as Expert Number 3, Comment 2. 
• Column two is my summary of those particular comments for inclusion in 
the resultant ECF A diagram. Often the same underlying immediate or root 
cause will be explained in different ways by different experts. My job was 
to provide a summary that captured the meanings of the various experts in 
clear language. 
• Column three allows for any explanatory text. 
• The particular column in the table ( either: immediate cause; root cause -
instructor error; or, root cause - management system error) that I chose to 
place feedback from a particular Delphi panel member in may be different 
than that used by the Delphi member. 
• My role was also as an extra member of the Delphi panel. Ifl believed that 
a particular immediate cause or root cause had been missed, based on my 
expert knowledge, this was included and coded "R" for researcher. 
Table 25 
Summary of Delphi Comments for Iteration One of Incident 1471 
Delphi Panel Comment Summary for ECFA Explanation 
Dia2ram 
IMMEDIATE CAUSES 
1 ( 1) Mixed group, some not Mixed ability group, This immediate cause 
confident. some not confident is pertinent because 
1(3) Some students unstable in and one student has any planned trip 
kayak. poor English. needs to cater for all 
1 ( 4) Some students did not have group members in all 
a very good grasp of English. encountered 
2(2) Party keen, but of diverse conditions. 
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skill range. 
3(3) Mixed bag group of 
students. 
4(2) Beginners in sea kayaks. 
6(2) Perceived mixed ability/ 
motivation group, participant 
level of experience. 
1 (2) Exposed coastline, not Coastline is rocky with Self explanatory. 
many places to land. very few places to land 
4( 1) Unpredictable shore. safely. 
6(3) Coastline is exposed with 
not many places to land. 
1 ( 6) First time being in charge First time being an Self explanatory. 
of the group. instructor in charge of 
4(3) Inexperienced instructor( s) a group. 
in their roles. 
6( 1) Instructor experience. 
1(5) Waves breaking on the Instructor not familiar Self-explanatory. 
beach - bigger than expected. with local conditions. 
1 (7) Instructor not familiar with 
the area and conditions. 
2( 1) Fine weather - a nothing Fine weather. Slight Prevailing conditions 
can go wrong day. swell with light on- like this would 
3( 1) Weather/water; slight swell shore wind. Almost no encourage a person to 
with a light on-shore wind. surf. continue, even if 
6( 4) Slight swell and a light on- some aspects of the 
shore wind. trip may be in doubt. 
3(6) Student requiring exclusive One weak student was This may have 
attention of one instructor; "this being closely looked diverted the attention 
would free up the other after by the senior of the senior 
instructor to keep an eye on the instructor. instructor. 
Maori student," and, "the other 
instructor was a little back and 
behind the break, she was still 
rafted up with the Maori girl." 
3(12) In the narrative no Lack of thorough Briefing of students 
mention is made of what briefing of the on emergency plans 
students were to do to avoid the students. may have helped 
rocks or of any other plan for prevent further 
multiple capsize. capsizes. 
R Had all demonstrated This gave the 
wet exits previously instructor confidence 
and instructor was in the group's ability. 
happy about their 
skills. 
R Last day ofkayaking This introduced a 
and instructor wanted pressure to produce a 
to give them a really challenging 
good challenge. experience. 
R Instructor had done This reinforced in the 
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this trip once before instructor's mind that 
and it had gone okay. the trip was safe. 
R Instructor wanted the This may have added 
group to be able to to the instructor 
help each other and wanting to provide a 
develop teamwork. challemring trip. 
ROOT CAUSES {INSTRUCTOR 
ERROR) 
1(6) First time being in charge Lack of skills and Increased experience 
of the group. experience. in leadership style, 
2(5) Instructor inexperienced as reassessing current 
a leader, by his own admission. risks and changing 
2( 11) Instructor/leader admitted activities because of 
a lack of experience for the them, could have 
leadership role. prevented this 
6( 1) Instructor inexperience, etc. incident. 
1 (7) Instructor not familiar with Lack of skills and Increased knowledge 
the area and conditions. experience of local of local conditions 
1(9) Instructor identified that conditions. other than one 
they had minimal knowledge of previous trip in 
the effects of swells and general presumably good 
inexperience with the conditions conditions could have 
of the area. prevented this 
2(8) Lack of local knowledge - incident. 
a change in coast topography 
can mean a change in wave 
action. 
3(5) Lack of knowledge of the 
environment; "I had done this 
trip before during my induction 
a month before," and, "I 
remember this wave rolling in, 
breaking a lot earlier and being 
a lot bigger than I expected." 
1(8) Instructor couldn't clearly Focus on personal It seems that a higher 
identify what they were hoping goals or perceived level of risk was 
to achieve - instructor goals organisational goals of taken to meet either 
versus group goals? providing a the personal goal of 
2(10) While it's a team thing, challenging trip over- doing this trip, goals 
the judgment of the students riding the safety goals of the students in 
should not affect the decision of for the group. continuing the trip, or 
the leader. the perceived goals of 
3(4) Undefined outcomes. management to 
6(6) Nature of the programme provide challenge on 
. . . "Maybe there was an element the course . 
of pressure, placed on myself by 
myself, to give the students a 
challenging experience - after 
all that is what this programme 
was I is about. .. but I guess 
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partly by the reputation/ 
expectation and more 
importantly my interpretation of 
the programme" .... 
1 ( 10) Order of landing (most 
confident first) and then action 
taken when that student 
capsized - instructed rest of 
group to go ahead instead of 
stabilising group and checking 
out the situation. 
2( 6) A change in conditions will 
often be a signal to change 
plans. 
2(9) Decision point - take the 
safest option, its always best for 
health. 
3(9) Not responding to a change 
in the situation / condition; "The 
first student went on shore and 
capsized." 
3(10) Instructor decision "To 
continue the plan of sending the 
students in one by one." 
4(5) Failure to alter plan even 
when strongest student was 
capsized on the beach and it 
seemed unlikely others were 
going to succeed. 
1(13a) Instructor experience in 
the conditions was lacking - if a 
senior instructor was present 
why did they not offer more 
advice and guidance? 
3(13) Insufficient experience in 
the supervisor. Why didn't the 
senior instructor identify the 
potential for an incident and 
intervene? 
4( 4) Senior instructor not 
experienced enough to either 
identify the hazard or step in 
and take over - management 
issue with the identification of 
people and roles of senior 
instructors. 
5(2) I'm interested why the 
second "more senior" instructor 
didn't proffer an opinion! Seems 
a lack of leadershio on their 
Unwilling to change a 
plan based on new 
information coming to 
hand. 
Inappropriate 
leadership style. The 
senior instructor was 
unwilling to step in 
and exert authority 
over a less experienced 
staff member who has 




Easier to continue 
with existing plan, 
even though risks are 
demonstrably higher, 
than to change the 
plan. Changing the 
plan to not land other 
students on the beach 
would have reduced 
the potential severity 
of this incident. 
Senior instructor 
should have used a 
more directive 
leadership style with 
the less experienced 
instructor when the 
group started making 
their hazardous 
approach to the 
beach. 
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part. After all they were there 
for a reason. 
2(13 & 18) There was no Lack of planning Having other 
mention of a contingency plan. ahead by the contingency plans in 
3( 11) No escape plan. instructor. place for bad weather 
/ conditions would 
have made it easier to 
change plans and 
avoid the incident. 
3(7) Not completely inspecting Lack of good Taking time to 
the beach/hazard; "The situational awareness properly assess the 
information I had was based on by the instructor. conditions may have 
what I could see," and, "Maybe Failed to fully gather led to the trip being 
with hindsight it would have all necessary changed and the risk 
been better for me to go and information to be able averted. 
check it out first." to assess the risk. 
3(8) Collecting students in the 
impact zone; "I remember this 
wave rolling in, breaking a lot 
earlier and being a lot bigger 
than I expected," and, "I did 
believe that the students were in 
a safe place in relation to the 
breakers." 
5(1) I agree with all the 
comments the instructor made 
'in retrospect'. Particularly the 
statement where he should have 
landed first. Also the notion of 
moving further along the beach 
to get a better look at the surf 
seemed a good idea. 
R Risky shift? Two Self explanatory. 
instructors prepared to 
make a riskier decision 
than if they had been 
there by themselves? 
R Familiarity - Incorrect Even one previous 
appraisal of current successful trip can 
hazards due to having reduce the situational 
successfully completed awareness and risk 
the trip at another assessment abilities 
time? of an instructor. 
ROOT CAUSES (MANAGEMENT 
SYSTEM ERRORS) 
1 ( 1 1 ) Procedures for matching Lack of vetting of the Having the instructor 
group ability vs. goals should be planned activity by declare their plans to 
clearly set prior to any trip management to ensure management before 
leaving - is there such a process a match between the trip and 
set by the organisation? activity, students and contingencies 
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2(7) Activity and route not 
suited to the whole group. 
2( 15) If described as 'exciting' 
by the instructor, that may mean 
terrifying for the students. 
3(4) Undefined outcomes. 
6(6) Nature of the programme 
.... "The group was a mixed 
bunch ... quite solid ... low self 
esteem ... sent by WINZ ... in 
general a bit on the outside of 
the group, very slight ... always 
cold, water confident surfie." 
1 (12) Staff training prior to 
leading a group - may not be 
sufficient. 
1 ( 14) Instructor interpretation of 
programme goals vs. sound 
practice did not match, 
indicating a missing link in the 
training process for new 
instructors. 
5(3) It appears to me that the 
organisation had not properly 
prepared the instructor. 
6(7) A little bit of an extension 
of the 'Nature of the 
Programme' [in 6(6)] ... a 
culture that is both explicit and 
implicit, formalised and 
informal, leading to a training or 
induction pathway done 'by the 
numbers', 'join the dots' 
approach ... 
1(13b) What is the 
organisational criteria relating to 
the role of the senior instructor 
when safety issues are 
concerned? 
2( 19) What was the main role of 
the co-instructor and how senior 
were they? 
4( 4) Senior instructor not 
experienced enough to either 
identify the hazard or step in 
and take over - management 
issue with the identification of 
people and roles of senior 
instructors. 
5(4. 5. 6) The senior instructor 
environmental 
conditions, etc. 
LT A staff training. 




planned in case of 
poor weather, would 
allow poor choices 
and planning to be 
seen in advance and 
corrected. 
Training of staff in 
matching activity to 
students' abilities and . . 
managmg groups m 
sea kayaking 
situations appears to 
be inadequate. 
When two instructors 
are with a group it 
should be clear as to 
who has ultimate 
accountability and 
that person's 
responsibility to step 
in if risk is present. 
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should have taken charge earlier 
- may have been a different 
result, etc. 
2(12) The instructor did not LT A risk assessment Organisation should 
refer to any safety management and management have thorough set of 
process, RAMS, etc. system by risk management 
4( 6) possible management management. plans for activities / 
failure to identify or collate venues. 
collective experience from that 
particular beach. 
2(14) It was one of the n/a Discounted as a root 
instructor's first instructs. An cause as a senior 
experienced leader should have member of staff had 
accompanied the group. been assigned to 
accompany the group 
by management. 
3( 14) Insufficient LT A policies and Policies and 
documentation; Activity guidelines for the guidelines should be 
guidelines / procedures, activity. in place for activities 
operating parameters for wind / / venues to state 
swell, description of under what 
environment I location. conditions they are 
5(8) I would have thought more allowed to be carried 
information would have been out. 
available to the new instructor, 
both from the senior instructor 
and the organisation. 
6(6) Nature of the programme. Set activities in a The focus of an 
"The final day was to be a beach structured programme instructor can be 
day .... A paddle along the can lead to trips that placed on carrying 
shoreline and exploring of the don't necessarily take out the prescribed 
sea cave was the logical into account instructor activity rather on 
alternative." experience, student adapting to the 
ability and current conditions 
environmental and changing activity 
conditions. completely. 
R LT A monitoring of It is only through 
instructor performance observing actual 
in the field? performance of staff 
in real situations that 
corrections can be put 
in place. In this case 
the role of senior 
instructor should 




inadequacies of the 
less experienced 
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instructor. However 
the real issue that 
needed observing 
was the leadership 
style of the senior 
instructor while 
supervising the less 
experienced 
instructor. 
6.2.3.1.(d) Compilation of an Events and Causal Factors Analysis (ECFA) 
for the incident 
An ECF A diagram was then prepared for Incident 14 71. This included a 
chronological list of events leading up to and including the actual incident. The 
identified immediate causes and root causes of the incident were then added to 
this chronological list of events with the relationships indicated by arrows. 
Immediate causes and root causes that had evidence to support them based on the 
CAI, were enclosed in solid objects. Those that were the subjective view of a 
Delphi panel member(s) were enclosed in dotted objects. 




























Figure 39. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 1471 -Second Iteration Diagram 
{Incident 1471: 10 students capsized by waves on sea kayaking trip with one student swept onto rocks) 
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6.2.3.2 Second Delphi Iteration 
The ECF A diagram was emailed to all of the Delphi panel members and the 
instructor involved in Incident 14 71 for feedback. The instructions given to the 
Delphi panel members to help interpret the diagram are shown in Appendix Four. 
Five of the experts indicated that no changes needed to be made to the ECFA 
diagram. One expert asked that a further management system root cause be 
included: 
"Having reviewed the diagram I agree with the analysis but on reflection it 
seems to me that the corporate culture in the organisation may not be 
making it clear that safety goals come before educational goals. It might be 
worth including something about that." 
This additional root cause at management system level was included in the revised 
ECFA. 
The instructor for Incident 1471 made the following comments: 
"Line 2: First time being an instructor etc., this is incorrect. It should say 
something like: first time instructing for that particular organisation on that 
particular activity in that location." 
This change was included in the revised ECF A. 
"Line 3: Risk is lower on a fine day for that activity - I was not thinking 
'nothing could go wrong'. I had enough experience to be aware of the 
dangers of coastal paddling" 
If this psychological factor had any effect on the decisions of the instructors 
concerned, it is likely to be at a lower level of consciousness. Therefore it may 
have been present in this incident despite the comment by the instructor. As the 
aim of this research is to identify potential root causes by the analysis of a number 
of outdoor incidents, this remains a valid potential root cause. In the revised 
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version of the ECF A this root cause is shown in grey rather than black to indicate 
there is some disagreement among those reviewing the incident that this potential 
root cause contributed to this particular incident. 
"Line 3: Lack of skills and experience - same thing as my comment 
before. There was definitely a lack of local knowledge and conditions and 
I guess a lack of experience within the organisation, as this was my first 
instruct for this organisation. I definitely had lots ofrelated experience." 
This is accepted but no change is thought to be required to the ECF A diagram. 
"Line 4: Set programme days - the decision to go to the beach was ours 
(the instructors'), based on student abilities and group needs. The 
organisation does not decide this. The organisation does decide that you 
are kayaking - where, what and how is the instructors' decision. However 
there is an expectation to deliver a challenging course." 
This is noted and the root cause is shown in grey to signify some doubt among 
reviewers as to the place of this potential root cause in this particular incident 
analysis. 
"That's it. All looks very professional. .. " 
These changes were incorporated into a revised ECF A diagram for Incident 14 71. 
This revised version is shown as Figure 40. 
6.2.3.3 Third Delphi Iteration 
No further changes were suggested by any of the panel members and therefore 
stability had been reached in the analysis process for Incident 14 71. The ECF A 
diagram representing the result of the third iteration of the Delphi process is 
shown as Figure 40. 
Figure 40. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 1471 - Third Iteration Diagram 
(Incident 1471: I O students capsized by waves on sea kayaking trip with one student swept onto rocks) 
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6.3 Results of and Comments on the Delphi Analysis of 18 Serious Outdoor 
Education Incidents 
The other 17 incidents selected for further study were analysed in a similar 
manner to that explained in the case study of incident 14 71 in Section 6.2. The 
completed ECFA diagrams for these incidents follow in Figures 41 - 57. The 
following observations were noted during the Delphi process: 
• The Delphi process itself was extremely valuable in bringing together a 
range of expert views of root causes of the incidents. As shown in the case 
study of Incident 14 71 where no root cause was identified by all six 
experts and no single expert identified all of the root causes in the final 
ECF A, the combined analysis was far more thorough than simply using 
one expert - no matter the experience level of that one expert. Each expert 
brought to the analysis a different background and set of experiences from 
which to view the incident, often surprising other experts in the second 
iteration with their insights. 
One Delphi member commented on the structure that I had suggested for 
the feedback they were to give on the incidents. He believed it was too 
rigid and may have impacted his ability to think widely on root causes: 
"I struggled with the structured way you wanted us to respond and 
so I free-formed it... it seemed to me that the structure you wanted 
kept us locked into the current way we view risk management and I 
was under the impression we were trying to look at the whole thing 
in a new light...ifl was wrong I apologise but that's what it was for 
me." 
The purpose of the Delphi exercise was to get as wide a range of opinions 
as possible from a cross-section of outdoor experts. Whatever form the 
opinions arrived in was accepted without comment. Some adopted this 
"free-form" approach and others appreciated and followed the guidance of 
a structure for the feedback. 
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• Because none of the experts identified all of the root causes, and some 
identified smaller subsets of the final number than others, individual panel 
members suffered self-doubt early in the Delphi process. I received emails 
such as: 
"I have just received the first incident summary from you. It looks 
great but .... I realise how few of the root causes I managed to 
identify compared to the analysis you sent me. I must admit to 
feeling a bit inadequate and if you want me to pull out just let me 
know." 
"Boy, the diagram of the first incident just came through - it looks 
very thorough! I am a bit in awe of how other people giving 
feedback to you came up with such in-depth root causes. I just 
hadn't thought of them! If you don't think I'm pulling my weight 
then please feel free to get someone else in." 
I was able to reassure them that their feelings were shared by others and 
that everyone's contribution built up the final picture of the incident 
pathway. In this way all panel members stayed motivated and became 
educated through the process to look at different aspects of an incident to 
identify root causes. 
• The ECF A representations of incidents were very well received. After 
sending out the first incident summaries to panel members I received 
unsolicited feedback from both panel members and the instructors 
involved in iteration 2 and 3 of the process: 
"Great format, easy to read and follow." 
"Thanks for sending though the review of my incident. I like the 
format used." 
"Looks great - so easy to follow!" 
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"It all fits and sounds right. It makes me realise how many 
mistakes I made and how I could improve in the future. The 
diagram was really easy for me to follow and makes it really easy 
to see how the events flowed to create the final accident. Thanks 
and good luck with your study." 
There was only one negative comment received from the 18 members of 
the Delphi panel and 18 instructors involved: 
" ... the big diagrams were a nightmare for me to read and printing 
them off helped little ... unusual as I am normally pretty visual...this 
didn't help to bolster my enthusiasm either." 
One instructor commented that it took a little bit of adjustment to get used 
to the diagrams and then they were very useful: 
"I found it a bit confusing to start with, especially at the deeper 
levels, but after I did a couple it was easier. I think if I was actually 
using it as a tool it would become easier again. The advantage that 
the diagram has over a written narrative or a list is that it allows 
you to see at a glance the key areas of the incident, it just takes a 
while to remember what the dotted parallelogram etc. represents." 
Some concerns were simply about the size of the diagrams making it 
difficult to read on a computer screen until it was printed out. 
" ... it was kind of annoying that I couldn't read it easily on one 
screen without having to print it out - having to flip all over the 
place, but you get that ... but all the information was there and easy 
to follow if printed out." 
This feedback was vindication of the choice of the ECFA diagram as an 
incident evaluation tool for the purpose and target audience. A suggested 
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incident analysis system for managers of outdoor education programmes 
that uses the ECF A tool will be explained in Chapter 8. 
• There were very few changes suggested to the ECF A analysis by Delphi 
panel members after receiving the first combined result at the end of 
iteration one. The most changes were suggested by the instructors 
involved in the incidents. At times this instructor feedback concerned 
factual changes that were required to the analysis based on the 
misinterpretation of the CAI data and these changes were straightforward. 
More contentious at times were the critical judgment points signaled in the 
analysis and the root cause analysis. While some instructors viewed the 
analysis as a learning tool from which they could extract points for 
improvement based on feedback from expert peers, others became quite 
defensive and wrote justifications of their decisions and actions. This was 
to be anticipated given the fact that the analysis was delivered 
electronically without one-on-one guidance throughout to explain the 
rationale of the causal factors. Once changes had been made to the analysis 
and some areas were "greyed out" as shown in the case study of Incident 
14 71 to indicate doubt about the applicability of the identified cause, there 
were no requests for further change. 
• The first iterations of the early incidents studied by the Delphi panels 
contained more feedback on root causes due to instructor error than 
management system error. This is not surprising considering the history of 
outdoor education incident analysis where often the immediate search is 
for someone to 'blame'. By the time of the later incidents there was more 
of a balance in their feedback as the Delphi members educated themselves 
through successive incident analysis on areas to consider for root causes. 
• Analysing six incidents was reaching, and in some cases had reached, the 
saturation level for panel members. Interest levels, which had been high at 
the beginning, were beginning to wane, response times increased and the 




































Figure 41. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 126 
(Incident 126: Student swept away while crossing swollen river. Rescued before injury) 
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Figure 42. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 281 
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Figure 43. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 1649 
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supervision 
"Decision lo stay al lire truck was 
one oftrusl. We considered we 
were willr most of tire high risk 
"One of either Instructor B 
myself could have gone ovei 
to watch proceedings .... " 
guys ... 
~ I //~· 
~--·------"'--.... 
( \ 
LT A Monitoring of instructors 
performance in the field and 
feedback to raise standards? 
l_ _________ ) 
Assuming students will follow 
instructions and act with common 
sense. 
Figure 44. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 611 











Given task to 
bui Id raft for 
four of group. 
Raft must 
collect clues - along bank with other members 
on bank helping 
raft into eddies 
with ropes. 
P1.:~.~,ir~· c1, .n..::c! th,· 
l'~ .. Ll'\ ', cd .;, 1, 1~ {,I 
L I i·~1l/',.:(' 
···-:::.::.:_ 
Rafi not Despite 
made well extra 
and a test equipment 
launch Instructor isn't happy students 
indicates with the construction decide not 
it has but decides to run with to rectify 
marginal it as it is and let the the bad 
flotation students learn from their raft 
for4 islakcs. 
people 
' - "~----! 
Pressure to not appear overly 
protective of an adult group 
"Adu/ls need as much 
I 
Inappropriate leadership 
style "An earlier 
intervention could have 
made the task more 
achievable along with 
more desirable 
outcomes ... " 
Group fail 















activity in ,-~, rl'-~~, ... above a final group continue down 
run through final rapid ~th t~e ho_pe 
bigger water that~~ will timsh with 
without a positive result of fun 




done this exercise 
3 times before but 
used this section 
fthe river lots --• 
Long ropes 
were removed 
from the raft 
and instructor 
went down to 
below the 
rapid to act as 
safety person 
in case of 
capsize 
L TA briefing of students and 
supervisor "My safety briefing 
was not adequate enough for the 
altitude of the group ... I did not 
comprehensively stress the risks 
involved and possible strategies 
for them to take more 
responsibility for their own 
Failure to sec the risk due 
to using venue often 
without incident "/ saw no 
immediate danger and 





one of the 
coiled ropes in 
loose coils 
around the 
neck of one of 
the students in 
the raft 
t 
A.Mume students will behave 
as expected "My expectation 
of adult groups are often 
unn:a/istic. I automatically 
assume becau,e of age and 
maturity that they will he 
more capable·· 
Instructor ~· ~-sees this broaches on drags but no time rocks and victim from or ability all students water with 
for the washed into bruising 
instructor river. Rope and rope 
to get to tightens bum around 
raft to around the neck 






/ Poor group management / 
i techniques? How was a / 
/ student able to place a / 
/ rope around another /; 
, student's neck without,. 
/ intervention? / 
L.___ I 
.__ ,.,, / safety" / -· .--·--·' 
"-------·-·----::::::"·-----.. -~~- ..... , ', t _ .......... ---------==---------· --
supervision as students ... I 
continually have to remind 
myself of this and lose my 
fear of appearing 
condescending. ·• .. 
---.. ----y-· . ----·---~~---i L TA monitoring of f"" 
· standards of field l 
r--~ 
I Task too large? j 
· Ratio of staff to [ 
students too high forl 
l, .. :~~i~~on? ___ .) 
I staff operations? 
























































Figure 45. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 292 











. lnsttuctor willing to/-
take more casual 
/ approach in sunny , 















the end oftbc 
session and the 
group-.. 
seal launching 






lnatructor lets the group 
continue to play and 



















is going to 
jump into 
water. 
lnsbUCIOr decides not to 
intervene by hying to 
stop her fiom jumping 
Student 
jumps into 
lake next to a 
group of girls 
OD kayaks. 
Lets oot a yell 
IS she has hit 
the bottom. 
Instructor is on 
shore but 












' "' ~ 
\ ----
~'~ ----------- . ·--..... '11,;·; .1.;:,,i _;1., . .,;~m...::1, 1.r-p.1-r~·,: h: 




.,, :, n,1! r; :;-,,: 11' I ,,., 
!,,_. 1r.,rra .. ·1:11,1: 
<JW!1 ,1,·fi-f:,':,1;.: lh,r< •\:h 




r (llllrUctor less / ,---.::.....----~ ,,-----_.;::.-------, 
Lack of awareness of the L TA briefing of students. No LTA supervision of students Penonal values / L focussed on risk 11 L TA assessment of Lack of knowledgc/experience-~.hanged loca_l ~d1bons briefing of, "/ made this d«ision on the followed. "Trying to management at end hazards. "/ did not "In hindsight, with incn,ased 
Nol recogn,s,ng that the "NtJt ... emphusising ... the need environment being 'mfe • give them lpQCI! to enjoy of session? really see lhe knowledge "f the lih/;hood ,if the 
lake was lower than fi,r care with any jumping" from my picture of the the siJualion and have 1 , likelihood of the event comequences I wm~IJ try 1,, 
normal '!n:' the':if_ore activity was one f had and "In hindsight, I could hazards that existed ... and fun wilhaut that being / _ 1 occu"ing, tho~ght ii intervene ... that dedsion war 
~as,s,ng th,s ~.the done before and the site huve reemphasLred any felt I could keep a good driven by me as the __,,. would be fine. ' more ha.,ed on my understanding 
brief to students... wcu familiar. " critit'a/ safety issues before I vi.rual check on the students imtrvctor. " ----- of what was 'sufe •. A situation thut 
._ • left then lo continue playing. __ ... ~ j ~ does""' sum ideal/or me being a 
t ~-~~---~~~---~- .... ____ .................... \ _.J ~ ----===-~---- ---- --r-.:::...:--z-~;;:::-.:.--- ~;t:.!ve.!"':::::==~: 
J ............... ------ -............__ ~ _ ---=-~ ----- __.-,--- ,oundtkcisio,u_" 
r:;;-1--_ -""": r·"""-.---1 ~-~----=~---·----~::=.:::::::-,------ -------=._1 ----==.::::::=.:_----·----~--·---··-·----·-----· t 
! trammg? j j ~ TA .nsk . j . L TA monitoring of j L TA policies and guidelines "Not sun ( \ f,...-- '\ 
! ! J 1denu::;:non [ ! ofstandards? j whotthepolicywasatthetimeon j ~TAmonitoringof ! j ~TA.risk. ! 
! ! j sys Y ? ! l j jumping off stuff ... think something ! instructor j j 1dent1ficat1on · 
\... : ~ management. i i i was ,·reared after this evrnt" i health/stress? ! j systems by 
____ N _ _J --N--NN_N_/ _N.J \. ! l l management? j 
\._ ______ / '-._ _______ .../ 
L TA incident recording and transfer t1 
other staff "Exposure to knowledge ~ 
fHBI similar events would increase my 
awareness of the likelihood of this 
occurring." 
Figure 46. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 318 
(Incident 3 I 8: Student falls on bike while doing jump and ruptures spleen) 
Instructor decides to 
follow group wish and 
























lnsnuctor decides to 








One of the 
more 
experienced ---·} riders swapped tum this into a bike bikes with a jumping session where less 
experienced riders teach experienced 





__.I / '--- y • -~~~ i '"- y 
! ; - . 
7/"1~----------·-·-·-~~ i ~":::::,,___-
Perceived need to provide a challenging 
trip to meet the goals of the students 
Unwilling to prohibit the activity 
or put limit on the activity as 
would have looked overbearing 
and disappointed students? 
"It war Ml up so the slUJenlS cou/J 
finish up the year by heading out on 
an apedilion which brought to~the1 
all the skill& and experiences they 
had learnt over the year". " 
L TA policies for course design ii 
malehing equipment and experience 
available to activities - instead could ! 
be prone lo allow activities to be run I 
: that appear sexy/attractive to the j ~·· ) 
L TA policies and guidelines Risk 
analysis and protocols needed/or 
jumping bikes with students, 
i equipment limilations, etc. , 
\_ _) 
Perception or risk lowered as 
activity carried out without incident. 
"Everything ..., gning really well. 
As far as I rememlH!r, they were 
all biking in control and within 
their skill boundaries, although, 
they were trying the jumps 
OU/. 
( 
j L TA monitoring of instructor 
Dcfcned judgement to students who had 
more experience of the activity. "/ aslu,d 
(student A) if there was anything we 
should loolr. nut for ... walking around 
areas they romidered too difficult far 
where they were al. "And, "Maybe 
shouldn ·, have been there al all. 
They seemed hannless al that 
point in time however. " 
: performance - lnatructor shouldn't 
have been canying out activities where 
the risks had not been analysed by 
mansgcmcnt and shoold not have 
defcned responsibility ro the srudcnts. 
Experienced. ~-- Student student I area evacuated demonstrates swells to hospital jump with indicating whc:R:his bike that had internal spleen is 
no toe clips. bleeding - found to Loses footing be 
and crashes, ruptured. 
landing 
awkwardly 






Lack of skills aD~perienccat this activity 
including matchin equipment to the activity. 
Diff'ercnt tcchniqu with toe clips compared 
to having none. 
"I had done quite a la ,fbi/cing ... alth<,ugh I 
wouldn't call myself a I hnical moun1ain-
bkr ", and "/ wasn'tftt like /war overly 
familiar with the area and ith this in mind I 
was a Iii/le unsure about huto.,flu, day war 
going lo unfold. " 
\ 
LT A maintenance carried out on 
bikes. "Some of these bikes were 
dodgy al the best a/times ... lillle 
maintenance ... and did not have 
toecl~" 
Equipment trap. Gear supplied to 
instructor wu inadequate or perfonned in 
a way that was different than cxpccted. In 
this case bikes with both toe clips and no 
toe clips .. " ... went over the first on the 
(organisations) bike and once he landed 
off the jump, lost his footing on the pedals 































































Figure 47. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 857 
(Incident 857: Student climbing on dangle-duo is taken off belay and put at risk) 
- ~ Students Two hours 2 climbers Instructor drives to briefed and of activities and4 observes ropes checked for an: carried belayers students and course for safety. out start IO do they seem IO 
:~~nof 
Allowed co. successfully. dangle- be managing 
choose now late duo the safety 
activlbcs activities afternoon activity procedures 




Instructor decides to 
leave group and go and 
assist a teacher who is 
running the pamper pole 





__./ gets bor<d and wants 
to swap y 
------













- -.;__..-- J 
__ .. Y. •--- ..... 
Instructor 
glances across 
and finds that 
students have 
swapped places. 













-~. -- ·-- ----·~·~ 
............ _ --...... _____ ·-.. ,-·---
---·-....... .._._ --.... ·---.. ---... _ ;· Sunny day causcd--7 
·--., ---- --·- lowenngofnsk /' 
- . ......_ -·--·-- ; perccpuon? 
---- / ----/7K(-~-
____ .. _ .. _._... _.,../.,..,,. / .......... , .. 
·-..... 
- -- I ---...... ......__ --------.. L ... ___ .. ·---·---' 
.. ..-~ .... ~..... / .... 
... ..--·--- .. ~· .,./ ~ ____ .. _/ / ! '-,. 
--·- _,,,. / ! --.... ,--------'"::; _____ -____ ...- /' i ,---·...:'·.,.._ ________ .., 
Tiredness lowering risk management 
awareness 
"Being the end of the year I may hav, 
been quite tired ... / could have bee", 
more tired than I thought I was 
and missed the signs that would 
hove prt!Vt!nled this incident" 
Overfamiliar with activity causing 1·----·- 1;· 
lower risk management / Overfamiliar with 
"This aclivity had been done by me / students after long / / 
many times before with other / / programme causing / 
groups ... I was probably also / a dropping of i 
relaxed1 fias l1kn1 ""'..ii was fairly L ____ !"'..:!-!_. _ __}, easy O OCI I ale 
Inadequate level of supervision 
of students - deferred 
respoosibility to students 
"I left the belay teams so I cou, 
support the other teacher an, 
climbing groups." 
Expecled student IO follow 
instructions and act in a way that 
exhibited .. common sense" 
"/ was possibly overconfident of 
where the suspended students 
were al ... with their ability lo 
behave safely. " 
Raising risk potential to follow personal 
values system - in order to make 
students feel better about themselves. "/ 
was felling the students know thal by~ 
actions of leaving I hem, thal I percef, 
their skills al 
a standard where they could 
manage a risky situation wilh 
-~---.... __ r:=-----
h<1<kt,'.1<.1C..: •11,·1.he,1, I ''1~·;1b, 
f11; ,<dt•c ~-...'. t:1 cll l I~ ·1; lt1 tn."IP!'.:111 
,._·,m.;..:r:.1at1n11 l'·,~' ;i/1('1 11/;'h t. ,i11 
Ii,,, zL.: 
··11 :~i;, .~,,l/ "'''' .-J.-,, (''', rn""''· 
;•, r~,:f!1 ,.' !101//, /,ud .~·1·:1< 
h;, fr "H;, ho! :J!',i 1;,nm 
t,'lf .. ..._ /..,. ..... ......_ / their own skills and lcnowledge/' 
i '~ / "::::, - 1__./ 
' '-........_ --....... ---- '-....... 
_______ _. _____ ............. i V -..... .......... ---------------~ 
L TA policies and guidelines for instructo 
workloads "S1affing policies within the 
school syslem were trying lo deal with th 
impad on staff of such an outdoor 
workload as well as other leaching I 
management duties" 
Policies & Guidelines had not been made to 
keep up with change/growth of organisation 
"Staffing policies within the school syslem were 
trying lo deal with the impact on staff of such a, 
outdoor 
workload as well as other leaching I 
management duties " 
l j \ 1 , •.:~ .. ::, 11°,! :,;_111L,: 
,,,jh::·. 
LT A monitoring of 
instructor performancef 
·· .... _____ .. ___ __..) 
'-
LTA policies and guidelines for standards of 
competence to run activity leading to higher than 
anticipated ratios "/ left the belay teams so that I 
could support the other teacher and climbing 
groups on other elements·· - Teacher did not have 
competence to supervise. 
Figure 48. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 42 
(Incident 42: Potential student pin on log during kayak instruction. Rescued without injury but paddle lost) 
Group Students divided 
Group Skilled 
programmed into groups. 
paddles students First two Swdent Next -· t Sb!dents on kayak Skilled paddler.; down and students in student hits rescued, skills lnstructol'3 decide to with one Decision that river and instructor Instructors decide Instructor decides that negotiate playboat SCCS the stump, paddle instruction take all the students on instructor and unskilled student reach negotiate the less skilled students will paddle into the rapid hits capsize, capsizes lost and 
week with the same section of unskilled with could use his 
rapid with rapid students will be 
... the rapid one after without stump, freezes on it and exit the 
three grade II water other two playboat on the trip 
tree without allowed to paddle another without waiting problems capsizes and manages nip at lhc 
instructors instructors. 
hazards problem the rapid for successful 
and panics to get out next 
on left and completion by previous swims of boat rapid. 
stump on student. and 
left swims 
\... ~ y / -----
______ _1 
Y •. .. I!- ... '· ... 
I i~-~~~--:~~~-----i -- - // l, I 
' \ \ ',, ,,,, 
i \ ........ ~ ... , 
\ \ ',. '-... 
Personal value system followed in 
wanting students to take a leadership 
role on trip and raising risk level 
"We may have abdicaJed some 
decisions or management 
strategies in order 10 give a 
learning experience. " 
River chosen as a 
compromise to allow all 
students to work 
together. 2 sb!dents 








Accepting a higher risk level rather Lowered perception of the risk due Inappropriate management techniques on / 
than disappoint a student and appear to incident-free previous trips the water in having more than one stufan< 
overcontrolling. "All three instructors hod paddled at a time enter the hazard area. / 
"He was a heavy, inflexible perso the section before, with and withou "This meant I did not have lj,.1rthance lo 
of in.rufficient ability {for such a / students ... the water level was lo reassess my interpretatip,{of the current 
boat). He hod just purchased th / and so not as pushy. •• flow and th• li!a,f i/y,di[ of hilling the_.. J, 
boat and was keen to we it. ·· i stump. " _ _,..,....... _.... . ....-
~ \ ,,~ ·,,,"' 
~~'',,, II::~==~: ·-7 
i •.•·----- ..:::,.,,:----··· ----/ ~:=:=..~:n~:"w I \ J ',\ ,,.,.'x,...... / instructor'/ / 
I "' _.../ "' ~----------~ 
\ 
. 'x...-/ Instructors working together tacitly 
\ ....- ', accephng a higher level ofnsk (nsky shift.) 
\ / '- Had also worked together a number of 
\ . ....- .... -....._, limes before (Fam1hansallon) 
i ,...,..\...- '"(We) did not ducuss anything but 
'\ _../ \ continued our normal tacit 
..,... . .....-· understanding of hazard and group 
A/ \ management on the waJer thaJ hod 
// ·\ '\ },(eviously served us well. " 
./ / " 
/// \ _,.......-....-~/ ~-----'.....-,.-------~ 
c/ I . \,/" 
L TA assesmien.1~ risklbazards 
"I hod thf:.l'l!Freption ~haJ if you cross•d 
thµddfiine in a nomit/lfmhion you 
_.. .. ~Id miss the sturnp .. \/focwsed on 
the line of branches as If significant 
hazard but felt the risk fipsed was 
all but over .. " \ 
LTA allocation ofresponsibility. lnsttuctor 
in eddy with second student should have 
stopped them when the fint capsize 
occurred but didn't feel n:sponsible 
""/W•) did not discuss anything but 
continued our normal tacit 
Willing to accept higher risk to 
accommodate group values 
/ ........... / .//-
-~.-;---~-------~-,-,~; . /./~ 
.. ______ :_~:::.::-t::::::::::_," l<-·~::: ___ . __ .,.-----------· 
\ 
/ ~~:epting a higher level of risk rather than ./ 
understanding of hazard and group 
management on the water that hod 
previowly served w well. " 
"This trip was a compromise that 
allowed t~ whole group lo paddle 
together - something the group 
had decided was desirable. ·• 
r--------JC---°"\:---~'.~-:;-------------~-
1 Organisational goals of students to L TA Monitoring of instructor 1 -· -~·-··--··-~-. 
! achieve learning outcomes for unit performance and standards? 
! standards causing students to be on 
unsuitable rivers? i "----·---.. ·-·-·-·-----~----··) \...._ ___________ ) 





~ ta.lc.ing a harder/longer option. / 
· It may have been better for the less / 
experienced to either portage. have 
greater spacing or closer supervision by / 
an inst!Uctor - all of which would take , 
_jl more effort and/or time? 
t 
LT A SOPs for team teaching with 



































































Figure 49. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 43 
(Incident 43: Student trapped by foot in pinned tube raft. Rescued without injury) 
Instructor Drove to Group Group 
and group river and briefed showed 
programmed Instructor decides to do constructed and set off poor 
Instructor Raft heads 
considered too far left 
pulling out Instructor decides to in rapid and 
Raft pinned Instructor Student Instructor Managed Raft frees 
on the snag got out of wearing slashes to pull the itself and 
with girls kayak. gumboots tubes with student's drifts 
lo do water 1 tube rafting trip with 111ft down the control of of the river cany on with trip to the drifts onto a screaming waded to bas foot 
knife but foot out of away with 






"' i \ Lack of skills ~nd experience in 
bcing able to orer a range of 
water activities°' " .. olher avoilabl1 
water activities \.,ere eilher 
unavailable or I'r'as unfamili 
wilhlhem \ 
\ 
Poor BSSCMmcnt of student skills 
and abilities in relation to 
activity. "In relrospect /feel the 
activily was too difficult for the, 







helped between worsens Group is 
girls to tubes the foot finally 
shore trap rescued 
and 
reunited 
....... -.......... \ 
~-\--._ 
~ ·-····-·--·-. i 
I 
I 
\ \ --\ -........ \ 
\ 
\ ·-_ "1 ~. --
\ , '·-, ·-r-- --------7 
............. \ f '·-.. ... , / Task overload? This 
·-·-. ~t:·::·:·~---.. --------- --.. I ."- ·,,,__ ! / 1 ;;Ef~~ond/ 
\ - ... ___ -------- / .. 1 / thecapabilityofthi!( 
.... ---............ ~ ...... 




\ ·-·-··-.__ ----.J.. ···-....l_ I instructor? L -\-- \ -··----, / ·-------- '···,,.,,. ·- L--=--==~l----
P~e~ed risk of~~vi~ lowe:mt by Unwilli.ngness ~o chang~ sct.~lan Faili~g to correctly anal~ Perceived need to provide a chaneJging ' Poor application of instructor / 
havmg~n ~eact1v1ty tn prev~ous even with n~ ~nformat10~ I the risk because ?f~nh~F.to trip to meet the goals of the · skills on the river? Positio1ed ; ~}'.5, wtill ~1fferent group5:- ~th no made the decision to do this meet student d~n::s Thi is organisation . incorrectly and acted too I te ./ 
mctdcnts. 't.1 made the decision... a favoured ac11v11yfor "My decision lo do tubin was based to get raft into right / 
base~ on ru'>..!:'inJ! ~he ~ve~ in .. students. " / on wanting the group lo iave a \ 1 position on the river. Jr 
prewous days\w1I out 1ncidenl water activity thar would maximis/ / /[ 
\\ their experiences .. challenge, /__ __________ .. ·--·---- / i 
··--...... ..·-·-··- . . ..JI teambuilding, excitement and ' 
(_J ________________ ~ )---~=:-=_:~~~::.::~··----;::~=,-------==::--~-\-·---:~==:::::::;~::~:::;;- (~~---:~- -)_ _______ ~·:-------·-···-·-··-·'--~\ 
' LTA _policies/guidelines to matchj j Poor organisational culture? In) . LTA staff training? Needs to , LTA information for staff. ··mor j LTA monitoring o"rmstructor Equipment trap? Raft ! ' LTA policies/guidelines for i . LTA monitoring of instructor . 
bookmgs to available resources? 1 this case there may be a perceivJ j have a greater repertoire of water: detailed information on river i perfonnance made of tubes creates appropnate gear for activity? j j plans or .lack of management j 
; need built into the programme to j activities to offer. j jlows ... suiloblejlowsfordifferen ; . foot entrapment Shouldn't be wearing gumboots. j j leadership skills in not preventin~ 
l~ ........... __ .. ____ .. _________ .......... ___ .... ) \ .... do certain activities. _______ ... ./ l...._ ..... - .. ---------------·--·-.... ) gr~;::.~~~d "J:'e'(.~etai/ed river l-.. -----------------···-·---) l ... situations._ .. ________ ) -----· ·----··-----------_) \,__ the trip•----------·-) 
Instructor Instructor 
has moves 
crossed along gully 
gully at -+ edge to find 
easy angle group. Sees 
Walked Group Group upstream rope Instructor A second Instructor Overweight Student 
students briefed on were of group hanging scrambles student, tells student gets Jails, 
down DOC bearings, going fine down and down into overweight., student to to safe bounces (-~~~-· track to keeping with Instructor decides to then student gully IO is.seen move Instructor turns attcotioo ledge but nfTledge a semi-accompanied trip where together and instructor pass group to the side to falling lreSI trying IO back to a back IO the injured rather than and free .... 
with students in bush -+ students -I the steep ..... following f-+I be in front when they 1-- - H injured Ito lravene .... safe ledge f-t student 1-t stop, f+ Jails 
would head gullies that closely get to the road at the end Group en student under an attempts to approx 7m 
off into the existed of the exercise encounters a falls to overhanging climb back onto rocks 
bush on a Sleep gully bottom of a.con upa breaking 
\. bearing 
and decide to gully mossy rocks slippery femur . ... go down it. ... - slope They put a 




\ \ \ ~ 
I \ " 
\ \ \\ ~'~ I \ \ 
I \ ' 
• 
~ i '"-,,~~"'"' 
-...--... -, 
Perceived need to provide a challenging trip · 
to meet the goals of the organisation 
"11,e object of the activity was to give the 
students the rrsponsibility ofli.Jtening to 
technical imtructions, then following tJ 
with natural consequenca if /hey were 
iMccurate. The group then /tQd to wo, 
togetlll?r to get through the bwh in a 
rea.wnahle time. It creaJed an 
I \ \ , --:.=.·-\
I . '"""""''"" ..-,- •-' ""'"'""'" '""'~"' __ . .., ~ l lOrnHrcivcd any a~·llvitt? :::,tud..:nbd,'. '"he11 ch,·y ::couraged them In en nstruc r·-. . w'13' " . . . , .. I ., ,I " 'dent as unhkely IO "' knm, , •n·.• Ill. I""' .,1~, risky an::a. ~ ln.i,'~.~:!::·1:,,~1 ,',f hapnclpen? gol "';~",'.\'.~ ,'n ""'"".'''', ,/ 
"" """ ' ,, '"""" , ""dc11L, / •·.isc:",d'l" . .' ~ / "" _ _/, '""'''""""" / successfull!regulartasklstL. _ ~ -.,______ __ ----  ~ 
"77ruwas .. -; "' ----------- . = I lh
•- ----- -, nitoringofmstru I 
Expected student to follow 
instructions and act in a 
way that exhibited 
"common sense" 
L L\ ,1;:pL ... a111111 ur r·1:,1~ 
munugcm..:nt :,k!!b 




L TA policies and guidelines for 
supervision of such trips? 
Instructor should be in a position 
to be able to intervene 
'- -, m- ' ' -- -~~1- __J
-------- I '"""'" I __ ------ """'""""~,.;,."'"'''" ~ :'.:;~v~:~::~·1::~:.:1:krk,. ~:.:: r !l' 
,,~k,;. .n .::n1,11; 
LT.'\ ,,rgun1i.a1i.m:i.l r1!>k 
m..in;i~t·m..:nt .1n;il;,;1~ "1 
·\rc;.1 .11"->11t:.ibk f(l1 
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Figure SI. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 728 
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Figure 52. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 261 
(Incident 261: Student bush-bashing in lead walks over cliff and hangs from edge. Falls to river without injury before he can be rescued) 
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Figure 53. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 636 
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was aware of the haza, 
and river levels. 
' j LT A policies / guidelines? : j Ratio for river trip needs selling to j 
i industry std. The high ratio makes it I 
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Figure 54. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 845 
(Incident 845: Two students solo up large loose cliff with dangerous run-out) 
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Figure SS. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident ISIS 
Incident 1515: Canoe broached on willow in moving water. Student trapped in water against canoe. Rescued before injury) 
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Figure 56. ECF A diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 59 
(Incident 59: Students on tube raft go into trees. One student goes under trees before being rescued) 
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Figure S7. ECFA diagram representing the Delphi analysis of Incident 321 
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6.4 Establishing a Taxonomy of Error for the 18 Serious Outdoor Education 
Incidents 
From the completed ECFA diagrams shown in Figures 40 - 57, the identified root 
causes of the various incidents were transferred onto Post-it stickers so that they 
could be sorted into categories. There were 227 individual root causes for the 18 
incidents studied: 97 of these were root causes that were related to management 
system errors; and 130 were root causes due to instructor (front line manager) 
error. These results reinforced the concept of multiple causation discussed in 
Chapter 4, with an average of approximately 13 root causes per incident. 
6.4.1 Root Causes due to Instructor Error 
The 130 identified cases of root causes due to instructor error were grouped into 
categories based on similarities in the identified root causes. This process 
produced the 'types' ofroot cause shown in 6.4.1.1 - 6.4.1.10 Any incident where 
a particular root cause is cited as being contributory is shown in parentheses 
immediately following the named root cause. 
6. 4.1.1 Poor Condition of Instructor to Supervise and Make Judgments 
(Incidents: 42, 59, 126, 292, 636, 845, 857, 1515) 
In all of the incidents listed, the instructor either entered the instructional session 
with conditions that impaired performance or judgment making ability, or those 
conditions developed during the course of the activity. The conditions were either: 
a) Physical -injuries, tiredness, cold, etc. (59,126,636,857,845, 1515). 
b) Motivational - lack of motivation to perform (292, 42, 59). 
These physical or motivational conditions resulted in the instructors failing to 
properly apply an existing skill or adequately monitor the situation around them 
and assess the risks present, or accepting a higher level of risk than would 
normally be the case. 
It is a management responsibility to monitor the physical and mental state of the 
instructors prior to entry into the field, but it is also incumbent on the instructor to 
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disclose any existing conditions to management. It is often impossible for 
management to intervene if an instructor's condition deteriorates in the field. The 
instructor must be aware of the possible consequences of such deterioration and 
take steps to minimise the impact of any reduction in capability. 
6.4.1.2 Lack of Skills and Experience 
(Incidents: 43,126,261,281,292,318,321, 1471, 1649) 
Although this root cause is also linked to management system errors that would 
mismatch the skills of an instructor with an instructional task, the instructor, as a 
front line manager, must be willing to admit that his / her skill level is not up to a 
particular task or task environment and extricate him / herself from that situation. 
In the incidents discussed here, the instructors concerned did not do this and the 
lack of skills and experience placed them in situations beyond their ability, or 
increased the hazard potential so that an incident became more likely. 
The lack of skills and experience fell into the following sub-categories: 
a) Knowledge of the local area (126,261,318, 1471). 
b) Hard skills - the skills required to physically carry out any particular 
outdoor activity ( 43, 126, 261, 318, 321 ). 
c) Soft skills - the interpersonal skills to instruct, organise and facilitate a 
particular group (321, 1471, 1649). 
d) Meta skills - the skills required to combine the hard and soft skills into a 
workable design (281,292, 1471). 
6.4.1.3 Mental Slips and Lapses 
(Incident 59) 
In Incident 59 an instructor communicating with his group gave them a wrong 
direction, sending them 'left' down a dangerous channel in a river rather than 
'right' down a safe channel. This was a temporary mental slip that had potentially 
senous consequences. 
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6.4. 1 .4 Poor Application of Existing Skills I Experience 
(Incidents: 42, 43,281,292,321,576,611,636,845,857, 1471, 1515, 1649) 
Often instructors had the necessary training, skills and experience, but misapplied 
those skills leading to, what was in hindsight, an inevitable progression towards 
the incident. The misapplication of skills and experience could have fallen into 
one of the three sub-categories of hard skills, soft skills or metaskills. 
a) Hard skills: Lack of contingency planning (14 71 ), poor crisis management 
skills (576); lack of appropriate levels of supervision (292, 576, 636, 845, 
857, 1649); poorly managing safety with the group (42,175,611,636, 
43); not enough breaks taken (857). 
b) Soft skills: Inadequately briefing the group (281, 292, 321, 576, 611, 845); 
poorly allocating responsibility among instructors (42). 
c) Metaskills: Inappropriate leadership style ( 611, 14 71 ); assuming students 
or others will follow instructions or act with common sense (261, 281, 
321, 576, 636, 845, 857, 1649). 
The reason these misapplications of existing skills have occurred may be due to 
the physical and /or mental condition of the instructor, time pressures and other 
factors mentioned as root causes in this analysis. The fact remains that instructors 
have been screened by management as possessing the necessary skills to be 
supervising groups. However, the instructors themselves must also be conscious 
of the need to apply these critical skills appropriately to avoid an incident 
occumng. 
Assessing that students in their care have the skills to follow instructions given to 
them, or will act with what is termed by the general population as 'common 
sense', (or simply assuming they will) is identified as one of the root causes in a 
significant number of incidents. Common sense is a term used to describe the 
ability of someone without expert skills to identify hazards in everyday situations, 
assess the severity of the risk and take appropriate actions to avoid them. This is a 
complex set of skills and is generally only done successfully by those who have 
age, maturity and experience; the latter often gained through events in the past 
Toward~ Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.277 
that have gone wrong. Instructors, with the benefit of hindsight have summed up 
the issue: 
"It simply never occurred to me that someone would climb over the fence 
without being attached safely ... I assumed that the students had the ability 
to identify the obvious risks and avoid them. I now know this is not the 
case especially with young people. They trust you will provide a safe 
environment and often abdicate that responsibility to you as an instructor." 
(321) 
"I was possibly overconfident of where the suspended students were at ... 
with their ability to behave safely." (857) 
"My expectations of adult groups are often unrealistic. I automatically 
assume because of age and maturity that they will be more capable." ( 611) 
The metaskill of judging a student's skill level, likely behaviour and ability to 
accept responsibility is difficult. Certainly the consequences of making an 
incorrect judgment on any of these factors can be serious. It is the instructor's role 
to ensure that the consequences of misjudging a student do not result in serious 
injury to that individual or to any others. 
6.4.1.5 Poor Situational Awareness 
(Incidents: 43, 261, 281, 292, 845, 1471, 1515) 
Critical to managing the risks of taking groups of people into hazardous 
environments, is the need to constantly re-evaluate the hazards posed by the 
environment, individuals and the group as a whole (situational awareness). An 
incorrect understanding or mental model of the existing 'situation' can result in a 
lack of information, or misinterpretation, resulting in a flawed assessment of 
prevailing risks and strategies to manage those risks. It is hard to make the right 
decision if you don't even know there is a decision that needs to be made. 
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In a number of the incidents under study, there was a lack of appropriate 
situational awareness. This was due to the subcategories of: 
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a) Relaxing attention due to being on the way home, getting near camp, end 
of session, etc. (292, 845). 
b) Relaxing attention because of being comfortable / familiar with the 
situation and not allowing for changes in the local conditions (281, 292, 
1515). 
c) Relaxing attention because of the belief that someone else is monitoring 
conditions (261 ). 
d) Failing to gather information on all aspects of the situation because of 
undue concentration on one particular aspect or part of the plan ( 14 71 ). 
e) Relaxing attention due to being overly confident in the students' abilities 
(43, 1515). 
6.4.1.6 Poor Risk Assessment 
(Incidents: 42, 59,281,292,318,576,611,845,857, 1471, 1649, 845) 
Even if the instructor has an accurate mental image of the current situation, he / 
she still has to make a correct assessment of the risk in order to formulate an 
appropriate management strategy. The analysis of the incidents in this study 
showed that an incorrect assessment of the prevailing risk was a regular 
occurrence. This incorrect assessment of the current risk was due in these cases to 
a number of factors: 
a) Focusing on one hazard and therefore underestimating others or missing 
them entirely (42, 1471). 
b) Perceptions of the activity itself as being risk free (845). 
c) Justifying away the risk - talking oneself into believing that a match 
existed between the competence of the students and the challenge 
presented and therefore not planning for any contingencies (636). 
d) Sunny days lowering the perception of the scale of the risk (292, 857). 
e) Inability to see the hazard potential - believing an incident is unlikely 
(292, 576). 
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f) Sudden changes in plan leading to inadequate consideration of the risks 
(845). 
g) Over-familiarity leading to a lowered perception of the risk. The over-
familiarity can be with one or any combination of the following: activity 
(42, 59,292,318,576, 857, 1649), site (42, 43, 59,281,292,611, 1471), 
students (857) and co-instructors (42). For example, it is evident in 
Incident 42, that the activity, site and co-instructors were all familiar to the 
respondent. Although not identified as a root cause in the analysis, it was 
also the end of a four day kayak module and the students were well known 
to the staff (the kayak module was in itself a part of a year-long certificate 
programme). All of these factors combined in this case to cause a lowering 
of the perceived risk. 
6.4.1. 7 Failed to Make Own Judgment or Deferred the Responsibility to Others 
(126, 261, 318) 
Instructors are assessed by management to have the hard, soft and metaskills to 
manage the educational and safety outcomes for the groups they are working with. 
Those instructors must therefore make decisions based on their skills and their 
knowledge of their group and the prevailing conditions. While information can be 
gathered from colleagues, students and others, this information must be sorted by 
the instructor and a decision made on the appropriate course of action. In the 
incidents studied, a contributing root cause of the incidents has been found to be 
when the responsibility for critical judgments has been handed over to: 
a) Students (261, 318). 
b) Colleagues ( 126). 
6.4. 1.8 Accepting a Higher Than Required Level of Risk 
(Incidents: 42, 43, 59,126,261,281,292,318,576, 6JJ, 636,728,845,857, 
1471, 1515, 1649) 
In all but one of the incidents (321) it was found that the instructor in charge of 
the group had accepted a higher level of risk than the expert panel believed would 
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normally have been required to meet the goals of that activity, given the benefit of 
hindsight. Instructors took this higher level of risk for a number of reasons: 
a) Taking an easier option for the ease/ comfort for the instructor/ students 
(42, 126,261,636,845). 
b) To avoid entering a conflict situation with another member of staff or 
student (261, 728, 1515). 
c) For reasons of personal ego: 
To look good/ competent I friendly in front of the students (42, 59, 
261,318,321,611). 
To look good/ competent to peers (321 ). 
d) To meet client needs I desires (42, 43, 59,318,321,611). 
e) To meet peer needs (261). 
f) To meet the perceived goals of the organisation or management (43, 59, 
261,576,636, 1471). 
g) To achieve personal goals or values not explicitly held by the organisation: 
To provide very challenging trips ( 126). 
To provide certain types of trips, e.g., journeys (1515). 
To give students trust/ responsibility (42,292,857, 1649). 
h) Sticking with an existing plan even when circumstances / conditions have 
changed or new information has come to light (43, 126, 1471). 
i) When pressured by time / schedule to get home or make a meeting point 
(126, 1515). 
j) When two or more instructors working together take a higher risk decision 
than they would when solely responsible for the group - risky shift ( 42, 
845, 1471, 1515). 
An issue is whether the instructor, at some level of consciousness, believed that he 
/ she was making a judgment that would expose his / her student( s) to a higher 
level ofrisk by virtue of the actions following thatjudgment. My belief is that this 
is the case with all of the examples given. If the instructor did not have doubt 
about the decision he / she was making, then that would signal that a different root 
cause, such as the adequacy of his / her skills and experience or training, would be 
a factor in the incident. 
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6. 4.1. 9 Breached Organisational Policies 
(636) 
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Management have carefully analysed the risks of various activities in certain 
venues and set policies and standard operating procedures that signal what is an 
acceptable level of risk to undertake with a group. It is contingent on instructional 
staff to be aware of these policies and follow them. Breaches of policy are serious. 
If instructors breach policy knowingly then it shows that they are: a) prepared to 
place their personal values ahead of organisational ones (Section 6.4.1. 7 .g), b) 
have motivational issues (Section 6.4.1.1.b.) or c) are willing to sabotage the 
efforts of the organisation (Section 6.4.1.10). 
If an instructor breached policy unknowingly it would signal that training and 
induction systems are inadequate. 
6.4.1.10 Sabotage 
(728) 
This is an extreme case where an instructor works actively against the safety 
management system of the organisation. The organisation's clearly stated safety 
responsibilities are ignored, often for reasons of conflict or dissatisfaction with the 
organisation or management staff in that organisation. 
Incident 728 demonstrates an example of sabotage although not as blatant and 
premeditated as is possible in this category. In this case the instructor understood 
the need and requirement for carrying out a safety check on vehicles before use, 
but because of his / her belief that the responsibility for such checks should be 
carried out by others, refused to do the check and put the group at risk. 
6.4.2 Root Causes due to Management System Errors 
The 97 identified cases of root causes due to management system error were 
grouped into categories based on similarities in the identified root causes. This 
process produced the 'types' of root cause shown in 6.4.2.1 - 6.4.2.13. Any 
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incident where a particular root cause is cited as being contributory is shown in 
parentheses immediately following the named root cause. 
6.4.2.1 Poor Organisational Safety Philosophy 
(261, 576, 1471) 
The organisation must clearly state its philosophy in relation to safety, how much 
risk is acceptable and the priority safety takes over educational goals. If this is not 
done, the level of risk accepted by instructors becomes a matter of their personal 
philosophies or values. In the incidents studied the following subcategories of this 
error type were identified: 
a) Safety goals did not adequately state that safety took precedence to 
educational outcomes (261, 14 71 ). 
b) Organisational risk taking philosophy was excessive ( 576). 
An in-depth debate of the relevance of an appropriate safety philosophy in relation 
to Incident 576 is carried out in Section 6.4.3 
6.4.2.2 Poor Documentation of Safety Responsibilities and Accountabilities 
(728, 1471, 1515) 
In three incidents there seemed a lack of clear responsibilities and accountabilities 
for safety in the organisation concerned. Employees and management need to be 
clear where various aspects of responsibility and accountability lie within the 
organisation. In these cases: 
a) Job descriptions were not clear about safety responsibilities and 
accountabilities (728). 
b) Standard operating procedures were not specific. It was not clear who had 
the ultimate responsibility for safety decisions in a situation when two or 
more instructors were working simultaneously with a group (1471, 1515). 
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6.4.2.3 Less than Adequate Risk Management Systems 
(281,292,576, 1471, 1515) 
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In these five cases the organisation appeared not to have systematically identified 
the hazards for programmed activities and put in place documented management 
systems to eliminate, isolate or reduce any risk arising from those hazards. 
6.4.2.4 Less than Adequate Policies and Guidelines 
(42, 43,261,292,318,321,576, 636,728,845,857, 1515, 1649) 
In the incidents listed, there were inadequate documented policies and guidelines 
for staff that clearly pointed out organisational standards or instructor 
responsibilities, limitations, or required actions in various situations: 
a) Less than adequate documented standards of supervision of students (576, 
845, 857, 1649). 
b) Inadequate documentation of competencies required in order to supervise a 
training instructor or work experience student (261 ). 
c) Inadequate documentation of competencies required in order to run 
various activities (857). 
d) Inadequate documentation of the required physical/ mental condition in 
order to be able to work (636). 
e) Inadequate documentation of the roles of external staff ( e.g., teachers) and 
trainee instructors accompanying groups (261,636). 
f) Inadequate documentation of the roles of the various staff in team teaching 
situations ( 42). 
g) Lack of a policy giving the instructional staff the ability to stop or change 
programmed activity if students I conditions / equipment make the activity 
unsafe (636). 
h) Lack of a policy assigning the responsibility to cancel programmes if 
resources, including staff, are not adequate (636, 43). 
i) Inadequate policies outlining workload limits for staff (857). 
j) Inappropriate or missing staff to student ratios for various activities (611, 
636). 
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k) Inadequate activity related policies ( 43, 292, 318, 321, 636, 1515). 
l) Inadequate policies for course design, ensuring a match of chosen activity 
to the available organisational resources and organisational goals (318). 
m) Inadequate or missing policies to ensure vehicle and maintenance checks 
(728). 
6.4.2.5 Less than Adequate Systems to Provide Up-to-date Knowledge of 
Conditions 
(43, 126) 
In these two cases the failure to pass on to staff working with groups in the field 
important up-to-date local knowledge of river flows, river rapid changes (43) and 
the existence of a bridge not marked on the map ( 126) contributed to the incident. 
6.4.2.6 Less Than Adequate Training Systems 
(43,126,261,292, 1471) 
The induction of staff to local conditions, training of those staff to the required 
standard to supervise others in hazardous conditions while taking part in 
hazardous activities is self-evident. The issue raised in this study is not the 
number of incidents where staff did not have the required training, but the number 
where the skills the instructor already possessed were misapplied leading to an 
incident. 
6.4.2. 7 Less than Adequate System to Match the Instructor to the Task. 
(42, 43, 126, 321, 845, 857, 1515, 1471) 
A number of incidents showed that adequate system were not in place to ensure a 
match between the instructor's workload, skills and experience to the activity, 
environmental conditions and students' abilities. The incidents indicate that a 
vetting process by management needs to occur: 
a) At the time instructors are programmed to run a course; and, 
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b) In the morning before activities start to ensure instructors, environmental 
conditions, equipment and the group are appropriately matched to the 
planned activity. 
6.4.2.8 Less Than Adequate Monitoring of Instructional Staff 
(42, 43, 59, 126,281,292,318, 321, 576, 611, 728, 845, 857, 1515, 1471, 1649) 
The Delphi members believed that in almost every incident under study, there was 
inadequate monitoring of instructors' performance. Through observation of 
performance issues and then feedback and coaching, they believed that many of 
these incidents may have been avoided. This monitoring, feedback and coaching 
would be in areas of: 
a) Instructor workload, stress, physical condition. 




6.4.2.9 Less Than Adequate Incident Recording and Analysis Systems 
(292, 576, 1649) 
For three incidents it is believed that if knowledge learned from similar incidents 
in the organisation had been passed on to instructors, this may have prevented the 
incident. 
6.4.2.10 Less Than Adequate Maintenance Systems 
(318, 728) 
In these cases it was identified that better maintenance systems in the respective 
organisations may have changed the outcome of the incident. 
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6.4.2. 11 Equipment Traps - Less Than Adequate Equipment Selection Systems 
(43, 59, 318, 636) 
In these incidents, it is believed that equipment supplied to instructional staff 
created hazards that remained undetected and, as a result, were difficult to control. 
6.4.2. 12 Environment Traps - Less Than Adequate Site Selection Systems 
(281) 
In this incident it is believed that management programmed staff to use a site that 
contained unrecognised hazards which, as a result, were difficult to control. 
6.4.2. 13 Poor Application of Management Skills 
(43, 59, 126, 728) 
Just as instructors can create hazards by the poor performance of skills in running 
activities with groups as front-line managers, poor performance by senior 
managers in the application of a quality management system can also produce 
hazards leading to incidents. Analysis of incidents in this study revealed poor 
performance in the following areas that were believed to be a root cause of the 
incident in question: 
a) Inappropriate leadership style (43, 59). 
b) Poor communication techniques (728). 
c) Poor facilitation of an appropriate safety culture ( 126). 
6.4.3 The Error-Free Incident 
In incident 576 a student fell approximately seven metres over a cliff and broke 
his femur. He was not under direct supervision at the time of the incident as the 
instructor had separated some distance from the group to allow the students to 
gain experience in using navigational skills and making decisions on their own. 
The organisation concerned reviewed the incident and considered it was 
acceptable to continue to run similar exercises in this type of terrain. 
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The Delphi analysis of Incident 576 resulted in agreement from the experts, in the 
first iteration of the Delphi process, that the organisation's risk taking philosophy 
was too great and that allowing students to have such a level of responsibility in 
terrain containing significant hazards was not appropriate. In the second iteration 
of the Delphi process, where the instructor concerned was asked for feedback on 
the analysis, the instructor responded to this proposed root cause with the 
comment, 
"I believe that true adventure is being lost from outdoor education. This 
organisation has successfully maintained a high adventure level with a 
very good safety record, and I'm happy with it." 
While this reads like a personal value held by the instructor, it also seems 
reflective of the organisational values/ philosophy as indicated by the outcome of 
the incident review carried out by the organisation and discussed above. If such a 
philosophy was to be accepted throughout the sector, then such incidents would 
be deemed as acceptable outcomes of the inherent risk of outdoor educational 
activities. The issues therefore become: ( 1) What level ofrisk is justifiable for an 
outdoor education organisation? And, (2) Is there such a thing as a justifiable 
incident that is due to inherent risks rather than errors that should be controlled? 
This research is based on the premise that outdoor education, by its nature, needs 
to be able to continue to use the mountains, rivers, lakes and forests that are the 
contexts that make outdoor education unique and a powerful learning medium. 
However, wherever the hazards of an activity are analysed and found to produce a 
high potential for serious risk, the contention is that those hazards must be 
managed - regularly this is done by placing a skilled and experienced instructor in 
place to supervise the activity and the interaction of the group with the identified 
hazards. If the risks are too great and can't be controlled, then the activity should 
not go ahead. 
On the other hand, if the risks posed by an activity are not too great, and those 
hazards cannot be controlled without significantly changing the very activity that 
is being proposed, then the activity can justifiably continue. The responsibility 
then sits with the instructor to disclose the risks to the students and the 
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organisation must have already disclosed those risks to any parents or guardians 
concerned. In such a case the incident is not one due to lack of management 
control at either line manager or senior manager level but rather is due to the 
inherent risks in the activity. Such error-free incidents are recognised in safety 
management literature (Senders & Moray, 1991 ). 
In Incident 576, the contention of the Delphi panel is that the environment 
contained significant hazards in the form of cliffs of at least seven metres in 
height, and that these should have been controlled by management. To allow 
teenage students the responsibility of successfully negotiating these hazards was 
inappropriate and supervision should have been provided that was available when 
needed. This was not an error-free incident. 
Incident 318 on the other hand is an example where, with slightly different 
conditions, a situation could be imagined where an incident could be described as 
being error-free. Incident 318 involved a group of tertiary-level students carrying 
out mountain biking in a tracked forest situation. Mountain biking is an activity 
that contains inherent risks: people are travelling at speed, through terrain 
containing obstacles. It is easy to envisage falling while biking and striking trees, 
rocks, roots, the ground, the bike or other solid obstacles. Nonetheless, the activity 
has merit in that it involves challenge, skill, is fun and allows distance to be 
covered in a journey context. If the hazards are evaluated, students informed of 
the risks, appropriate clothing and protective gear worn, and speed controlled then 
the risks become acceptable. A spill from a bike under these conditions would be 
considered error-free and an inherent risk of the activity. Incident 318 was not 
error-free because extra risk was added through extending the activity to bike 
jumping. This extension had not been analysed by management and the activity 
was not condoned, or as it turns out, within the skill range of the supervising 
instructor. 
This discussion confirms the need for organisations to have clear and appropriate 
safety philosophies and goals. It also clarifies for the need to include a category of 
'error-free incidents' in any model of outdoor incidents developed. 
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6.4.4 An Interim Taxonomy of Error for Outdoor Education 
Based on the Delphi Analysis of 18 outdoor education incidents that resulted in, 
or had the potential for, serious injury, it is now possible to summarise the 
identified root causes of those incidents. This summary is the first attempt at 
establishing an interim taxonomy of root causes of error (taxonomy of error) to be 
applied to other outdoor education incidents. The resulting interim taxonomy of 
error is shown in Figure 58. 
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Figure 58. Interim taxonomy of error for outdoor education incidents 
INSTRUCTOR ERRORS (181 
I) Poor instructor condition (8] 
• Physical 
• Motivational 
2) Lack of skills and experience [9] 
• Hard skills 
• Soft skills 
• Metaskills 
3) Mental slips and lapses [I] 
4) Poor application of existing skills and experience [13] 
• Hard skills 
• Soft skills 
• Metaskills 
5) Poor situational awareness [7] 
Relaxing attention near end of session I home/ etc 
Relaxing attention when familiar with activity 
Relaxing attention in the belief that someone else is 
monitoring conditions 
Failing to gather information on all aspects because of 
undue attention on one aspect 
Relaxing attention when overly confident in students' 
abilities 
6) Poor risk assessment (12] 
• Focusing on one hazard and underestimating others 
• Perception of activity as risk free 
• Justifying away the risk 
• Sunny days lowering perception of risk 
• Inability to see hazard potential 
• Sudden changes in plan without considering risk 
• Over familiarity with activity, site, students, or co-
instructors 
7) Failing to make a judgment or deferring to others [3] 
8) Accepting a higher than required level of risk [ 17] 
• Taking an easier option for comfort / ease 
• To avoid conflict situations 
• For reasons of personal ego 
• To meet client needs/wants 
• To meet peer needs 
• To meet perceived goals of management 
• To achieve personal goals/ values 
• Easier to stick to an existing plan 
• Pressured by time 
• When working in an instructional team 
9) Breached organisational policies [I] 
I 0) Sabotage [I] 
ERROR - FREE INCIDENTS [01 
Inherent risks of outdoor activity that are 
justifiable and can't be controlled without 
adversely affecting the activity and its 
outcomes. 
D 
MANAGEMENT STAFF ERRORS (4( 
I) Poor application of management 
skills 
MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ERRORS (18( 
I) Poor organisational safety philosophy [3] 
2) Poor documentation of safety responsibilities and 
accountabilities [3] 
3) Less than adequate risk management systems [ 5] 
4) Less than adequate policies and guidelines [13] 
5) Less than adequate systems to provide up-to-date 
knowledge of conditions [2] 
6) Less than adequate training systems [5] 
7) Less than adequate systems to match instructor to 
the task [8] 
8) Less than adequate monitoring of instructional staff 
(16] 
9) Less than adequate incident recording and analysis 
systems [3] 
I 0) Less than adequate maintenance systems [2] 
11) Equipment traps [4] 
12) Environment traps [2] 
Note: Numbers in square brackets indicates the number of incidents in the study that demonstrated that particular error type 
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6.4.5 Discussion 
The method employed to derive the taxonomy in Figure 58 has its limitations as 
discussed in Chapter 3. In addition to the already identified limitations, it should 
also be noted that the method did not involve any representation from the 
management of the organisation concerned in the incident, which may impact on 
the validity of the management system errors and management staff errors 
identified for any particular incident. Generalisation of these results to the wider 
outdoor education sector needs to be done with care. Nevertheless the results 
obtained in Figure 58 give insights into the errors leading to the group of incidents 
studied in this research that are not obvious from studying the individual 
incidents. These include: 
6.4.5.1 Multiple Causation 
As already mentioned in the introduction to Section 6.4, the concept of multiple 
causation has been supported in this study with an average of 13 separate root 
causes per incident. In addition to this though, Figure 58 shows that every incident 
resulted from a combination of both instructor errors and management system 
errors. In no incident was the error due solely to front line management 
(instructors) or senior management; both needed to err in some way for the 
incident to occur. 
6.4.5.2 Most Frequently Occurring Root Cause(s) of Instructor Error 
I believe that if most people in the outdoor education sector were asked what 
instructor factors would be the most prevalent in the cause of incidents, the replies 
would be either a shortage of skills and experience for the conditions, or poor 
judgrnent. While both of these root causes were present in a significant number of 
the incidents, both were overshadowed by two other identified root causes. While 
nine incidents were linked to a lack of skills and experience, 13 were linked to a 
poor or misplaced application of existing skills (hard, soft and meta) and 
experience; and while 15 incidents were linked to either poor situational 
awareness or poor risk assessment leading to poor judgrnents for the situation, the 
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greatest single type of instructor error was the instructor purposely choosing to 
take a higher level of risk than was required for the educational outcomes required 
by the organisation. 
The research findings that the most common root causes of serious outdoor 
education incidents are the misapplication of skills by instructors, and their choice 
to undertake higher risk options, is not currently recognised in this sector. 
In general, the major training emphasis in outdoor education is on getting 
instructional staff to a required skill level and assessing them as having reached 
that standard. Once they have been deemed competent they are often left 
unsupervised with groups while effort is directed at training newer staff. The 
research finding here suggests that a shortage of skills and experience in 
instructional staff, if known, is not as likely to lead to an incident as instructors 
who believe they have the skills and experience but are misapplying them in the 
field. Management should take from this that it is equally, or even more, 
important to continually monitor that all instructors are applying their skills 
correctly. 
The finding, that instructors are purposely choosing to undertake higher risk 
options, is also significant. The literature review in Chapter 4 hints at some of the 
tokens of this error type but nowhere is this type of error stated to be a major 
concern. I believe that part of the reason for this is that the pressures leading to an 
instructor choosing a riskier option over a more conservative option are subtle, 
and even after the fact may not be recognised or accepted. However the 
cumulative effects of these subtle pressures, as recognised by the experts on the 
Delphi panels, are shown to be significant. 
Some might argue that the instructors purposely choosing higher risk options is 
another example of poor judgment. While this is technically correct, in that it is 
the outcome of a process of choice, I am intentionally separating this judgment 
process from others. In this case instructors are aware that they should be adopting 
the more conservative option and when they bow to the subtle pressures 
mentioned above, are left with a nagging feeling that they have taken a riskier 
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option. Because of this, there is not so much a problem with their judgment skills, 
but rather that the decision they made in applying this judgment has been put 
aside. 
6.4. 5.3 Major Inadequacies in the Management System 
With the major sources of front line manager error being identified as poor 
application of existing skills, poor judgment and the wilful acceptance of higher 
levels of risk, it is not surprising that the failures identified in the management 
system with the greatest frequency were those that might have alleviated the front 
line errors. These include: 
• Less than adequate monitoring of instructional staff ( attributed to 16 out of 18 
incidents). The only feasible way to identify if instructors are correctly applying 
their existing skills to the groups they are working with and the conditions they 
are encountering in the field, is for senior members of staff to observe them 
working with groups and providing feedback to the instructors in question. This 
also applies to the situational awareness, risk assessment and choice of action 
plan by the instructors. The expert panel believed that this was probably not 
occurring, or not occurring regularly enough in the incidents being studied. 
• Less than adequate policies and guidelines ( attributed to 13 out of 18 incidents). 
A second method commonly employed by managers of outdoor education 
programmes to help control risks when they can't.be present, is to analyse the 
risks and stipulate policies and standard operating procedures for the instructors 
that set parameters that those instructors should operate within. This takes away 
some of the judgment required by instructional staff in various situations, 
making the role clearer and the task itself easier. Care must be taken that the 
policies do not stifle the instructor's ability to provide an enjoyable educational 
experience. In 13 of the incidents studied the experts believed that the policies 
and other guidelines for staff were probably inadequate. 
• Less than adequate systems to match instructor to the task (attributed to eight 
out of 18 incidents). One further method of management control ofrisk is to 
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ensure there is an appropriate match between the instructor's skills, the 
educational goals of the programme, student abilities and expectations, 
equipment/ resources, and the environmental conditions. A system must be in 
place to ensure this match is achieved both before a course begins with the 
programming of staff and activities, and on a daily basis as conditions within the 
group, the environment and the instructor change. A failure of this system of 
ensuring a good match by management was believed by the Delphi experts to be 
a causal factor in eight of the incidents under study 
All other management system errors were attributed to five or less incidents. 
6.4.5.4 Management Staff Errors 
The Delphi analysis has raised the issue of how the performance of senior 
management in implementing the management system of an organisation can have 
an impact on safety. Just as the instructors, as front line managers, are susceptible 
to a number of errors as shown in Table 58, the senior managers are susceptible to 
the same list of errors. These can be due to slips, lapses, failures, mistakes or 
violations; or indirectly due to task overload which increases the likelihood of any 
of the former error types occurring. It is clear from these results that in the wake 
of any incident, managers should also review their performance to see what can be 
learnt to help prevent future incidents. 
6.4. 5. 5 Comparison of Findings with those from the Quantitative Results in 
Chapter 5. 
A number of conclusions were suggested in Chapter 5 regarding predictors of 
serious incidents in the outdoor education sector. It is worth reviewing these in 
light of the identified root causes of a number of specific outdoor incidents to see 
if further insight can be drawn as to the possible validity of those predictors: 
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6.4.5.5.(a) Extrapolation of Petersen 's model of predictors of serious 
injury 
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In Figure 3 7 I extrapolated the predictors of serious injuries that Petersen ( 1988) 
listed for industrial settings, to the outdoor education setting. While there were no 
data in this study on the first of these (instructor experience levels), the 
preliminary data indicated support for the validity of the other three. The root 
causes of the 18 incidents that were analysed in this study can be considered in 
relation to these proposed predictors of serious injury: 
• Activities run by instructors new to an activity. or overly familiar with an 
activity. The root causes identified show that a lack of skills and experience, the 
misapplication of existing skills, poor situational awareness, poor assessment of 
risk and deferring to others for judgment all lead to the occurrence of serious 
incidents. All of these factors are likely to be present in less experienced 
instructors who are new to an activity. 
The root causes also show that overfamiliarity with an activity is a token of both 
the root causes: 'poor situational awareness' and, 'poor risk assessment'. This 
would indicate that as instructors become more familiar with activities it is 
possible that their judgment in those activities becomes less astute and incidents 
would occur. 
• Activities with low levels of supervision or no supervision at all. 
Figure 58 shows that incidents are the result of a combination of instructor 
errors, management staff errors and management system errors. If instructor 
supervision is removed then all of the instructor roles are passed over to the 
students. The skill, experience and judgment abilities of the students are much 
less than that of an instructor and therefore an incident is much more likely. 
• Activities involving high energy sources. 
This is not an issue to do with the root causes of incidents, but rather a factor of 
the context. It is worth noting that all incidents under study here involved high 
energy sources: Seven involved height, nine involved moving water, and two 
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involved travelling at speed. 
• Any activity involving water. 
Once again this does not involve the causal sequence leading to the incident but 
rather the need for speed in resolving the situation, otherwise people will drown 
or succumb to hypothermia. Nine of the 18 incidents involved water. 
6.4.5.5.(b) Groups being supervised by male instructors are likely to have 
more serious injuries than those supervised by female instructors. 
In Chapter 5 quantitative evidence was given that supported this statement and it 
was suggested that the reason for this may be due to testosterone and ego effects 
leading to males being less likely to correctly assess the risk of activities and 
being willing to proceed with higher levels of risk. 
The root causes identified in Figure 58 do not include any factors that could be put 
down to testosterone influenced 'gung-ho' attitudes, although the root cause, 
'Poor risk assessment,' and the tokens of: 'For reasons of personal ego', and 'To 
achieve personal goals/ values', are associated with such attitudes. 
The gender breakdown for the 18 incidents according to the root cause of "Poor 
risk assessment,' shows that this root cause has been identified as a causal factor 
in nine of the 11 incidents involving male instructors (82%) and in only three of 
the seven incidents (43%) involving female instructors were related to this root 
cause. While the small sample size of this study means that this difference is not 
statistically significant, the need for further research is signalled. 
6.4.5.5.(c) Injuries happen more often in the afternoon 
It can be seen from the results in Figure 58 that the root causes of incidents 
include: physical and motivational level of the instructor, mental slips and lapses, 
poor situational awareness ( due to relaxing concentration near the end of a session 
I getting near home, and becoming familiar with the activity, site and group) and 
poor risk assessment (For similar reasons to those just listed). All of these root 
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causes will come into play more in the afternoon as the instructor becomes 
physically tired, less motivated by the activity and more familiar with the group, 
site and activity. 
6.5 Summary 
This study made an in-depth analysis of 18 incidents that have occurred in the 
outdoor education sector in the years 1996 - 2000 for the root causes of those 
incidents. All of the incidents selected for this analysis had resulted in, or had the 
potential for, serious injury. The incidents were reviewed by panels of objective 
outdoor experts who were able to use their skill and experience to identify what 
they believed were the underlying root causes. The findings from this process 
were: 
1) The Delphi process was a valuable way of focussing a broad ·range of 
expert outdoor opinion on an incident, without those experts being 
influenced by others' views. No one expert ever identified all of the root 
causes that were the outcome of the panel analyses, and no one root cause 
was identified by all experts. Thus the final analysis was far more 
comprehensive than would have been obtained had any one expert been 
used, no matter the extent of their previous experience. 
2) The ECFA diagrams used to represent the causal sequence of the incidents 
were well received by the experts and proved to be a useful tool to express 
the combined input of the group. 
3) The analyses of the 18 incidents were combined to produce a taxonomy of 
error for those incidents. This taxonomy, shown in Figure 58, lists 10 types 
of root cause due to instructor error, 12 types due to management system 
errors, and one type due to management staff errors. Within any type of 
root cause there may be any number of tokens of that cause. Many tokens 
were identified during the analysis. 
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4) The concept of an 'error-free incident' was posited. Such an incident is due 
to the inherent risks of the outdoor education experience and is acceptable 
as long as the risks have been analysed, found to be at a defensible level 
and cannot be controlled without altering the very medium of the outdoor 
education experience. None of the 18 cases studied in this research was 
found to be an error-free incident. 
5) The multiple causation principle for incidents was supported for the 
outdoor education sector. For the 18 incidents studied, 227 root causes 
were identified, making an average of 13 root causes per incident. The root 
causes for all incidents involved a combination of instructor errors and 
management system errors. 
6) The root causes of instructor error occurring with the most frequency were, 
in descending order: 
- Accepting a higher than required level of risk 
- Misapplication of existing skills 
- Poor risk assessment 
- Lack of skills and experience 
The first two root causes are not currently recognised by the sector as being 
the leading contributors to serious incidents. This points to the need for 
monitoring of instructor performance in the field ( even those instructors 
deemed to be skilled and experienced) and subsequent feedback, as well as 
the more traditional focus on training. 
7) The root causes associated with weaknesses in the management system 
occurring with the greatest frequency were, in descending order: 
- Less than adequate monitoring of instructor performance 
- Less than adequate policies and guidelines 
- Less than adequate systems to match the instructor to the task 
All of these relate to ensuring that management has greater control in 
minimising the likely occurrence of the instructor errors mentioned above 
and those errors resulting in harm. 
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8) Management staff making a poor job of implementing the safety 
management system can also lead to incidents. Although the only type 
identified in this category was the misapplication of existing skills, it is 
logical to assume that any of the root causes identified that could impact 
upon instructional performance could also apply to senior management in 
the execution of their duties. 
9) The identification of root causes of outdoor education incidents in this 
phase of the research gives some insight into the reasons why the proposed 
predictors of serious injury shown in Figure 3 7, Chapter 5, may be valid: 
- Instructors new to an activity will be more susceptible to the root causes 
of error of: Lack of skills and experience, poor application of existing 
skills, poor situational awareness, poor assessment of risk and deferring to 
others for judgment. This would make these instructors more prone to 
being involved in serious incidents. 
- Overfamiliarity with an activity is a token of both the root causes: 'poor 
situational awareness' and, 'poor risk assessment'. This would indicate that 
as instructors become more familiar with activities it is likely that their 
judgment in those activities becomes less astute and incidents would occur. 
- Activities with reduced or no instructor supervision of students result in 
the role of the instructor being passed to the students. The occurrence of 
error due to the lack of skill and experience of those students, especially at 
making astute assessments of risk and strategies to minimise the risk, 
greatly increases the likelihood of incidents occurring. 
- The concept that activities involving high energy sources may result in 
serious injury, is not related to the root causes of incidents, rather it is due 
to the principle that if an incident happens, the likelihood is that the energy 
involved will transfer to the person involved to result in serious harm. 
- Activities involving water are more likely to result in serious injury, not 
because water is critical in the causal sequence leading to the incident, but 
because of the need for speed in resolving the situation once it has 
developed otherwise people will drown or succumb to hypothermia. 
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10) No statistically valid data existed in the analysis of root causes to indicate 
why groups supervised by male instructors should be more prone to serious 
injuries than those supervised by female instructors. This may be due to the 
small sample size. It is interesting to note however that the gender 
breakdown for the 18 incidents according to the root cause of "Poor risk 
assessment,' shows that it has been identified as a causal factor in nine of 
the 11 incidents involving male instructors (82%) while only three of the 
seven incidents (43%) involving female instructors were related to this root 
cause. 
11) Incidents may occur more often in the afternoon than the morning due to 
the increased likelihood of these root causes being a factor later in the day: 
physical and motivational level of the instructor, mental slips and lapses, 
poor situational awareness ( due to relaxing concentration near the end of a 
session I getting near home, and becoming overfamiliar with the activity, 
site and group) and poor risk assessment (For similar reasons to those just 
listed). All of these root causes will come into play more in the afternoon as 
the instructor becomes physically tired, less motivated by the activity and 
more familiar with the group, site and activity. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION: 
A PROPOSED TAXONOMY OF ROOT CAUSES OF OUTDOOR 
EDUCATION INCIDENTS AND A MODEL OF INCIDENT CAUSATION 
FOR OUTDOOR EDUCATION 
7.1 Introduction 
The third phase of this research brings together the empirical results of Chapters 5 
and 6 with the theoretical overview developed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 6 identified a number of the root causes of serious outdoor incidents 
based on the analysis of 18 case studies from outdoor education in New Zealand. 
These were tested against a list of predictors of serious incidents identified in 
Chapter 5 as a test of validity. This chapter compares and combines these root 
causes with a list derived from theory in Chapter 4 and results in a proposed 
taxonomy of error for outdoor education. The taxonomy lists root causes of 
outdoor education incidents and describes their relationships in producing the 
potential for creating an incident. 
In Chapter 4 a model of outdoor education incidents was developed from the 
literature. Chapter 6 identified the causal sequence of 18 incidents with the 
assistance of Delphi panelists and this revealed the relationship and interaction 
between the causal factors. Using these two main sources, a proposed model of an 
outdoor education incident is developed in this Chapter. 
The draft taxonomy of error and model of outdoor education incident causation 
were sent to the Delphi panel members for review and to seek their assessment of 
the validity of the proposals. The comments from the Delphi members are 
reported and discussed. 
Finally, the significance of these results is discussed in terms of how knowledge 
in the outdoor education sector has been advanced. This includes a proposed new 
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model of outdoor education decision-making that was needed in order to 
incorporate the findings from the development of a taxonomy of error. 
7.2 A Taxonomy of Error for Outdoor Education 
7.2.1 The Nature of Taxonomies of Error 
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Many taxonomies of error already exist in the safety management literature. 
Senders & Moray ( 1991, p.86) note that, " ... almost a dozen proposed taxonomies 
of error have been published," and that there is, " ... no agreement about a single 
taxonomy which would serve all purposes of error research" {p. 41 ). They state 
that there is no generally accepted singular taxonomy and that it seems unlikely 
that there will ever be one. 
A conference in 1991 of the leading world experts in the fields of safety 
management and safety theory reached the conclusion that a successful taxonomy 
must be related to the theoretical and practical purposes of those wishing to use it 
(Senders & Moray, 1991). For this reason the existing taxonomies which have 
been developed for industrial applications, while having some elements of 
transferability, are not suited to, and do not meet the needs of the outdoor 
education sector. 
In developing any taxonomy a decision needs to be made as to how errors will be 
classified and at what level. In Section 4.3 .4 a differentiation has already been 
discussed between 'types' and 'tokens' of error, where 'types' are general 
categories of error and 'tokens' are individually defined events or cases of the 
particular 'type'. While the delineation between types and tokens of error sounds 
straightforward, it is not that simple in practice and requires judgment to be made 
as to an appropriate level of detail that differentiates the two. For example a basic 
classification system suggested by Senders & Sellen ( 1987) suggests a binary 
taxonomy where all errors can be classified as either endogenous (arising within 
the actor) or exogenous (arising outside the actor within the environment). Reason 
(1990) proposes a generic error-modeling system (GEMS) that is also a binary 
taxonomy where all errors are seen as either slips or mistakes. Such a high level 
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classification of types of error would not result in a taxonomy for outdoor 
education that would be practical in developing a language to discuss errors and to 
consider ways to prevent future incident occurrence. 
Senders & Moray ( 1991) believe there are four basic levels of analysis and that all 
error taxonomies are based on one or more of these levels. Using this premise they 
have produced what they term a "taxonomy of taxonomies", listing the ways in 
which data can be organised (pp. 43-44 and p.84): 
a) Phenomenological taxonomies (what happened?). Describing errors 
superficially with terms that refer to the events as they were observed. 
Typical categories include omissions, substitutions and unnecessary 
repetitions. 
b) Taxonomies of internal processes or cognitive mechanisms (how did it 
happen?). Errors are classified according to the stages of human 
information processing at which they occur. These processes may be such 
things as diagnosis, decision-making, hypothesis formulation, activation, 
choice of tactics, etc. 
c) Taxonomies based on biases or deep-rooted tendencies (why did it 
happen?). These are fundamental psychological mechanisms and can 
divide errors in terms of: perception, decision, attention, distraction, 
available response choices, capacity limitations and the like. 
d) Taxonomies based on neurological events. NB: All experts believe it is 
fruitless to look at classifications based on this level. 
These are all taxonomies targeted at endogenous errors. Levels b) and c) are 
supported by the greatest mass of research from modem experimental psychology. 
Senders & Moray add another type of taxonomy (p. 84 and Table 2, p. 91): 
e) Taxonomies of external processes - such as poor equipment design. 
This last type of taxonomy is one that deals with exogenous errors. 
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Senders & Moray believe that the type, or mix of types of taxonomy, that is best 
to use depends upon the situation and the problem. However, they believe that if 
the goal is to predict or understand errors of decision, a taxonomy at the level of 
information processing ( cognitive mechanisms) is more suitable. They also 
believe that a, " ... 'natural' taxonomy will emerge from the data; the whole 
concept of taxonomy is based on the idea that there is a natural and discoverable 
orderliness in the environment" (p. 85). Senders & Moray have developed the 
"Causal network for error analysis" shown in Figure 59 to show the relationship 
between the levels of taxonomies and what they term, "the natural history of 
errors" (p.94). Figure 59 is one example of a causal chain drawn to demonstrate 
the relationships whereby each factor at a higher level has a similar network of 
causes f~eding into it from below. In this case study, several factors led to a lack 
of effort, this lack of effort combined with other factors leading to an 
interpretation problem, the interpretation problem and other factors were the cause 
of interference, and the interference was a cause of commission errors in operating 
the plant. Many other examples of causal chains could have been chosen to 
demonstrate this network of errors. 
From this discussion it can be seen that there are a number of existing taxonomies 
of error in existence. These have been developed for various industrial situations 
and are not directly applicable to the outdoor education sector. In developing a 
new taxonomy, there are various levels of analysis at which the taxonomy can be 
positioned. Because the taxonomy being developed in this study is designed to 
show the root causes of outdoor education incidents, or the 'why' of incidents at a 
fundamental level, the taxonomy is best placed at the level of cognitive 
mechanisms for the endogenous types. The classification system of types of root 
causes of error will be at this level, whereas tokens of those root causes will be 
examples of cases of the type in question or lower levels (for example biases, 
deep-rooted tendencies or possibly even neurological issues). 
With the context (outdoor education) and the positioning of the taxonomy decided 
by virtue of its aim to document root causes ( cognitive mechanisms), theory 
suggests that a natural order will flow from an analysis of the data. 
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Figure 59. The Causal Network for Error Analysis 
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7.2.2 The Types and Tokens of Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents. 
A comparison of the root causes of outdoor education incidents obtained from the 
empirical analysis of 18 incidents (Figure 58, Chapter 6) with the theoretical root 
causes obtained from a review of safety management and psychology literature 
(Figure 29, Table 14 and Figure 31, Chapter 4) shows close similarities. In 
general terms, the empirically derived root causes are a subset of the theoretically 
determined collection. This result is logical as the limitations of the research 
method, which have already been discussed, make it unlikely that a full 
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18 incidents. In contrast the comprehensive research base from the fields of 
industrial safety management and psychology is likely to have identified more of 
the major types of root causes of incidents. 
The combined results of Chapters 4 and 6 produce the following taxonomy of root 
causes of error. The taxonomy contains root causes leading to poor performance 
or judgment (7.2.2.1 - 7.2.2.6) and those due to errors in the management system 
(7.2.2.7 - 7.2.2.10). The types of root causes will be discussed, grouped by major 
category. 'Tokens' of that root cause will be listed after the 'type' ofroot cause. 
For those root causes linked to human performance error, wherever possible an 
exemplar of that particular type of root cause or token will be given from the 
empirical data. Some of the listed 'types' ofroot causes and their 'tokens' have 
been identified through the literature review in Chapter 4 without any confirming 
evidence from the outdoor education data. For these cases an anecdotal or 
hypothetical example will be given to show how they are applicable to the 
outdoors. 
As previously discussed, the way senior management can act to control safety in 
the organisation is through the creation and implementation of a comprehensive 
safety management system. Deficiencies in the safety management system can 
lead to incidents occurring. These deficiencies are self-explanatory in terms of 
their impact and to prevent unnecessary repetition, no exemplars are given but 
examples can be referred to in section 6.4.2.1. Once again some of these 'types' of 
root cause will have empirical evidence to support them from the analysis of 18 
case studies of outdoor incidents in Chapter 6, while others have been identified 
from the literature review in Chapter 4 without any supporting outdoor evidence. 
While the following list may repeat information already conveyed in Chapters 4 
and 6, this is the first time that a comprehensive list of root causes is stated from 
the combination of empirical and theoretical sources. Since a complete list of root 
causes in the one place is an important contribution of this thesis, I believe the 
repetition is justified. 
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7.2.2.1 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Overload' of an Individual in 
their Role 
Petersen (1988, p.298) defines overload as, " ... the state in which the demands 
around you exceed your capacity to meet these demands." As discussed in 
Chapter 4, if an individual is placed in a position such that the job he / she is given 
to do is greater than that individual is capable of, or greater than someone with the 
skills for the described role could reasonably be expected to carry out, then there 
is an increased possibility of errors occurring. Often the overload conditions are 
due to failures in the safety management system of the organisation. In Figure 58 
the identified instructor errors of: (1) Poor instructor condition; and (2) Lack of 
skills and experience, are considered overload conditions. The Delphi experts also 
identified the management system errors: (11) Equipment traps; and (12) 
Environment traps as management system errors. In this collation of results they 
will be treated as overload conditions on the instructor and the fact that they were 
not picked up and corrected by management will be considered a failure of the 
risk management systems - Management system error (3) in Figure 58. 
The types of root causes of overload are: 
7.2.2.1.(a) Lack of personal capacity (Literature review only- no 
verification by empirical data) 
Any job has a minimum set of physical and mental requirements to be able to 
carry out the role. These are rarely defined explicitly in a job description but are 
real requirements to be efficient in carrying out the tasks dictated by the role. 
Outdoor instruction is at the extreme end of the spectrum in terms of physical and 
mental fortitude required. It is necessary to carry out physical work in sometimes 
extreme environmental conditions, and often critical decisions must be made 
under these trying and stressful conditions. If a person is appointed to such a role 
and does not have the required physical stamina or mental tenacity then overload 
will inevitably result with the possibility of incidents arising. Tokens: 
• Insufficient physical capability for role ( e.g., a person with poor physical 
fitness may get overly tired on a strenuous trip with students and because of 
this make poor decisions that lead to incidents). 
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• Insufficient mental capability for role - including confidence and self-esteem 
( e.g., An instructor with poor self-esteem is more likely to make decisions 
that are intended to please the group he / she is with rather than make hard 
decisions, that might upset the group, but lead to safe outcomes). 
7.2.2.1.(b) Poor physical or mental condition 
A person may temporarily be reduced in physical or mental capability making it 
difficult to meet all the requirements of the role given to them and therefore 
increasing the risk of incidents occurring. This can occur in any of the following 
ways: 
• Physical injuries ( e.g., Incident 636 involved an instructor working with a 
large haematoma. Because of the instructor's inability to walk far the choice 
was made to do a kayaking trip in conditions where rain was forecast. The 
river flooded and a serious incident occurred). 
• Sickness. (Literature review only - no verification by empirical data). 
• Physical fatigue I tiredness (e.g., Incident 126 involved an instructor on a 
journey, camping in poor conditions and getting little sleep. In hazardous 
environmental conditions, while tired, poor decisions were made leading to 
potentially serious outcomes). 
• Mental fatigue I tiredness ( e.g., Incident 857 involved an instructor who was 
mentally tired at the end of a long year of instructing. This caused a lowering 
of situational awareness and a serious incident resulted). 
• Arousal I motivation state impaired by: 
Drugs I alcohol 
Biorhythmic 
Menstrual 
Bored ( e.g., Incident 42 involved instructors who considered 
coaching the less able students to be a chore. Situational awareness 
and risk assessment were reduced because of this leading to a 
serious incident). 
7.2.2.1.(c) Mismatch of skills I experience with task 
If the task is not matched appropriately to the skills and experience of the 
individual, then task overload will occur and there will be increased likelihood of 
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incidents occurring. The mismatch of skills and experience can fall into any of 
these areas: 
• Knowledge of local area including knowledge of alternative sites ( e.g., 
Incident 14 71 involved an instructor who had sea kayaking skills and 
experience, but local conditions at the area where the group were taken 
contained hazards that surprised the instructor). 
• Hard skills ( e.g., Incident 318 involved an instructor who carried out 
mountain bike jumping with a group, without understanding the skills 
required and risks involved in the activity. Serious injury resulted). 
• Soft skills ( e.g., Incident 281 involved an instructor who had a limited 
repertoire of teaching skills. The inability to make the lesson relevant led to 
the students carrying out dangerous actions in order to prevent boredom and 
this resulted in a potentially serious incident). 
• Metaskills ( e.g., Incident 292 involved an instructor who did not know that it 
would be more effective to adopt an autocratic leadership style to control an 
activity when the risks increased). 
7.2.2.1.(d) Task too large (Literature review only - no verification by 
empirical data) 
The task itself can be too large for someone with the required skills and 
experience appropriate for the role specified. 
• Hours required to work per day too great. 
• Days programmed without adequate breaks too great. 
7.2.2.1.(e) Traps present in the work environment 
Management may place the instructor inadvertently in situations where 
undisclosed or unmanageable hazards are present. This will result in overload 
conditions resulting. Such traps can involve: 
• Equipment traps - Where equipment is supplied that contains hazards that 
aren't obvious. These traps may be ergonomic in nature ( e.g., Incident 318 
involved an instructor being sent on a mountain bike activity with a mixture 
of bikes, some of which had toe clips and some which didn't. The different 
skills required for the different equipment posed a hazard that wasn't 
identified and when students swapped bikes an incident resulted). 
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• Environment traps - Where the environment in which an instructor is 
scheduled to work contains unexpected hazards ( e.g., Incident 281 involved 
an instructor running a canoeing session in a canal. Upstream of the canal 
was a power station that increased the flow in the canal without warning 
which led to a potentially serious incident). 
• Student traps - Where the students in the group possess characteristics that 
pose hazards to an instructor ( e.g., students with undisclosed medical 
conditions or behavioural problems could pose hazards). 
7.2.2.2 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Poor Concentration' 
If individuals fail to maintain concentration on the job at hand, inadvertent slips 
may occur. The different types of common slips are described in Section 
4.4.4.1 (a). Rather than using the six different types described, I have chosen to 
condense these into two types of root causes which will be more useable in the 
outdoor education sector: 
7. 2. 2. 2. ( a) Actions without thinking 
Where a frequently carried out action sequence is used without thinking whereas a 
different action sequence was required in the specific case ( e.g., Incident 59 
involved an instructor giving directions to a group of students to send them down 
a safe channel rather than a dangerous one. He told them to go left, but failed to 
take into account that he was sitting in his kayak facing upstream so that his left 
was their right. This led to the students heading into the dangerous channel and a 
potentially serious situation). 
7.2.2.2.(b) Forgetting (Literature review only- no verification by 
empirical data) 
Forgetting to do something, or one part of a greater process, leading to increased 
likelihood of incident ( e.g., forgetting to leave intentions with the office on where 
you plan to go for the day). 
7.2.2.3 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Misapplication of Skills' 
If a person has the appropriate skills for a task but misapplies those skills in the 
task environment, then that produces the same result as not having the skills in the 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.3/ I 
first place. However it is easier to be aware that someone doesn't have the skills to 
start with and institute training so that the individual can 'upskill', rather than to 
be aware that an individual misapplies a known skill. Observation of staff is one 
of the few ways that this will become apparent. This can't be considered an 
overload situation because the person has been shown to have the skills and 
experience in the past to carry out the task. 
7.2.2.3(a) Misapplication of Skills 
This root cause has the following tokens: 
• Hard skills ( e.g., Incident 42 involved an experienced instructor who chose 
to use an inappropriate river running technique with students in their care). 
• Soft skills (e.g., Incident 845 involved an instructor with plenty of prior 
skills and experience who failed to fully brief his students). 
• Metaskills (e.g., Incident 611 involved an instructor knowledgeable about 
leadership styles who chose not to step in to exert his authority early in the 
incident and therefore the incident became more serious) and ( e.g.2., 
Incident 321 involved an instructor running a session who assumed students 
would behave in a certain manner, but the assessment of their skills and 
behaviours proved to be incorrect). 
7.2.2.4 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Poor Judgment' 
As discussed in Chapter 4, any judgment involves the four steps of: acquisition of 
information ( situational awareness); processing of information ( situational 
assessment); output (decision-making); and feedback. Errors can occur at any of 
these stages of the judgment process to lead to poor judgment. 
7.2.2.4.(a) Poor situational awareness 
This is the process of staying actively in touch with what is happening in order to 
gather the necessary information for decision-making. If the individual involved 
doesn't gather any information that a decision / judgment is required then an 
incident is likely to arise. Similarly, gaps in the necessary information will lead to 
poor or inappropriate decisions being made. Theoretical sources of bias in the 
acquisition of information are discussed in Section 4.4.2.1 and six tokens of this 
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root cause are discussed. Seven incidents were identified as having this as a root 
cause in Chapter 6. The tokens listed below are a combination of the two sources, 
restructured into plain language that should be useable by an outdoor educator. 
Purely theoretical tokens that do not seem immediately applicable to the outdoor 
sector have been excluded. 
• Availability - The ease with which certain information can be recalled can 
be confused with frequency of an event and therefore used as a predictor 
( e.g., I am aware of an incident where an instructor was told of a problem 
that had been encountered using a certain prussic knot as a self belay on an 
abseil. Despite that prussic knot being used successfully by hundreds of 
other users, the one recent comment meant the instructor used a different 
type of prussic knot which led to an incident occurring). 
• Selective perception - There is a tendency to see what we anticipate seeing 
and people seek information consistent with their own views and hypotheses 
( e.g., Incident 292 involved an instructor who failed to see that the lake level 
was lower than normal - perhaps they arrived at the session, took a quick 
glance at the lake and 'confirmed' an already held belief that the lake level 
was appropriate for the activity to proceed). 
• Selective focus - If a lot of attention is placed on executing one aspect of a 
plan, then situational awareness can tunnel-vision to that one aspect and 
other key information requiring attention is not gathered ( e.g., Incident 281 
involved an instructor who was so focused on rescuing a swimmer from a 
canoe that he failed to recognise that the whole group were being swept onto 
bridge pillars). 
• Frequency desensitisation (Familiarity - type 1) - Often people predict 
future occurrences based on the observed frequency of events. They can't 
take into account non-occurrences of events. Thus as people become more 
familiar, through successful experience, with any of the items listed below, 
then the belief becomes that there is little danger and situational awareness 
decreases ( e.g., Incident 1515 involved an instructor going on a river trip 
with a group. After a long period of easy river conditions, the instructor's 
situational awareness dropped and an incident resulted when unseen hazards 
were encountered). The frequency desensitisation effect can result from 
familiarisation with: 






• End of session / Going home - Situational awareness can also decrease at or 
near the end of a session or in the hurry to get home or to camp ( e.g., 
Incident 292 occurred at the end of a session when the instructor had almost 
stopped monitoring the situation). 
• Transferred responsibility - If it is believed that someone else with skills is 
monitoring the situation, then personal situational awareness can decrease 
( e.g., Incident 261 involved an instructor passing on the responsibility for 
navigation to a student who was observing the group from a Polytech 
programme. The instructor stopped monitoring the situation and an incident 
resulted). 
• Concrete information - Immediate information is accepted as a better 
predictor than long-term, less tangible, information ( e.g., I am aware of an 
incident where an instructor committed herself to a mountain trip in spite of 
a poor weather forecast, based on the fact that it was good weather when the 
group left. The resulting incident required the hospitalisation of a student). 
Pilots are very aware of the loss of situational awareness being a major factor in 
many aviation incidents. Of the estimated 80 per cent of the accidents that are 
ascribed to pilot error, it is believed that a large proportion of these are due to loss 
of situational awareness (Vector, 2003). One study of aircraft maintenance errors 
found that 18 per cent were due to lack of situational awareness (Hobbs, 2002). 
One model that pilots use to ensure they are monitoring the situation is 
Y.O.Y.T.T. (Vector, 2002). Yourself-know your limits, abilities and how well 
you are performing on a given flight; Other People - know about other people you 
have to deal with, what they do, problems they have, what they are like as 
individuals; Your Aircraft - systems, performance, handling and emergency 
procedures; The Environment - physical, regulatory and organisational; and Task, 
Customer, Risk - know the task you have to do, what the customer wants and the 
risks inherent in the job. 
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This model is readily transferable to the outdoor education sector as a reminder of 
the importance of situational awareness. 
7.2.2.4.(b) Inaccurate assessment of the risk 
Once information has been gathered, it must be processed and an accurate 
assessment of the risk made. The theoretical factors affecting this situational 
assessment are discussed in Section 4.4.2.2.(a)- (c).In Chapter 6, 12 incidents 
were identified where poor risk assessment was found to be a root cause. The 
tokens listed below are an amalgamation of the two sources of information, but 
couched in non-technical language that will be useful to an outdoor educator. 
• Inconsistency - the inability to apply a consistent assessment strategy. A 
good risk assessment may be made of one hazard while others are 
underestimated ( e.g., Incident 42 involved instructors working with novice 
students on moving water. Both a stump and a line of branches were 
recognised as hazards, but a focus on one of the hazards reduced the 
perceived risk posed by the other, "I had the perception that if you crossed 
the eddyline in a normal fashion you would miss the stump ... I focused on 
the line of branches as a significant hazard but felt the risk posed was all but 
over." A student ended up pinned against the stump with potential serious 
consequences). 
• Failure to review ( conservatism) - often there is a failure to revise opinion 
when new information is received, or plans are changed ( e.g., in a recent 
outdoor education incident in Australia a school organised a parent / son 
tramp to demonstrate to the parents the skills their child had accrued during 
their time in the programme. The participants on the trip were not 
accompanied by an experienced instructor. Conditions at the start included 
drizzling rain. Weather reports received just prior to the trip had changed to 
indicate heavy rain was expected with possible flooding. The school did not 
re-evaluate the risk, the trip continued and a student drowned (Stevenson, 
2001)). 
• No-risk perception - a perception that the activity being undertaken is risk-
free causes an underestimation of the risk (e.g., Incident 845 involved an 
instructor stopping to allow the students to walk down a steep track to see a 
rapid. The concept of a track walk was perceived as risk free and the 
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students were therefore unsupervised. Two students decided to solo up 
crumbling cliffs beside the track putting themselves at significant risk). 
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• Perceived as unlikely to happen - despite identifying the hazards, the 
potential for those hazards to result in an incident is not recognised or is seen 
as improbable. This is similar to the concept of 'non-linear extrapolation' in 
Section 4.4.2.2( c) ( e.g., Incident 576 involved students traveling without 
direct supervision in bush-covered terrain containing cliffs. While 
understanding the hazards, there was a perception that the risk of students 
choosing a route through the cliffs and falling was highly unlikely. However 
they did and serious injury resulted). 
• Justifying away the risk - a person can convince themselves that the risk 
present is lower than it actually is ( e.g., Incident 636 - the instructor 
assessed that a serious hazard existed on the river but convinced herself that 
the risk was low due to the skills that had been demonstrated by the students. 
The actual risk was high and an incident occurred). 
• Sunny day syndrome - the perception of the risk can be lowered if other 
conditions are favourable - such as when the sky is blue and the sun is out 
(e.g., Incident 292 - the Delphi panel believed that the instructor's 
perception of the risk may have been lowered because it was a sunny day 
and everything was going well). 
• Negative event feedback (Familiarity - Type 2) - just as situational 
awareness can decrease with continued exposure to the situation, familiarity 
with a situation can also affect the assessment of the risk, even if all of the 
hazards have been identified ( e.g., in the early 1980s an article on avalanche 
travel described this tendency as negative event feedback. In this article 
(which I read at the time but have never been able to find again) the author 
described the tendency of a back-country traveler getting to a snow slope, 
gathering all the necessary data and gauging that the slope had a high 
potential for avalanche. The first person in the party tentatively steps onto 
the slope, roped up, prepared to quickly retreat at the first sign of trouble. 
When they get over without incident, the second person in the party sets off 
to cross the slope with more confidence. When that person is safely across 
the rest of the party cross believing it to be safe and an avalanche occurs. 
The immediate feedback received by those in the party of no-event, caused 
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those people to re-evaluate the risk potential down, when in fact people 
crossing the slope had actually increased the hazard). 
• Illusion of control (over-confidence) - If a person spends a great deal of time 
and effort analysing the risk and planning for it, these activities can engender 
a feeling of control over the events and lower the perception of the actual 
risk. See Section 4.4.2.3.( c ). 
• Wishful thinking - People's preference for the outcomes of events can affect 
their assessment of the events. Thus a mere desire for the activity to be 
successful can diminish the correct assessment of risk. See Section 
4.4.2.3 .(b ). 
• Risk homeostasis - The tendency for some people to assess the level of risk 
present in a situation down, due to having in their possession 'safety' 
technology that can aid in the outdoor activity. This is termed risk 
homeostasis because people tend to want to take the same level of risk. As a 
device enters the market that seems to reduce the risk, then people will take 
higher levels of risk assuming that the level of risk they are taking is 
unchanged ( e.g., people have been known to head into untracked territory 
with students, where they would not normally travel, because they are 
carrying a global positioning system (GPS) and rely on this device for 
navigation. When the GPS failed they were left in a very serious situation). 
7.2.2.4.(c) Snap decision made without considering alternatives 
(Literature review only - no verification by empirical data) 
When humans make decisions in complex environments, often under time 
pressures, they tend to take short-cuts to simplify the decision-making process. 
Once a situation is recognised, a general rule is recalled to use in that recognised 
situation that may have worked in a similar situation in the past. These short-cuts 
to decision-making are known as heuristics (see Sections 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.2.2.(d)). 
The problem is that the heuristic approach is a general solution applied to a 
situation that may be different than previous applications and therefore the 
solution inappropriate. 
• Habits / rules of thumb - a solution to a past situation is recalled and applied 
to a new situation without completely considering its appropriateness ( e.g., I 
am aware of an incident where an instructor had been running a number of 
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kayak training sessions on slow moving water. When someone tipped out he 
hooked his tow line onto the kayak and towed them to shore without 
incident. When he took a group on more difficult rapids and a student tipped 
out above the rapid, without apparently changing his thinking he hooked his 
towline on, drifted into the rapid hooked to a kayak, tipped upside down and 
was injured. The changed situation of faster moving water had not been 
considered in choosing a solution for the problem of the capsized student). 
• First impressions (Anchoring with adjustment)-These are predictions made 
by anchoring on some clue and not adjusting for changed circumstances. 
First impressions of student abilities are a good example of this. I know of 
an incident where students on a journey into the mountains were initially 
observed walking confidently on snow. When the snow became firmer and 
the terrain increased in steepness, the instructor made a judgment based on 
the earlier impression of student competence without adjusting for the new 
situation and an incident occurred. 
• Expert opinion - Although the use of expert opinion has been identified in 
Section 4.4.2.2.(d) as a heuristic (use a solution suggested by an expert 
rather than take the time to think of a suitable solution yourself), I have 
chosen to treat this error as a token of the type, 'deferringjudgment to 
others' (Section 7.2.2.5.(b)). 
7.2.2.4(d) Poor processing of past experiences (Literature review only - no 
verification by empirical data) 
If people have made poor judgments in the past, but not learnt from those past 
experiences, then poor judgments may be continued into the future. For anyone to 
learn from past experiences feedback needs to occur with the individual absorbing 
lessons to use in future situations. There are a number of common reasons for lack 
of appropriate and timely feedback. Many of these have already been discussed 
previously in Section 4.4.2.4. 
• No-accident errors (Familiarity- Type 3); also referred to as outcome 
irrelevant learning structures in the literature review in Chapter 4) - if 
someone adopts a poor judgment in a particular situation, and yet no 
accident results, then this can reinforce the appropriateness of the 'poor' 
judgment. In this way, a habit/ rule may form for that situation and when a 
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similar situation is recognised in the future, that habit / rule is put into place 
- see Section 7.2.2.4.(c). This is very similar to the token 'negative event 
feedback' in section 7.2.2.4.(b) and may seem on first reading to be 
identical. The difference is that 'negative event feedback' happens at the 
time of the incident and results in a lowering of the perception of the risk, 
whereas 'no-accident errors' happen during the internal processing 
following successfully completing an activity containing hazards, and results 
in habits / rules being formed that will be used in future similar activities -
perhaps with unfavourable outcomes. 
• It must go right next time (Gambler's fallacy) - it has been noted that some 
people believe that if a sequence of failures are observed, then it is likely 
that the next event will be a success. 
• Success / failure attribution - people tend to attribute success to skill and 
failure to bad luck or other factors. Because of this some people can fail to 
learn from past events. 
• Rebuilding of events (Logical fallacies in recall) - following any event it is 
common for people to rebuild the event in their minds, omitting or adding 
details, such that this new version of the event becomes reality for them and 
may prevent learning of key decisions and the cues they received to make 
those decisions. 
• Hindsight bias - people are often not surprised by past events and can find 
plausible explanations not related to their poor judgments. 
7.2.2.5 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Failing to Meet the Judgment 
Responsibilities of the Role' 
An individual, in accepting a management position in an organisation (whether 
that be an instructional frontline management role or more senior manager), 
accepts certain responsibilities. These include making decisions / judgments that 
will result in actions that fit within the safety philosophies of the organisation and 
not to delegate those responsibilities to others without permission from an 
appropriate person in the organisation. If these responsibilities are not met then it 
can lead to hazards developing in the work environment. 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.319 
7.2.2.5.(a) Choosing to take a higher level of risk than needed 
In both the theoretical review of safety management theory in Chapter 4 and the 
qualitative results in Chapter 6, it was found that once people had a good 
situational awareness and correctly assessed the risk to form a judgment of a 
strategy to progress safely, subtle and not-so-subtle pressures can come into play 
to shift the risk taking levels higher and a new judgment being made on an 
acceptable action plan to adopt. 
As explained in Chapter 6, it could easily be justified in placing this as a 
subcategory of 'Poor judgment'. The reason I have not taken this approach is that 
I believe the person has either: considered risk-taking options, including those that 
would meet the safety goals of the organisation, but has opted for an activity that 
meets personal attitudes I values towards acceptable risk and challenge instead of 
the organisational ones; or, have opted for an activity option based on established 
personal behavioural norms without taking care to think through the consequences 
in terms of acceptable risk (See Section 7 .2.8.5 for further discussion of this). This 
changes the basic error type from a 'mistake' to a 'violation' in Figure 31. 
Although the term 'violation' may seem harsh, because the individuals concerned 
did not proceed knowing an incident would happen, by choosing to take a higher 
level of risk than was required, they have effectively increased the likelihood of 
such an incident and have thus violated the tenets of the safety management 
system of the organisation. This is an important differentiation. 
Some of these pressures to adopt a riskier judgment are discussed in Section 
4.4.2.2.(f) as part of the decision environment. As already pointed out, choosing to 
accept a higher level of risk was identified as a contributing factor in 17 out of the 
18 incidents analysed by the Delphi panel members. 
The pressures on an individual to 'violate' the safety goals of the organisation 
include: 
• Physical comfort/ ease - It may be physically easier to take a course of 
action that presents a greater level of risk than a more difficult, lower risk 
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option ( e.g., the instructor chose not to portage the rapid in Incident 636 with 
students because it was easier to stay in the boat than to get out and walk). 
• Mental ease - It may be easier to stick to an existing plan or course of action 
when new information comes to light, even if that seems to be riskier than 
previously thought ( e.g., the instructor in Incident 43 actually made her 
plans for the day before meeting their group and weren't willing to revise 
these even when new information made the choice of activity seem 
inappropriate). 
• Emotional comfort / ease - Similar to the previous token, it may be easier to 
take a course of action that presents a greater long term level of risk than 
deal with difficult interpersonal issues such as conflict, prejudice, etc. ( e.g., 
the instructor in Incident 728 chose to drive a vehicle in dangerous condition 
rather than enter a conflict situation with the manager who was responsible 
for the vehicle maintenance). 
• To meet personal ego needs - Individuals have varying requirements of 
external approval in order to maintain or boost their self-image or feelings of 
self-worth. Some people will choose to take part in activities that are beyond 
their skill level in order to look competent in front of others ( e.g., Incident 
321 involved an instructor who carried on running a high ropes course 
activity that she felt uncomfortable about, rather than ask for help and advice 
from peers and risk looking incompetent). Alternatively instructors may 
allow those in their care to undertake risky activities rather than intervene 
and look bad in the eyes of some of their students for being too overbearing 
( e.g., the instructor in Incident 318 allowed the group to continue jumping 
their mountain bikes, even though it was beyond the instructor's skill level 
and expertise, rather than look too restrictive of the students fun). Those 




Any other person whose opinion is respected. 
Meeting personal ego needs is often linked to the following two tokens of 
meeting others' needs I values or meeting personal needs I values. In order 
to 'look good' in front of others and hence increase feelings of self-worth, 
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there needs to be a gauge of what is desirable behaviour - and these are 
often values held personally or by a peer group. For example, there is an 
unwritten code in kayaking that it is very 'uncool' to tip out and swim while 
. on a kayaking trip, and even worse to lose your kayak and paddle while 
swimming. I have seen some horrible head injuries result from upturned 
kayakers doggedly staying in their kayaks, attempting to roll upright 
multiple times in shallow water rather than swim. I have also seen kayakers 
take a horrible swim down a rapid rather than leave their equipment and 
swim to the side. Both of these examples are attempts to build or retain ego 
based on group values. The ultimate example of this is explained in 
Maclean's (1999) analysis of the death of 14 firefighters while attempting to 
control a forest fire on Storm King Mountain in Colorado. A contributing 
cause to some of the deaths was a reticence to drop heavy equipment such as 
chainsaws while firefighters were running up a ridge to escape the blaze. 
Leaving equipment such as this behind was considered amongst firefighters 
to be very poor form. Others who dropped their gear and ran managed to 
survive. 
• To meet others' needs/ values - often a lot of pressure is exerted to meet 
other people's needs. Arguments may be made to reverse an earlier 
judgment I decision to a riskier option with justifications that include: other 
groups already having done the activity; it is important for educational 
outcomes; they have paid money for the course and demand value ( e.g., a 
contributing factor in Incident 42 was allowing all students to paddle on the 
same stretch of water, despite some of the group having marginal skill levels 
for that difficulty of river, because the group wanted to stay together at the 
end of their programme). This token is discussed under the heading 'Social 
pressures' in Section 4.4.2.2.(f). These needs can even extend to individual 
ego needs within the greater group (e.g., a student training as an instructor 
was with the group in Incident 261. This person had failed at a previous task 
in front of the group and the supervising instructor raised the risk level in 
order to give the trainee a chance to rebuild his ego, "Wanted him to be able 
to regain credibility with the group. In hindsight I should have kept him with 
the group or attached him to a rope as I was unsure of the terrain"). 
The people whose needs are being served can be any of: 





• To meet personal goals / values - Any organisation should have stated 
philosophies / values, educational goals and safety goals. Individuals 
working for that organisation will have their own philosophies and goals / 
values in relation to education and safety. Often there will be a close 
alignment between the organisation and the individual on these issues. When 
the individual has personal philosophies, goals and values which promote a 
higher level of challenge and risk than the employing organisation, then 
issues can arise where trips are run beyond the scope of the organisation's 
safety management system and place students at risk ( e.g., the instructor in 
Incident 857 left the students unsupervised on the high ropes course. This 
was so that the students would perceive that they were trusted to have the 
skills to manage a risky situation on their own. It was considered by the 
Delphi panel unlikely that the organisation would condone this lack of 
supervision and that it was the instructor's values / goals being 
demonstrated. In this case the students put themselves at serious risk while 
unsupervised). Other personal goals and values can also distract the 
instructor from focusing on his / her primary role with students and therefore 
placing those students at risk ( e.g., the Delphi panel believed that the 
instructor in Incident 261 may have neglected his safety responsibilities with 
the students in order to follow a personal goal of 'chatting-up' the 
accompanying teacher). 
• To meet the perceived goals of management - For various reasons an 
individual may not have a good understanding of the organisation's safety 
and educational goals. If he / she misunderstands or is ignorant of these 
goals he I she may run activities in order to try to meet his/ her perceptions 
of management's goals, even if those activities seem riskier than he I she 
would normally choose to undertake. It is that individual's responsibility to 
ensure he I she has a very good understanding of the organisation's position 
on the acceptable level of risk to achieve educational outcomes ( e.g., in 
Incident 14 71 the instructor believed that one reason she chose to carry out 
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the activity was, "There might have been an element of pressure ... to give 
the students a challenging experience - after all that's what the programme 
is about." In other words, she increased the level of challenge in order to 
achieve what was perceived as the programme objectives). 
• Pressured by time or conditions - When there is time pressure to achieve a 
part of the programme, which may include meeting for a rendezvous for 
example, even though the supervising individual is situationally aware and 
has correctly assessed the risks, she / he will accept higher levels of risk to 
meet those time constraints ( e.g., a contributing factor in Incident 1515 was 
that the instructor pushed the group onwards down the river in canoes 
because, "We had a long way to go and was aware of the time we were 
taking ... we were due back that night"). Weather and other conditions can 
also add pressures to increase the risk. 
• Risky Shift - It is a well documented social phenomenon that individuals 
can shift their risk taking propensity higher in a group situation. The group 
in question is generally made up of peers. The examples of 'risky shift' seen 
in this study occurred when instructors were team-teaching with groups and 
chose to undertake activities with students that they probably would not have 
chosen had they not been team-teaching. This can happen without any 
communication between the instructors, where lack of questioning of a 
decision for the group is seen as tacit approval of that decision (e.g., the 
Delphi panel believed that the instructors in Incident 42 chose to adopt a 
poor management strategy during the kayaking instruction because of a risky 
shift process). 
• Illusions of invulnerability (It can't happen to me)- (see also Section 
7.2.2.4.(d)). The belief, often achieved through many successes in the past 
without mishap, that bigger and bigger risks can be taken and no incident 
will result. Thus people believing this will accept higher risks than wanted 
by the employing organisation believing they and their decisions are sound. 
(No verification by empirical data). 
• Natural risk takers - Often linked to illusions of invulnerability, some people 
have higher risk taking propensities than others. This has been referred to as 
the 'testosterone' effect in Section 4.2.2.2 where males are noted as tending 
to make and accept riskier decisions than females. (No verification by 
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empirical data from the Delphi analysis of incidents, although the 
quantitative data in Chapter 5 lend support to this). 
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• Gender and other social interactions - Although closely linked to the listed 
tokens of meeting personal ego needs and meeting other's needs/ values, 
various social interactions that can contribute to higher levels of risk being 
accepted. For example, when instructors are working in a team situation with 
a group, a gender mix among the instructors can cause higher risks to be 
taken: some women may not feel confident to over-ride a high-risk decision 
made be a male instructor; and similarly, some males may be reticent to 
over-ride a high risk decision made by a woman instructor for fear of being 
considered overbearing and controlling. Other issues of power and 
experience inequities between co-instructors could also lead to this same 
outcome. 
7.2.2.5.(b) Deferringjudgment to others 
People are employed in positions of responsibility on the basis of their skills and 
experience and are expected to make judgments reflecting this capability. Some 
people avoid this responsibility by deferring / abdicating to others. Those 
deferred to can include peers, students and others. Often these people may have or 
be perceived to have more skills and experience than the instructor in that 
situation,. Whatever the case, it is the instructor's role to verify the information 
and make the final decision ( e.g., the instructor in Incident 318 invited a student to 
make the decision about the suitability of the activity and terrain. In Incident 261, 
responsibility for route choice was deferred to a trainee instructor without being 
checked and in Incident 126, the instructor deferred to the judgment of peers). 
7.2.2.5.(c) Nojudgment I Decision 
Similar to deferring judgment, but much more difficult to identify, is making no 
judgment or decision - just allowing an activity to proceed, irrespective of the 
hazards present and making no intervention. It is possible that some of the 
incidents where root causes were identified as 'poor assessment of risk' or 
'choosing to take a higher level of risk than needed' may actually be examples of 
no judgment being made at all. 
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7.2.2.6 Root Causes Attributable to the Category of 'Misdirected Motivation I 
Attitude' 
If an individual has a total mismatch of personal goals and philosophies to the 
organisation, or becomes disenfranchised or demotivated in some way with the 
organisation for which he / she works, then the extreme result is the purposeful 
disregard for the organisation's safety systems, or in fact actively working 
contrary to those systems. All forms of management control of safety efforts have 
become irrelevant if this occurs. 
7.2.2.6.(a) Breaks organisational policies 
Any organisation makes a statement of the level of risk that is acceptable through 
its documented policies and procedures. These set operational limits to activities 
based on management's analysis of the risk present in an activity at any particular 
venue. The health and safety policy of any organisation will make it mandatory 
for its staff to understand and follow these policies. A breach of the policies 
means that person is operating outside the agreed safety parameters of the 
organisation while management in the organisation believes such actions will 
make an incident more likely ( e.g., the instructor in Incident 636 broke the centre 
policy on instructor to student ratios which led to a potentially serious incident 
occurring). 
7.2.2.6.(b) Sabotage 
There are degrees of culpability in the breach of policies. If the breach occurs 
because the individual temporarily forgot the policy or believed that the breach 
would be working in the best interests of the organisation, this is still serious but 
not as severe as actively working against a policy for personal reasons or 
encouraging others to do the same ( e.g., an incident bordering on sabotage is 
Incident 728, where the instructor chose not to undertake the vehicle safety checks 
as a personal protest about lack of performance by another individual in the 
organisation. This placed students in that instructor's care in serious risk). 
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7.2.2. 7 Root Causes Attributable to the Category 'Senior Management System 
Errors' 
At a governance, or senior management level, the philosophies and standards need 
to be established that set the framework that all other safety efforts in the 
organisation are based on. In addition to this the accountability for safety to the 
governance level of the organisation must be clear to ensure safety efforts are 
implemented at all lower levels. Reviews of the safety system should be a senior 
management responsibility. 
7.2.2. 7.(a) Less than adequate (LTA) organisational safety philosophy, 
goals and learning objectives 
These must be clearly stated and available to all employees including volunteers. 
They set the over-riding philosophies for the organisation, establish where the 
balance lies between safety objectives and educational objectives and state the 
learning objectives for all programmes. 
7.2.2. 7.(b) LTA accountability for the safety system 
One person in the organisation must be clearly accountable for the management of 
the safety system, its implementation and review. 
7.2.2.7.(c) LTA review of safety systems 
An organisation should conduct internal reviews of its safety system but can 
become blinkered in its view of its own systems. The only way to minimise this, 
and to ensure it is staying contemporary with changing external standards, is to 
have regular audits of its systems by external experts. 
7.2.2.8 Root Causes Attributable to the Category 'Staff Recruitment and Training 
System Errors ' 
The staffing systems have been separated from other management systems 
because the selection, training and monitoring of staff has been shown to be 
critical to the organisational safety effort. 
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7.2.2.8.(a) LTA staff recruitment systems 
The organisation must have documented job descriptions and specifications of 
skill sets for each role. These must be complemented by systems to verify past 
experience, safety records and screening for other factors that may affect 
successful employment (physical, mental, criminal histories). 
7.2.2.8.(b) LTA staff induction systems 
A thorough system of induction into the organisation's systems and procedures 
must exist to ensure a working knowledge of what is expected by that staff 
member to achieve their role. 
7.2.2.8.(c) LTA staff training systems 
A system must be in place that identifies deficits in each employee's skill and 
experience, prioritises these, establishes a training pathway to remove these 
deficits and then ensures the training occurs. 
7.2.2.8.(d) LTA staff monitoring and appraisal 
Systems must be in place to monitor the actual performance of staff in their role, 
as opposed to the theoretical performance based on documented skills and 
experience, and give feedback based on this monitoring. 
7.2.2.9 Root Causes Attributable to the Category 'Middle Management System 
Errors' 
Middle management in any organisation is responsible for the creation and 
implementation of systems that manage risk within that organisation. 
7.2.2.9.(a) LTA documentation of safety responsibilities and 
accountabilities 
All members of staff need to know what their roles, responsibilities, and to whom 
they are accountable, and the chain of command when working in teams. 
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7.2.2.9.(b) LTA risk management systems 
The organisation must analyse the risks identified for all of its work situations and 
document appropriate methods to manage those risks. This includes all outdoor 
education activities in the different settings in which they occur. 
7.2.2.9.(c) LTA policies and guidelines 
The organisation must have clearly written and easily accessible policies and 
guidelines for its staff which give direction about levels of risk that are acceptable 
and ways to manage those risks. Many of these policies will be the result of the 
risk management systems in 7.2.2.9(b). 
7.2.2.9.(d) LTA hazard reporting systems 
If employees identify hazards in the workplace, there must be a system to ensure 
these are reported to management and the staff member is able to refuse to work 
in the environment containing such unmanaged hazards. 
7.2.2.9.(e) LTA communication systems 
The organisation must have appropriate systems of communication to be able to 
pass on necessary safety information both within the office and in the field. These 
might involve safety bulletin boards, written memos, radio and mobile phone 
technology for example. 
7.2.2.9.(f) LTA emergency systems 
The organisation should have a documented emergency response plan that covers 
all major types of crisis. 
7.2.2.9.(g) LTA incident reporting systems 
The organisation needs to have a system in place that is capturing information 
from all incidents ( especially those with potential for serious harm), analysing the 
incidents, and putting in place recommendations to prevent recurrence of similar 
events. 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.329 
7.2.2 .. 9(h) LTA equipment I resource systems 
Systems must be in place to identify equipment needs, appropriate equipment that 
meets that need, purchasing systems to procure the equipment, maintenance 
systems to ensure the equipment is kept serviceable, and retirement systems to 
remove inappropriate equipment from circulation. These systems should extend to 
vehicles, buildings and any other resources that will be used by staff. 
7.2.2.9.(i) LTA compliance to statutory requirements 
The organisation must ensure it has systems in place to meet all statutory 
requirements placed on it by local, regional and national government agencies. 
These will include standards and codes for buildings, drinking water, swimming 
pools, etc. 
7.2.2.10 Root Causes Attributable to the Category- Operational System Errors 
Some systems that are critical to safety performance are implemented at the 
operational, day-to-day, level of the organisation. 
7.2.2.10.(a) LTA client screening mechanisms 
Clients must be screened to ensure there is an appropriate match with what the 
organisation can and is willing to deliver. This includes health, medical history, 
social issues, etc. There should also be a disclosure of risk to the clients so that 
they are enrolling in the programme with risks stated explicitly .. 
7.2.2.10.(b) LTA systems to match an instructor with a task 
The organisation must ensure that the skills and experience of each instructor 
match the task being assigned. This includes consideration of activity, venue, 
weather, client group, etc. This match must be considered when an instructor is 
initially assigned to a group and also on a daily basis to ensure planned activities 
are suitable. 
7.2.2.10.(c) LTA safety meetings 
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Regular meetings need to be held to discuss safety issues and concerns. 
Information can be shared between staff members from their experiences at these 
meetings. 
7.2.3 A Taxonomy of Error for the Outdoor Education Sector 
The root causes of error leading to outdoor education incidents described in 
Section 7.2.2 are proposed as a taxonomy of error for the outdoor education 
sector. This taxonomy is shown in Figure 60. Those items in the taxonomy that 
have been verified by empirical evidence from the analysis of outdoor education 
incidents in Chapter 6 are shown in black, whereas those that have been identified 
from the literature review in Chapter 4 and have no support from the empirical 
data in Chapter 6 are shown in grey. 
The result, as indicated by Figure 60, is the identification of 3 7 root causes of 
outdoor education incidents. Eighteen of these are root causes that lead to poor 
performance or judgment by those with safety responsibilities, while 19 are 
inadequacies in the safety management system of the organisation. All of these 
root causes can, either by themselves, or more usually in combination, lead to 
accident potential and eventually to accidents. 
The actual groupings of root causes into categories of type, and the differentiation 
of levels between types and tokens have been done according to subjective 
criteria. This is one of the limitations of the study and is recognised as an issue in 
the formulation of any taxonomy: 
" ... Identifying these clusterings and matching them with phenomena and 
mechanisms calls for judgment by the statistical analyst, and thus to a 
greater extent depends upon the concepts and models the analyst already 
possesses. In short, the analyst's expectations of possible phenomena and 
mechanisms greatly influence the development of the taxonomy" (Senders 
& Moray, 1991, p.85). 
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Figure 60. Taxonomy of error for the outdoor education sector 
Root Causes Leading to Poor Performance or Judgment 
OVERLOAD 
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h. i\.kntal 
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FAILING TO MEET JUDGMENT RESPONSIBILITIES 
14. Choosing to take a Higher Level of Risk then Needed 
a. Physical comfort/ease 
b. Mental ease 
c. Emotion comfort/ease 
d. Personal ego needs 
e. Others' needs/values 
f. Personal goals/values 
g. Perceived goals of management 
h. Pressured by time/conditions 
i. Risky shift 
j. Illusions (If invulnerability 
k. Natural risk taker 
I. Gender and other social interactions 
15. Deferring Judgment to Others 
16. No Judgment rvtutlc 
MISDIRECTED MOTIVATION/ATIITUDE 
17. Breaks Organisational Policies 
18. Sabotage 
Root Causes in the Management System 
STRATEGIC SYSTEM ERRORS 
I. LT A Organisational Safety Philosophy, Goals and Leaming 
Objectives 
., LTA At·c<>untahilitv for the Saft·tv Svst.:m 
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STAFF RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING ERRORS 
4. LTA Staff Recruitment System~ 
5. l..Ti\ Staff lndu.:tion Systems 
6. LT A Staff Training Systems 
7. LT A Staff Monitoring and Appraisal Systems 
MIDDLE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM ERRORS 
8. LTA Documentation of Safety Responsibilities and 
Accountabilities 
9. LTA Risk Management Systems 
I 0. LT A Policies and Guidelines 
I I. LTA Ha/.ard Rcprn1ing Systems 
I:!. L TA Communication Systems 
13. LTA Ernergcn.:y Sysl.:rns 
14. LT A Incident Reporting Systems 
15. L TA Equipment/Resource Systems 
16. L..TA (.\1111pliann· to Statuti>ry Rcquin.:m.:nts 
OPERATIONAL SYSTEM ERRORS 
17. L TA Client Screening T\·1t:ch:misms 
18. LT A Systems to Match an Instructor to a Task 
19. L..TA Safety tvkctings 
NB: L TA= Less Than Adequate 
NB: Items shown in black have been verified by empirical 
evidence while those shown in grey are theoretical constructs 
only at this stage, derived from a literature review in the fields 
of outdoor education, industrial safety and psychology. 
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This limitation is mitigated to some extent by seeking review of the final 
taxonomy by the Delphi panel members and adjustments made based on that 
feedback. 
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This taxonomy should not be considered to be a final and definitive list, it is a 
base from which the sector can discuss, add, change and delete as cases are put 
and evidence decrees. This fluid approach to the taxonomy is its strength and the 
taxonomy must be able to change in order to take into account new information 
that will inevitably come to light. 
7.2.4 The Application of Case-based Reasoning and Information Retrieval 
Tools to Extend the Taxonomy 
When designing the method to address the research questions, it was realised that 
any taxonomy produced must remain open for additions in the future as new 
knowledge and research comes to light. It is an identified fact that taxonomies of 
error are never static but change as new knowledge is gained (Johnson, 2000). 
Johnson proposed a technique to deal with this issue of changing taxonomies 
which he described as 'case based reasoning and information retrieval tools'. 
Case-based reasoning uses computer searches of written incident narratives for 
key words, and their similes, in order to identify new types added to a taxonomy. 
In this way, as a new root cause is added to a taxonomy, large databases of 
previously analysed incidents can be searched quickly for these key words or 
'cases' and statistical analysis carried out. The concept was that incident 
narratives that were collected in any future incident database could be searched 
for keywords in this fashion as the taxonomy was updated. 
The experience of carrying out the Delphi analysis on the 18 outdoor education 
incidents proved that such a concept was overly optimistic. The identification of 
root causes often relied on the interpretation of subtle messages in the narratives 
by expert outdoor practitioners. A simple word search of narratives for key words, 
phrases and their similes would fail, except for trivial cases where words such as 
"tired" and its similes might gain some reward in a search for the root cause, 
"poor physical condition". Word searches of documents for root causes such as, 
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"Choosing to take a higher level of risk than needed", and its tokens seems a 
daunting task at present. 
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As the taxonomy of error for the outdoor education sector changes in the future as 
more information and research comes to light, there seems no easy way to 
retrospectively review incident narratives for examples of that root cause unless it 
can be identified with some key words and phrases. The experience shown in this 
research is that such a search would require an intensive revisit of each incident 
by an expert or experts. Such a time commitment would be hard to justify and the 
incorporation of any new root cause to the taxonomy would probably only be 
applied to incidents recorded from that point in time forward. 
7.3 A Model of Outdoor Education Incident Causation 
In Chapter 4 a proposed model of an outdoor education incident was produced 
from a literature review and shown as Figure 31. In Chapter 6 a Delphi technique 
was used to produce the causal sequences for 18 case studies of New Zealand 
outdoor education incidents. The Delphi panel was sent the narratives from the 
instructor who had been in charge of the incident at the time and were asked to 
identify prevailing conditions (immediate causes) that were pertinent to the 
incident in question and also to identify what they believed were the root causes 
of the incident. The results of this qualitative analysis of 18 outdoor education 
incidents supported the incident model (Figure 31) in the following ways: 
a) All of the root causes identified by the Delphi analysis could be 
satisfactorily accommodated within the two major categories of root 
causes i.e. either: errors due to inadequate performance / judgment of 
instructors (although this had to be extended to include errors by senior 
management - see below); or errors in the safety management system of 
the organisation. 
b) All of the immediate causes identified that were pertinent to the incident 
could be categorised as either environmental hazards, equipment / resource 
hazards or hazards due to dangerous acts by students or other people. 
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c) In the review of the incident diagrams by the Delphi panel members, there 
was no request for the immediate causes described in (b) to be included at 
the level of root causes. 
d) Although management system errors were identified in all of the 18 
incidents as being contributory, in every case the actions of an instructor in 
the field had more direct effects, and different actions could have averted 
the incident despite any inadequacy in the safety management system. 
The qualitative analysis did however reveal two important additions that were not 
shown in Figure 31: 
a) Management Staff Errors. While the focus in Chapter 4 had been on 
identifying the root causes of poor performance or judgment of instructors, 
errors made by the organisation's senior and middle managers developing 
and implementing the safety management system had not been considered. 
Empirical evidence of these factors leading to incidents showed that such a 
category should be included. There is no reason to believe that any 
category of root cause that could affect instructors' performance could not 
equally affect the performance of more senior managers. 
b) Error-Free Incidents. Discussion about the appropriateness of an 
organisation's safety philosophy prompted the development of the concept 
of an 'error-free incident'. An error-free incident is one where the risks of 
an activity have been analysed, found to be acceptable, and the hazards 
identified could not be controlled without adversely affecting the very 
nature of the activity. The incident is therefore due to the inherent risks of 
the activity. 
Incorporating these two concepts, and the final taxonomy of root causes shown in 
Figure 60, into the model of an outdoor education incident in Figure 31, results in 
the model of outdoor education incident causation shown in Figure 61. 
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Figure 61. Model of outdoor education incident causation 
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The structure of this model is built around root causes in two main areas: Poor 
performance andjudgment in either instructors or more senior management; or, 
failures in the safety management systems. These two groupings of error have not 
been previously identified in outdoor education literature. They are based 
primarily on the work of industrial safety managers such as Petersen ( 1988) and 
Bird & Germain ( 1989) whose focus is on behavioural / participative approaches 
to safety. As explained in detail in Chapter 4, outdoor education writers have 
concentrated in the main on the immediate causes leading to incidents and failed 
to identify the more important root causes of those incidents. Haddock (2003, pp. 
84-86) has introduced the concept of a "lack of management control" to outdoor 
incident causal sequences based on her reading of Bird & Germain. The model 
presented here goes further than this as it identifies the role of the instructor as a 
front-line manager and therefore the factors leading to that front-line manager 
making errors become root causes of any incident. 
The model of incident causation shown in Figure 61 can be explained by working 
backwards from the incident occurrence in the following way: 
a) Any incident (accident or near accident) occurring in an outdoor education 
activity can be the result of either the inherent risks of the activity or an 
instructor error - either unintentional or intentional. Any instructor error 
occurs in the context of an organisation's safety management system which 
may also contain errors. 
b) Some incidents are therefore beyond the control of management (Error-free 
incidents) and must be accepted as part of working in the outdoors. 
c) When supervising an outdoor education activity the instructor is working in an 
environment that often contains a range of hazards including dangerous acts 
by students and others, hazardous environmental conditions and hazards in 
equipment or other resources. It is the instructor's role to manage these 
hazards. These hazards are not the root cause of any incident - they are merely 
conditions that exist and must be taken into account. They are considered to be 
immediate causes of the incident that have underlying root causes that allowed 
those immediate causes to exist. 
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d) An instructor may fail to adequately manage the hazards through one or more 
basic error types - slips, lapses, failures, mistakes or violations. 
e) The instructor makes these errors in performance or judgment due to one or 
more root causes of error in the categories of: poor concentration; 
misapplication of skills; poor judgment; failing to meet judgment 
responsibilities; or, misdirected motivation I attitude. 
f) If the instructor is overloaded in the task environment, then any of the root 
causes mentioned in (e) are more likely to occur. Therefore, a number of 
overload conditions are also considered to be root causes of the incident. 
g) The instructor is working within the framework of an organisational safety 
management system. If there are inadequacies in this system they can lead to 
an incident in a number of ways, indicated by the arrows heading away from 
the box titled, 'Root causes in the safety management system'. 
i) The management system errors can lead to task overload conditions for 
the instructor, increasing likelihood of instructor error, or poor induction, 
training and monitoring of the instructor can lead to the other root causes 
of instructor error. 
ii) The management system errors can lead to increased hazards existing in 
the instructor's workplace in the form of unsuitable clients, environmental 
hazards and equipment I resource hazards. 
iii) A good safety management system can sometimes prevent incidents 
progressing, even once instructor errors have begun to occur. This can 
happen through the intervention of more experienced staff while 
monitoring instructor performance, the vetting of instructor plans, etc. 
h) Senior managers, even working with a perfectly adequate safety management 
system, can make errors in the implementation of that system due to the same 
root causes that result in instructor error. These senior management errors will 
result in the same impacts on the instructor's work environment indicated in 
(f) as if errors did exist in the safety management system itself. 
This model is the first time in outdoor education literature that the relationship 
between unsafe acts, unsafe conditions, basic error types, and the types and tokens 
of root causes due to human error and system error are explained. Through such a 
Chapter Seven - Results and Discussion: A Proposed Taxonomy of Root Causes ... 
model it is possible to focus on a training mentality in the aftermath of an 
incident, rather than on a mentality of looking for someone to blame. 
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7.4 Delphi Panel Response to the Taxonomy of Error and Model of Incident 
Causation 
The Delphi panel members were sent copies of the proposed taxonomy of error 
(Figure 60) and model of outdoor education incident causation (Figure 61) with 
accompanying explanations. They were asked to review these two documents and 
comment on: 
• Does the model fit within your experience of incidents that occur in the 
outdoor education sector? 
• Does the taxonomy of root causes make sense within your experience of 
outdoor education? 
• Is the grouping of the root causes within the taxonomy logical? 
• Any other comments? 
Thirteen of the 18 Delphi panel members provided feedback. Two of the five non-
respondents were overseas on expeditions and three simply failed to respond to 
email requests. The feedback below is coded by the Delphi member's team colour 
(red, yellow or green) and the member's number within that team (1-6). Thus Red 
3 would be the third Delphi member of the Red team. 
The feedback from the 13 Delphi members was generally very positive. A number 
of responses simply indicated that both the model and taxonomy fitted the 
experience that person had of outdoor education incidents: 
"Yes, it makes sense. It fits with my experience of accidents in the 
outdoors. Yes, the list of root causes makes sense and yes, the grouping is 
logical." (Yell ow 1) 
"The model and list make sense. They seem to fit well with my experience 
of accidents in the outdoors. The list and grouping of root causes seems 
logical and makes sense." (Red 4) 
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"Overall the information and the documents are logical, are complete 
based on my experience and with the involvement that I've had with the 
review process they are understandable. All the groupings of root causes 
mesh well and it all fits with the experience that I have as an outdoor 
instructor." (Red 6) 
Even though Delphi members were not asked directly, many were already 
considering whether this model could be used in their work environments. 
Various people made comments that the model itself was complex and would be 
difficult to use in this form as a tool to introduce within any outdoor education 
organisation. 
"It would be hard to introduce into an organisation as a tool. It depends 
how you see it being applied. There is a difference between a tool for 
analysis and communication at the factory floor level. .. The diagram is a 
bit of an horrendogram. The whole thing doesn't lend itself to a piece of 
A4 paper as I can imagine you would agree with." (Green 2) 
"Is the model supposed to be used as an actual tool for institutes, etc.? If it 
is to be an applied thing then I've got to say, putting it all on one page is 
pretty confusing. It would have to be the A3 wall version with some space 
to make it all useful." (Red 5) 
These points are valid. The model as it stands is being used to summarise a 
number of theoretical concepts. If the model was to be used with practitioners it 
would need to be adapted and simplified for that audience. 
Other feedback suggested that the model may be easier to understand if the flow 
was reversed. In other words they suggested that the box containing the word 
"Incident" was placed on the left hand side of the page in Figure 61 and that flow 
should progress from this towards the root causes. I believe that people are 
suggesting this change because they are finding it easier to read the diagram in 
this direction for two reasons. Firstly, I chose to explain the diagram in the 
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documents sent to the Delphi members in reverse order, and secondly, because I 
believe these Delphi members are reflecting on incidents that they have 
experience of, and mentally working backwards from the incident to possible root 
causes. My intention with the model in this instance is to indicate the flow from 
root causes towards incident as a causal sequence and therefore I believe that the 
current flow is appropriate. 
One result that was personally satisfying was that the model caused some of the 
experts to review their concepts of incident causation and provided them with 
insights that they hadn't considered before. 
"I felt there became an overwhelming key component of instructor 
judgment that your Figure 61 impacted on me. It brought home the vital 
role of instructor decision-making even in the light of a sound 
management system ... this diagram was very visual in this regard." (Red 
2) 
"It would seem that accidents are maybe more as a result of the pressures 
that the instructor puts on themselves than the more usual 'obvious' causes 
of outside factors like weather ... " (Yell ow 1) 
Comments such as these are good endorsements of the model in that it is creating 
realisation in experienced outdoor educators that their previous mental models of 
incident causation need to change. 
Other experts commented on the fact that they had seen models of incident 
causation in other literature, but this was the first model that specifically dealt 
with outdoor education. 
"I've seen concepts similar to this before but I've never seen anything that 
is specific to the outdoor sector. The model makes more sense in an 
outdoor environment than other (non-outdoor) ones I have seen." (Green 
1) 
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"Personally I think there's not much out there to read that is specific to the 
outdoors. What there is either deals with specific cases and fails to draw 
any general patterns or deals with surface level, hands-on, how to manage 
risk and fails to provide any underlying analysis. This is great!" (Green 3) 
"Seems to work with most accident scenarios that spring to mind. Its 
certainly more comprehensive than anything else I've seen." (Red 5) 
Feedback about the taxonomy of error was almost all positive. Only one expert 
stated that, 
"Yes, the root causes make sense but I would need some good clinical 
psychology skills to work with the person concerned to whittle down to 
the difference between some of them. I wonder if they could be broader?" 
(Green 2) 
All of the other experts thought that the language was appropriate and wasn't 
overly academic. The use of exemplars from the case studies was found to be 
particularly useful. 
"The taxonomy and root causes are excellent." (Green 3) 
"The taxonomy provides substantive material and analysis reinforcing and 
I or changing intuitively held thoughts and unsubstantiated anecdotal 
debates. The examples make it a very useful teaching resource providing 
meaning and application to the theory. Students will be able to use this 
material, especially at (NZQA) levels 6 and 7. It will provide more 
direction for management practices, supervision, training and induction." 
(Yellow 5) 
"I haven't seen root causes explained as comprehensively in any reading I 
have done and certainly not with outdoor examples. I also wasn't aware of 
some of the root causes you have described. For me there was a 
considerable amount of new information in the types and tokens of root 
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causes ... The explanations are pretty clear and in a language that's not too 
academic. The examples help lots. I think they reflect that this stuff 
happens in the outdoors." (Green 1) 
"It was fascinating and illuminating reading! The language was pretty user 
friendly and not too over-the-top academically. I believe the outdoor 
instructor I educator community will find lots of value in it." (Red 4) 
"The list of root causes is more extensive than anything I've seen 
previously and the grouping is clear and logical." (Red 6) 
A number of the experts did suggest minor changes to the explanations of root 
causes to remove ambiguities. These have been made where appropriate but none 
affected the structure of the taxonomy. Others sought further explanation of the 
types or tokens to increase their own understanding. Some of the experts 
suggested additions to the taxonomy but each addition suggested was simply a 
practical example of a token of an already listed type of error. An example of this 
is the suggestion by one expert that the use of inappropriate learning progressions 
could be a factor. Using appropriate learning progressions with students is an 
example of a metaskill under the type of root cause, "Mismatch of skills / 
experience to the task". It would not be helpful to go through all of the suggested 
changes and explain how the suggestions are tokens of existing types, or practical 
examples of those tokens, as future training and discussion of the taxonomy in the 
sector will make this self-evident. 
When asked for other comments, there was widespread endorsement of the value 
of the work. 
"The information is logical and seems complete from my perspective. This 
seems to be coming together as a great piece of work." (Red 6) 
"I have run risk management courses for a number of years now and have 
read a lot of the stuff that is out there related to accidents in the outdoor 
world. This is the first time I have read such a comprehensive compilation 
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of root causes along with a model that demonstrates the relationships of 
causal factors within an accident. If I was able to I would use this stuff in 
my risk management courses tomorrow!" (Green 1) 
"Do you mind if I use this with my outdoor leadership students? I'll ensure 
you are appropriately credited as the source. The information is great and 
goes well beyond anything currently out there - well done." (Yellow 5) 
"There must be potential for this work to impact on the training of 
instructors significantly - rating the important skills, knowledge and 
experience that equals judgment; and the importance of self-reflection on 
performance." (Red 2) 
In general this feedback is comforting endorsement from outdoor experts to the 
validity of the research outcomes. 
7.5 Further Discussion - Significance of the Research 
7.5.1 The Current State of Knowledge 
When this research began in 2000, a new text had recently been published that 
outlined the combined knowledge about incident causation in the outdoor 
education sector. This text was titled Lessons learned: A guide to accident 
prevention and crisis response (Ajango, 2000). It was compiled by staff of the 
University of Alaska, Anchorage, outdoor and experiential education program in 
the wake of a serious incident that occurred on their program. Fourteen climbers 
fell over 1 OOO feet down a steep mountainside in Alaska, killing two of the 
students. The intention was to compile a comprehensive summary of what was 
known about incidents, and how they occur, in order to help prevent them. It 
contained seven separate sections written by recognised experts on outdoor 
education safety management. The first section titled, "How Accidents Happen", 
claimed in the table of contents (p.xiii) to, 
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" ... explores the current state of thinking on how accidents happen in 
outdoor adventure activities. The authors explain several methods for 
analysing outdoor accidents and use real case studies to demonstrate the 
practical application of these methods." 
The Vice President of Outward Bound USA tasked with the portfolio of 'Safety 
and Program', Lewis Glenn, reviewed the book and stated: 
"Lessons Learned is comprehensive in its look at the design and delivery 
of outdoor adventure programs from the standpoint of managing the risks 
to participants ... " (Ajango, 2000, p.iii) 
Based on these comments there seemed little doubt that the contents of this text 
contained the current state of knowledge within the outdoor education sector at 
the time of publication. 
The information within 'Lessons Learned' related to the mechanisms and models 
of incident causation have all been reviewed in Chapter 4 of this thesis. The 
accident model shown in the text is Hale's and shown in this study as Figure 5. 
This is a simple model showing that accident potential is created when 
environmental factors interact with human factors. To discuss the causes of 
accidents, the Meyer & Williamson matrix is used which appears in this study as 
Table 12. This matrix divides the potential causes of accidents into the three 
categories of: Unsafe conditions, unsafe acts, and errors in judgment. 
As I have explained in Chapter Two these models and explanations are simplistic 
and of limited use in explaining the complex interactions of humans in hazardous 
situations. Very little of the extensive work from the fields of industrial safety 
management and psychology has been used and incorporated into the outdoor 
education literature. The suggested 'deeper causes' of outdoor accidents are not 
root causes as I am defining them in this study but are a mixture of prevailing 
conditions, and types and tokens of root causes. 
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After this study had commenced, Haddock (2003) released her updated version of 
the Mountain Safety Council, Outdoor Safety Manual. Again, this was 
representative of the combined knowledge within the outdoor education sector of 
incident causation at the time of writing. This manual introduced the work of Bird 
& Germain (1989) in terms of a causal sequence for incidents that is shown as 
Figure 9 in this study. This points to root causes of all incidents being due to a 
lack of management control, which is a systems approach to safety. Haddock 
listed a number of causal factors in her book under categories of people, 
equipment and the environment. Once again there was a tendency through this 
process, language and categorisation to confuse root causes with prevailing 
conditions (immediate causes) and therefore not focus on the underlying reasons 
for incidents developing. 
Paralleling the development of the knowledge of incident causation in the outdoor 
education sector, there has also been the development of an understanding of the 
processes of judgment and decision-making. A comprehensive summary of this 
knowledge is also contained in Chapter 4. Boyes (2000) conducted research into 
outdoor adventure decision-making as a PhD study at Otago University. He 
identified a need to, "understand more about an outdoor leader's decision-making 
to improve the quality of performance and to develop instructional curricula and 
technologies to aid and support training" (Boyes, 2000, p.ii). Boyes came up with 
a framework model of outdoor adventure decision-making (OADM) that is shown 
as Figure 23 in Chapter 4. This model is based on the work of naturalistic 
decision-making (NDM) theorists such as Endsley (1997), Klein & Woods 
(1993), Orasanu & Fischer (1997) and others. Boyes' study acknowledges 
foundation work done in the outdoor education sector on decision-making and 
judgment (Martin & Priest, 1986; Mortlock, 1984; Priest & Chase, 1989; Priest & 
Gass, 1997) and builds on this. This model suggests that outdoor leaders make 
decisions based on wanting to achieve, "an ideal balance of challenge, through the 
identification and correction of over-challenging and under-challenging 
situations" (Boyes, 2000, p.309). Boyes' explained that challenge is defined using 
Martin and Priest's (1986) Adventure Experience Paradigm as an interaction of 
risk and competence. Thus Boyes' model suggests that outdoor leaders make 
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ongoing decisions in an effort to balance the risk present with the competence of 
the group in order to achieve an ideal level of challenge. 
These models and theories are the most recently developed and summarise the 
current state of knowledge in the outdoor education sector about incident 
causation and the role of instructor judgment. The research in this study takes 
these concepts and develops them along new lines to enhance the understanding 
of incident causation within the sector. 
7.5.2 A Language and Categorisation System/or Outdoor Education Error 
Perhaps one of the most important outcomes of this research is a structured 
language for the discussion of root causes of error. In the editorial comment 
introducing a special edition of the Journal of Adventure Education and Outdoor 
Leaming with a focus on risk and safety, Loynes (1996, p.4) stated that, "We still 
do not have a widely understood language with which to discuss risk." It is my 
belief that a language helps remove the mystique of any subject and allows the 
concepts to enter everyday conversation for those involved. Having the words to 
describe root causes and their concepts will mean that discussions can occur about 
the causes of incidents in the outdoor education sector. This may raise awareness 
of those root causes and that awareness might itself help to prevent incidents. 
While the recent work of authors such as Priest ( 1990), Priest & Baillie (1987), 
Priest & Gass ( 1997) and Haddock (2003) have established and built on a basic 
vocabulary, I believe the work here goes substantially further than the previous 
efforts, incorporating elements from recent work in the fields of safety 
management and psychology. 
Through the work presented in this study people throughout the sector will, for the 
first time, be able to discuss the difference between prevailing conditions that are 
the immediate causes of incidents, and the underlying root causes that lead to the 
existence of those conditions. They will be able to discuss the difference between 
types of root cause and the tokens of those types. Furthermore the root causes and 
tokens will have names that people can start to use and discuss during their work. 
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The proposed taxonomy of error shown in Figure 60 shows the language of the 
root causes of error for outdoor education incidents. The 'types' of root causes are 
categorised according to how they lead to incidents occurring, and the 'tokens' of 
the various 'types' are shown to demonstrate the relationships between the 'types' 
and 'tokens'. This taxonomy, when combined with the model of outdoor 
education incident causation, clearly delineates a structure of root causes of 
outdoor education incidents and explain the link between these root causes and 
higher order 'conditions' leading to such incidents. 
A clear demonstration of the value of this new language and system of 
categorisation of error can be shown in relation to an example from existing 
outdoor education literature. Haddock (2003) stated that there are a number of 
social and psychological factors which are at play whenever an outdoor education 
activity is undertaken and which can contribute to the risk of that activity. 
Haddock then listed a number of these factors, such as familiarisation, risk (sic) 
shift, get-home-itis, dropping your guard and attribution theory, with an 
explanation of each. However the explanation does not include the relationship 
between the factors mentioned and how they impact on the causal sequence in any 
incident. 
Using Figures 60 and 61 it now becomes clear how these various factors influence 
the causal sequence of an incident. Haddock's 'familiarisation' can be seen to be 
three separate effects in the causal sequence due to the ongoing exposure of an 
instructor to an activity, group of students or activity setting: frequency 
desensitivity is a token of the root cause 'poor situational awareness'; negative 
event feedback is a token of the root cause 'inaccurate assessment of the risk'; 
and, no-accident errors are a token of the root causes 'poor processing of past 
experiences'. 'Risky shift' and 'Get-home-itis' are both seen to be tokens of the 
root cause 'choosing to take a higher level of risk than needed'. 'Dropping your 
guard' is seen to be a token of the root cause 'poor situational awareness' that I 
have named 'end of session I going home'. 
The proposed taxonomy shifts the focus from the individual factors that Haddock 
mentioned, and which are seen to all be tokens of root causes, to the actual types 
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of root cause. By doing this the emphasis can be placed on actions to prevent the 
root causes from progressing towards an incident. In the examples mentioned in 
the last paragraph, this would see any instructor ensuring that he / she maintains 
good levels of situational awareness, an accurate assessment of any risks, and not 
taking unnecessary risks with the group in his/ her care. Understanding the way 
in which these various factors interact to produce an incident sequence therefore 
gives clarity to the emphasis required when managing activities. 
7.5.3 Implications for Hate's Model of an Outdoor Accident 
Hale's model (Figure 5) and Meyer's extension of it (Figure 6) have their place as 
very simple depictions of how the potential for an accident is created but are 
limited in their use. They do not show the relationship between the conditions 
leading to an incident (immediate causes) and the root causes of the incident. Nor 
do they explain the function of an organisation and its safety system, compared to 
the role of the instructor in decision-making and performance of the instructor 
while looking after the group. Furthermore the concept of a no-error incident by 
virtue of the inherent risk of outdoor activities is not contained within the model. 
Figure 61 has replaced these other two models. All of the deficiencies explained 
in relation to both Hale's model and Meyer's model have been addressed in the 
new model. However, the feedback from some Delphi panel members expressed 
that Figure 61 was too complex for an introduction to practitioners as a tool. For 
that reason I have developed a simplified version of the model which is shown as 
Figure 62. This retains the core principles of Figure 61 but leaves the detail to be 
expanded at a time that is deemed appropriate by anyone introducing the model to 
others. 
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Root Causes due to a poor safety management system or poor 
implementation of the safety management system by managers. 
This model is a significant advance on the previous models by Hale (1984) and 
Meyer (1979), as it directs the reader beyond the immediate causes to focus 
attention on the underlying root causes of the incident. Identifying and correcting 
these root causes will lead to long-term solutions to problems. 
7.5.4 Implications/or the Meyer and Williamson Matrix 
Prior to this study the Meyer/ Williamson matrix was the most regularly cited 
summary of the potential causes of accidents. This summary contained a mixture 
of unsafe conditions, unsafe acts and errors in judgment. Although containing 
some of the root causes named in this study, this structure did not solely identify 
root causes. The taxonomy of error shown in Figure 60 replaces this matrix and 
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offers a significant advance over the previous work. The root causes are identified 
as falling into two main categories: Management systems errors; and, those 
factors leading to poor performance or judgment. Within the two major categories 
there is a structured list ofroot causes, ordered by subcategory. It is now possible 
to work through this list with management staff and instructors, or trainee 
instructors, in a logical manner. The list will both raise awareness of the 
underlying causes of incidents, and also act as a tool to focus the monitoring and 
training of staff. 
Feedback from experts in the outdoor education field has attested to the 
comprehensive and useful nature of this new taxonomy. 
7.5.5 Implications/or Boyes' Outdoor Adventure Decision-Making Model 
7.5.5.1. Weaknesses in the Outdoor Adventure Decision-Making Model 
As explained earlier, Boyes' (2000) model of how outdoor leaders make decisions 
when working in an adventure education setting with students is the most recent 
published model. His outdoor adventure decision-making (OADM) model is 
based on the theories of naturalistic decision-making which are applicable to 
complex time-dependent situations such as adventure education experiences. 
Boyes OADM model is shown in Figure 23 (Chapter 4). The results of this study 
both support Boyes' model and also point to some limitations. The OADM model 
suggests that any leader is continually carrying out the processes of situational 
awareness and situational (risk) assessment. The situational awareness is in 
relation to the environment and people while the assessment is in relation to 
ensuring that the level of challenge presented to the group is appropriate to the 
educational goals of the programme. 
The taxonomy of error presented in Figure 60 can be applied to this OADM 
model to show how error can enter the decision-making process as it is depicted. 
In this way the root causes leading to poor performance or judgment numbered 1 
- 13 in Figure 60 can be applied to the OADM model. These are all factors that 
relate to the decision-making environment and implementation of any decision. 
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However the root causes numbered 14- 17 cannot be fitted into the OADM 
model as currently depicted. The root causes that do not fit are 'failing to meet 
judgment responsibilities' and 'misdirected motivation'. These two categories of 
root causes have been found in this study to be the most frequently occurring root 
causes in the 18 case studies. As the Delphi panel has endorsed the taxonomy of 
error in Figure 60, the fact that they can't be readily placed into the OADM model 
points to the existence of some significant limitations. 
The challenge is to produce another model of outdoor adventure decision-making 
that retains the basic features of Boyes' OADM model, but allows for the final 
decision reached ( and the behaviours based on that decision) to result in a higher 
level of risk being taken than is explained by the instructor simply making efforts 
to optimise the challenge in an activity in order to achieve the educational goals of 
the programme. I believe the clue to a suitable decision-making model is revealed 
by contemporary theories on how attitudes guide behaviour. Two such theories 
can be used to develop a model of outdoor adventure decision-making that is able 
to explain how root causes 14 - 17 in Figure 60 lead to poor risk-taking strategies 
being adopted; which is the current weakness in Boyes' model. 
7.5.5.2. The Theory of Reasoned Action 
Ajzen and Fishbein's (1980) theory ofreasoned action is shown in schematic form 
in Figure 63. According to this theory an individual's eventual behaviour is 
governed by their behavioural intention. Their intention is arrived at by 
considering, weighing up and combining two separate factors: 
1. His or her attitude toward the behaviour in question; and 
2. Subjective norms about the behaviour. These norms involve both the 
person's beliefs about what important others think that he or she should do 
and the person's motivation to comply with those wishes (Fazio & 
Roskos-Ewoldson, 1994). 
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Figure 63. A schematic diagram of Ajzen and Fishbein's theory ofreasoned action. 
(From Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p.8) 
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An example of this model in the outdoor education decision-making context will 
help to explain why it is useful. Consider two instructors deciding whether to 
undertake an activity that has a higher level of risk than would be dictated by 
simply trying to optimise the challenge to meet programme goals. According to 
the theory an instructor faced with making this decision would consider the 
outcomes that are likely to occur if this higher risk option was taken. Instructor A 
may believe the higher risk option will result in students that are challenged, who 
feel really excited by their day's activities and who return with a high degree of 
personal development. Instructor B however may believe the outcomes could be 
injury or discomfort from the higher risk option, leading to censure from 
management and peers. From this information each instructor would adopt a 
different attitude towards taking the higher risk option: Instructor A would have a 
positive attitude and Instructor B would have a negative attitude to the more risky 
option. According to the theory, the instructors would also consider how people 
who are important to them (management, peers, students, etc.) would feel about 
them undertaking the higher risk activity and their motivation to comply with 
those people's wishes. For example, Instructor A is with a group of students who 
he / she believes are very keen on attempting the high risk option. It is easy to see 
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that this belief (subjective norm) will reinforce Instructor A's attitudes to adopt 
the higher risk options. In contrast, Instructor B may hold the belief (subjective 
norm) that it is wiser to follow company policy which prescribes only using the 
minimum level of risk to achieve educational outcomes and, as a result would 
reject the higher risk option. 
This hypothetical case study shows how the theory of reasoned action can explain 
how an individual can reach a decision that is based on personal beliefs, social 
pressures, personal goals / values and their individual motivations. These factors 
were not present in the OADM model and so an incorporation of this theory into 
the model would eliminate this oversight. However the theory of reasoned action 
assumes that people deliberate about the wisdom of a given course of action. The 
assumption is that they have the time and ability to consciously consider and 
deliberate about their attitudes and their implications before adopting a specific 
course of action. As has been discussed earlier in this thesis, and certainly when 
concerning theories of naturalistic decision-making, there are often times in 
outdoor education settings when there is limited time and / or ability to carry out 
reasoned thought. What does the theory suggest happens in these cases? 
7.5.5.3 The Attitude-to-Behaviour Process Model 
The 'Attitude-to-Behaviour Process Model' developed by Fazio and his 
colleagues (Fazio, 1986; Fazio, Powell & Williams, 1983) suggests that attitudes 
can guide a person's behaviour even when they don't actively reflect on and 
deliberate about the attitude. Fazio's model is shown in Figure 64. 
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Figure 64. A schematic diagram of Fazio's Attitude-to-Behaviour process model 
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According to this model an individual's behaviour is triggered by the individual's 
definition (interpretation) of the event that is occurring. This definition or 
interpretation of the event consists of two components: the individual's immediate 
perceptions of the attitude object in that situation and the definition of the 
situation. The 'definition of the situation' refers to the stored knowledge that the 
individual has about behaviours that are expected and appropriate in this situation. 
Furthermore, the model maintains that upon viewing a certain situation, this will 
activate an attitude from memory which will itself affect the perception of the 
situation being viewed. This selective perception will impact on the definition of 
the event and affect the eventual behaviour exhibited. The initial attitude-to-
behaviour process is activated from memory as a result of situational cues. If the 
attitudes are highly accessible from memory due to strong associations then the 
whole process, from first viewing a situation through to carrying out a behaviour, 
is automatic and effortless. No conscious thought is required (Fazio & Roskos-
Ewoldsen, 1994). 
An example in an outdoor education context will help explain the process. 
Consider Instructor A from the previous example. Assume that he / she has been 
working for some time with the personal beliefs and attitudes discussed in the 
previous example (i.e., he / she believes in presenting groups with a high level of 
challenge / adventure and wants to meet any group's desires / wishes I 
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expectations to carry out adventurous activities whenever possible). Also assume 
that the instructor has had no feedback, either from respected peers, or from 
misadventures I incidents, that would cause them to re-evaluate their past 
decisions at a time when they had the opportunity to reflect. Strong attitudes and 
behavioural norms will have been built up over time by Instructor A. Now 
assume Instructor A is on a river, above a rapid, with a group of students. Part 
way down the rapid there is a tree across part of the rapid but a clear passage 
exists to one side. Instructor A has to make a decision on a course of action. The 
students all say they want to run the rapid. The model suggests that in this case an 
automatic behaviour will be triggered. The situation will be recognised as one 
where there is the opportunity to challenge the students and test their skills. This 
will activate the attitude in Instructor A that adventurous activities are a good 
thing. Selective perception will cause the instructor to underplay issues such as: 
the water flow mostly going into the tree, one student in the group who has not 
been showing good skills, and the navigable passage not being very wide. 
Furthermore, the instructor has built up behavioural norms in similar situations 
where running a rapid like this has been successful. Thus for Instructor A the 
process from being presented with the situation, through to making a decision to 
run the rapid, is almost immediate and without serious weighing of any 
alternatives. 
These two models present two different processes by which attitudes can guide 
people to making decisions on which final behaviour to adopt. One focuses on a 
deliberate, planned, reasoned action in which attitudes exert an impact because of 
reflection upon the attitude and those of others. The other is a more impulsive 
reaction, almost a habit, based on one's attitude's influence upon one's 
perceptions of situations. Just as in the Elaboration Likelihood Model to 
Persuasion in Section 4.4.3 this suggests there are two possible routes to 
behaviour. Fazio & Roskos-Ewoldsen (1994) believe that choice between the two 
routes depends upon both the levels of involvement of the person and the 
opportunity they have to spend time and energy on the problem. The reasoned 
approach requires a lot of cognitive effort and therefore both involvement and 
opportunity must be high. Involvement will be high if the consequences of the 
behavioural decision are thought to be important and personally relevant. When 
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there is low perceived consequence of unfavourable outcome, behaviour is likely 
to flow spontaneously from the interpretation of the situation. Situations that 
require an immediate decision can also deny the chance to engage in reasoning. 
7.5.5.4. A Proposed Decision-making Mode/for Outdoor Education -The 
Likelihood-To-Think Model (LTT). 
A model of outdoor education decision-making is proposed in Figures 65-67 that 
integrates theories of 'reasoned thinking' and the 'attitude-to-behaviour process' 
into a naturalistic decision-making framework. 
The proposed 'Likelihood-To-Think' model (LTT) is significantly different than 
the OADM model proposed by Boyes (2000). Based on cognitive theory, I 
suggest through the L TT model that there are two possible paths by which an 
instructor can reach a decision as to the appropriate action to take when in charge 
of a group of students in a hazardous situation. First, the instructor must realise 
that an action is required. He / she becomes aware of this through an on-going 
monitoring of the situation (situational awareness). Boyes contends that this 
involves monitoring the environment, people and goals of the programme. My 
belief is that the instructor monitors the potential hazards in the environment, 
people and resources (immediate causes) and makes an assessment that an 
intervention is required if any combination of hazards registers against their 
personal assessment that the risk is too high. Then, depending on the instructor's 
level of involvement in the situation, the opportunity they have for processing and 
their ability to process, they will either use a 'spontaneous' path or a 'thoughtful' 
path to reach a decision on the best course of action. 
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Figure 65. Proposed model of outdoor education decision-making in a hazardous 
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Figure 66. Proposed model of the spontaneous path to decision-making 
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Figure 67. Proposed model of the thoughtful path to decision-making 
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The 'thoughtful path' will be used if the instructor recognises the importance of 
the situation in terms of the potential consequences of a poor decision being 
implemented while at the same time believing there is a need to consider various 
possible solutions in detail, has the time to stop and consider options, and has the 
ability (physical, mental, emotional states) to consider the options. Based on his / 
her perception of the situation, his I her experience and other resources at hand, 
the instructor will generate a number of possible options for action. The instructor 
will assess these to determine an optimal solution. However that optimal solution 
is gauged not only against the instructor's perception of the programme goals set 
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by the organisation, but also against the instructor's beliefs about those goals, the 
instructor's personal goals, and their motivation to comply with either of these 
and many other factors. In this way, even though an instructor may be completely 
cognisant of the organisational safety goals and acceptable level of risk, a higher 
level of risk may be implemented that is compatible with the instructor's personal 
beliefs, or the social pressures on him / her. 
A further reason that the 'thoughtful path' will be taken is if the situation is so 
dynamic as to be unpredictable or significantly different to past experiences. In 
both of these cases Shanteau ( 1992) believes that a decision based on a recognised 
solution is not possible. However, even if the situation is recognised as being 
unique, time pressures may force a spontaneous 'best-fit' path to be taken. 
The 'spontaneous path' will be used when involvement, opportunity or ability to 
adopt the 'thoughtful path' are not present. This path sees the immediate trigger of 
attitudes held by that instructor to the situation. This will limit their ability to 
objectively assess the situation and a rule-based solution based on past experience 
will be chosen and implemented. This is an automatic process and careful 
consideration of programme goals, etc., will not occur. 
This dual pathway model is similar in many ways to the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model of Persuasion discussed in Section 4.4.3. Theories of dual pathways to 
attitude change or behaviour are common in cognitive psychology (e.g., Norman 
& Shallice, 1986; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977;) where 
there is believed to be a difference between 'controlled' and 'automatic' 
processmg. 
The L TT model is able to incorporate all of the types of instructor error contained 
in the taxonomy of error shown in Figure 60. The root causes 14 (Choosing to 
take a higher level of risk than needed), 15 (Deferring judgment to others), 16 (No 
judgment made), 1 7 (Breaks organisational policies) and 18 (Sabotage) can all be 
accommodated by this model. 
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I believe the reason that Boyes did not specifically identify the role of personal 
attitudes / values in his decision-making model was due to a limitation in his 
research method. Boyes' method can be considered to consist of two phases. The 
first phase involved the interview of ten highly experienced outdoor experts. The 
experts were interviewed in a semi-structured manner about past experiences 
where, "things had gone wrong or had the potential to do so" (Boyes, 2000, p.75). 
These experiences were explored for what had happened in the task environment 
in terms of cues that were present that the leader used to make an assessment of 
the situation and base a decision upon. The second phase of the research involved 
constructing seven scenarios, based on the incidents discussed by the leaders in 
phase one, and having other outdoor leaders work through those scenarios using a 
computer model to make decisions on how they would proceed in the given 
situations. 
The fact that the interviews in phase one were structured around the task 
environment in determining how the leader established a balance between risk and 
competence, meant that cues that triggered the introduction of personal attitudes 
into the decision-making process were probably overlooked. The scenarios for 
phase two of the research were built on the cues discovered in phase one and, as 
already mentioned, were unlikely to include issues related to the personal needs, 
values, goals of, and social pressures on, the leader. In his thesis Boyes mentions 
that NDM theory, "involves an interaction of the leader's experiences, values and 
goals with dynamic information from the natural environment and the social 
group" (Boyes, 2000, p.309). This is consistent with the proposed LTT model in 
Figure 65. 
The L TT model has implications for Boyes' recommendations on the training of 
outdoor leaders based on his OADM model. He suggested that direct outdoor 
experience of leadership situations can be supplemented with theoretical and 
classroom based learning and that case studies can be used to, "expose novices to 
relatively unfamiliar situations and experiences as well as exploring classical 
decision situations" (Boyes, 2000, p.311 ). While I agree with this form of training 
and have suggested it myself in this study, care must be taken to ensure that case 
studies include cues that will raise issues of how the leader's beliefs, involvement, 
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abilities and opportunity impact on the final decision that is implemented with the 
group in that leader's care. 
7.5.5.5. Cognitive Dissonance and Implications for the LTT Model 
I have chosen to label the proposed model of outdoor education decision-making 
the "likelihood-to-think" model for much the same reason that Petty & Cacioppo 
( 1981) described their model the "Elaboration Likelihood Model". While Petty 
and Cacioppo were interested in the likelihood that people would elaborate upon 
certain messages and be persuaded by those messages, the L TT model is 
concerned with whether instructors in hazardous situations are likely to think 
deeply about the options available and the impact of personal attitudes on any 
final decision. 
Neuman (1984) contended that experts are more likely to adopt the automatic 
process (spontaneous path) because they have a well-developed set of available 
skills linked to a wide range of recognisable experiences. Styles ( 1997) made the 
comparison with a skilled and experienced chess player. As the game progresses, 
the experienced person recognises cues which activate pre-existing schemata in 
long-term memory. Actions are chosen automatically and implemented. Novices 
do not have these pre-existing schemata to aid them. This applies equally to the 
outdoor education world where experienced instructors will rely less and less on 
the 'thinking path' as their experience builds and an increasing number of 
schemata (patterned behaviours in response to cues) are stored in long-term 
memory. Beare (2001) researched the way that outdoor experts made decisions in 
hazardous situations and concluded that those experts preferred to use intuitive or 
recognition-primed strategies over rational decision-making strategies. 
Furthermore Beare's research showed that experts would try the first available 
solution to see if this worked and would only search for another possible solution 
if the first was unsuccessful - a serial approach to decision-making. These 
findings are consistent with the proposed L TT model. 
The use by outdoor experts ofrecognition-primed strategies (spontaneous path) is 
appropriate and efficient as long as the schemata are appropriate, and as long as 
the right cues are being perceived from which to recall stored solutions. Beare 
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(2001) noted that outdoor experts are using these recognition-primed decision-
making strategies regularly, often many times within an hour, and this approach 
only rarely results in any incident. However, as discussed in this chapter, if either 
the schemata are inappropriate or there is an error in perceiving situational cues, 
then incidents are more likely to result. My belief is that we should be 
encouraging instructors to adopt the 'thinking path' to decision-making whenever 
possible (even if this is retrospectively through a review process at the end of the 
day to reconsider key decisions made during activities for alternative and possibly 
better solutions to problems that arose) and ensuring they have clear 
understandings of organisational attitudes to acceptable risk-taking to help reach a 
defendable course of action. While there are many times when the 'spontaneous 
path' is effective and efficient, and this is especially true in emergency situations, 
there is an argument that some may overuse this path in the outdoors. My 
experience is that when instructing it may appear necessary to make fast 
decisions, but it is rare that time is not available to consider options and the 
consequences of those options. As has been discussed earlier, root causes that lead 
to the poor processing of past experiences can lead to unsafe practices being 
applied automatically in inappropriate contexts. Encouraging regular use of the 
'thinking path' will help facilitate the storage of solutions incorporating 
organisational-approved risk taking levels as schemata to be used in crisis 
situations. 
The L TT model suggests that there are times when instructors will adopt 
behaviours / actions that follow personal attitudes / beliefs that produce higher 
risks than the organisation would condone. Is there some way that this mismatch 
can be rectified / prevented? 
Festinger (1957) proposed a theory which has general acceptance in the field of 
cognitive psychology to explain what would happen in a situation like this 
(Cooper & Scher, 1994). Festinger's theory, called the theory of cognitive 
dissonance, states that whenever a person holds thoughts that are inconsistent or 
in conflict, that the person will feel tension. The tension will be experienced as a 
drive or need to reduce the inconsistency between the two opposing thoughts. 
Festinger claimed that the amount of dissonance (and therefore the intensity of the 
Chapter Seven - Results and Discussion: A Proposed Taxonomy of Root Causes ... p.364 
drive to reduce that dissonance) will be related to the number of discrepant 
conditions one has, divided by the number of consonant conditions one has ( each 
weighted by their perceived importance). Thus producing the equation: 
D= 
w1(# dissonant cognitions) 
w2(# consonant cognitions) 
In this equation D stands for the amount of dissonance and therefore the amount 
of drive to reduce it, while w 1 and w2 represent the weightings of importance for 
the two cognitions. To reduce the dissonance in any case there are various options. 
The most obvious is either to add consonant thoughts or reduce dissonant ones. 
Festinger argued that people change the one that is least resistant to change. 
McCool and Braithwaite ( 1992) argued that cognitive dissonance will lead 
individuals to change behaviour and avoid future situations that may produce 
dissonance. This would be a preferred outcome if the individuals in question 
avoided taking higher risks in the future. However the equation above shows that 
by entrenching existing attitudes the dissonance can also be reduced. 
Consider again the hypothetical case study of Instructor A who chose to take a 
higher risk option than would be sanctioned by company policy. This conflict 
between his action and the moral duty to follow the practices of the employer 
would produce cognitive dissonance. The way Instructor A can reduce the 
dissonance is by thinking about all of the positive outcomes of his decision 
(increasing the consonant cognitions) and perhaps discussing with other 
instructors the inappropriateness of the organisational risk-taking philosophies 
(decreasing the dissonant cognitions). If his activity is undertaken without 
incident, this will further reinforce consonant cognitions, dissonance will be 
reduced and the attitude will form a regular pattern of behaviour for that 
instructor. Even in the wake of negative outcomes it has been shown that people 
will try to reduce dissonance by claiming responsibility for their successes and 
stating their failures were due to something else. It is believed by some that the 
more thinking that people do about issues, without being exposed to new 
influences, leads to strengthening of personal attitudes and is referred to as 
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thought polarisation (Petty & Krosnick, 1995). Some researchers believe that the 
entrenching of attitudes in dissonance-causing situations is related to the desire to 
protect self-image or self-esteem (Schlenker, 1982; Steele, 1988). 
A good example of the process of cognitive dissonance at work is in the feedback 
for Incident 576. In this case a student fell approximately seven metres over a cliff 
and broke his femur. There was no direct supervision at the time as the instructor 
had removed himself from the group to allow the students to navigate and make 
decisions on their own. The fact that the incident occurred would have raised 
dissonance in the instructor's mind: 'my actions were justified in allowing 
opportunity for the group to develop by making decision on their own,' vs., 'ifl 
had been with the group the incident wouldn't have occurred.' In his narrative of 
the incident, the instructor reduced the level of dissonance by explaining the 
benefits of unaccompanied trips for students (increased consonant cognitions), 
explained that he and the centre staff had reviewed the terrain and their practices 
following the incident and found this activity to be acceptable, and explained the 
incident as being due to the student not following instructions. The instructor had 
therefore justified to himself that this incident was not due to his decision to leave 
the group unsupervised ( decreased dissonant cognitions). When the Delphi panel 
raised queries about the inappropriateness of that organisation's risk-taking 
philosophies this again increased the dissonance in the instructor. The response 
was an attempt to reduce the dissonance through the statement that: 
"I believe that true adventure is being lost from outdoor education. This 
organisation has successfully maintained a high adventure level with a 
very good safety record and I'm happy with it." 
How can cognitive dissonance theory be used to decrease incident rates? Senior 
management will be trying to manage risk to minimise the number of times that 
staff are operating at levels of risk that are higher than is believed to be 
acceptable. In order to achieve this goal, each individual instructor's personal 
beliefs and values must be aligned to the same risk-taking level as that held by the 
organisation. Cognitive dissonance theory states that if dissonance levels are high 
then instructors will want to reduce the level. Dissonance will be high, thereby 
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signaling the need for change, if the person feels personally responsible and 
appreciates the moral wrongfulness of any potential negative outcomes (Cooper & 
Scher, 1994). Attitudes will change as a way to reduce dissonance if that is the 
easiest thing for the instructor to change to reduce the dissonance. If such a 
change is seen as a threat to self-image or self-esteem then other avenues will be 
taken to reduce the dissonance. 
The outcome of this discussion of the LTT model and cognitive dissonance is that 
the safety conscious organisation must therefore ensure its safety goals and 
philosophies are well communicated to staff in order to maximise any potential 
dissonance if individual instructional staff hold different attitudes to risk. The 
management of the organisation must find ways to help that individual to examine 
and change their attitudes, and therefore behaviours, in a way that preserves their 
self-esteem, if safety is to be maintained. The expressed attitudes and norms 
followed by respected peers will aid this process where individuals must reassess 
their personal attitudes. Another approach to encouraging this change in 
individual attitudes is suggested by Norman and Shallice's (1986) list of task 
attributes where deliberate attentional resources are needed: 
1) Require planning or decision-making. 
2) Involve components of trouble shooting. 
3) Are ill-learned or contain novel sequences. 
4) Are judged to be dangerous or technically difficult. 
5) Require overcoming a strong habitual response. 
The task of re-learning a satisfactory response to situational cues in a hazardous 
situation meets all of these criteria. Therefore the instructor with an inappropriate 
match of risk-taking attitude should be encouraged to document his / her decision 
and the process taken to arrive at it. In this way he / she will be encouraged to 
adopt the 'thinking path' and will start storing new solutions in long-term memory 
that involve organisationally-acceptable levels of risk. 
7.5.6 Implications for Priest's Multiphase Problem Solving Model 
Priest (1988) proposed a model of how he believed outdoor leaders made 
decisions (solved problems) that has recently been republished in a text that 
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purports on its back cover to be, " ... the first book to provide in-depth information 
on the key elements of effective outdoor leadership" (Priest & Gass, 1997). 
Priest's model (Figure 68) has not been mentioned until this stage of the thesis 
because close analysis of the model shows that, at its core, it is only a slightly 
embellished version of the traditional model of decision-making (Figure 19). The 
traditional model has already been shown to have limitations in incorporating 
knowledge about how decisions are made in real-life, complex, time-dependent 
situations and been superseded by NDM models. 
The reason I have chosen to introduce the model now is that Priest proposed that 
outdoor leaders use two versions of the multiphase problem solving model: a short 
form and a long form. At first reading this sounds similar to the two paths 
proposed in the L TT model derived in this thesis and therefore needs 
consideration. 
Priest and Gass's (1997) explanation of the appropriate use of the two forms relies 
on the complexity of the problem. They state that the short form of the model is 
used when the problem is 'simple', where 'simple' is defined as when everything 
appears known about the problem and therefore there are no 'No' answers coming 
from the decision boxes in the analytical phase of the model. For the short form of 
the model only the assessment and analytical phases are used, therefore requiring 
no creativity and no experience-based judgment; although Priest & Gass ( 1997, 
p.267) state that, "Although judgment does not play a formal role in the process, 
naturally you cannot afford to abandon judgment at any time while solving a 
problem". They also concede that the short form should also be used if," ... time to 
consider is limited, the decision is not life-threatening, group resources are 
predictable, or success is predictable" (p.268). The complex form is used when 
answers to questions in the analytical phase are negative or don't come easily. 
They state that judgment plays a large role in this longer form of the model. 
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Figure 68. Priest's Multiphase Problem Solving Model 
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These descriptions of the usefulness of, and the processes involved in, the two 
forms of decision-making are counter to the empirical evidence gathered by NDM 
researchers of how real life decisions are made by experts as described earlier in 
this thesis. Experts tend to use a shorter form of decision-making by preference, 
based on their long experience of successfully solving similar situations. They 
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tend to choose and employ a solution with little conscious thought, based on the 
recognition of situational cues that they pick out from the problem environment. 
The more expert the leader, the greater the number of stored solutions and 
therefore the less likely that expert is to use a longer form of decision-making. 
This ability to successfully recall and implement an immediate solution is what 
practitioners would refer to as experience-based judgment. Thus experts will 
regularly make 'snap' decisions and put them into action, even when the outcomes 
are life-threatening, resources are limited and there is time to consider other 
solutions. Contrary to Priest and Gass's assertions, a longer form of decision-
making tends to be used by novices who do not have the benefit of experience and 
need to carefully weigh the consequences of different possible options before 
making a decision in the absence of experience-based judgment. 
A further problem with Priest's model is that it shares the same limitation as the 
Boyes model discussed earlier, in that it is not easy to incorporate the root causes 
numbered 14 - 17 (Figure 60) into the model as currently depicted. The model 
would need to be altered to allow for the impact of the beliefs, values, attitudes 
and motivations of the instructor on the various stages of the decision-making 
process. There is no indication that Priest's model has been built on empirically 
derived research, but rather has been developed as a theoretical construct, and the 
limitations of this approach are seen when empirical data fail to be accommodated 
by this construct. 
The identified limitations and weaknesses of Priest's 'Multiphase' model appear 
to be resolved in the L TT Model that has been proposed. 
7.6Summary 
This chapter saw the combination of the empirical results of Chapter 6 with the 
theoretical results of a literature review in the fields of outdoor education, safety 
management and psychology from Chapter 4. The outcomes ofthis were a 
taxonomy of the root causes of error for the outdoor education sector (Figure 60) 
and a model of outdoor education incident causation (Figures·61 and 62). 
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The taxonomy offers a language and system of categorisation of outdoor 
education error while the model offers a structure for the causal sequence of any 
incident. Between them, the taxonomy and model provide the outdoor education 
sector with a means to discuss and debate the root causes of incidents. Even the 
action of talking about the various root causes is likely to have an awareness-
raising function and help prevent some incidents from eventuating. 
The taxonomy of error gives the management of any outdoor education 
organisation a structure by which they can self-audit their safety management 
system and work towards improvements. It also offers an aid to in-house and off-
job training of outdoor leaders where targeted training methods can be employed 
to correct examples of specific root causes identified following any incident. 
Both the taxonomy and the model of incident causation, which contains the 
taxonomy, are considered to be 'works in progress'. As more information comes 
to light from the sector, either of these tools can be added to or changed in order 
to incorporate the new knowledge. Unfortunately, as the taxonomy of error is 
updated with new information, despite indications to the contrary, it appears there 
is no easy tool available to look back over previously recorded incidents in any 
database of incident narratives for occurrences of these new root causes for 
statistical analysis. 
The development of both the taxonomy and the model of incident causation have 
advanced knowledge in the outdoor education sector in a number of significant 
ways: 
• A structure and language have been developed around the types and tokens 
of root causes. This language will allow those in the outdoor education 
sector to discuss the underlying causes of incidents. This knowledge and 
discussion will hopefully keep those root causes nearer the forefront of 
people's consciousness and thus, may lead to a reduction in the frequency of 
incidents. 
• Hale's (1984) model ofan outdoor accident (Figure 5) and Meyer's (1979) 
extension of this model (Figure 6) were both found to have serious 
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limitations. The models mixed prevailing conditions (immediate causes) 
with the root causes, they did not indicate the relationships between the root 
causes and the immediate causes, and there was no mention of the role of the 
organisational safety management system in the model. A new model of an 
outdoor education incident causal sequence has been proposed (Figures 61 
& 62) that has none of these limitations. This model gives greater insight to 
those in the outdoor education sector wishing to understand the causal 
pathway following any incident. 
• The Meyer I Williamson (1979-2003) matrix of the potential causes of 
accidents in outdoor pursuits is the most commonly cited list of such causes. 
The matrix was found to contain a mixture of conditions (immediate causes) 
and root causes. The matrix was also far from comprehensive. In its place is 
a proposed taxonomy of error for outdoor education (Figure 60). This 
taxonomy has been reviewed by a group of outdoor experts. The feedback 
from the experts has been that the taxonomy is well structured and the root 
causes identified within it are all credible. Many commented that it is the 
most comprehensive list that they have seen and believe it will be a very 
useful tool for the sector. 
• Boyes' (2000) OADM model of how an outdoor leader makes decisions was 
found to be inconsistent with the taxonomy of error. Boyes' model is based 
on the premise that an outdoor leader will make a decision within an activity 
context whereby they will choose an optimum level of challenge to achieve 
their programme goals. In order to remove the inconsistency, a new model 
of outdoor education decision-making has been proposed based on work in 
cognitive psychology. This model, the 'Likelihood To Think' model (LTT) 
suggests that there are two possible paths to decision-making. One involves 
conscious thought but is driven by individual values and beliefs, and the 
other involves almost no thought and is driven by behavioural norms that the 
person has that are implemented in response to situational cues. The new 
model is shown in Figures 65, 66 and 67. Further research will need to be 
undertaken to see if this model is valid for the outdoor education sector. 
• The L TT model predicts that riskier activities will be undertaken than the 
organisation is prepared to sanction if individual instructors believe those 
risks are desirable. In order to change those individual's attitudes to risk, 
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cognitive dissonance theory suggests that the instructors must be very clear 
on the organisational philosophies, which are at conflict with their own, and 
provided with ways in which they can modify their attitudes and behaviours 
while maintaining self-image and self-esteem. 
• Priest's (1998) Multiphase Problem Solving Model for outdoor leaders was 
found to have weaknesses and limitations when compared to the empirical 
evidence from this study and from other studies into naturalistic decision-
making. The L TT model resolves these problems while retaining the 
concepts of a 'short' and 'long' form of decision-making as espoused by 
Priest. 
It is important to note that the structure and delineation of categories of both the 
taxonomy and model are likely to be highly influenced by my own preconceptions 
and expectations. There are many other possible ways the information could have 
been structured and while it is important to recognise this, the real test is whether 
the taxonomy and model can be understood and found to be useful by those 
actually working in the outdoor education sector. These were both tested for 
validity by sending them to the members of the Delphi panels who are all outdoor 
experts. Their feedback confirmed that both the model of incident causation and 
the taxonomy of error fitted their experience of incident occurrence in the 
outdoors. This suggests that the approach taken to the structure and categorisation 
of root causes is legitimate. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a review of the thesis. It summarises the way in which the 
research objective was addressed and makes recommendations for incorporating 
the findings into the work of the outdoor education sector in New Zealand. This is 
followed by an assessment of the opportunities for further research that have been 
identified by this study. 
8.2 Background to the Study and Research Objective 
This research was driven by a belief in the benefits that can be gained from 
outdoor education experiences for the youth of New Zealand, while holding a 
growing sense of concern that the provision of those outdoor education services is 
under threat because of perceptions in society that outdoor education is dangerous. 
This perception is evidenced by growing media scrutiny of any outdoor education 
incident that occurs, increasing legislation that threatens punitive action should 
incidents occur if problems are found in the organisation's health and safety plans, 
and a growing willingness of government agencies such as the Police, Maritime 
Safety Authority and the Department of Labour to investigate incidents with a 
view towards prosecution. 
In order to counter this threat, I believe the outdoor education sector must be 
proactive. The sector must be able to provide comparative data indicating that 
outdoor education is not unduly dangerous. The sector must also have a thorough 
understanding of the root causes that lead to outdoor education incidents occurring 
so that practices can be put in place to reduce their occurrence, showing that the 
sector is acting in a professional manner. I believe that the current knowledge in 
the outdoor education sector about the root causes of incidents, and models of 
incident causation are at a primitive stage of development and offer only limited 
direction in terms of preventative effort. 
Chapter Eight - Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 
One objective of this research was to construct a model that increases 
understanding of the root causes of incidents in outdoor education. 
As part of the process the research addressed a number of secondary issues: 
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• An understanding of the current state of knowledge about outdoor education 
incidents was compiled. This included both theoretical knowledge and 
empirical evidence. 
• A sample of outdoor education incidents was gathered from which an 
outdoor education incident profile was developed. This profile included the 
distribution of recorded incidents by variables such as severity of outcome, 
time of day, gender of instructor, etc. An accident rate was also calculated 
from this sample and compared to other accident rates to draw comparisons. 
• The sample of incidents was analysed to identify variables that are predictors 
of those incidents, especially ones likely to result in serious injury. 
• A Delphi analysis of 18 case studies of serious incidents was used to 
produce a list of root causes of those incidents. 
• The list of root causes from the 18 incidents was supplemented by additional 
root causes of incidents, identified from a literature review from the fields of 
safety management and psychology, to produce a taxonomy of error for 
outdoor education. 
• A model of outdoor education decision-making was developed from theories 
of cognitive psychology that is consistent with the taxonomy of root causes. 
• Possible implications of the findings of this research to the training needs of 
the sector were explored. 
8.3 Research Methodology and Method 
A mixed methods approach was used to address the research objective using a 
pragmatist paradigm. 
The first phase of the research involved choosing a sample of the larger outdoor 
education centres from which to gather information about incident occurrence and 
then later in the study, to gather case studies of incidents for further analysis. 
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From 25 identified organisations that met my criteria of being 'larger outdoor 
education centres', 12 agreed to supply data. Data on their incidents from the 
years 1996 - 2000 was entered into a database and resulted in a total number of 
1908 incidents being recorded. 
The data was analysed using statistical techniques to create a profile of outdoor 
education incidents, including incident and accident rates. A number of predictors 
of serious injury were also identified. 
The second phase of the research involved the in-depth analysis of a number of 
case studies of serious incidents in order to identify the root causes of those 
incidents. Incidents that had high potential for severe injury (greater than five on 
the severity scale) were selected and a sample from those chosen that represented 
a good cross-section of: organisation involved; gender of instructor; activity type; 
and activity setting. 
Those instructors agreeing to participate were sent a computer aided interview 
tool (CAI) that guided them to write a narrative of their incident and reflect on key 
decisions they made during the development of the incident. 
Three Delphi panels, each composed of six experienced outdoor experts, were 
created for the analysis of the qualitative data. The experts were each sent six of 
the 18 CAI case studies and asked to identify what they believed were the 
immediate and root causes that led to the incidents occurring. I summarised the 
feedback from the experts studying each incident using an Events and Causal 
Factor Analysis (ECF A) diagram for the incident. This gave a visual 
representation of the incident showing all of the events leading up to the loss-
producing event in chronological sequence, and how the immediate and root 
causes were linked to these events. Through an iterative process consensus was 
reached among the experts as to the root causes of each incident. 
From the completed ECF A diagrams for all 18 case studies, the identified root 
causes were studied in greater depth. I was looking to identify categories of root 
causes based on their similarities and produce lists of the types of root causes for 
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the 18 incidents based on whether they were related to instructor judgment / 
performance errors or errors in the management systems. 
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Phase 3 of the research took these lists and combined them with a list of potential 
root causes that had been compiled from a literature review from the fields of 
outdoor education, industrial safety management and psychology. The literature 
review had also resulted in a draft model of incident causation for outdoor 
education being developed. The findings from the analysis of the case studies 
were used to reflect on the draft model and make changes to that model. The 
result was a proposed model of outdoor education incident causation. This was 
given to the Delphi panel members, along with the taxonomy of root causes that 
had been developed to test their validity in the outdoor sector. Both of these 
received endorsement from the experts with only minor changes recommended. 
8.4 Research Findings and Contributions to Knowledge 
As shown by the extensive literature review in Chapter 4, knowledge of the nature 
of the incidents occurring in outdoor education (their frequency, activities 
involved, time of occurrence, etc.) is limited. Other weaknesses in current 
knowledge involve suitable models to explain outdoor education causation, 
outdoor education decision-making and a knowledge of the root causes of outdoor 
education incidents. There is also a lack of a common language to discuss outdoor 
incidents and their causal factors. This research has helped to reduce this 
knowledge deficit. 
The results of Phase One of the research are described in detail in Chapter 5. A 
profile of outdoor education incidents was created for 12 of the larger outdoor 
education centres in New Zealand which revealed the following insights into the 
rate of accidents occurring: 
• The overall rate of serious injury resulting from outdoor education 
experiences among those organisations surveyed was no greater than the rate 
of serious injury occurring in everyday life when compared to statistics from 
the New Zealand Accident Compensation Commission. 
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• The overall injury rate for the outdoor education centres surveyed compares 
favourably with counterparts from the USA who tend to be more 
conservative in their choice of activities because of the greater threat of legal 
action in that country. 
These results are encouraging in being able to justify the continued use of the 
outdoor education medium to achieve positive outcomes with the personal 
development of young New Zealanders. However the size and make-up of the 
sample of organisations used (12 larger outdoor centres taken from an estimate of 
over 800 providers in New Zealand) means that extrapolation of these results to 
the general population of outdoor providers should be done with care. 
A detailed investigation of the 1908 recorded incidents from the 12 contributing 
organisations in the years 1996 - 2000 revealed that: 
• Studying non-serious accidents to try to prevent serious accidents is wasteful 
of time and resources. This study showed that non-serious accidents are not 
necessarily a predictor of serious accidents with only 3. 7 per cent of non-
serious accidents (rating less than 5 on the severity scale) having the 
potential for serious injury (rating 6 or more on the severity scale). The data 
showed that it was more useful to look at those incidents (accidents and near 
accidents) that had the potential for serious outcomes, and study those in 
more depth as a way of preventing serious injury. 
• Preliminary evidence from this data suggests that the following factors are 
predictive of the possibility of serious injury if they are present in an outdoor 
education activity: 
o Limited or no direct supervision by an experienced instructor. 
o Containing high energy sources such as: 
:i,.. Height, 
}.,, Speed, 
}.,, Unexpected changes in weather, 
}.,, Moving water, 
}.,, Fire or other large heat sources. 
o Carried out in a water environment. 
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No research currently exists that permits the ranking of these factors in order 
of importance and it could be argued that their relative importance is 
programme / activity dependent. While many of the recent fatalities in the 
outdoor education sector that have achieved significant media attention 
(listed in Section 2.4) have involved water, and most of these moving water, 
this should not be seen as indicative of a trend. The two multiple fatality 
incidents that rate special mention in the New Zealand Mountain Safety 
Council's report on fatalities in outdoor recreation (Table 7) did not involve 
water: Six soldiers died while undertaking adventurous training on Mt 
Ruapehu when they were trapped on the summit in unexpected weather; and, 
14 students died on a field trip when a DOC viewing platform collapsed 
(height). Three mountain guides and one client were recently killed on Mt 
Tasman when they fell several hundred metres (Cropp, 2004). My own 
experience from running a large outdoor education centre is that the majority 
of fractures are due to skiing and snowboarding (speed). 
Instructor training programmes and managers need to be aware of these 
various factors and act to manage the increased hazard whenever one or 
more of these factors is present. 
• Activities that are often used in outdoor education programmes because they 
are considered low risk, while challenging participants mentally and 
physically (such as high ropes, abseiling and tramping), can have potential 
for serious injury if any of the predictors listed above are present. 
• The ratio of reported serious to non-serious injuries is higher for groups 
supervised by male instructors than those supervised by female instructors. 
Although the reasons for this are not known, one hypothesis is that this may 
be due to males being prepared to place their groups in situations of higher 
risk than women. This has implications for the training of male instructors in 
the assessment and management of risk. 
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• Injuries are more likely to occur in the afternoons, with the worst time 
period being between 2:30pm and 4:30pm. Once again more research is 
needed to understand the reasons for this but one suggestion is that attention 
and concentration are diminished due to tiredness and lack of food. Stops to 
rest and eat before afternoon activities would be prudent. 
This is the first time that data such as these have been compiled for the outdoor 
education sector in New Zealand. The compilation of these data revealed a 
significant weakness in the incident recording systems used in the sector. 
Information that is being recorded by various outdoor education organisations is 
not consistent, and in order to be able to draw meaningful inferences from the 
data, it needs to be more comprehensive. 
In Phases Two and Three of the research the root causes of 18 case studies of 
serious outdoor education incidents were identified. These results were combined 
with the results of a literature review from the fields of outdoor education, safety 
management and cognitive psychology to propose a taxonomy of error for outdoor 
education (Figure 60) and a model of incident causation (Figure 61 ). The 
following insights are particularly relevant to the sector: 
• Many of the existing models for understanding outdoor education incidents 
and their causal factors ( e.g., Meyer, 1979; Hale, 1984; Meyer & 
Williamson, 2003) look primarily at what I consider in this study to be 
'immediate causes' (see Figure 17) and do not consider the underlying root 
causes. At best the immediate and root causes are mixed together in any 
existing model. This failure makes the models and causal factors unclear, 
and leaves doubt about where effort should be placed in preventing future 
incidents. 
• The root causes of error leading to all outdoor education incidents can be 
considered under two broad categories: 
o Those due to poor performance or judgment on behalf of a person 
responsible for the safety of participants ( directly by instructors, or 
indirectly by managers); and 
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o Those due to inadequacies in the safety management system of the 
organisation. 
Based on the work of safety management experts such as Petersen ( 1988) 
and Bird & Germain (1989) this is the first time such a formal categorisation 
of these two major classes of error has been documented and used in the 
outdoor education sector. This binary classification system has been shown 
to be useful in the identification of the root causes of outdoor education 
incidents and is endorsed by comments from the experts on the Delphi 
panels who analysed the case studies. 
• All of the case studies of serious incidents were found to be due to a 
combination of both performance/ judgment errors and management system 
errors with an average of 13 root causes identified per incident. This 
supports the theory of 'multiple causation' propounded by Petersen (1988) 
and others that suggests that an incident is generally the result of a 
combination of a number of causal factors combining to produce accident 
potential. 
• The taxonomy of error proposed for the outdoor education sector (Figure 60) 
identifies 18 'types' of root cause leading to poor performance or judgment, 
and 19 'types' due to inadequacies in the safety management system. 
Underlying these 'types' are many more 'tokens' which are manifestations 
of the types. 
• Casual enquiry of those involved in the outdoor industry indicated that 
popular belief was that incidents were occurring in outdoor education due to 
instructors with inadequate skills and experience being placed in charge of 
groups, or because of instructors' poor judgment skills. However, the Delphi 
analysis of 18 case studies did not support this. The most common types of 
root cause across all incidents studied were those where the instructors in 
charge of the group either: chose to take a higher level of risk than that 
needed to achieve the programme outcomes; or, misapplied skills in which 
they already had been assessed as being competent. These results have 
significant relevance for instructor training programmes (where emphasis 
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needs to be shifted to include analysis of, and attitudes towards, risk) and for 
the need to constantly monitor instructor performance and provide feedback. 
• The identification of types ofroot causes of error where instructors: chose to 
take higher levels of risk than needed; deferred judgment to others; 
disregarded organisational policies or purposefully sabotaged the safety 
efforts of the organisation, did not easily fit within the existing decision-
making models used in the outdoors ( e.g., Boyes, 2000; Priest, 1988). This 
meant that a new approach to outdoor decision-making should be formulated 
in order to encompass these findings. Using theories from the field of 
cognitive psychology I have suggested a new model for outdoor education 
decision-making which I have termed the Likelihood-To-Think (LTT) 
model (Figures 65-67). The LTT model takes into account the abilities and 
level of involvement of the decision-maker, their personal beliefs, and the 
social and other environmental factors in which they operate. It is also 
consistent with naturalistic decision-making theory which is applicable in 
complex, time-dependent situations. Early indications are that this model is 
useful in order to consider the decision processes undertaken by outdoor 
education instructors. It helps to explain how the root causes are generated 
and how they become relevant in an outdoor education incident (Figure 61 ). 
8.5 Limitations 
From the outset this study had inherent challenges and limitations. Anyone setting 
out to study outdoor education incidents, especially ones that resulted in serious 
injury, or had the potential to do so, should expect to experience difficulty in 
accessing data, and the possibility of bias appearing in those data. This study was 
no exception! 
In attempting to create a profile of outdoor education incidents which had 
occurred in New Zealand I received agreement from 12 of the larger outdoor 
education centres to participate from among the 25 that were identified. This 
sample is small compared to the estimated 800 providers of outdoor education 
services in New Zealand. 
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Of the 1908 incidents that were recorded from those participating organisations, I 
carried out in-depth analysis of 18 case studies. These 18 were all serious 
incidents. With a serious incident, getting agreement from the organisation 
involved to participate, and then agreement from the instructor involved, was a 
lengthy process. Each instructor had been through a stressful and emotional 
experience at the time of the incident, and it was recognised that bias could be 
introduced into their accounts of the incidents by wrongly interpreting key 
information at the time of the incident, forgetting key information in their retelling 
of the incident, or even omitting or altering information in their retelling in order 
to look better in the eyes of any reader of the account. The fact that all 
participation was voluntary and that a reasonable period of time had passed since 
the incident (one to five years) was hoped would act to minimise these biases. No 
patterns of non-participation by either the organisations or the instructors 
contacted were identified that could have resulted in bias. 
A Delphi technique using a number of outdoor experts was used to identify the 
root causes of the incidents being case-studied. My subjective input as researcher 
in deciding on the relevance of certain expert comments, and categorising those 
comments, could have biased the outcome. However the various iterations of the 
Delphi process and the fact that the resultant taxonomy of error and model of an 
outdoor education incident were given to the Delphi members for comment, 
helped ensure the validity of these results. 
The final taxonomy of error and model of an outdoor education incident presented 
in this study are based on the analysis of empirical data from only 18 case studies 
and a literature review across several disciplines. It is up to the reader to decide 
how applicable these results are to the wider outdoor education sector. 
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8.6 Recommendations and Suggestions for Further Research 
As a result of this research a number of recommendations and practical 
implications for the outdoor education sector arose, along with areas that require 
further research. All of these are beyond the objective of this research but should 
be noted here. 
8.6.J Need for a National Incident Database 
What became apparent throughout this study, especially when reviewing outdoor 
education literature in Chapter 4 and developing a profile of outdoor education 
incidents in Chapter 5, was the lack of reliable data on outdoor education 
incidents in New Zealand. What is required is a nationally coordinated system 
whereby outdoor education providers can input their incident data in a 
confidential manner, receive reports from their individual data but also receive 
information from the entire database about trends and incident rates. In this way 
the information that is being recorded can be consistent and useful for further 
research. 
At a national level the information from this database could provide more 
sophisticated and comprehensive data which may support the finding of this study 
that accident rates are at or below levels accepted in other aspects of life. 
A call for the creation of a National Incident Database for the outdoor education 
sector was made, based on these research findings, at the Risk 2002 Conference. 
This was a national conference organised for outdoor education managers, 
instructors and researchers sponsored by Sport and Recreation New Zealand, 
Water Safety New Zealand and the Sport Fitness and Recreation Industry Training 
Organisation. The result of this call was the development of a web-based database 
recording system for the sector, driven by a consortium of outdoor organisations 
but led by the New Zealand Mountain Safety Council and supported by Outdoors 
New Zealand. A version of this has recently (early 2005) been trialed before 
release throughout New Zealand. 
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8.6.2 Implications of the Taxonomy of Error for Outdoor Education Safety and 
Training Efforts 
It is worth noting briefly here the implications of the findings of this research for 
the training of outdoor education instructors. 
One of the criticisms of taxonomies of error is the, " ... extent to which a taxonomy 
is useful only for analysis of errors after the event; while it is valuable for research 
and theory building, it cannot be used to predict the imminent occurrence of 
errors" (Senders & Moray, 1991, p.51 ). While there may be some truth in this, the 
taxonomy presented here points to efforts that can be made to prevent incidents 
occumng. 
The first action that senior managers in any organisation can take is to audit their 
safety management system to ensure it is robust in all of the areas identified as 
potential weaknesses in Figure 60. From this a priority list can be established from 
identified weaknesses and a timeline documented in which to deal with each issue. 
The timeline would need to be cognisant of the individual organisation's resource 
limitations. Wherever possible priority needs to be given to those aspects of the 
safety management system that have greater elements of control over the front-
line management who are the final arbiters of safety. These include: the setting 
and documentation of organisational policy that will clearly show the 
organisation's level of acceptable risk for various activities; the monitoring of 
instructional staff in the field to ensure their management of risk is aligned with 
the organisation's expectations; the systems to monitor the correct match of 
instructors to tasks - both on a programme-to-programme basis and on a day-to-
day basis; and, the staff training systems to 'upskill' instructional staff in any 
deficiencies uncovered during the earlier monitoring process. 
For those involved in the training of instructional staff in particular, whether that 
be on-job training within an organisation, or off-job training through a polytechnic 
or other training provider, the list of root causes leading to poor performance or 
judgment should be a guide to curriculum development. Most instructor training 
programmes involve elements of risk management training, often based around 
Towards Understanding the Root Causes of Outdoor Education Incidents p.385 
the hard skills of various activities. This risk management training is often 
structured on the concepts of identifying hazards, finding ways to manage these 
hazards and deciding if the final risk is acceptable. What this research has 
established is that the most common root cause of serious outdoor incidents is 
accepting higher levels of risk than required for the educational outcomes of the 
activity, due to subtle pressures on the instructor to take these higher risks. The 
second and third most common root causes are poor assessment of the risk present 
and poor situational awareness. Training in all of these points is therefore critical 
to preventing incidents in the future and rather than restricting this training to a 
one-off risk management session, is probably best done in an holistic manner 
across all aspects of the course. 
While not new, the importance of what could be called 'judgment training' is 
starting to be highlighted through the outdoor education literature. Writers 
understand the limitations of training judgment skills through paper-based theory 
sessions and are suggesting more practical approaches. Priest & Gass ( 1997) 
prescribe training through case studies, horror stories of other leaders, self-
analysis of personal mistakes and feedback from experts who observe trainee 
instructors in the field; Ewert & Galloway (2002) prescribe the use of interactive 
video simulation to mimic field experiences in the development of situational 
awareness, assessment and judgment; and, Garrett (2003) describes an instructor 
training curriculum used by Outward Bound USA based on intensive use of case 
study, analyses and discussion. 
Based on the results of this research, I would endorse the approach of using the 
analysis of well-presented case studies (perhaps using the incident analysis 
approach outlined in Section 8.5.5) to introduce the concepts of situational 
awareness, risk assessment and the root causes of poor judgment and 
performance. The classroom-based exercises would then be reinforced throughout 
a longer training programme by continued exercises to test trainee's situational 
awareness and risk assessment, and their understanding of various subtle 
pressures to accept higher levels of risk. Feedback to those trainees in supervised 
leadership roles would be an important part of their training programme. 
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Based on the discussion above, the taxonomy not only gives a list of the root 
causes of outdoor education incidents, it also points towards training methods to 
put in place once those root causes have been identified following any incident. 
Possible corrective training methods are shown in Table 26 
Table 26 
Possible Corrective Training Methods for Instructors Once the Root Causes of 
Outdoor Education Incidents have been Identified 
Root Cause(s) 
1 - 6 Overload Conditions 
7 - 8 Poor Concentration 
10 - 12 Poor Judgment 
• Poor situational awareness 
• Inaccurate assessment of risk 
• Snap decisions without 
considering options 
13 Poor Judgment 
• Poor processing of past 
experiences 
14-16 Failing to Meet Judgment 
Responsibilities 
1 7 - 18 Misdirected Motivation / 
Attitude 
Management System Errors 
1 - 19 
Trainin2 Method 
• The instructor being placed in overload 
conditions may be more due to poor safety 
management systems, or the poor 
implementation of those systems by 
management. 
• Monitoring / observation of staff in the 
field and around base facilities is the only 
method to gauge if overload is occurring. 
• Training and testing in organisational 
systems 
• Monitoring / observation & feedback 
• Training in the theory of good judgment 
and biases that can enter the judgment 
process 
• Case study analysis 
• Co-instruction with experienced peer 
• Monitoring / observation & feedback 
• Use of a journal in which an instructor 
notes cues and their decisions based on 
cues. These to be reviewed by an 
experienced mentor. 
• Structured analysis of those past 
experiences with a respected peer 
involved. 
• Review of organisational safety 
philosophies 
• Structured analysis of past experiences 
with a respected peer involved 
• Monitoring I observation and feedback 
• Review of organisational safety 
philosophies 
• Interviews to establish alignment of 
personal to organisational values 
• Monitoring / observation and feedback 
• Cease employment if alignment in values 
can not be reached. 
• Not a training issue. Review specific 
elements of the management system, 
involvine: all levels of staff where oossible 
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8. 6.3 Considerations of a Hierarchy of Importance of the Root Causes of Error 
The proposed taxonomy of error for the outdoor education sector shown in Figure 
60 identifies 37 types of root cause and many more tokens of those types. Subsets 
of these root causes have been shown, through the analysis of 18 real-life 
incidents in Chapter 6, to come together throughout the chronology of an incident 
in a seemingly random manner, to create accident potential. Whether an accident 
actually occurs once the accident potential has developed, and the seriousness of 
any injuries that result, seems to be a matter of chance. The question arises then: 
are any of the root causes more important than others in increasing potential for an 
accident? 
The answer to this question will require further research, although I believe there 
is preliminary evidence in Chapter 6 and also that there are logical arguments to 
support such a hierarchy. 
As already discussed in Section 4.3.2, front-line managers (in this case the 
instructors) are critical to safety performance. Their decisions and actions can 
further exacerbate the adverse effects of poor decisions by senior management or 
even cause good decisions to have bad effects. Their competence and judgment 
can mitigate poor situations in which they find themselves, and lack of good 
judgment and competence can lead to bad outcomes even in seemingly benign 
situations. For this reason, a good case can be made for placing all of the root 
causes due to failures in the safety management system below all of the errors 
leading to poor judgment or performance of the instructor. 
If the argument to place instructor errors ahead of safety management system 
errors in the hierarchy is accepted, then it also makes sense to prioritise those 
elements of the safety management system that focus on: 
1. Organisational safety philosophies - these will dictate the type of staff that 
are sought; 
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2. Staff recruitment - if the criteria for selection is comprehensive and 
screening of staff against those criteria are robust, then the right people 
making competent decisions will be with groups in the field. 
3. Staff induction and staff training- this provides further checks of 
competence and allows for alignment of new staff to organisational values. 
4. Monitoring of instructor performance - this helps ensure that the person is 
competent and making good decisions. 
5. Policies and standards of operation - these set limits in which the staff 
member should operate. 
Focussing purely on the root causes leading to instructor error also points towards 
a hierarchy of importance for these root causes. As already discussed in Section 
6.4.5.2., the most prevalent root causes of instructor error that lead to serious 
incidents are: the choice to accept higher levels of risk than required to meet 
programme goals; and, the misapplication of existing skills. 
It seems sensible that those people who are willing to take higher levels of risk are 
more likely to produce the potential for an accident than those who are 
conservative. While it could be argued that higher risk could be mitigated by 
higher levels of skill and experience, my argument would be that these skills are 
taken into account when estimating the level of risk present. I believe a person 
who has a lower level of skill and experience, who is aware of his / her lower 
level of skill, and operates at a conservative level of risk because of this, is less 
likely to have an incident than someone who is highly skilled and experienced 
who purposefully seeks situations containing higher levels of risk. 
Using the same argument, I believe that the need for good judgment surpasses 
skills in the hierarchy. Correctly assessing the situation, the risk and then making 
a good decision is critical to the safety of the group and more important than 
actual skill level. This is also supported in the empirical evidence with the root 
causes attributed to poor judgment being identified as contributory in the 
following number of incidents: "Poor situational awareness" (7); "Poor risk 
assessment" ( 12). 
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It could also be argued that deficiencies in skills and experience, if known, are not 
as likely to lead to an incident as believing you have those skills and experience 
and then misapplying them. Once again the empirical evidence supports this 
contention at an intuitive level in that more incidents were identified as having 
misapplication of skills and experience as a root cause ( 13) than simply lacking 
the necessary skills and experience (9). Although this difference may not be 
statistically significant due to small sample size, it does indicate the need for 
further research. 
This leads me to propose the hierarchy of root causes leading to increased incident 
potential shown in Figure 69. 





ROOT CAUSES LEADING TO POOR INSTRUCTOR 
PERFORMANCE OR JUDGMENT 
• Misdirected motivation/attitude 
• Failing to meetjudgment responsibilities 
• Poor judgment 
• Misapplication of skills 
• Overload (including lack of skills) 
• Lack of concentration 
ROOT CAUSES LEADING TO POOR PERFORMANCE OR 
JUDGMENT IN SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
ROOT CAUSES IN THE SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM 
• Poor organisational safety philosophy, etc 
• Poor staff recruitment systems 
• Poor staff induction systems 
• Poor staff training systems 
• Poor staff monitoring and appraisal systems 
• Poor policies and guidelines 
• Other 
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As explained above, this hierarchy is based on the premise that errors in instructor 
performance or judgment are necessary and sufficient to create an incident, while 
errors made by either senior management in the design or implementation of the 
safety management system, or the safety management system itself, are generally 
necessary but not sufficient. This assumes that an instructor is supervising the 
group in situations where hazards exist. If no supervision is occurring then the 
only safeguards are those put in place by the safety management system. 
One outcome of this proposed hierarchy is that instructor-related errors are more 
important than errors in the safety management system in that the impact of 
instructor errors are immediate and override other control mechanisms. Even 
though the safety management systems document the systems by which staff are 
employed, trained, monitored and other standards of operation, and therefore 
could be construed as more important, an error by front-line management can 
undo all of this work in seconds. Front-line staff are therefore the most important 
element of an outdoor education safety system. This is not unexpected. For as 
long as outdoor education has existed, it has been understood intuitively that 
having staff with sound judgment and good skills in the field with groups is a 
better way of managing safety than any number of manuals in the office outlining 
safety systems. This is counter to contemporary practice where the HSE Act 
places emphasis on documented systems as a way to ensure safe workplaces. The 
management of outdoor education centres must ensure that both the appropriate 
documentation is in place recording the safety management system, and also that 
their front line managers are being monitored and 'upskilled' on an on-going basis 
as part of the implementation of those systems. 
8.6.4 Is Judgment a Transferable Skill? 
Most outdoor education instructors are employed to provide safe educational 
experiences across a spectrum of activities and settings. It is very rare for 
instructors to be able to specialise in a particular activity as a full time occupation. 
Two questions arise from this observation: 
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• Are incidents more ( or less) apparent when instructors are working in their 
less proficient activities? 
• What is the most appropriate training for instructors working in multiple 
disciplines? 
The first of these questions has been partially addressed in Chapters 5 and 6. 
While the data collected for this study did not allow the question to be considered 
in detail in Chapter 5, there is some indication through the analysis of the root 
causes of a number of serious incidents in Chapter 6 that both, being relatively 
new to an activity and being very experienced in an activity, can increase the 
potential for incidents. Those new to an activity will have less skills and 
experience to bring to bear in their instructional sessions to manage any hazards 
that exist. They are also likely to be less experienced at identifying cues in any 
situation that would indicate hazards being present and assessing the risk posed 
from those hazards. A tendency to defer to others for judgments would have to be 
guarded against. On the other hand very experienced instructors can also be 
remiss in their judgment. Over-familiarity with activities can cause a reduction in 
the search for cues to emerging hazards, and the successful completion of similar 
activities in the past can also lead to a lowered assessment of the risk in those 
activities. As stated earlier, further research into both of these categories of 
instructor experience and any correlation with incident rates is required. 
What was not addressed in Chapters 5 and 6 was the issue of the transfer of 
judgment skills. If an instructor is skilled and experienced in one particular 
activity, and has a record of good judgment while supervising that activity as 
evidenced by a good safety record, can that sound judgment be transferred to 
activities where the instructor has less skills and experience? The taxonomy of 
root causes of outdoor education incidents implies that judgment is a separate skill 
set to the activity skills and therefore can be learnt and transferred. Intuitively it 
would be expected that an experienced instructor supervising a new activity would 
manage the risk better than a new instructor in that activity. This is because the 
experienced instructor is better at judgment skills and situational awareness, risk 
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assessment and decision making. Further research is required to investigate 
whether or not this can be supported. 
8.6.5 A Suggested Approach to Incident Analysis 
p.392 
My experience of using a Delphi technique and ECFA diagrams to analyse 
outdoor incidents for root causes was that the results were highly useful and valid. 
I have considered ways in which this approach might be adapted within a practical 
outdoor education setting so that root causes can be established following any 
incident. Once established the root causes can be used as the basis to design 
training sessions for staff and to correct inadequacies in the safety management 
system to prevent further incidents. I have experimented with the following 
procedure and found it to produce excellent results: 
• Begin the incident investigation as soon as practical after the crisis is over, 
and once all parts of the organisational crisis plan and post-crisis procedures 
have been completed ( or are under way). 
• Obtain written narratives of the incident from as many eye-witnesses as 
possible. 
• Gather a pool of 'experts' from inside the organisation and outside if 
warranted. These experts should provide a cross-section of organisational 
input: including instruction, management, operations, etc. Anyone whose 
role impacted the chain of events of the incident should be invited to 
contribute. 
• Using "Post-it" notes and a big white board, allow the group of experts to 
construct a chronology of events for the incident. This will take into account 
the eye-witness testimony but will also include events involving 
management, maintenance, etc. that may have been important in the chain of 
events leading to the incident. Give people time to consider this list and give 
them the opportunity to come back to it on their own over several hours to 
add or suggest changes to it. In this way all people should feel able to 
contribute. 
• Once the event sequence has reached a level of stability, invite contributions 
from the experts to what the immediate causes of the incident were. One 
structure to use here is to think in terms of the categories of people, 
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environment and resources. Link these immediate causes to the event 
sequence on the white board with arrows. Again allow time for people to 
consider and make alterations. 
• The final stage is to look through the partially complete diagram to establish 
what the root causes were that led to the creation of the immediate causes 
and any instructor judgments or actions that were critical to the causal 
pathway. The taxonomy of error produced in this thesis will assist in this 
process. 
• Once root causes have been established, the group can recommend 
corrective actions to improve safety management systems, and identify 
training needs for the instructional staff. 
My experience of this process is that it is inclusive and empowering for all 
involved. The needs of any individuals who are identified in this process as 
having made errors should be handled with sensitivity. The completed ECF A 
diagram, or selected parts of it, can be used as a learning tool with the entire staff 
if permission is sought from those individuals most affected by the analysis. 
8.6.6 Suggestions for Further Research 
This study has revealed a number of areas where further research would advance 
knowledge in the outdoor education field. These include investigating: 
• The relationship between the level of supervision and incident rates. 
• The relationship between activity type and incident rate taking into account 
participation rates. 
• The relationship between gender of instructor and incident rates. 
• The relationship between time of day and incident rates. 
• The relationship between level of instructor experience and incident rates. 
• Overall incident rates ( and the subcategory of accident rates) compared with 
other commonly accepted activities in New Zealand. 
• The frequency of occurrence of the each identified root cause over a number 
of incidents from the outdoor education sector. 
• Whether any hierarchy of root causes can be justified in terms of targeting 
efforts in reducing incident occurrence. 
Chapter Eight - Summary, Recommendations and Conclusion 
• Whether the proposed L TT decision-making is valid for the outdoor 
education sector. 
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• Whether the skills of judgment are transferable from an instructor skilled in 
one activity to other activities. 
8. 7 Conclusion 
This study had the objective of constructing a model of an outdoor education 
incident that increased the understanding of the root causes leading to those 
incidents occurring. I believe that objective has been achieved and the outdoor 
education sector has gained new knowledge through the process of achieving the 
objective. 
I have suggested a new model of outdoor education incident causation in Figure 
61 (simplified version shown as Figure 62) that provides a much greater depth of 
knowledge of the underlying processes of incident causation than has existed 
previously. This is supported by a taxonomy of the root causes of error for 
outdoor education incidents (Figure 60) that categorises error as being due to 
either root causes leading to poor performance or judgment, or inadequacies in the 
organisation's safety management system. This binary categorisation system has 
not been used in the outdoor education sector previously and adds clarity to the 
identification of root causes of incidents. Both the incident causation model and 
the taxonomy of error have received support from a panel of outdoor experts from 
throughout New Zealand. 
One of the more interesting findings to come from this research is that the most 
common forms of instructor error leading to serious incidents were: ( 1) choosing 
to take higher levels of risk than needed to achieve programme goals; and, (2) the 
misapplication of existing skills. These findings were counter to existing 
perceptions in the sector that instructor error is primarily due to poor judgment or 
the lack of skills and experience. 
The taxonomy of error that was produced signaled that a revision of current 
outdoor adventure decision-making models was needed in order to incorporate 
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this new knowledge. My belief is that the proposed Likelihood-To-Think model 
(Figures 65-67) will give greater understanding to practical decision-making in 
the outdoors, and the role of biases entering that process that can lead to incidents 
occumng. 
Practical applications have been suggested in this research. One of these is a 
suggested process, based on the Delphi process that worked so effectively in this 
study, that will help outdoor education organisations to analyse any incident for 
root causes. An analysis such as this will help put in place improvements to safety 
management systems that will aid in preventing further similar incidents. There 
are also practical suggestions on how to focus training efforts in order to reduce 
possible instructor error. 
In addition to this however, the research has presented important findings about 
accident rates that support and justify the continued use of outdoor education with 
young New Zealanders and show that we are as good at managing risk in New 
Zealand as our counterparts in the USA and Britain. 
Finally, a number of suggestions for further research have been made that will 
further increase the collective knowledge in the outdoor education sector as to 
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Appendix One 
A detailed comparison of a range of outdoor education providers in New Zealand 
Outdoor Objective Activities Staff Participant Participant 
Education and sites Numbers Days 
Example 
Voluntary- Developing young • Can involve any Any supervision Approximately Approximately 
Award focused: people. The expedition outdoor activity must be organized 15,000 participating 16,000 per year. 
The Young New section of the award has such as tramping, by the participants. each year, but it is 
Zealanders' the goals of organizing, mountaineering, All practice and difficult to know 
Challenge planning and training in canoeing, qualifying ventures how many carry out 
(Formerly known order to carry out a kayaking, caving, must be supervised the expedition 
as the Duke of venture in an unfamiliar sailing, etc. by an experienced section. A 
Edinburgh's environment requiring • Can take place and responsible conservative 
Award) teamwork, self-reliance, anywhere in New adult who may in estimate can be 
determination and Zealand certain based on how many 
Programme cooperation. There is circumstances finish the award 
began in 1963. also a focus on accompany the each year. 1,500 
developing an awareness group. The Bronze Award with 
Information of the environment and experienced and a minimum of 6 
supplied by importance of protecting responsible adult days on expedition 
Naresh (2004) it. must be satisfied the section; 600 Silver 
participants are fully Award with a 
trained and properly minimum of 8 days 
equipped to on expedition 
undertake the section; 200 Gold 
venture. Award with a 
minimum of 11 days 
on expedition 
section. 
Uniformed The mission of World • Camping, All volunteer Scout Approximately Approximately 
Youth Group: Scouting is to contribute tramping, leaders come from 18,000 young 90,000 
Scouting NZ to the education of confidence volunteers within people enrolled in participant days 
young people, through a courses, local communities. Scouting each year per year 
Programme value system based on orienteering, doing outdoor 
began in 1908. the Scout Promise and conservation activities. Each 
Law, to help build a projects, nature Scout is likely to 
Information better world where trails, water carry out a 
supplied by people are self-fulfilled activities and minimum of 5 days 
Knighton (2004) as individuals and play a other specialised of outdoor activities 
constructive role in outdoor pursuits per year. 
society. • Can take place 
anywhere in NZ 
Outdoor Developing people's • Tramping, Approximately 34 Approximately Approximately 
Education potential through: kayaking, full time equivalent 6,600 participants 26,000 
Centre • Challenging outdoor canoeing, caving, staff of which 18 are per year. Over half participant days 
operating as a adventures skiing, instructional. are secondary school per year. 
Private Training • Environmental mountaineering, students on five day 
Establishment: education rock climbing, programmes. The 
The Sir Edmund • Fun and support ropes courses, sea remainder are made 
Hillary Outdoor - kayaking and up of adults on skills 
Pursuits Centre of other activities. programmes, adults 
New Zealand. • Most activities on outdoor 
are based in and leadership 
Programmes around the programmes, 
began in 1973. mountains, bush contract OE courses 
and rivers of the and corporate 
Information Central North training 
supplied by Smith Island, but some programmes. 
(2004) courses are run 
throucliout NZ. 
Youth Sail To offer equal • Sailing and I O full time sea staff, Approximately 5500 Approximately 
Training: opportunity to young some tramping 5 on for 10 days and participants 13,750 
The Spirit of New Zealanders to and beach I O days stand down annually. 1200 participant days 
Adventure Trust develop qua Ii ties of activities. rotating , 8 shore 15/ 19 year olds do per year. 
leadership ,independence • Carried out staff and I part the I O day youth 
Programmes and community spirit around the coast time. development 
began in 1973 through the medium of and coastal islands voyage, 320 the 5 
the sea. of New Zealand In addition there are day Spirit Trophy 
Information 3 cadets full time voyage for 13/ 14 
supplied by Lister unpaid: 2 on I off year olds, 30 on the 
(2004) and aoorox 1200 disabled vovae:e and 
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volunteer's nation about 3500 people 
wide who pay for sai I on our 25 day or 
their training, part day or evening 
uniforms and travel public sailings. 
to and from the 
ship's side. 
Adult Personal Vision: • Sailing, Approximately 49 Approximately I 065 Approximately 
Development The Outward Bound kayaking, (both staff, 22 of whom students do 21 day 25,205 
Centre: Trust of New Zealand, white water and are instructional courses annually and participant days 
Outward Bound through its vision has set sea), map and 355 do 8 day per year. 
NZ itself the following goal compass, courses. Those on 
- Helping to develop journeys, rock specially designed 
Programmes better people, better climbing, high courses are not 
began in 1963 communities and a better ropes, creative counted. 
world. days, drama, 
Information Mission: painting, music, 
supplied by The Mission of the service schemes, 
Taylor (2004) Outward Bound Trust of solo reflection, 
New Zealand sets out experiential team 
how this vision will be building activities. 
achieved - Outward • Activities are 
Bound NZ is a charitable run in and around 
trust inspiring personal the Marlborough 
and social development Sounds 
through value based 
experiential learning in 
an outdoor environment. 
Polytech To provide leadership • Tramping, 12.5 Full time 150 students on Approximately 
Vocational and scholarship in mountain biking, equivalent staff. Certificate, Diploma 15,400 
Training: outdoor education and orienteering, and Degree courses. participant days 
Christchurch adventure recreation in sailing, surfing, per year. 
Polytech Institute order to enrich rafting, skiing, 
of Technology individuals and society; snowboarding, 
and to contribute to the kayaking, rock 
Programmes sustainability of the climbing. 
began in 1994 natural environment. • Activities are 
Leaming opportunities run in Otago, 
Information will be provided in a Canterbury, West 
supplied by supportive, holistic and Coast, Nelson, 
Bailey (2004) challenging environment Marlborough and 
to inspire students to MtArapiles 
perform at the highest (Australia). 
practical and academic 
level. 
School In this unique and • kayak, rock, 12 full time staff, I 0 128 students take Approximately 
Residential OE challenging sail, tramping, of these are place each year. 10,240 
Programme: environment, through the caving, solo, instructional. This is a compulsory participant days 
Tihoi Venture medium of community alpine skills, component of school per year. 
School living, a quality survival. life for year I 0 
academic programme • Activities are students at St Paul's 
Programmes and wide ranging run in the central Collegiate Hamilton. 
began in 1979 outdoor pursuits we aim North Island. All students spend 
to provide the best five months at Tihoi. 
Information possible opportunities to Each student gets 
supplied by promote the personal and approximately 80 
Firminger (2004) social development of days of OE during 
our students. their time there. 
School OE To teach students the • Fishing, Two specialist OE Approx 453 students Approximately 
Programme: skills of goal setting, tramping, teachers who also take part each year. 4,280 participant 
Nelson College communication, team bushcraft, teach other subjects. A sequential OE days per year. 
work and environmental adventure games, Rely on other programme is 
Programmes awareness while taking enviro studies, teachers and some offered through the 
began in 1964. part in outdoor pursuits mountain biking, contractors to run school: Year 7 -
School built a in New Zealand's farm visits, open the programmes compulsory five day 
lodge in 1966. outdoors. fire cooking, camp; Year 8 -
overnight camps, compulsory five day 
Information sea kayaking, camp; Year 9 - no 
supplied by Cant snorkeling, rock OE; Year 10-
(2004) climbing, white compulsory five day 
water kayaking. camp; Year 11 -
• Activities are optional 7 day 
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run in the expedition; Year 12 
mountain ranges, - full year Level 2 
rivers, bush and NCEA OE subject; 
sea of the greater Year 13 - full year 
Nelson area. Level 3 NCEA OE 
subject. Also Fish 
and Game course, 
International student 
induction, ski trips, 
indoor rock 
climbing team and a 
leadership 
programme. 
Community Personal development, • Adventure based Four full time staff Approximately 2100 Approximately 
Programme: recreation skills, training learning, and the remaining participants per year 8,000 participant 
New Plymouth and qualifications - We kayaking, rock programmes are run in programmes such days per year. 
YMCA build strong kids, strong climbing, by contractors as Conservation 
families, strong abseiling, Corps, Specialist 
Programmes communities. gym/swim, youth services, 
began in 2000 Me whakahangaia tramping, team school contracts, etc. 
hangaia e matou, i nga building games, 
Information tamariki, i nga whanau, i caving, high/low 
supplied by nga hapori e ropes course, 
McKee (2004) orienteering, 
navigation. 
• Activities are 





The Computer Assisted Interview (CAI) 
1) Introduction: 
Hello and thank you for agreeing to take part in this study of outdoor education incidents. 
Along with this disc you should have received some paperwork. The paperwork contains 
an overview of the research and what the objective is, explaining who to contact if you 
have any further questions. There is also a consent form that should be completed and 
mailed back with this disc. 
It is important to remember that participation in this research is voluntary and all names, 
place names and dates will be removed in any analysis to ensure anonymity. 
2) Free time: 
Before completing this computer interview, please make sure that you have set aside 
enough time so that you can complete it undisturbed. Depending on how complex the 
incident involved was, this may take an hour or more to complete. An evening after 
dinner would be a good time to complete this. If you haven't got the time now, that's fine, 
simply close down and come back to it when you have more time. 
Also make sure that you are feeling relaxed and in a state of mind where you are OK 
about revisiting the incident. If you are not relaxed about this then leave it and come back 
to this interview when you are. 
3) Just what happened: 
During the following interview, you will be asked a number of questions about an 
incident you were involved in that you completed an incident report for in your 
organisation at the time. In answering the questions, try to stick to exactly what happened 
at the time and what you were thinking or feeling at the time that led you to make certain 
decisions. The natural tendency, when reviewing a critical incident some time after it has 
happened, is to include some details that in retrospect you would have liked to have done, 
and omit others that in hindsight you wouldn't do again. I would like you to try to avoid 
this and only include what actually happened. Remember, the point of this research is not 
to look for blame or to criticise, it is to look at what happens before and during incidents 
in the hope of finding patterns that will help others avoid those similar traps in the future. 
4) Critical Incident: The incident that I would like you to reflect on is 
Brief incident description here: 
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5) Setting the scene: 
This incident probably took place at least two years ago. I want you to cast your mind 
back to that time. Remember as much as you can about what was happening for you that 
month, week and then day ..... 
Could you now write down as accurately as you can remember, what the background was 
for you going into that activity. Some cues to help ... 
How were you feeling? 
How did this activity fit into the programme? 
Had you done this activity many times before? 
What was the group like? 
Were you looking forward to this activity? 
What were you hoping to get out of the activity? 
Were there any particular issues you had on your mind? 
Were there any time constraints? 
What was the weather like? 
What was your equipment/resources like? 
Your thoughts on the background here .... 
6) The Incident: 
Write a narrative of the incident as it happened through your eyes. Start at whatever point 
in the activity you think is appropriate and finish at the time when control has been re-
established. 
Your narrative here .... 
7) Incident Timeline: 
Now put together a simple timeline of the event, as accurately as you can, by building a 
list of approximate times with key events that were happening. 
Your timeline here .... 
8) Decision Point Identification: 
With the benefit of hindsight, can you identify points on the time line at which key 
decisions were made that influenced the outcome in this case? Work backwards through 
your timeline and list the decision points, and for each decision point: 
What decision you made at the time 
What you were trying to do in making that decision 
What information you had that led you to make the decision 
What you would do differently, if anything, at that decision point given the 
benefit of hindsight? 
What other information\skills could you have had at the time that would have 
helped make the decision you would make given the benefit of hindsight? 
List your decision points here .... 
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9) Other Comments: 
If you have any other comments you want to make about the incident in general that you 
haven't had the opportunity to do so already, then please do so here .... 
10) Where to now: 
I will analyse this incident, along with many others to establish what might be the root 
causes of the incident to see if there are any trends that can help prevent similar incidents 
occurring in the future. As part of my research, some of the incidents will be studied 
further to see if more, or different, information emerges about the incident. Are you 
willing to participate in an: 
Email analysis - your incident will be converted into a diagram showing possible 
causal factors leading to the incident. This will be sent to you and a number of 
experts by email to get further input on what are believed to be causal factors. 
Remember that no names, place names or dates will be used and none of the 
experts, or you, will know who the others taking part are. 
ARE YOU WILLING TO PARTICPATE? 
Thank you again for all your help in my research. Once you have completed all the 
questions, please save the file on the disc and return it along with the completed and 
signed consent form to: 
Grant Davidson 
Outdoor Pursuits Centre of NZ 
Private Bag 3 7 
Turangi. 
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Appendix Three 
Instructions for Delphi Members 
Hi there 
Attached to this email is an incident file. The incident file contains a completed 
questionnaire from an instructor who was involved in an incident in the past that either 
resulted in, or could have resulted in, serious injury to one or more students in their care. 
The instructor has been asked to provide information as background to the incident, a 
narrative of the incident itself, a time line, and what, given the benefit of hindsight, they 
may have done differently. 
Some incidents may seem quite straight forward, others will be more complex. 
I want you to read through the information provided and decide, based on your 
experience as an outdoor instructor, two things: 1) conditions present that were pertinent 
to the incident occurring; and 2) what you believe are the root causes of the incident. It is 
likely that in each incident there will be more than one root cause that combined with 
others to lead to the incident occurring. Not all root causes will be linked to conditions so 
don't get hung up by this. 
Be careful not to confuse the prevailing conditions leading to the incident with the root 
causes. 
Conditions that are pertinent to the incident are likely to fall into three main areas -
people factors, equipment factors, environmental factors. Examples could be things like: 
The group were identified as at-risk students and had short concentration spans; or, the 
weather forecast indicated high winds would be present; or, their weren't enough large 
harnesses in the gear pool. I want you to think beneath this level to what caused those 
factors to be present - the root causes. To do this there may be clues in the incident file 
that point at what the root cause was, but alternatively you may have to make some 
subjective opinions based on your experience and what you "read between the lines". 
For example: Let us imagine an incident where a student is lead climbing under 
instruction. They fall, a piece of protection pulls out of the rock, and there is no other 
protection so they hit the ground breaking their leg. The conditions are the badly placed 
protection, lack of further protection, poor level of supervision by the instructor. I want 
you to be thinking about the root causes. Why was the student allowed on such a climb 
with poor rock? Or allowed to get so high with so little gear? Or allowed to climb on with 
poorly placed gear? Etc? Were there suitable management policies in place to prevent 
this? Was the training and skill level of the instructor suitable? Were they tired and/or 
distracted? Had they been observed running such a session by senior staff? Etc. 
Think as widely as you can about the root causes for the incident. Based on your 
experience in the outdoor sector you may even make guesses about causes that there is no 
direct evidence of in the incident report provided but seems intuitively "right" to you. 
This is completely valid and I welcome these thoughts being sent through. For any root 
cause you identify, I want you to decide whether there is any evidence in the incident file 
to support that finding or not. If there is, then quote the evidence along with the root 
cause. If there isn't, then state that it is a subjective decision. 
For example: 
Root cause 1: Instructor too tired to provide proper level of supervision for the climbing 
session. "I was feeling tired going into the course having just worked ten days in a row." 
UNIVERSITY OF WAiKA'fO 
LIBRARY 
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Root cause 2: I feel the instructor had a set of personal values that caused them to push 
their students to do things beyond their ability- subjective call. 
You will therefore be sending me a list of: 
1) Conditions present 
2) Root causes with evidence statements from the text 
3) Root causes based on our subjective opinion. 
I hope this makes sense to you. Just keep asking yourself - why did they make that 
decision? And, what did management have in place, or not have in place, that would have 
prevented this from occurring. 
When you believe you have discovered all of the root causes you believe led to the 
incident occurring, then send them to me. I will combine your results with those of other 
experts and send a diagram of the incident to you for a further round of feedback. 
If you have any questions at any stage, then please get in touch. I think this will all make 
more sense as you start studying the incidents and working through them. You will get 
faster at the process! 
Thanks again for your help. 
Grant 
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Appendix Four 
Instructions for Delphi Panel Members to Assist in Interpreting the ECF A Diagrams 
Hello 
I have now combined your incident analysis with that of several other outdoor experts -
the result is a diagrammatical representation of the incident in the attached file. I hope 
that reading the diagram is fairly intuitive - but let me guide you through it. 
1) The key events in the incident are outlined across the top of the diagram in a 
chronological fashion. These events are represented by rectangular boxes. If an event 
represents a critical judgment that the instructor made that, given a different decision 
could have resulted in no incident occurring, then this is represented by an octagon (stop 
sign). 
2) Conditions present that could be pertinent to the incident are represented by ovals. 
3) Root causes that are linked to why the instructor may have made certainjudgment 
decisions are shown as parallelograms. If these are confirmed by evidence statements in 
the narrative then they are solid, if they are subjective without evidence statements then 
they are shown dotted. 
4) Root causes that are linked to management practices are shown as rounded rectangles -
again either solid or dotted dependent on whether there is confirming evidence in the 
narrative. 
The diagram therefore moves chronologically across the page and moves deeper into the 
management of the organisation down the page. 
The diagram, as already stated, is the synthesis of everybody's thoughts. Some of you 
will have identified more conditions and root causes than others. Don't worry about this. 
Another point is that some of you may have identified an action/inaction/decision made 
by a student as a root cause. The analysis shown here assumes that the instructor has the 
responsibility of supervising the students and therefore student actions are not considered 
root causes, but can be conditions influencing the incident. 
What I would like you to do now is consider the diagram and decide whether you agree 
with the analysis. If there is anything included in the diagram you disagree with, then let 
me know with your reasons. If there is anything you think is missing, then please do the 
same. If you believe the diagram is a fair representation of the incident, then let me know 
this as well. 
I want to try to fit the incident analysis onto one page for ease of study - sometimes this 
may make them a little tight on the page - sorry! But better than running to more than one 
page I hope. 
Please note: LT A stands for Less Than Adequate. 
Thanks again. 
Grant 
